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I. ABSTRACT	
This	thesis	offers	an	explanation	for	why	urban	settlement	in	Somaliland’s	capital	city	of	Hargeisa	
is	segregated	along	clan	lines.	The	topic	of	urban	segregation	has	been	neglected	in	both	classic	
Somali	 studies,	 and	 recent	 studies	 of	 post-war	 state-building	 and	 governance	 in	 Somaliland.	
Such	negligence	of	urban	governance	in	debates	over	state-making	stems	from	a	predominant	
focus	on	national	and	regional	levels,	which	overlooks	the	institutions	governing	cities.	Yet	urban	
governance	can	provide	key	insights	into	the	nature	and	quality	of	interaction	between	people	
and	the	local	state,	and	the	processes	of	making	and	unmaking	of	Somali	urban	spaces.	Given	
the	rapid	urban	growth	in	the	Somali	populated	territories,	I	propose	a	shift	in	focus	to	explore	
city	 spaces,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 deepening	 understanding	 of	 Somali	 social,	 political	 and	 spatial	
organisation.	 In	 advancing	 this	 proposed	 shift,	 the	 thesis	 scrutinises	 the	 nexus	 between	
governance	and	segregation	 in	Hargeisa,	drawing	on	urban	ethnographic	methods,	 interview	
and	 archival	 sources.	 I	 argue	 that	 segregation	 in	 the	 city	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 spatial	
manifestation	of	governance	practices	across	colonial	and	postcolonial	periods,	in	intersection	
with	bottom	up	processes,	particularly	the	quest	for	security	and	peacebuilding	in	what	is	largely	
characterised	as	a	hybrid	order.		The	concept	of	hybrid	governance	–	while	capturing	important	
aspects	of	control	over	city	space	-	is	often	insufficiently	historicised	and	politicised	to	convey	
the	 complex	 intersection	 of	 state	 institutions,	 clan	 and	 sub-clan	 allegiance	 and	 traditional	
authorities.	My	analysis	thus	situates	recent	urban	governance	and	conflicts	over	land	in	a	longer	
history	 of	 municipal	 governance,	 urban	 land	 administration	 and	 conflict	 adjudication.	 This	
historical	 perspective	 is	 important	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 how	 segregation	 has	 been	
reproduced	 over	 time,	 and	 adds	 a	 new	 dimension	 to	 the	 understandings	 of	 the	 drivers	 and	
dynamics	of	Hargeisa’s	spatial	character.	
KEY	WORDS:	Urban,	Segregation,	State-building,	Governance,	Hybrid	(ity),	Customary,	and	Clan	
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CHAPTER	1 INTRODUCTION		
Somaliland	has	attracted	a	significant	research	interest	in	the	last	two	and	half	decades,	focused	
on	post-conflict	peace-building	and	the	‘hybridity’	of	state	institutions.	This	has	shed	important	
light	on	the	role	of	clan	elders	in	negotiating	a	place	within	the	state,	and	has	given	birth	to	a	
wider	debate	about	hybridity	in	African	state	institutions.	It	is,	however,	important	to	point	out	
that	the	debates	on	post-conflict	state	formation	in	Somaliland	over	emphasise	hybridity	as	a	
departure	 from	 the	 past,	 notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 trajectory	 of	 state	 building	 in	
Somaliland	shows	evidence	of	cyclical	reproduction	of	statutory	institutions	and	their	practices	
(Hoehne,	2009).	In	addition	to	this	over-elaboration	of	the	novelty	of	clan	authority	within	the	
state,	the	current	debates	over	hybrid-state	building	are	limited	in	several	ways.	Firstly,	these	
studies	are	aimed	at	the	national	or	semi-national	level,	largely	overlooking	urban	authority	and	
city	governance	[exceptions	include	Gandrup	(2014)	and	Hagmann	(2015)];	secondly,	they	focus	
on	 the	 intersection	 between	 the	 central	 state	 and	 peace-building,	 paying	 scant	 attention	 to	
everyday	institutional	practices	in	the	more	mundane	roles	of	regulating	and	delivering	services;	
and	thirdly,	they	neglect	the	nexus	between	clan-based	urban	segregation	and	governance.		
This	thesis,	which	is	focused	on	the	governance	of	Somaliland’s	capital	city	of	Hargeisa,	begins	
to	redress	these	limitations,	by	addressing	the	dearth	of	knowledge	about	post-conflict	urban	
authority	 and	 spatial	 form.	 The	 shift	 in	 focus	 from	 the	 national	 to	 the	 urban	 level	 is	
fundamentally	important	because	the	local	and	more	specifically	the	urban	is	the	site	where	the	
vast	majority	 of	 people	 “come	 into	 contact	with	 ‘the	 state’	 and	 this	 is	where	many	 of	 their	
images	 of	 the	 state	 are	 forged”(Gupta,	 1995,	 p.	 376).	Moreover,	 almost	 40%	 of	 the	 Somali	
population	now	live	in	cities,1	with	an	estimated	annual	growth	of	4.6%	between	2010-2015	(The	
World	Factbook,	2015b).	The	 trend	 is	expected	 to	 rise	 further	 sharply	as	 current	projections	
predict	urban	population	growth	of	270%	by	2050	–	See	table	1	below	(UN,	2014).	Related	to	
this,	 focussing	 on	 the	 city	 can	 enable	 us	 to	 examine	 the	 everyday	 practices	 and	 quality	 of	
interaction	between	the	people	and	the	local	state	more	closely	and	hence	gain	comprehensive	
analytical	 understanding	 of	 the	 politics	 and	 practices	 of	 governance	 in	 the	 post-conflict	
Somaliland	context	where	institutions	are	in	a	formative	or	reformative	state.		
																																								 																				
1	Urban	populations	in	Somalia	have	also	risen	by	125%	between	1990	to	2014	with	an	annual	rate	of	change	of	1.2.	
See	(UN,	2014).	
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Table	1:	Urban	and	rural	population,	urban	proportion	and	average	annual	rate	of	change	
SOMALIA:	URBAN	AND	RURAL	POPULATION,	PERCENTILE	PROPORTION	OF	URBAN	POPULATION,	
AND	AVERAGE	ANNUAL	RATE	OF	CHANGE		
	 Urban	 Rural	
Proportion	of	Urban	
(per	cent)	
Average	
annual	
rate	of	
change	
(per	cent)	
Year	 1990	 2014	 2050	 1990	 2014	 2050	 1990	 2014	 2050	 	
(in	thousands)	 1875	 4223	 15664	 4447	 6583	 11412	 30	 39	 58	 1.2	
Source:	(UN,	2014)	
In	this	thesis,	I	take	a	historical	approach	to	analyse	the	hitherto	unexplored	link	between	urban	
governance	and	segregation,	focusing	specifically	on	municipal	governance,	land	administration,	
and	conflict	adjudication.	This	historical	approach	is	important	because	it	can	shed	light	on	the	
roots	of	current	urban	segregation	and	can	explain	how	governance	practices	not	only	shaped	
but	also	reinforced	people’s	on-going	suspicion	of	the	state,	which	in	turn	contributed	to	the	
perpetuation	of	segregation	of	cities	in	Somaliland.		
The	thesis	provides	the	first	in-depth	analysis	of	Hargeisa	city	space.	I	examine	the	relationship	
between	urban	segregation	and	governance,	arguing	that	urban	segregation	is	partly	a	spatial	
manifestation	of	the	relationship	between	the	state	institutions	with	authority	over	city	space	
and	the	public.	Equally,	 I	argue	that	the	present	segregated	urban	form	in	Hargeisa	has	been	
cyclically	configured	and	reconfigured	over	time,	through	governance	practices	many	of	which	
create	a	continuum	between	episodes	of	colonial	and	postcolonial	civilian	and	military	rule.	The	
present	discussions	over	hybrid	governance	ignore	these	continuities,	as	their	major	focus	is	to	
point	 out	 the	 relative	 difference	 in	 peace	 and	 stability	 between	 Somaliland	 and	 the	 rest	 of	
Somalia.	 In	 the	process,	 Somaliland’s	 state	 institutions	are	 represented	as	an	 ideal	model	of	
governance	for	Somalis.	This	celebratory	approach	(over)	emphasises	the	key	mediating	roles	of	
‘traditional’	authorities,	such	as	the	clan	elders,	Akils,	and	Sultans2,	in	state-building	and	service	
provision,	and	implicitly	represents	their	involvement	as	a	new	phenomenon.	But	this	is	by	no	
means	new	or	unique.	In	fact,	customary	institutions	had	often	played	a	key	role	in	both	colonial	
and	 postcolonial	 administrations.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 go	 beyond	 existing	
																																								 																				
2	 Akils	 and	 Sultans	 are	 traditional	 authorities	 mainly	 found	 in	 Somaliland.	 The	 Sultans	 are	 higher	 in	
hierarchy	as	he	is	the	leader	of	a	larger	clan	conglomerate.	The	Akils	are	chiefs	who	are	often	involved	in	
the	day	today	governance	and	mediation	of	clan	politics.				
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debates	over	 'hybridity'	 to	understand	urban	 institutions	and	 their	 role	 in	 the	emergence	of	
Hargeisa’s	 spatial	 character.	 The	 specific	 conflicts	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis	 do	 not	 point	 to	
integrated/fused	local	state	institutions,	but	rather	to	plurality,	coexistence	and	contradiction.		
1.1 Why	Hargeisa?		
This	 study	 focuses	 on	 Hargeisa,	 Somaliland	 (See	 map	 of	 the	 city	 on	 page	 13)3,	 which	 is	 a	
particularly	interesting	site	for	a	study	of	urban	form	and	spatial	dynamics,	given	the	paucity	of	
existing	scholarship,	and	the	potential	 for	research	on	the	neglected	municipal	authorities	to	
contribute	 to	broader	debates	about	 state	hybridity	and	 institutional	pluralism,	as	well	as	 to	
debates	 over	African	 cities	 and	 segregation.	 The	 study	was	hosted	 and	 co-sponsored	by	 the	
Observatory	 of	 Conflict	 and	 Violence	 Prevention	 (OCVP),	 which	 is	 a	 non-profit	 institution	 in	
Hargeisa	established	in	2009	to	conduct	research	on	peacebuilding.	This	study	complements	and	
extends	the	OCVP’s	existing	research	on	post-conflict	governance,	conflict,	security,	and	justice.	
As	a	former	Hargeisa	resident	and	employee	of	OCVP,	the	research	has	benefited	from	the	fact	
that	my	professional,	social	and	personal	networks	are	concentrated	in	this	city.	An	important	
element	of	my	decision	to	focus	on	Hargeisa	also	relates	to	the	fact	that	it	is	Somaliland’s	biggest	
city	 in	both	 geographical	 and	population	 terms	 (though,	due	 to	 the	absence	of	 census	data,	
population	size	estimations	rely	on	good	guesses	based	on	triangulations	of	secondary	data	from	
various	sources).	The	International	Non-Governmental	Organisations	(INGOs),	United	Nations’	
agencies,	local	and	central	governments	use	working	figures	ranging	from	400	000	to	1200	000	
(The	World	Factbook,	2015a,	HM,	2010,	Demographia,	2016,	WPR,	2016).		
For	these	reasons,	the	making	and	un-making	of	urban	segregation	in	Hargeisa	is	of	particular	
significance.	The	city’s	distinctive	segregated	clan-based	spatial	form	dates	back	to	the	colonial	
period,	 when	 the	 administrative	 functions	 of	 the	 state	 were	 not	 in	 Hargeisa,	 but	 were	
concentrated	in	and	largely	limited	to	the	coastal	towns	of	Zeila,	Bulahar	and	Berbera	with	the	
latter	serving	as	the	seat	of	government	and	remaining	to	be	so	for	nearly	57	out	of	85	years	in	
which	Somaliland	was	part	of	the	British	Empire.	The	capital	was	moved	to	Hargeisa	in	1942	and	
it	became	the	seat	of	the	protectorate’s	government.	The	colonial	period	was	characterised	by	
an	 authoritarian	 governance	 of	 the	 city	 mediated	 by	 clan	 authorities.	 The	 importance	 of	
Hargeisa	both	in	administrative	and	economic	terms	declined	during	the	postcolonial	civil	and	
military	 period,	 when	 it	 was	 significantly	 overshadowed	 by	 Mogadishu,	 Somalia’s	 capital.	
																																								 																				
3	See	also	the	map	of	Somaliland	on	page	14.	
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Administratively,	 the	 colonial-era	 authoritarian	 governance	 of	 the	 city	 mediated	 by	 clan	
authorities	continued	to	shape	the	segregation	of	urban	space	in	Hargeisa.	In	instances	where	
the	authoritarian	government	was	able	to	create	an	environment	in	which	cosmopolitan	spaces	
emerged,	 these	 were	 then	 subsequently	 undone	 by	 the	 reintroduction	 of	 clan-based	 state	
politics,	which	by	implication	made	clan-	protection	essential.	Hargeisa	regained	its	importance	
in	the	region	when	Somaliland	reinstated	its	independence	unilaterally	from	the	rest	of	Somalia	
in	 1991,	 reclaiming	 its	 statehood	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 colonial	 administrative	 boundaries	
developed	over	a	period	of	85	years	under	British	colonial	rule.	During	this	period	segregation	
in	the	city	continued	along	the	same	clan-based	lines	primarily	because	of	the	state’s	inability	to	
guarantee	 the	 security	 of	 urban	 citizens.	 All	 of	 this	 makes	 it	 ideal	 to	 extend	 or	 question	
(celebratory)	 debates	 of	 hybrid	 peace-building	 by	 focusing	 on	 neglected	 city	 space	 and	
authority,	where	 subjects/citizens	 encounter	 the	 local	 state	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 and	where	 the	
manifestation	of	lack	of	trust	has	repeatedly	fostered	a	trend	towards	spatial	segregation.			
It	is	important	here	to	note	that	clan	identity	shapes	not	only	the	relationship	between	the	state	
and	 the	 public	 but	 it	 also	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 life	 of	 residents	 in	
Hargeisa.	 For	 instance,	 employment	 opportunities	 are	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 influenced	 by	
kinship.	 Justifications	 for	 this	 include	 that	 there	 are	 social	 expectations	which	 bind	 business	
owners,	shareholders	and	or	senior	officials	to	take	part	in	their	clan’s	economic	empowerment	
in	order	 to	benefit	 from	 its	protection.	Others	point	out	 that	businesses	 require	prospective	
employees	to	have	some	sort	of	a	guarantor	who	could	be	held	responsible	in	case	of	a	theft	
and	other	forms	of	misappropriation.	This	makes	the	employment	of	people	from	one’s	kinship	
networks	much	easier	to	trace	and	settle	cases.	Nonetheless,	the	focus	of	this	research	is	the	
intersection	 between	 urban	 governance	 and	 the	 formation	 and	 perpetuation	 of	 clan	 based	
segregation	in	the	city.		
Hargeisa	is	divided	into	five	administrative	districts	namely	Ahmed	Dhagax4,	Mohamoud	Haybe,	
Ga’an	 Libax,	 26	 June,	 and	 Ibrahim	 Koodbuur.	 Arab	 and	Ayub	 clans5	 predominantly	 populate	
																																								 																				
4	Somali	spelling	is	used	in	some	cases	as	some	of	the	place	names	appear	on	maps	in	Somali.	 In	such	
cases,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	letters	of	X	and	C	have	different	pronunciations	in	Somali.	X	can	be	
read	as	H	while	C	can	be	read	as	A.		
5	I	refer	to	various	sub-clans	i.e.	Isaaq	as	clans	because	they	speak	of	themselves	mostly	as	clans	rather	
than	 sub-clans.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 used	 the	 language	 commonly	 spoken	and	understood	 in	 the	 streets	
rather	than	the	texts	which	refer	Isaaq	as	one	clan.	My	reference	should	not	however	be	taken	as	though	
I	am	suggesting	Isaaq	sub-clans	are	unrelated	and	are	independent	from	each	other	as	clan	units.			
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Ahmed	Dhagah.	The	former	straddles	over	various	sub-districts	such	as	Mohamed	Ali,	18th	May	
and	 Farah	Nur	while	 the	 latter	 is	mainly	 found	 in	 a	neighbourhood	popularly	 known	as	 Isha	
Borama	 as	 well	 as	 other	 sub-districts	 in	 the	 North	 and	Western	 parts	 of	 the	 city.	 Garhajis	
(Eidagale	 and	 Habar	 Yonis)	 populates	 Mohamoud	 Haybe	 District,	 consisting	 of	 various	 sub-
districts	 such	 as	 Burco	 Durey,	 Sheikh	 Shukri,	 Qudhac-Dheer,	 Jameeco	Wayn,	 and	Mohamed	
Mooge	as	well	as	parts	of	Ga’an	Libah	District	such	as	the	New	Hargeisa	sub-district.	Awal	Clans	
(Sa’ad	Muse,	Isse	Muse	and	Afgab	Muse)	predominantly	populate	Ibrahim	Koodbuur	consisting	
of	Guul-Alle,	Jig-Jiga	Yar,	Hero	Awr,	and	Lihle,	as	well	as	26th	June	district	consisting	of	Gol-Jano	
Ayngal,	Durya,	Almis.	Additionally,	they	also	reside	in	parts	of	Gacan	Libax	such	as	Sheikh	Madar,	
Waraaba	Salaan,	Sheekh	Yusuf,	Sheikh	Nuur,	and	Aw	Adan.	The	Gaboye	clan	is	found	in	the	Dami	
neighbourhood	of	Ga’an	Libah.		
Figure	1:	Map	of	Hargeisa	
	
Source:(UN-Habitat,	2013)	
The	 above	description	of	 the	 clan	based	 settlement	pattern	 in	Hargeisa	 is	meant	 to	provide	
overall	 picture	 about	 how	 clans	 are	 predominantly	 distributed	 over	 space.	 It	 is	 however	
important	to	point	out	that	population	distribution	and	space	identity	in	Hargeisa	is	contested	
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and	therefore	the	above	account	must	not	be	taken	for	a	firm	recognition	of	space	identity.	The	
aim	is	to	indicate	that	settlement	in	Hargeisa	has	a	clan	undertone	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	
many	residents	defy	the	clan	logic	and	are	found	in	areas	predominantly	occupied	by	clan	(s)	
other	 than	 their	 own.	 In	 other	 words,	 even	 in	 spaces	 where	 strong	 evidence	 of	 clan	
predominance	exists,	it	is	difficult	to	delineate	residential	patterns	between	the	different	clans	
as	the	boundaries	are	fluid	and	porous.	
Figure	2:	Somaliland	Administrative	Map	
	
Source:	(OCHA,	2012)	
1.2 Research	Aims	and	Questions		
This	study’s	focus	on	Hargeisa’s	governance	and	spatial	form	aims	to	highlight	the	importance	
of	understanding	city	dynamics,	and	to	contribute	to	a	greater	understanding	of	peace-making,	
institutions	 and	 governance	 in	 a	 post-conflict	 context.	 	 We	 can	 gain	 a	 more	 insightful	
understanding	of	post-conflict	state-building	processes	amid	rapid	urbanisation	through	greater	
knowledge	of	urban	governance	institutions	and	the	relations	of	power	that	are	manifest	in	the	
city’s	spatial	organisation.	The	study	can	also	contribute	to	broader	debates	over	African	cities,	
15	|	P a g e 	
	
	
governance	and	segregation.	Governance	is	not	the	only	explanatory	factor	that	can	account	for	
the	emergence	and	perpetuation	of	segregation	in	Hargeisa,	but	is	one	of	the	key	factors	that	
shapes	the	making	and	unmaking	of	urban	spaces	in	Somaliland.	My	argument	emphasises	the	
intersection	 between	 governance	 and	 popular	 responses	 to	 insecurity	 and	mistrust	 of	 state	
institutions	 to	 explain	 the	 reproduction	of	 segregation	over	 time.	 The	 study	has	 a	 particular	
focus	 on	 urban	 land	 administration	 and	 conflict	 adjudication	 and	 their	 interface	with	 urban	
development	as	a	means	to	shed	light	on	the	spatial	outcome	of	clan-based	politics	in	the	city.		
The	key	overarching	question	in	this	thesis	is:	what	are	the	key	historical	processes	and	recent	
socio-political	 dynamics	 underpinning	 Hargeisa’s	 spatial	 character	 as	 clan-based	 segregated	
urban	space;	how	do	people	navigate	the	terrain	of	urban	institutions;	and	how	does	this	shape	
the	making	and	remaking	of	urban	space	in	Hargeisa?	As	the	thesis	examines	particular	aspects	
of	 urban	 governance	 and	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 urban	 land	 administration	 and	 conflict	
adjudication,	the	main	research	question	can	be	broken	down	into	the	following	sub-questions:		
• How	do	the	historically	rooted	hybrid	municipal	politics	and	the	top	down	urban	
land	administration	explain	the	configuration	and	reconfiguration	of	Hargeisa’s	
spatial	character?	
• What	are	the	key	drivers	and	dynamics	of	urban	land	accessibility,	conflicts	and	
adjudication	and	how	do	they	relate	to	trust/	mistrust	of	the	state	and	the	city’s	
pattern	of	segregation?	
• How	do	 people	 navigate	 the	 terrain	 of	 urban	 institutions	 and	 how	does	 this	
shape	the	making	and	remaking	of	urban	spaces	in	Hargeisa?	
• What	are	the	security	implications	of	unresolved	urban	land	conflicts	in	the	city	
and	 how	 do	 they	 influence	 state	 legitimacy	 and	 affect	 the	 city’s	 spatial	
character?		
1.3 Structure	of	the	Thesis			
To	answer	these	questions,	the	remaining	parts	of	the	thesis	is	organised	into	nine	chapters:	In	
the	next	chapter	(two),	 I	explore	debates	 in	the	 literature	over	urban	segregation	and	hybrid	
governance	in	the	African	context	and	Somaliland	specifically.	I	discuss	the	historical	and	recent	
dynamics	underpinning	the	absence	of	trust	and	the	negative	perceptions	towards	the	state,	
situating	such	dynamics	as	crucial	explanatory	factors	for	the	emergence	and	perpetuation	of	
urban	 segregation	 in	 both	 colonial	 and	 postcolonial	 times.	 I	 elaborate	 debates	 over	 hybrid	
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governance,	state	legitimacy	and	trust,	and	their	interface	with	the	production	and	reproduction	
of	urban	segregation	to	develop	new	ways	of	understanding	the	spatial	character	of	cities	 in	
Somali/land.	 I	 argue	 that	 negative	 public	 perceptions	 of	 the	 state	 and	 lack	 of	 trust	 in	 its	
institutions	can	to	a	significant	degree	explain	the	clan-based	urban	segregation.		The	absence	
of	acceptable	means	of	regulating	public	services	and	conflicts	have	eroded	trust	in	the	state.		
The	spatial	character	of	the	city	can	be	seen	as	a	response	to	these	dynamics.	The	chapter	also	
reveals	the	shortcomings	of	predominant	debates	about	Somaliland	that	focus	on	the	national	
level	and	neglect	the	urban	level.	The	problem	here	is	that	such	negligence	overlooks	the	fact	
that	clan	segregation	creates	both	urban	governance	challenges	and	opportunities.	On	the	one	
hand,	it	cements	clan	citizenship	and	encourages	fragmented	urban	governance	politics	which	
makes	it	difficult	for	the	state	to	implement	development	policies.	On	the	other	hand,	it	not	only	
enables	residents	resist	more	successfully	government	policies	and	practices	which	overlooks	
public	acceptance	but	it	also	makes	it	easier	for	new	comers	such	as	migrants	negotiate	space	
in	the	city	through	their	existing	clan	networks.		
I	therefore	argue	that	the	current	literature	on	Somaliland	and	its	focus	on	the	hybrid	political	
order	are	mainly	aimed	at	examining	state	legitimacy,	which	is	important	given	the	long	colonial	
and	postcolonial	history	of	local	unacceptability	but	they	neglect	the	urban	as	a	crucial	site	for	
deepening	 understanding	 into	 the	 legitimacy	 crises	 the	 Somali	 state	 suffered	 for	 a	 long	 and	
hence	 fail	 to	 inform	public	policy	and	urban	governance	practices	 that	are	adequate	 to	alter	
public	choices	of	residential	places,	which	are	currently	perpetuating	segregation.	
In	 the	 third	 chapter,	 I	 discuss	 the	methodological	 approach	 for	 this	 study,	 emphasising	 the	
importance	 of	 urban	 ethnographic	 methods	 and	 historical	 sources	 to	 complement	 formal	
interviews	with	 key	 informants	 and	 residents.	 After	 reviewing	 the	main	 empirical	 sources,	 I	
outline	the	challenges	of	collecting	data	from	state	domains,	and	discuss	how	I	used	teashops	in	
Hargeisa	as	important	sites	for	gathering	information	and	locating	key	informants,	including	in	
the	diaspora.		
In	the	fourth	chapter,	I	analyse	urban	segregation	in	Hargeisa	in	relation	to	the	trajectory	of	local	
governance,	 drawing	 on	 oral	 narratives,	 archives	 and	 ethnographic	 field	 research,	 with	 the	
purpose	of	mapping	the	continuities	and	changes	in	urban	governance	and	their	relationship	to	
the	making	and	remaking	of	segregation	in	the	city.	This	historical	approach	to	urban	institutions	
is	important	partly	because	particular	episodes	are	often	used	as	a	point	of	reference	positively	
or	negatively	for	the	legitimation	of	power	and	authority.	For	instance,	memories	of	how	things	
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were	done	in	the	past	serve	as	examples	of	how	a	state	should	behave	in	the	present	or	the	
future.	 The	 chapter	 begins	 by	 exploring	 the	 introduction	 of	 local	 and	municipal	 governance	
during	the	colonial	period	and	the	popular	resistance	this	provoked.	It	then	turns	to	the	early	
postcolonial	government’s	failure	to	shift	away	from	the	colonial	rules	and	regulations	governing	
urban	spaces,	and	the	military’s	subsequent	attempts	to	break	away	with	the	past.	In	the	final	
section,	 I	 discuss	 the	 post-conflict	 state’s	 attempt	 to	 re-establish	 local	 and	 municipal	
governance.	 I	 argue	 that	 spatial	 segregation	 has	 been	 a	 salient	 feature	 of	 the	 city	 from	 the	
outset,	and	explore	the	power	relations	and	turbulent	history	through	which	segregation	along	
clan	lines	and	popular	distrust	of	state	institutions	have	been	reproduced	over	time.	My	focus	is	
on	the	important	mediating	role	of	Akils	(Chiefs)6,	and	the	effects	of	episodes	of	insecurity	that	
reinforce	urban	residents’	desire	to	live	in	spatial	proximity	of	fellow	clan	members.		
The	fifth	chapter	turns	to	urban	land	management	institutions	and	practices,	which	also	have	a	
history	 of	 operating	 from	 top-down,	 and	 I	 explore	 and	 how	 these	 shape	 public	 perception	
towards	the	state.	The	chapter	begins	by	exploring	the	colonial	subversion	and	alteration	of	the	
indigenous	approach	to	land	management.	I	show	that	the	colonial	administration’s	approach	
to	 land	management	 contravened	 local	 customs	on	 resource	management	based	on	mutual	
understanding	informed	by	a	set	of	unwritten	rules.	It	introduced	a	top-down	land	management	
with	 little	 or	 no	 consultation,	 which	 undermined	 the	 prior	 voluntary	 compliance	 with	 rules	
governing	natural	resources	including	land.	As	Hargeisa	became	a	critical	site	where	new	urban	
land	 regulations	 were	 enforced	 most	 visibly	 during	 the	 colonial	 period,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	
expropriation	of	land	in	Hargeisa	affected	residents	in	two	important	ways.	Firstly,	those	whose	
land	was	expropriated	had	no	alternative	but	 to	negotiate	space	 in	areas	populated	by	 their	
clan.	 Secondly,	 those	who	qualified	 for	 compensation	were	 required	 to	bring	 their	 elders	 as	
guarantors	for	these	pay-outs,	forcing	them	to	be	close	to	where	they	could	get	access	to	the	
traditional	leaders.	I	also	argue	that	the	colonial	top	down	approach	to	land	management,	which	
was	understood	as	altering	land	ownership	from	the	domain	of	God	to	the	domain	of	humans	
undermined	 the	acceptability	of	 the	new	urban	 land	management	 regime.	The	chapter	 then	
discusses	 postcolonial	 attempts	 to	 bring	 about	 change	 in	 the	 land	 management	 regime,	
primarily	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 boosting	 economic	development.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	postcolonial	 state’s	
attempt	 to	 bring	 about	 change	was	 unsuccessful,	 and	 that	 the	 continuation	 of	 the	 previous	
																																								 																				
6	Akils	and	Sultans	are	traditional	authorities.	In	Somaliland,	the	Sultan	is	higher	in	hierarchy	than	the	Akil	
as	he	is	the	leader	of	a	larger	clan	conglomerate.	The	Akil	is	equivalent	to	a	chief	and	he	is	often	involved	
in	the	day	today	governance	and	mediation	of	clan	politics.					
18	|	P a g e 	
	
	
colonial	rules	undermined	public	trust	in	the	state.	Furthermore,	the	continued	alienation	of	the	
poor	further	entrenched	lack	of	public	trust.	In	the	final	part	of	the	chapter,	I	discuss	the	post-
conflict	dynamics	of	re-establishing	urban	land	management	and	conflict	adjudication	regimes.	
I	 argue	 that	 post-conflict	 attempts	 aimed	 at	 improving	 the	 legal	 framework	 for	 urban	 land	
administration	 have	 not	 been	 successful,	 as	 the	 newly	 enacted	 laws	 are	 characterised	 by	
ambiguity,	 further	 undermining	 public	 trust.	 This	 top-down	 land	 management	 was	 further	
exacerbated	by	 the	state’s	 inability	 to	 regulate	 land,	enforce	 its	decisions	and	guarantee	 the	
security	of	urban	residents.	I	argue	that	the	top	down	nature	of	urban	land	regulatory	regimes	
in	the	city	significantly	contributes	to	the	perpetuation	of	segregation.		
In	the	sixth	chapter,	I	discuss	urban	land	conflicts	and	adjudication	mechanisms	as	they	were	
operating	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 research,	 supposedly	 regulated	 initially	 through	 ad	 hoc	 local	
government	 committees	 and	 the	 statutory	 judicial	 system	but	 later	 through	 the	Urban	 Land	
Commission	(a	special	tribunal	for	urban	land).		The	Commission	was	set	up	in	2009	to	mediate	
and	 adjudicate	 urban	 land	 conflicts,	 but	 which	 was	 shaped	 in	 practice	 by	 a	 plurality	 of	
institutions.	The	chapter	begins	by	discussing	key	issues	in	accessibility	to	urban	land	and	the	
alienation	of	 the	poor.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 current	mechanism	of	 access	 to	 land	 in	urban	 areas	
marginalises	the	poor,	as	the	existing	land	management	regime	imposes	restrictions	with	which	
the	low-income	people	in	the	city	cannot	comply.	In	the	second	section,	I	show	that	institutional	
weaknesses,	rapid	urbanisation,	 increasing	 land	prices,	and	greater	competition	for	access	to	
land	in	urban	areas	can,	to	a	 large	degree,	account	for	the	rise	 in	urban	land	conflicts.	These	
conflicts	 are	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 inability	 of	 the	 plural	 justice	 system	 to	 deal	 with	 them	
adequately.	In	the	third	and	fourth	sections,	I	discuss	urban	land	conflict	adjudication,	shaped	
by	the	plural	justice	system.	I	argue	that	attempts	to	improve	the	dispute	mediation	mechanism	
have	 shown	 institutional	 gaps	 in	 how	 the	 state	 deals	 with	 land	 issues.	 While	 the	 Land	
Commission	deals	with	conflicts	among	city	residents,	it	rarely	addresses	disputes	between	the	
people	 and	 the	 state.	One	 of	 the	 key	 challenges	 emanating	 from	 this	 gap	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
reinforces	the	plurality	of	institutions	involved	by	driving	recourse	to	clan,	and	also	undermines	
trust	in	the	state.	I	argue	that	urban	segregation	is	the	product	of	such	struggles	and	competition	
between	customary	and	statutory	institutions.		
In	 the	 seventh	 chapter,	 I	 discuss	 a	 high-profile	 land	 conflict	 between	 the	 government	 of	
Somaliland	and	residents	in	the	South	of	the	city.	The	government	decided	to	expand	the	airport,	
but	the	 land	concerned	was	held	by	residents	who	were	unwilling	to	hand	it	over.	 I	begin	by	
discussing	the	history	of	airport	expansion,	and	scrutinise	the	significance	of	the	airport	for	state	
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territorial	control.	I	argue	that	the	state’s	expansion	attempts	are	premised	on	an	assumption	
for	the	need	for	full	territorial	control	as	a	means	of	both	local	and	international	legitimation,	
and	that	the	airport	is	seen	as	an	important	site	for	state	legitimation.	The	chapter	then	moves	
on	to	discuss	the	rationale	for	the	land	expropriation,	resistance	and	the	dynamics	of	mediation,	
valuation	 and	 compensation,	much	of	which	pits	 the	 state	 evoking	 its	 rights	 to	develop	 and	
manage	land	against	residents’	claims	of	both	formal	 legal	entitlements	as	well	as	traditional	
customary	rights	to	the	land.	Such	struggles	for	legitimacy	between	land	claimants/owners	and	
the	state	marginalises	the	poor,	undermines	public	trust,	and	forms	the	basis	on	which	violent	
resistance	to	the	state	is	justified,	and	public	choice	of	abode	are	made.	I	argue	that	the	nature	
and	 means	 through	 which	 urban	 land	 conflicts	 are	 adjudicated	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	
entrenchment	of	the	city’s	segregated	spatial	character.	
In	 the	 eighth	 chapter,	 I	 discuss	 the	 impact	 of	 urban	 land	 conflicts	 on	 security.	 The	 chapter	
focuses	on	a	case	study	in	which	the	government	was	involved	with	land	conflict	at	a	military	
base	 located	 in	 Eastern	Hargeisa.	 Locals	 also	 claimed	 the	 land	 on	which	 the	military	 base	 is	
located.	 The	 dispute	 flared	 up	 after	 the	 government	 decided	 to	 compensate	 a	 prominent	
Ethiopian	politician,	from	whom	it	confiscated	land,	by	giving	him	rights	to	land	located	in	the	
contested	area.	This	 led	 to	violent	 resistance	 in	which	seven	people	 lost	 their	 lives,	and	 four	
others	were	injured.	The	chapter	consists	of	three	sections.	In	the	first	section,	I	provide	a	brief	
overview	 of	 security	 in	 urban	 Somali	 settings.	 I	 show	 that	 the	 state	 is	 not	 the	 only	 actor	 in	
security	provisions	in	the	country.	I	argue	that	clan	identity	is	a	major	feature	of	public	safety	
and	security.	I	also	argue	that	the	multiplicity	of	actors	in	security	may	have	contributed	to	the	
stability	in	Somaliland	overall,	but	it	can	also	be	an	obstacle	to	progress	towards	accountable	
state	institutions.	My	account	of	this	conflict	seeks	to	show	the	dire	security	impacts	that	can	
result	 from	the	 lack	of	credible	mediation	and	resolution	mechanisms	 for	cases	 in	which	 the	
state	is	one	of	the	disputants.	 I	argue	that	the	absence	of	credible	mechanisms	to	adjudicate	
land	 conflicts	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 state	 is	 one	 of	 the	 disputing	 parties	 frequently	 produces	
insecurity	in	urban	contexts,	because	of	the	way	the	state	manipulates	the	justice	system.	I	argue	
that	 this	 erodes	 public	 trust,	 and	 hence	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 production	 and	
reproduction	 of	 clan-segregated	 spaces.	 The	 security	 implications	 of	 unresolved	 urban	 land	
conflicts	in	the	city	thus	also	play	a	significant	in	reinforcing	the	city’s	existing	spatial	segregation	
along	clan	lines.			
In	the	final	chapter,	conclusion,	I	provide	overview	of	the	chapters	and	summarise	key	finding	
and	arguments.			
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CHAPTER	2 DEBATING	HYBRID	GOVERNANCE	AND	SEGREGATION		
2.1 Introduction	
This	 chapter	 elaborates	 debates	 in	 the	 literature	 over	 hybrid	 governance	 to	 show	 their	
inadequacy	for	illuminating	urban	form	and	spatial	character	of	cities	in	Somali/land.	It	seeks	to	
develop	 new	 perspectives	 on	 understanding	 the	 spatial	 character	 of	 cities	 in	 Somali/land	
through	 alternative	 concepts	 such	 as	 state	 legitimacy	 and	 mistrust.	 These	 concepts	 are	
appropriate	because	they	are	more	concerned	with	the	quality	of	the	interaction	between	the	
ruler	and	the	ruled.	The	chapter	consists	of	two	main	sections.	In	the	first	section,	I	show	that	
recent	studies	on	Somaliland	focus	on	the	national	or	subnational	level.	I	argue	that	the	current	
debates	neglect	the	urban	level	and	its	relevance	to	the	state	building,	as	well	as	the	interface	
between	governance	and	urban	form	in	the	broader	Somali	context	and	Somaliland	in	particular.	
In	 the	second	section,	 I	argue	that	 the	recent	post-conflict	hybrid	state-building	processes	 in	
Somaliland	–	which	were	by	large	aimed	at	addressing	legitimacy	concerns	given	the	repeated	
legitimacy	crises	of	Somali	state-building	from	the	colonial	period	through	to	the	present	time	–	
failed	to	deliver	a	significant	shift	adequate	to	alter	public	choice	of	residence.	I	therefore	argue	
that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 go	 beyond	 existing	 debates	 over	 'hybridity'	 to	 understand	 the	 social,	
political	and	more	specifically	governance	dynamics	underpinning	the	spatial	character	of	cities	
in	Somaliland.	I	then	move	on	to	discuss	urban	segregation	and	argue	that	negative	attitudes	
towards	the	state	and	low	levels	of	trust	in	its	institutions	can	to	a	significant	degree	explain	the	
perpetuation	of	urban	segregation	on	the	basis	of	clan	identity.	I	also	argue	that	the	absence	of	
credible	mechanisms	to	manage	service	delivery	left	people	with	no	alternative	to	using	identity-
based	social	arrangements	to	regulate	their	relations	with	the	state	and	among	themselves.	This	
prevented	the	emergence	of	cosmopolitan	spaces	and	reinforced	the	resilience	of	segregation	
by	(sub)clans.		
2.2 Hybrid	Governance	and	Somali	State	(Re	–)	Formation		
Before	embarking	on	the	discussion	about	the	post-conflict	hybrid	governance	and	state	(re–)	
formation	in	Somaliland,	it	is	important	to	look	briefly	at	the	history	of	the	conflict.	In	1981,	an	
insurgent	political	 organisation,	 the	 Somali	National	Movement	 (SNM),	was	established	by	 a	
group	of	mainly	Isaaq	politicians.	Their	stated	objective	was	to	liberate	Somalia	from	the	grip	of	
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Mohamed	 Siad	 Barre’s	 dictatorship.	 Soon	 after	 its	 launch7,	 SNM	 established	 itself	 along	 the	
border	with	Ethiopia	particularly	North	Western	and	Togdheer	regions	amid	hostilities	between	
Ethiopia	 and	 Somalia.	 It	 started	waging	 sporadic	 guerrilla	 attacks	on	 the	 Somali	 government	
forces	based	along	the	borders	and	further	inside.	The	response	of	the	Somali	state	was	heavy	
handed	as	it	often	visited	wrath	on	the	civil	population	(mainly	the	Isaaq	clans)	in	the	North	who	
were	accused	of	providing	 support	 for	 the	 insurgency.	This	gave	SNM	the	 tools	 it	needed	 to	
enlist	widespread	support	and	recruit	more	people	in	its	ranks.	Realising	the	danger	apparent	in	
the	popular	growth	of	SNM,	Barre	embarked	on	a	diplomatic	effort	aimed	at	cutting	off	support	
and	supplies	from	SNM	by	mending	relations	with	his	arch	rival,	Dictator	Mengistu	Haile	Mariam,	
the	then	President	of	Ethiopia	who	was	providing	Somali	insurgencies8	with	military	and	financial	
support.		
In	April	1988,	Barre	and	Haile	Mariam	signed	a	deal	mediated	by	Djibouti’s	President	Hassan	
Gouled	Aptidon.	Key	among	the	agreed	points	were	the	restoration	of	diplomatic	ties	and	ending	
of	hostilities	particularly	the	provision	of	support	for	each	other’s	insurgencies.	This	was	a	major	
blow	to	SNM.	On	the	27th	of	May,	merely	two	months	after	the	agreement	was	signed,	SNM	
forces	waged	a	surprise	attack	on	the	Somali	Army,	which	was	at	the	time	one	of	the	strongest	
in	the	region.	The	epicentre	of	the	attacks	were	the	major	cities	of	Hargeisa	and	Burao.	Both	
cities	were	almost	levelled	to	the	ground	by	government	forces	and	nearly	50	000	people	lost	
their	lives.	The	war	lasted	for	three	years	and	in	the	end,	it	not	only	drained	the	state	resources	
but	it	also	weakened	its	military	capability.	It	also	ushered	in	the	death	of	the	military	regime	in	
Somalia	as	two	more	guerrilla	movements,	United	Somali	Congress	(USC)	and	Somali	Patriotic	
Movement	 (SPM)	 sprung	 up	 in	 the	 Southern	 regions	 of	 Somalia.	 Barre	was	 finally	 ousted	 in	
January	1991	and	the	major	cities	in	the	North	were	captured	by	SNM	forces.	However,	SNM	
was	unable	to	govern	peacefully	as	rifts	between	its	leadership	emerged.	In	some	instances,	this	
led	to	a	fresh	form	of	conflicts	within	the	SNM	elites	and	their	clans.	Clan	authorities	such	as	
elders,	Akils	and	Sultans	which	were	vital	in	the	SNM	struggle	against	the	Barre	regime	became	
essential	once	again	for	finding	a	political	solution	in	the	post	Barre	conflict	over	resource	control	
and	power	sharing	between	the	SNM	elites.		
																																								 																				
7	Some	accounts	suggest	that	some	of	 the	forces	that	 laid	the	foundation	for	the	armed	wing	of	SNM	
defected	from	the	Somali	Armed	Forces	as	far	back	as	in	1978.		
8	Primarily	Somali	National	Movement	(SNM)	and	Somali	Salvation	Democratic	Front	(SSDF)	which	was	2	
years	prior	to	SNM		
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The	 important	 role	 traditional	 authorities	 played	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 political	 dispensation	
occurred	at	a	time	when	the	political	situation	in	the	South	was	deteriorating.	For	this	reason,	
discussions	on	hybridity	dominate	the	post-conflict	political	writing	about	Somaliland.	Explicitly	
or	implicitly,	this	body	of	literature	points	to	the	fact	that	the	hybrid	political	order	in	the	post-
conflict	context	was	largely	an	attempt	in	which	the	elites	were	trying	to	address	the	deficit	in	
state	legitimacy	and	public	trust.	But	this	has	not	brought	about	significant	changes	in	the	level	
of	trust	for	the	state	in	any	qualitatively	meaningful	way.		For	instance,	for	the	first	three	years	
(1991-1993)	of	the	post-conflict	hybrid	order	in	Somaliland,	tension	was	running	high	between	
the	 different	 factions	 in	 major	 cities	 as	 armed	 confrontations	 occurred	 in	 Berbera	 when	
Abdirahman	Ahmed	Ali	was	in	charge9	(Drysdale,	2001).	His	successor,	Mohamed	Ibrahim	Egal,	
also	encountered	resistance	from	sections	of	the	major	clans	in	1994-1997,	as	armed	conflict	
broke	out	in	both	the	capital,	Hargeisa,	and	second	capital,	Burao.	For	Balthasar	(2013),	these	
wars	 formed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 state-building	 processes.	 More	 importantly,	 these	 wars	 can	 be	
understood	as	a	legitimation	struggle	in	which	each	side	of	the	conflict	was	trying	to	address	the	
legitimacy	crisis	which	led	to	the	disintegration	of	the	Somali	state	between	1988-1991.	Before	
arguing	why	 it	 is	necessary	to	go	beyond	hybridity	 for	understanding	the	spatial	character	of	
cities	in	Somaliland,	it	is	important	to	define	hybridity	as	a	concept.		
2.2.1 Conceptualising	Hybrid	Political	Orders		
Hybrid	political	orders	can	be		defined	as	“contradictory	and	dialectic	co-existence	of	forms	of	
socio-political	organisations	that	have	their	roots	in	both	non-state	indigenous	social	structures	
and	 introduced	 state	 and	 societal	 structures”	 (Boege	 et	 al.,	 2009b,	 p.	 17).	 More	
comprehensively,	 Hagmann	 and	 Hoehne	 define	 hybrid	 political	 orders	 as	 the	 “sum	 of	
institutionalised,	yet	dynamic	power	relations	that	one	can	empirically	grasp	at	a	given	time	and	
place,	 [involving]	 international	 legal	 arrangements	 as	well	 as	 everyday	 practices	 of	 ordinary	
people	and	processes	at	the	 local	 level,	often	across	but	rarely	without	reference	to	national	
boundaries”	 (Hagmann	 and	 Hoehne,	 2009,	 p.	 44).	 The	 use	 of	 the	 words	 contradiction	 and	
coexistence	 are	 important	 here,	 as	 they	 show	 that	 traditional	 institutions	 may	 act	 in	
contradiction	 of	 state	 authority	 in	 some	 instances,	 but	 may	 also	 be	 complementary	 and	
enmeshed	in	other	instances.	Examples	can	readily	be	found	in	in	cases	where	the	state	is	weak	
																																								 																				
9	These	include	the	period	in	which	Ali	was	a	caretaker	SNM	leader	(January	to	May	1991)	for	the	Northern	
Regions,	 and	 after	 he	 was	 elected	 as	 President	 of	 Somaliland	 on	 18th	 May	 1991-1993	 when	 he	 was	
replaced	by	Mohamed	Ibrahim	Egal.				
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and	seeks	the	support	of	non-state	actors	to,	for	example,	uphold	peace	and	stability.	But	there	
may	 also	 be	 contradictions	 when	 the	 existence	 of	 traditional	 institutions	 works	 against	 the	
desires	of	the	state	to	discharge	its	local	and	international	obligations.	The	dynamic	nature	of	
hybrid	 	 political	 orders	partly	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 the	boundaries	between	 ‘traditional’	 and	
‘state’	are	not	defined	absolutely,	as	customary	leaders,	business	men	and	religious	leaders	may	
become	politicians	and	take	on	state	roles,	and	vice	versa	(Boege	et	al.,	2009a).		
According	to	Boege	et	al.	(2009a),	hybrid	political	orders	differ	from		Western	conceptualities	of	
the	state	in	a	number	of	ways.	Firstly,	in	hybrid	orders,	security	is	undertaken	by	various	actors	
unlike	the	Western	model,	which	makes	security	the	exclusive	domain	of	the	state.	Secondly,	
political	leadership	is	not	the	sole	prerogative	of	the	state	as	there	are	different	kinds	of	political	
leaderships	existing	along	the	state.	Thirdly,	the	welfare	of	the	people	is	not	in	the	hands	of	the	
state	mostly	as	people	rely	on	social	safety	nets	such	as	kinship,	and	in	Somaliland,	clan-based	
social	networks.	Richards	(2015)	argues	that	hybridity	goes	beyond	the	traditional	and	formal	
governance	combination	discussed	in	the	literature.	She	argues	it	is	also	about	striking	a	balance	
between	 “domestic	 needs	 and	 external	 demands”,	 supported	 and	 sustained	 locally	 but	 also	
aimed	at	reaching	sovereignty.	At	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	in	early	1990s,	many	African	states	
disintegrated	and	Western	powers	 saw	 it	necessary	 to	 intervene	 in	what	 they	considered	as	
failed	states,	so	as	to	enhance	the	new	international	order	of	peace	and	security.	Somalia	lay	at	
the	heart	of	 these	theoretical	debates	over	hybrid-state-making	and	became	the	first	 testing	
ground	for	state	revival	attempts	conceptualised	in	relation	to	the	state	failure	thesis.		
Proponents	of	hybrid	political	orders	suggest	that	the	central	problem	with	interventions	that	
stemmed	from	the	assumption	of	state	failure	related	to	conceptualisation	of	the	latter	itself.	
(Boege	et	al.,	2009a).	By	casting	state	order	as	‘hybrid’,	scholars		rejected	the	representation	of	
African	states	as	being	“pathologically	weak’	in	need	of	saving	through	interventions	(Hagmann	
and	Péclard,	2010).	According	 to	Hagmann	and	Hoehne	 (2009),	 the	state	 failure	 thesis	has	a	
number	 of	 weaknesses.	 Firstly,	 it	 fails	 to	 recognise	 the	 differences	 between	 African	 states.	
Secondly,	 the	state	 failure	thesis	has	a	tendency	to	assume	that	the	disintegration	of	central	
institutions	means	anarchy.		Thirdly,	the	state	failure	thesis	uses	the	Western	state	as	the	model	
against	which	other	states	should	be	measured,	often	assuming	that	Western	states	are	strong	
and	 others	 are	 weak.	 Fourthly,	 the	 abovementioned	 assumption	 inherently	 leads	 to	 the	
conceptualisation	 of	 intervention	 mechanisms	 relying	 on	 set	 of	 indicators	 developed	 under	
these	assumptions	in	order	to	analyse	and	arrive	at	a	solution	for	the	“failing	states”.		
24	|	P a g e 	
	
	
Given	the	realities	of		state-building,	which		are	characterised	by	multiple	processes,	there	were	
many	emerging	political	orders	that	deviated	from	the	main	tenets	of	the	state	failure	thesis		
(Hagmann	 and	 Hoehne,	 2009).	 For	 instance,	 Somali	 territories	 represent	 an	 example	 of	 an	
emergent	trend	of	governance	arrangements	negotiated	at	the	local	level	(Menkhaus,	2006b,	
Menkhaus,	 2006a).	 The	 manner	 in	 which	 such	 orders	 develop	 differs	 from	 one	 context	 to	
another,	 indeed,	 	such	negotiation	“refers	 to	the	dynamic	and,	at	 least	partly,	undetermined	
processes	of	state	(de-construction”	(Hagmann	and	Péclard,	2010,	p.	544)	which	takes	place	at	
both	 the	 local	and	national	 levels	 (Renders	and	Terlinden,	2010).	 In	states	where	centralised	
formal	institutions	are	non-existent,	unable	or	unwilling	to	reach	all	parts	of	their	territory,	such	
inexistence	 or	 gaps	 in	 governance	 are	 filled	 through	 non	 state	 actors	 such	 as	 customary	
institutions	and	subnational	or	local	political	organisations,	negating	the	idea	that	those	areas	
are	chaotic	and	anarchic	Boege	et	al.	(2008).	For	instance,	Bakonyi	(2013)	argues	the	Rahanweyn	
Resistance	Army	(RRA)	in	the	Southern	part	of	Somalia	was	a	political	organisation	that	managed	
to	 bring	 about	 three	 elements	 which	 are	 essential	 for	 governance;	 security	 managements,	
judicial	services	and	local	tax	collection	for	the	first	time	since	the	disintegration	of	the	Somali	
central	state.		
2.2.2 Recent	Somali	State-Building	and	Hybridity	
As	the	central	Somali	state	was	nearing	disintegration	in	the	late	1980s,	scholarly	debates	about	
what	went	wrong	and	how	an	alternative	option	 could	be	mapped	 for	 Somali	 state-building	
raged	 among	 academics.	 These	 debates	 often	 focussed	 on	 the	 national	 level.	 The	 object	 of	
argument	was	the	analytical	use	of	the	concept	of	clan,	which,	 in	 its	most	basic	definition,	 is	
termed	as	a	“dynamic	social	construct	that	can	be	subject	to	different	interpretations	and	are	
used	to	describe	and	validate	changing	social	and	political	relations”	Bradbury	(2008,	p.	13).	Two	
major	perspectives	emerged	from	these	debates.	The	first	sought	to	take	the	clan	as	a	basic	unit	
of	analysis	for	the	social	and	political	organisation	of	the	Somalis,	while	the	second	posited	that	
clan	is	one	of	many	ways	in	which	the	Somali	society	could	be	analysed.	Both	debates	place	the	
focus	 on	 political	 and	 cultural	 dimensions	 of	 the	 concept,	while	 overlooking	 its	 socio-spatial	
utility	and	 the	 factors	underpinning	 such	utilities.	 The	use	of	 clan	as	analytical	 frame	can	be	
traced	 to	 Lewis’s	 seminal	 works	 in	 the	 late	 1950s	 on	 Somaliland	 (1958,	 1961).	 For	 Lewis,	
clannism	was	and	remains	to	be	pervasive	among	the	Somalis,	as	clan	 identity	 is	acquired	at	
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birth	and	is	used	to	form	social	and	political	alliances.10	His	basic	contention	is	that	if	you	want	
to	understand	the	Somalis,	you	need	to	understand	the	mechanics	of	kinship	and	clan.	This	view	
remained	unchanged	for	Lewis	from	his	early	works	through	to	his	recent	writing	in	the	1990s	
and	2000s.	He	maintained	that	clan	lineage	is	intrinsically	‘inherent	in	the	Somali	culture’,	saying	
that	the	“global	 level	modern	mass	society	seems,	by	 its	scale	and	anonymity,	to	expand	the	
bounds	of	patriotism	beyond	acceptable,	viable	limits.	This	appears	to	evoke	alienation	at	the	
local	level,	so	remote	from	the	centre	of	real	power,	and	promoting	renaissances	of	the	little	
traditional	of	familiar	communal	identity”	(Lewis	2010,	p.141).		
Luling	(2006,	p.	473)	observes	that	genealogy,	which	is	essentially	the	architecture	on	which	clan	
mechanics	are	built,	is	a	“web	which	holds	[Somali]	society	together	and	underpins	political	life”.	
She	 further	 points	 out	 that	 clan	 is	 a	 complex	 system,	 characterised	by	 shifting	 alliances	 and	
allegiances,	the	understanding	of	which	often	slip	through	the	fingers	of	observers.	Lewis	(2004)	
refers	to	this	“intricacy”	as	invisibility,	which	presumably	masks	the	differences	among	Somalis,	
leading	to	over-elaboration	of	their	homogeneity.	For	Lewis,	the	kinship	concept	provided	the	
tool	 for	 understanding	 the	political	 and	 social	 dynamics	 underpinning	 conflict.	His	 argument	
posited	 that	 clan	 lay	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 state-building	 and	 it	 is	 the	 clan	 through	 which	 its	
disintegration	could	be	comprehended	and	resolved	(Lewis	and	Mayall,	1995,	Lewis,	1993).	In	
this	perspective,	clan	becomes	the	most	important	means	through	which	the	Somali	state	could	
be	revived.	This	approach	criticises	the	anti-clan	sentiments	officially	adopted	by	the	previous	
Somali	 administrations	 during	 both	 the	 democratic	 and	military	 rules	 as	 being	 far	 from	 the	
Somali	 reality	 (Lewis,	 2008a).	Here,	 kinship	 is	 presented	 as	 an	organising	principle	pervasive	
enough	that	even	the	Islamists,	whose	war	on	clan	was	thus	far	the	toughest,	were	unable	to	
subdue	 as	 clan	 divisions	 between	 them	 come	 to	 the	 surface	 endangering	 the	 very	 anti-clan	
ideologies	they	promoted	or	breached.		
Lewis	(1998)	points	out	that	political	violence	should	not	be	a	surprise	among	the	Somalis.	He	
asserts	that	any	observer	who	studied	the	Somalis	knows	that	violence	is	inherent	in	its	culture	
and	 symmetric	 clan	 system.	 The	 Somali	 culture	 according	 to	 the	 author	 distinguished	 only	
warranleh	(warrior)	and	wadaad	(religious	man).	This	violent	and	segmentary	clan	system,	he	
argues,	gave	the	dictatorship	an	opportunity	which	it	could	exploit	to	prolong	its	time	in	power.	
He	points	out	that	“any	realistic	assessment	of	possible	future	trends	has	to	acknowledge	that	
																																								 																				
10	He	further	argues	that	clan	can	be	understood	within	the	same	framework	of	tribe	as	a	blood-based	
“social,	territorial,	political,	and	to	some	extent	religious	unit”	(Lewis,	1955,	p.585)		
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Somali	nationalism	evidently	 retains	 its	 segmentary	character	and	has	not	been	 transformed	
into	a	modern	organic	mode”	 (Lewis,	1989,	p.	578).	He	argues	 further	 that	 this	 is	 so	despite	
rejection	 by	 “urbanised	 and	Westernised	 Somalis	 [who]	maintain	 that	 discrimination	 is	 'old-
fashioned',	 that	 it	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 injunctions	 of	 the	 Prophet”	 (Lewis,	 1955,	 p.	 584).	 Even	
though	the	concept	of	clan	lies	in	the	centre	of	Lewis’	view,	he	neglects	the	spatial	dimensions	
of	clan	as	a	key	feature	of	urban	settlements	in	Somaliland.	Equally	he	overlooks	the	fluidity	of	
the	clan	concept	and	alignments	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	he	emphasises	its	importance	as	a	tool	
of	understanding	the	Somalis.	For	instance,	critics	point	out	that	clan	identity	is	more	politicised	
in	the	current	climate	in	Somaliland	and	Somalia	than	it	traditionally	was	(Bradbury,	2008).		
The	above	critiques	point	to	the	changing	face	of	clan	as	a	concept	both	 in	 its	dynamics	and	
function	among	the	Somalis.	According	to	Little	(2003),	clan	has	in	the	past	served	as	a	means	
through	which	communities	seek	to	survive	in	a	hostile	ecological	and	economic	environment.	
This	however	was/is	neither	uniform	across	geographical	spaces	nor	static	in	social	domains	over	
time.	For	instance	Bjork	(2007)	observes	that	there	are	differences	in	the	way	that	clan	is	used	
in	the	different	geographical	spaces	in	the	country.	For	instance,	in	urban	contexts,	clan	identity	
is	not	as	strong	as	in	the	rural	contexts.	The	author	notes	that	many	people	in	urban	centres	did	
not	know	their	clan	membership	until	the	civil	war	broke	out.	It	was	also	common	for	urbanites	
to	live	in	cosmopolitan	neighbourhoods	where	people	hailed	from	different	clan	backgrounds.	
In	spite	of	the	fact	that	clan	is	used	as	social	and	economic	network	among	the	Somalis,	many	
people	still	despise	clan	identity	(Bjork,	2007).	Furthermore,	Luling	(2006)	claims	that	clannism	
was	ideologically	rejected	by	Somali	nationalists	during	the	run	up	to	the	parliamentary	elections	
of	1960s.	But	these	attempts,	she	argues,	did	not	last	long	as	clannism	played	an	important	role	
in	post-independence	Somali	politics.	She	argues	that	clannism	did	not	and	probably	will	not	
disappear	as	a	divider	among	Somalis	until	something	else	replaces	it	as	total	unity	is	difficult	to	
achieve	in	any	society.	She	acknowledges,	however,	the	possibility	of	urban	places	as	sites	 in	
which	 the	 influence	of	 clannism	could	 reduce,	 as	 these	 sites	produced	 young	generations	 in	
which	clannism	meant	nothing.		
The	second	main	perspective	in	the	debate	about	the	manner	in	which	the	central	Somali	state	
could	be	revived	was	opposed	to	the	use	of	clan	as	an	overarching	analytical	concept	for	the	
social,	 economic	 and	 political	 organisation	 of	 the	 Somalis	 (Samatar,	 1989,	 Kapteijns,	 2004,	
Besteman,	1998).	These	authors	 likewise	 focussed	on	national	politics,	often	overlooking	the	
urban	level.	This	perspective	proposes	that	clan	is	one	of	many	elements	that	underpin	Somali	
cultural	and	political	reality,	but	it	is	far	from	being	the	answer	for	central	state	revival.	They	cite	
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the	existence	of	a	 common	culture,	 language,	 religion	and	appearance	as	 some	of	 the	other	
more	legitimate	tools	of	analysis	that	could	be	used	to	understand	Somali	society.	In	opposing	
those	who	present	 clan	as	a	means	 to	 resolve	 the	political	 crisis	 in	Somalia,	 this	perspective	
places	the	blame	on	bad	leadership	and	exclusionary	politics	(Samatar,	1997).	This	suggests	that	
political	 conflict	 in	 the	 Somali	 territories	 cannot	 be	 understood	 as	 being	 the	 result	 of	 an	
intrinsically	 violent	 culture	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 civil	 way	 to	 address	 political	 and	
economic	concerns.	Samatar	(2006b)	argues	that	the	mobilisation	of	people	and	resources	for	
political	 or	 military	 action	 is	 often	 necessitated	 by	 the	 “absence	 of	 a	 viable	 civic	 political	
associations”.	Samatar	(2009)	submits	that	common	civic	belonging	is	possible	and	there	have	
been	many	cases	demonstrated	in	Somali	politics.	A	case	in	point	is	Somali	Youth	League	(SYL)	
where	despite	being	the	least	favourite	political	movement	for	colonialists,	it	emerged	as	a	victor	
in	the	Mogadishu’s	municipal	election	in	1955.		
Samatar	(2006b)	also	argues	that	clan	identity	is	not	the	only	main	determinant	of	social	and	
political	organisation	among	the	Somalis.	He	points	out	that	the	Somali	traditional	and	moderate	
practices	of	Islam	provide	an	important	platform	of	common	citizenship	where	different	clans	
can	see	that	they	belong	to	a	community	above		clan	segmentation	(Samatar,	2006b).	Equally,	
clan	 identity	 is	 context	bound	and	 can	be	overridden	by	 social	 and	political	 occurrences.	He	
further	points	out	that	recent	events	in	which	the	Islamic	courts	were	able	to	mobilise	cross	clan	
support	for	their	efforts	shows	that	clan	is	not	the	big	elephant	in	Somali	politics	and	it	can	be	
overcome	 in	 many	 instances	 through	 nationalist	 or	 religious	 means.	 In	 other	 words,	 both	
external	 and	 internal	 factors	 can	 bring	 about	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 Somalis	 can	 act	
nationalistically.	An	important	example	is	the	way	that	the	Islamic	Courts	came	to	prominence	
in	Mogadishu,	which	can	be	explained	by	a	conjunction	of	several	factors.	Firstly,	oppression	by	
warlords;	secondly,	the	way	in	which	Kenya	intervened	and	manipulated	the	peace	process	in	
Embagathi;	thirdly,	the	endorsement	of	the	Islamic	Courts		by	the	international	community	and	
fourthly	the	popular	perception	that	the	West	is	against	Islamic	values	(Samatar,	2006b).	The	
suggestion	 inherent	 in	 this	 view	 is	 that	 clan	 ideals	 and	 identity	 are	 contextual	 and	 can	 be	
configured	and	reconfigured	by	political,	economic	and	social	events	and	occurrences.		
Similarly,	Kapteijns	 (2004)	criticises	 the	absence	of	 the	 ‘impact	of	colonial	 rule’	 in	clan-based	
analyses	of	Somali	society,	which	ignore	the	changes	that	may	have	occurred	to	the	concept	of	
clan	during	this	period.	She	provides	three	examples	of	how	the	impact	of	colonial	rule	on	clan-
based	Somali	social	and	political	organisation	could	be	teased	out.	Firstly,	the	division	of	Somali	
land	 is	 put	 forward	 as	 being	 a	 drastic	 measure	 cutting	 communities	 from	 each	 other	 and	
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therefore	 altering	 their	 clan-based	 interdependence.	 Secondly,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 colonial	
administration	 in	 using	 and	 abusing	 the	 clan-based	 political	 structures	 through	 a	 process	 of	
formalisation	in	which	the	state	imposed	itself	on	its	subjects	is	overlooked.	She	argues	that	this	
reinvention	of	 traditional	 institutions	by	 the	colonial	administration	altered	 the	 fundamental	
tenets	of	Somali	political	organisation	and	dented	its	image.		Equally,	Besteman	(1998,	p.	110)	
argues	 that	 even	 though	 the	 kinship	 skeleton	 remains,	 its	 content	 has	 changed	 due	 to	 the	
pressures	imposed	on	it	by		global	processes	such	as	“colonialism,	state	building	and	Cold	War”,	
and	these	changes	need	to	be	accounted	for	when	analysing		Somali	society.	This	perspective	
advances	Somalis	as	being	one	ethnic	group,	organised	through	membership	of	a	kinship	system	
of	 association,	 but	 warns	 of	 the	 danger	 apparent	 in	 the	 ‘deployment	 of	 this	 genealogical	
difference’	as	the	basis	for	politics		(Samatar,	2006a).		
This	perspective	also	underlines	how	Somali	political	crises	have	been	rooted	in	the	politicisation	
of	genealogical	differences	among	the	Somalis	and	if	this	 is	reinvented	it	will	 lead	to	another	
disaster	 as	 Somali	 cultural	 values	 and	 the	 political	 exploitation	 of	 clan	 identities	will	 collide.	
While	this	perspective	has	successfully	provided	alternative	understandings	of	Somali	social	and	
political	organisation,	like	the	previous	perspective,	it	also	fails	to	elaborate	the	utilities	of	clan	
in	 the	 spatial	 character	 of	 cities	 in	 the	 Somali	 territories	 and	 its	 role	 in	 urban	 governance.	
Moreover,	critics	of	this	perspective	point	to	the	usefulness	of	clan	as	an	organisational	asset	
and	readily	point	to	the	clan-based	segregation	apparent	 in	almost	all	 	aspects	of	the	Somali	
society	 (Luling,	 2006).	 This	 accords	 well	 with	 the	 assumption	 inherent	 in	 the	 early	 Somali	
scholarship	which	characterises	the	Somalis	as	culturally	fractious	and	prone	to	violence	because	
of	the	power	of	clan.		In	riposte,	advocates	of	the	Samatarian	perspective	postulate	that	a	far	
better	explanation	for	the	destruction	and	anarchy	in	Somali	politics	can	be	found	in	the	obvious	
hegemonic	struggle	between	powerful	political	forces	who	seek	refuge	in	identity	politics	and	
use	it	instrumentally	as	a	means	to	realise	their	aims	(Samatar,	1992,	Samatar,	1988,	Samatar,	
2009).		
This	 argument	 against	 an	 essentialist	 view	 of	 clan	 is	 further	 reinforced	 when	 the	 practices	
committed	in	the	name	of	clan	are	separated	from	the	clan	as	a	mode	of	social	organisation.	For	
instance	 Samatar	 (2006a,	 p.	 57)	 distinguishes	 clanism	 “as	 the	 political	 mechanism	 for	
manipulating	 community	 sentiment	 along	 sectarian	 lines”	 from	 clan	 as	 the	 “genealogical	
differences	[that]	have	been	one	of	the	elements	of	Somali	tradition,	but…never	 induced	the	
kind	of	mayhem	that	mar	[the	Somali]	society”	now.	Samatar	(1997)	seeks	to	validate	this	point	
in	his	comparative	study	of	Botswana	and	Somalia	where	he	argues	 that	 these	 two	societies	
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have	taken	two	different	paths	despite	having	similar	ecological	and	cultural	elements.	Whereas	
one	created	a	sectarian	and	exclusive	norm,	the	other	enjoys	a	civil	and	inclusive	system.	In	this	
view,	when	the	civic	state	prevails,	legitimacy	is	enforced	and	national	identity	is	strengthened	
leading	to	the	entrenchment	of	a	democratic	culture	and	enhancement	of	peaceful	coexistence.	
While	 the	 author	 does	 not	 focus	 on	 the	 urban	 level,	 the	 same	point	 could	 be	made	 for	 the	
formation	 of	 spatially	 segregated	 cities	 in	 Somaliland,	 which	 are,	 as	 will	 be	 argued	 in	 the	
empirical	chapters,	to	a	 large	extent	the	outcome	of	 low	levels	of	 legitimacy	and	trust	 in	the	
state.		
At	the	subnational	level,	scholarly	debates	about	recent	state-building	in	Somaliland	focus	on	
the	hybrid	political	order	whose	history	can	partly	be	traced	to	SNM’s	manifesto	of	1982.		The	
manifesto	 advocated	 a	 decentralised	 system	 of	 governance	 for	 the	 post	 Barre	 political	
dispensation,		aimed	at	incorporating	clan-based	politics	as	well	as	regional	identities	(Prunier,	
1998,	Gilkes,	1999).	Like	the	previous	strands	of	argument,	these	debates	neglect	the	urban	level	
in	their	discussion	of	the	hybrid	state	building	in	Somaliland.	They	too	accredit	success	to	the	
significant	role	of	traditional	institutions	in	mediating	post-war	clan	and	political	conflicts.	The	
first	of	these	conflicts	took	place	in	Burao	in	September	1991	where	local	clan	militias	collided.	
This	undermined	the	optimism	that	followed	the	declaration	of	independence,	as	pro-SNM	clans	
were	thought	to	benefit	 from	the	new	state	disproportionately	and	at	the	expense	of	others	
(Farah	and	Lewis,	1997).	The	second	conflict	took	place	in	Berbera	in	March	1992	when	the	SNM	
administration	tried	to	impose	control	over	the	port	of	Berbera	and	the	local	clans	refused	to	
abide	by	that	order.	Not	long	thereafter,		the	third	major	political	conflict	took	place	in	Hargeisa	
and	Burao	in	1994	(Bradbury,	2008)	as	some	of	the	clans	felt	that	they	were	not	given	their	due	
share	in		government	structures.	These	conflicts	occurred	against	the	backdrop	of	excitement	
about	Somaliland’s	statehood	and	most	people	felt	that	clans	who	supported	the	SNM	to	fight	
Barre	would	not	 fight	among	 themselves	 (Farah	and	Lewis,	1997).	A	major	dimension	of	 the	
political	 conflicts	 in	 Somaliland	 which	 was	 not	 captured	 in	 the	 literature	 relates	 to	 an	
observation	made	by	Menkhaus	(2003)	in	relation	to	Southern	Somalia.	He	argues	that	when	
conflicts	 devolve	 in	 a	 lower	 level	 of	 the	 genealogical	 chain,	 the	 scale	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
conflict	 reduces.	 This	 observation	may	 also	well	 explain	 an	 important	 factor	 that	 expedited	
peace	 in	 Somaliland,	 as	 clans	 had	 become	war	 weary	 during	 the	 final	 years	 of	 the	 political	
conflict	and	could	no	longer	afford	to	sustain	the	war.	The	political	class	in	both	camps	had	also	
realised	 that	 their	 days	 were	 numbered	 before	 the	 public	 turned	 their	 back	 on	 them.	 This	
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created	friction	between		politicians	within	the	same	factions	as	they	started	accusing	each	other	
of	being	beneficiaries	of	the	war	(Balthasar,	2013).	
The	peacebuilding	processes	in	Somaliland	began	with	clan-based	meetings	largely	sanctioned	
by	the	SNM	and	were	motivated	by	a	desire	to	reconcile	the	clans	 in	Somaliland	rather	than	
inflame	 their	differences.	 These	 clan-based	peace	 initiatives	paved	 the	way	 for	bigger	peace	
conferences	to	settle	political	differences	between	the	clans.	The	first	major	peace	conference	
in	Somaliland	took	place	in	Burao	in	1991	(Bradbury,	2008).	The	convention	of	this	conference	
was	aimed	at	reconciling	the	clans	so	as	to	enhance	the	legitimacy	of	the	SNM	administration	in	
the	region.	The	conference	addressed	the	difference	between	the	clans	in	the	North	and	laid	
the	foundation	for	the	present	day	Somaliland	administration.	It	was		this	conference	that	saw	
the	 reinstatement	of	 Somaliland’s	 statehood	against	 the	wish	of	 SNM	 top	 leadership	 (Walls,	
2011).	In	spite	of	initial	public	approval,	political	conflicts	erupted	between	the	clans	mainly	over	
hegemony	and	resource-sharing	in	the	newly	founded	state.	The	second	major	conference	in	
Somaliland	was	a	response	to	these	conflicts	and	it	occurred	in	Sheikh	in	October	1992.	Several	
key	issues	were	agreed	in	this	conference,	including	the	designation	of	major	ports	and	airports	
as	a	national	asset.	Bradbury	(2008)	suggests	that	this	conference	was	a	defining	moment	for	
the	Guurti	(a	state-wide	council	of	elders)	as	it	paved	the	way	for	its	formalisation.	Walls	(2009)	
observes	that	there	were	two	outcomes	from	the	conference;	a	ceasefire	agreement	between	
the	warring	clans	and	the	foundation	for	another	peace	conference	to	be	held	in	Borama.	The	
Borama	conference	was	from	the	beginning	‘intended	to	be	a	bigger’	conference	and	aimed	to	
have	 a	 fundamental	 impact	 on	 the	 country’s	 political	 landscape.	 Even	 though	 the	 Borama	
conference	 was	 more	 to	 do	 with	 state-building	 than	 peace-building,	 the	 existence	 of	 the	
different	militias	loyal	to	their	respective	clans	and	other	freelancers	who	were	bent	on	making	
money	 for	 themselves	 caused	 concern	 for	 the	 participants,	 such	 that	 peace-related	 issues	
remained	at	the	heart	of	the	conference.			
2.2.3 Role	of	Customary	Institutions	in	Hybridity	
The	overall	drive	towards	hybrid	political	order	in	Somaliland	can	best	be	characterised	as	an	
attempt	aimed	at	constituting	or	 reconstituting	public	 trust	and	state	 legitimacy	 in	 the	post-
conflict	context.	Key	to	this	attempt	is	the	enmeshment	of	traditional	institutions	in	the	modern	
state	building	processes.	In	the	Somali	context,	this	is	not	a	new	phenomenon.	In	both	the	recent	
and	distant	past	of	state	formation	in	the	Somali	peninsula,	‘modern’	and	‘traditional’	forms	of	
governance	in	many	cases	contradicted,	coexisted	and	complemented	each	other.	For	instance,	
31	|	P a g e 	
	
	
colonial	administrators	often	collaborated	with	clan	elders.	Farah	and	Lewis	(1997)	describe	the	
process	of	delegating	 responsibility	 to	 the	elders	during	 the	colonial	era	when	Akils	 (Chiefs),	
were	 paid	 to	 perform	 some	 state	 functions.	 In	 post-colonial	 times,	 traditional	 systems	were	
again	used	by	the	state	in	order	to	bring	about	law	and	order	among	the	populace,	particularly	
in	rural	areas.	What	is	unique	about	the	current	hybrid	political	order	in	Somaliland	is,	perhaps,	
the	 scale	 rather	 than	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 mixture.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
traditional	systems	are	formalised	and	constitutionally	sanctioned	is	new.	In	the	past,	however,	
Akils	and	pro-government	elders	were	also	key	instruments	through	which	the	state	maintained	
law	and	order	 in	 a	 politically	 charged	environment	where	most	 of	 the	 ‘people	 regarded	 the	
government	 as	 an	 enemy	 and	 declined	 to	 cooperate.	 Akils	were	 important	 for	 these	 efforts	
because	of	their	knowledge	about	the	members	of	their	clans	and	the	fact	that	they	could	easily	
facilitate	the	capture	of	suspects	and	impoundment	of	livestock.	For	instance,	Rayne	(1921,	p.	
21)	wrote	that	“a	wanted	man’s	Akil	may	be	ordered	to	produce”	a	suspect	“instead	of	sending	
a	[messenger]	to	call”	him.	For	many	people,	Akils	were	part	of	the	problem	since	they	were	
voluntarily	or	involuntarily	working	with	an	illegitimate	state	security	apparatus.		
But	it	is	important	to	remember	that	the	politics	of	chieftaincy	was	characterised	by	diversity	as	
it	 was	 underpinned	 by	 individual	 agency.	 Indeed,	 this	 diversity	was	 characteristic	 of	 African	
contexts	more	 broadly,	 as	 some	 chiefs	willingly	 supported	 the	 colonial	 powers	while	 others	
opposed.	According	to	von	Trotha	(1996,	p.	80)	“this	diversity	was	transformed	and	subsumed	
into	 a	 unifying	 administrative	 structure....organised	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 institutional	 innovations	
following	three	principles:	those	of	devolution,	hierarchy	and	the	administrative”		(von	Trotha,	
1996,	 p.	 80).	 Firstly,	 the	 principal	 of	 devolved	 powers	 upheld	 	 the	 colonial	 state’s	 right	 of	
‘appointment	and	 removal	of	 chiefs	as	 its	 sole	prerogative	 (von	Trotha,	1996);	 secondly,	 the	
principal	 of	 hierarchy	 meant	 that	 the	 colonial	 government	 could	 invent	 and/or	 modify	 the	
institution	 of	 chieftaincy	 to	 serve	 as	 auxiliary	 communicative	means	 between	 itself	 and	 the	
population;	and	thirdly	the	principal	of	administration	underpinned	the	colonial	government’s	
introduction	of	 territoriality	and	 jurisdictional	district	boundaries	 for	 local	governance.	 In	the	
case	of	Somaliland,	the	institution	of	chieftaincy	preceded	the	British	colonial	administration.	It	
was	inherited	from	the	Egyptians	who	constituted	chiefs	among	the	Somalis	during	their	brief	
rule	prior	to	the	arrival	of	the	British,	to	facilitate	basic	administrative	functions	such	as	record	
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keeping	and	population	counts	for	their	officials	in	the	coastal	towns.	Each	Akil	was	responsible	
for	a	dia-paying	group11	and	would	report	back	to	his	Egyptian	superiors	in	Berbera	and	Zeila.		
Even	 though	 the	 customary	 institutions	 were	 not	 limited	 to	 only	 Akils,	 they	 became	 the	
preferred	colonial	means	of	governance	in	the	Protectorate	during	British	rule.	The	home-grown	
Sultanate	system	of	public	authority,	which	had	better	social	standing	and	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	
of	 the	 public,	was	marginalised	 to	 a	 significant	 degree.	 	Unlike	Akils,	 the	 public	 authority	 of	
Sultans	was	not	a	colonial	invention.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	Sultans	were	totally	outside	the	
state	but	rather	the	level	of	Akils’	engagement	was	pronounced.	One	of	the	reasons	why	Akils	
were	 preferred	 as	 an	 administrative	 instrument	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 could	 cover	 wider	
geographical	 areas	 by	 their	 sheer	 far	 greater	 number	 than	 the	 Sultans	 who	 were	 few	 and	
represented	 bigger	 clan	 groupings.	 According	 to	 Lewis	 (1955,	 p.	 585),	 the	 institution	 of	
chieftaincy	 (i.e.	 Akil)	 was	 highly	 revered	 or	 feared.	 He	 observes	 that	 “chief's	 glance	 [was]	
referred	to	as	(il	kulul)	'the	burning	eye'	…	his	person	is	so	strongly	endowed	with	power	that	
among	some	closely	related	tribes	it	is	usual	for	a	visiting	chief	to	avoid	a	face	to	face	encounter	
with	 his	 equivalent	 and	 to	 be	 greeted	 indirectly	 by	 a	 representative”.	 Consequent	 upon	 his	
special	relation	with	God,	a	chief	can	call	down	blessing	or	misfortune	upon	his	people	and	their	
stock”.	As	evident	here,	the	chiefs	are	represented	as	the	agent	of	God,	which	deviates	from	the	
general	perception	of	chiefdom	as	a	political	position,	which	was	and	still	is	subject	to	challenge	
by	the	mainly	egalitarian	society	 in	which	 it	operates.	The	author	himself	points	out	that	the	
chiefs’	decisions	were	mainly	voluntary	as	there	was	no	special	police	to	enforce	their	decisions.		
Functionally,	the	Akil	system	was	constituted	in	two	ways.	The	first	was	based	on	peoples’	choice	
and	 clans	 were	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 nominate	 an	 Akil	 and	 present	 their	 choice	 to	 the	
government,	 while	 the	 second	 was	 based	 on	 government	 selection	 where	 the	 District	
Commissioner	(DC)	appointed	the	Akil	without	necessarily	consulting	the	clan.	Deceased	Akils	
were	inherited	in	many	cases	by	their	next	of	kin.	The	colonial	administrators	did	not	consider	
the	 Akil	 system	 they	 introduced	 as	 wholly	 traditional	 but	 they	 were	 hopeful	 that	 it	 would	
transform	into	an	indigenous	form	of	governance	having	features	and	properties	of	traditional	
leadership.	The	primary	administrative	function	of	this	institution	was	basically	determined	by	
the	 colonial	 administrators	 and	 most	 importantly	 the	 District	 Commissioner	 whose	 orders	
																																								 																				
11	Dia	 is	a	blood	money	and	a	dia	group	 is	comprised	of	members	of	a	clan	who	collectively	pay	blood	
money	 in	 cases	 where	 one	 of	 their	 members	 causes	 death	 within	 or	 outside	 the	 clan	 accidently	 or	
deliberately.	
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outlined	 the	 duties	 and	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 Akils.	 In	 other	words,	 Akils	were	 government	
agents	as	well	as	traditional	authorities.	Even	though	Akils	were	seen	as	colonial	stooges	they	
were	nevertheless	needed	by	 their	 subjects,	as	 they	were	 the	most	effective	means	 through	
which	the	population	could	make	contact	with	the	state.	The	need	for	Akils’	mediation	was	even	
made	greater	in	situations	where	a	collective	punishment	involving	the	confiscation	of	property	
and	seizure	of	livestock	was	carried	out	against	clans	(Millman,	2013).	Understandably,	for	this	
reason,	 among	 others,	 Akils’	 intervention	 often	 necessitated	 that	 people	 of	 the	 same	 clan	
background	concentrate	 in	areas	where	 they	 could	easily	 get	 access	 to	 their	Akils	 and	other	
support	system	inherent	 in	the	clan	structure.	Despite	these	historic	roles	of	Akils	as	colonial	
state	agents,	there	is	nonetheless	a	consensus	in	the	literature	about	the	key	role	of	traditional	
authorities	in	the	more	recent	hybrid	state-building	processes.		
There	is,	however,		an	emergent	trend	in	the	literature	on	state-making	that	provides	a	crucial	
case	 for	 going	 beyond	 hybridity	 (Hoehne,	 2013,	 Hoehne,	 2011).	 Furthermore,	 the	 role	 of	
customary	 institutions	 in	 the	hybrid	order	can	be	critiqued	 in	a	number	of	ways.	The	 idea	of	
hybridity	evokes	an	image	in	which	state	institutions	are	made	of	two	forms	of	governance	that	
are	nicely	fitting	and	merged	–	it	is	cast	as	a	magic	medicine	that	could	revive	the	Somali	state	
or	other	African	states.	Put	 it	differently,	 the	role	of	 the	customary	 institutions	 in	 the	hybrid	
order	 is	over-emphasised	and	represented	as	the	missing	 link	that	can	explain	the	difference	
between	successful	governance	and	 failed	attempts	of	 top	down	 international	 interventions.	
This	 representation	 seems	 exaggerated	 and	might	 in	many	 cases	 jar	with	 the	 reality	 on	 the	
ground.	 For	 instance,	 one	 could	 question	 the	 extent	 to	which	 institutions	 in	 Somaliland	 are	
hybrid.	Apart	from	the	Guurti,	the	house	of	elders,	there	is	no	notable	national	level	institution	
which	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 being	 hybrid	 in	 Somaliland.	 This	 is	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	
assumption	inherent	in	the	literature	that	sees	hybridity	as	a	golden	thread	that	goes	through	
the	state	structures	in	Somaliland.		
Additionally,	some	scholars	accuse	the	hybrid	orders	of	being	instrumentalised.	At	the	heart	of	
these	accusations	is	the	fact	that	the	customary	institutions	are	increasingly	becoming	co-opted	
by	 the	 political	 elites	 in	 the	 executive	 branch	 of	 the	 government.	 For	 instance,	 traditional	
authorities	 in	 Somaliland	 were	 accused	 of	 transforming	 into	 institutions	 that	 undermine	
democratic	progress	and	hence	further	exacerbate	the	already	bleak	image	of	state	legitimacy	
(Hashi,	2005).	Other	sceptics	of	the	 long	term	applicability	of	the	hybrid	political	order	argue	
that	 hybrid	 state-building	 processes	 have	 outlived	 their	 usefulness	 and	 what	 remains	 now	
“undermines	democratic	progress…and	legitimate	authority	of	the	state	institutions	as	well	as	
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the	leading	traditional	authorities	in	the	region”	(Hoehne,	2013,	p.	199).	The	author	also	outlines	
a	number	of	weaknesses	inherent	in	the	traditional	systems,	which	gets	transferred	to	the	state	
when	 the	 tradition	 and	 the	modern	 are	 combined	 to	 form	one	political	 order.	 For	 instance,	
traditional	systems	may	be	effective	at	 the	 local	 level	but	 they	might	be	 less	effective	at	 the	
national	level	and	lead	to	divisions	between	clans,	as	their	authority	is	limited	to	their	particular	
clan	of	belonging.	Traditional	systems	also	have	a	tendency	of	being	biasing	against	women	and	
young	people.	 	 If	 they	continue	to	be	a	significant	part	of	 the	state	structures,	 they	could	all	
present	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 democratic	 and	 equitable	 participation	 in	 the	 political	
processes	where	women	have	 the	same	rights	 in	 state	affairs	as	 their	male	counterparts.	As	
evident	 here,	 the	 interaction	 between	 traditional	 and	 modern	 ways	 of	 governance	 are	
“characterised	by	complementarity	and	incompatibility”(Renders,	2007,	p.	441)	in	contrast	to		
representations	that	cast	their	relationship	as	blended	and	functioning	well	together.		
A	major	weakness	in	the	hybrid	state-building	argument	is		what	Hoehne	(2013)	calls	imbalanced	
state-building,	 in	 which	 the	 modern	 structures	 of	 the	 state	 dominate	 the	 incorporated	
traditional	structure,	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	Guurti.	In	spite	of	its	formal	inclusion	in	the	state	
structure,	 the	 current	 political	 dispensation	 in	 Somaliland	 makes	 the	 Guurti	 functionally	
marginal.	 This	 undermines	 the	 quest	 for	 state	 legitimacy,	 which	 was	 the	 main	 reason	 why	
traditional	 institutions	were	 incorporated	 in	 the	 first	place.	The	Guurti’s	 standing	among	 the	
public	 is	 vulnerable.	 They	 are	 not	 elected	 and	 they	 have	 on	many	 occasions	 prevented	 the	
democratic	process	by	either	extending	their	term,	or	that	of	the	executive.	Moreover,	Guurti	is	
traditionally	 a	 dynamic	 institution	 in	 which	 any	 male	 capable	 of	 commanding	 respect	 can	
represent	the	clan	and	perform	the	functions	known	for	Guurti	i.e.	mediation	of	disputes	and	
conflict.	 This,	 coupled	with	 their	 institutionalisation	 as	part	of	 the	 state,	has	 cost	 them	 their	
legitimacy	among	the	populace,	and	by	implication	worsened	that	of	the	state	(Renders,	2007).		
2.3 Beyond	Hybridity:	Legitimacy,	Trust	and	Segregation		
For	the	above-mentioned	reasons	as	well	as	the	fact	that	hybridity	fails	to	illuminate	the	quality	
of	 interaction	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 people	 and	 the	 spatial	 manifestation	 of	 such	
interaction,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 go	 beyond	 existing	 debates	 over	 'hybridity'	 to	 understand	 urban	
spatial	form	and	the	unban	institutions	that	shape	settlement	patterns.	The	argument	here	is	
that	the	literatures	on	urban	segregation,	state	legitimacy	and	trust	are	more	able	to	provide	
new	understandings	of	 the	dynamics	 that	 shape	 the	 spatial	 character	 of	Hargeisa	 and	other	
Somali	cities.	While	hybridity	generally	focuses	on	the	nature	of	state	 institutions	and	can	be	
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descriptive	of	 the	 character	 of	 state-building,	 the	 concepts	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 trust	 are	more	
concerned	with	the	quality	of	interaction	between	the	state	and	the	people.	As	such,	they	can	
provide	a	better	understanding	of	urban	governance	and	segregation	in	Hargeisa.		
2.3.1 Understanding	Legitimacy	and	Trust		
Tyler	(2006,	p.	1),	defines	legitimacy	as	a	“psychological	property	of	an	authority,	institution,	or	
social	arrangement	that	leads	those	connected	to	it	to	believe	that	it	is	appropriate,	proper,	and	
just”.	This	is	reinforced	by	the	OECD	(2010,	p.	15)’s	postulation	that	a	“political	order,	institution	
or	 actor	 is	 legitimate	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 people	 regard	 it	 as	 satisfactory	 and	 believe	 that	 no	
available	alternative	would	be	vastly	 superior”.	 The	OECD	 (2010),	differentiates	at	 least	 four	
forms	 of	 state	 legitimacy.	 First	 is	 ‘process	 legitimacy’,	 which	 is	 about	 setting	 the	 rules	 of	
engagement	between	citizens	and	the	state.	Second	is	‘performance	legitimacy’,	which	is	about	
the	state’s	performance	against	a	set	of	measures	believed	to	indicate	level	of	performance	i.e.	
service	 delivery.	 Third	 is	 legitimacy	 that	 emerges	 from	 shared	 beliefs	 and	 social	 practices	
informed	 by	 values,	 ideology	 or	 religion.	 And	 finally,	 there	 is	 a	 legitimacy	 that	 derives	 from	
recognition	of	the	state	by	external	actors	ascertaining	its	sovereignty,	which	in	turn	impacts	on	
its	internal	legitimacy.		
Discussions	over	 legitimacy	are	important	for	understanding	state-building	processes.	Lemay-
Hébert	 (2009)	 divides	 state-building	 debates	 into	 two	main	 camps.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 is	 the	
‘institutional	approach’,	which	builds	on	the	Weberian	conceptualisation	of	the	territorial	and	
organisational	control	of	the	state,	through	the	monopoly	of	violence,	which	is	case	as	a	crucial	
element	for	understanding	legitimacy.	In	this	approach,	state	legitimacy	is	also	measured	by	the	
state’s	ability	to	devise	plans	or	policies	and	its	ability	to	enforce	regulations	and	laws	through	
accountable	 and	 transparent	 processes	 and	 instruments	 of	 power	 (Fukuyama,	 2004a).	 The	
second	 approach	 draws	 heavily	 on	 Durkheimian	 state-building	 perspectives	 and	 it	 places	
emphasis	not	on	the	physical	structures	and	institutions	of	the	state,	but	rather	the	political	and	
social	aspects	of	the	state	i.e.	the	people	who	constitute	the	powers	in	institutional	structures	
(Buzan,	 2008).	 As	 evident	 here,	 these	 conceptions	 of	 the	 state	 also	 vary	 in	 their	
conceptualisation	of	legitimacy,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	emphasise	it.	According	to	Lemay-
Hébert	(2009),	the	institutional	approach	places	emphasis	on	the	relationship	between	service	
delivery	and	legitimacy	as	a	fulfilment	of	the	social	contract	between	ruler	and	ruled	(Rotberg,	
2004	 ),	while	 in	 the	 legitimacy	 approach,	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	
democracy	exists	are	seen	as		factors	enhancing	legitimacy	(Fukuyama,	2004b).		
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The	 literature	 also	makes	other	distinctions	 in	 how	 to	understand	 the	 concept.	 For	 instance	
Gilley	 (2006)	makes	a	distinction	between	objective	and	 subjective	 legitimacy.	 The	 former	 is	
based	on	impartial	observation	of	state	behaviour,	how	people	view	the	state	as	well	as	their	
level	of	 trust,	whereas	the	 latter	 is	based	on	subjective	experience	and	 interpretation	by	the	
opinion	givers.	The	policy	implications	of	these	different	analytical	perspectives	on	legitimacy	
take	two	forms,	descriptive	and	prescriptive,	as	mapped	by	Hoffman	and	Kirk	(2013).	The	former	
places	 the	 emphasis	 on	 understanding	 legitimacy	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 specifics	 of	 beliefs	 and	
perceptions	and	how	this	shapes	the	way	people	relate	to	and	assess	the	state	(Andersen,	2011).	
The	latter	places	emphasis	on	normative	indicators	based	on	universal	guidelines	(Bellina	et	al.,	
2009).	 This	 is	 mainly	 concerned	 with	 improving	 political	 legitimacy,	 and	 it	 is	 particularly	
important	for	countries	going	through	delicate	democratic	transitions,	assuming	that	the	level	
of	state	legitimacy	is	likely	to	increase	voluntary	compliance	with	rules	and	regulations	(Moehler,	
2005).		
Further	differentiation	of	legitimacy	include	input,	output	and	throughput	legitimacy	(Schmidt,	
2013).	The	input	legitimacy	is	concerned	with	the	citizen’s	participation	in	the	decision	making	
processes	whereas	output	is	concerned	with	the	performance	of	the	state	institutions	entrusted	
with	discharging	public	service.	The	throughput	is	concerned	more	with	the	processes	through	
which	 both	 the	 input	 and	 output	 as	 well	 as	 the	 practices	 and	 cultures	 which	 shape	 their	
interaction	are	constituted	(Lieberherr).							
State	 legitimacy	 is	 associated	with	 effective	 institutional	 development.	 Positive	 attributes	 of	
high	state	 legitimacy	 include	 increased	voluntary	engagement	 in	governance,	as	well	as	non-
coercive	 compliance	 with	 rules	 and	 regulations.	 In	 other	 words,	 legitimacy	 is	 believed	 to	
enhance	 state	 capacity	 as	 it	 spares	 the	need	 to	 devote	 resources	 to	 coercion	 (OECD,	 2010).	
Consequently,	states	are	often	keen	to	increase	positive	regard	from	the	public.	In	a	continent	
marred	by	authoritarianism,	one	of	the	most	popular	means	through	which	political	legitimacy	
is	pursued	is	elections,	whether	genuine	or	nominal	(Moehler,	2005).	But	the	pitfall	of	pursuing	
legitimacy	 through	 elections	 is	 that	 people’s	 perception	 is	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 shaped	by	
which	political	party	they	identify	with.	The	author	observes	that	in	many	African	countries,	it	is	
likely	 that	 losers	 of	 elections	 may	 display	 negative	 perceptions	 towards	 state	 institutions	
whereas	those	who	voted	for	the	winning	party	are	likely	to	exhibit	more	trust	in	the	state.	This	
may	 be	 particularly	 pronounced	 in	 cases	 where	 state	 and	 party	 institutions	 are	merged,	 or	
where	parties	have	a	constituency	that	is	defined	by	regional,	ethnic	(or	in	the	Somali	case),	clan	
loyalties.	 Similarly,	 winners	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 defend	 civic	 rights	 than	 losers	 if	 such	 action	 is	
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perceived	to	be	against	the	government	(Moehler,	2005).	An	important	spatial	manifestation	of	
the	weaknesses	in	the	primacy	of	elections	as	a	legitimation	process	is	the	fact	that	such	efforts	
produce	asymmetrical	distributions	of	legitimacy	across	territories,	as	people	living	in	different	
parties	of	a	city	or	country	may	have	significantly	varying	perception	towards	the	state	for	social,	
economic	and	political	reasons.	Even	though	this	is	overlooked	in	the	literature,	it	is	important	
to	point	out	that	identity	politics	in	such	elections	can	often	perpetuate	urban	segregation	along	
ethnic	and	clan	lines.		
According	 Etzioni	 (2011),	 legitimacy	 is,	 more	 often	 than	 not,	 underpinned	 or	 informed	 by	
normative	values	and	social	practices,	“subject	to	moral	dialogues”	but	not	necessarily	produced	
by	them.	In	many	cases,	such	moral	dialogues	inform	the	understanding	of	what	is	considered	
and	 what	 is	 not	 considered	 just.	 But	 Buckley	 (2013)	 problematises	 this,	 underscoring	 the	
importance	 of	 distinguishing	 the	 related	 acts	 of	 justice	 and	 legitimacy.	 While	 just	 can	 be	
understood	as	morally	informed	principles	through	which	decisions	are	appropriated	as	being	
correct,	 legitimacy	 denotes	 rules	 to	 which	 conformance	 is	 attained	 voluntarily	 without	
necessarily	believing	that	such	acts	are	just.	He	points	out	that	“the	concept	of	legitimacy	differs	
from	 the	 concept	 of	 justice	 insofar	 as	 citizens	 accept	 “just”	 principles	 as	 both	 morally	
appropriate	and	morally	correct,	whereas	citizens	accept	“legitimate”	uses	of	public	power	as	
morally	 appropriate	 but	 not	 fully	 correct”	 [ibid,	 p	 329].	 Arguing	 along	 these	 lines,	 	 Samatar	
(2009)	invokes	the	concept	of	faith	(by	which	he	means	devotion	to	particular	values	found	in	
both	the	Islamic	religion	and	nomadic	Somali	culture,	i.e.		egalitarian	“belief	in	self-reliance	and	
development	of	confidence	in	the	community’s	commitment	to	justice”)	as	a	means	of	restoring	
state	legitimacy	that	suffered	from	long	term	negative	attitudes.		
Negative	public	attitudes	towards	the	Somali	state	date	back	to	the	colonial	times	when	most	
of	the	Somali	population	felt	that	the	state	institutions	through	which	they	were	governed	did	
not	represent	their	values	and	beliefs.	This	was	manifested	by	the	stiff	resistance	to	the	colonial	
powers	 from	 their	 arrival	 in	 1884	 to	 their	 departure	 in	 the	 1960	 (Irons,	 2013,	 Hess,	 1964,	
Mohamed,	2002a).	Key	to	this	resistance	was	a	widespread	rejection	of	the	exclusionary	nature	
of		colonial	rule,	which	not	only	imposed	an	alien	state	(s)	but	also	subdivided	Somali	territories	
into	various	entities	(Samatar,	1982,	Mohamed,	1996).	Being	aware	of	such	discontent,	colonial	
authorities	 embarked	 on	 political	manoeuvres	 prior	 to	 independence	 such	 that	 	 some	 loyal	
Somalis	 were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 formal	 governing	 system	 primarily	 to	 bring	 about	 state	
legitimacy	 (Samatar,	 2009,	 Mohamed,	 2002b).	 These	 attempts	 did	 not,	 however,	 yield	
significant	improvements	in	the	relationship	between	the	colonial	state	and	Somalis.	As	a	result,	
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political	resistance	gained	momentum,	leading	to	independence	in	the	1960	(Mohamed,	2004).	
To	 the	dismay	of	many	who	expected	a	 turnaround	 in	how	governance	was	constituted	and	
executed,	the	postcolonial	state	became	a	site	for	fresh	forms	of	struggle	for	resources	mainly	
between	elites.	Similarly,	the	postcolonial	state	inherited	all	instruments	of	repression,	as	those	
who	assumed	the	power	did	not	have	immediate	intentions	of	dismantling	them.		
Consequently,	 public	 perception	of	 state	 legitimacy	made	 little	 if	 any	progress.	 This	 became	
clear	 soon	 after	 independence	when	 poets	 who	were	 strong	 supporters	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	
independence	found	themselves	at	war	again	with	a	new	African	state	replicating	old	colonial	
behaviours.	Among	the	first	to	criticise	the	way	in	which	power-sharing	took	place	and	the	way	
in	 which	 resources	 were	misappropriated	 by	 the	 ruling	 elites	 was	 Ali	 Sugule	 (Sugule,	 1962,	
Sugule,	1966).	Growing	popular	discontent	with	the	immediate	postcolonial	state	facilitated	the	
coup	in	1969.	The	military	officers	who	overthrew	the	civilian	government	were	aware	of	the	
legitimacy	deficit	 from	which	the	civilian	Somali	state	was	suffering.	As	a	result,	 the	first	 few	
years	of	military	rule	were	characterised	by	nation-building	and	development	narratives	aimed	
at	restoring	public	confidence	in	the	state.	This,	however,	did	not	last	long	as	the	military	regime	
became	more	repressive	than	the	civilian	regime	it	replaced.	According	to	Bradbury	(2003),	in	
the	 aftermath	 of	 Somalia's	 war	 with	 Ethiopia	 in	 1997,	 public	 institutions	 were	 dilapidated	
through	 scarcity	 of	 financial	 resources	 and	 dwindling	 aid	 and	 state	 legitimacy	 declined	
significantly	as	clans	became	an	 important	source	of	“patronage	and	protection”.	Those	who	
were	excluded	from	power	and	the	benefits	of	the	state	also	further	entrenched	group	identity	
by	mobilising	resources	through	clan	structures.	By	the	early	1980s,	increased	competition	for	
illicit	and	formal	trade	led	to	increasing	segregation	of	the	military	and	political	elites	and	the	
eventual	 collapse	 of	 the	 state	 in	 Somalia	 [ibid].	 This	 insecurity	 and	 breakdown	 of	 state	 rule	
underpinned	 people’s	 tendency	 for	 concentrating	 in	 particular	 geographical	 locations.	 The	
manner	 in	which	 the	 state	was	 governed	 had	 significantly	 undermined	 trust	 in	 formal	 state	
institutions	 in	 the	 country.	 Trust	 in	 the	 state	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	 understanding	 the	
perpetuation	of	urban	segregation.	This	is	because	trust	plays	an	important	role	in	forming	social	
relationships	based	on	choice	and	reciprocity.	In	other	words,	the	state’s	mode	and	practices	of	
governance	 shapes	 the	 level	of	 credibility	and	 legitimacy	 it	 can	 reciprocally	 receive	 from	the	
public.			
Dunn	(1992,	p.	74)	defines	trust	as	the	“confident	expectation	of	benign	intentions	in	another	
free	 agent”.	 But	 Luhmann	 (1992)	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 confidence	 and	 trust.	While	
confidence	can	be	understood	as	a	certain	level	of	expectations	of	a	person	or	institutions,	trust	
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can	 be	 understood	 as	 being	 based	 on	 previous	 encounters	 and	 confidential	 information	
presupposing	 scenarios	 of	 risk.	 Similarly,	 Dasgupta	 (1992,	 p.	 51)	 places	 emphasis	 on	
expectations	by	defining	 trust	as	a	“sense	of	correct	expectations	about	 the	actions	of	other	
people	 that	have	a	bearing	on	one’s	own	choice	of	action”.	Although	 this	 	does	not	address	
Luhmann	(1992)’s	concern	regarding	assessments	of	risk	as	a	key	component	of	trust,	Gambetta	
(1992,	p.	217)’s	proposal	of	trust	does	seem	to	address	this	concern,	as	he	suggests	that	trust	
“or,	symmetrically,	distrust	[can	be	understood	as]	a	particular	level	of	the	subjective	probability	
with	which	an	agent	assesses	that	another	agent	or	group	of	agents	will	perform	a	particular	
action,	both	before	he	can	monitor	such	action	(or	independently	of	his	capacity	ever	to	be	able	
to	monitor	it)	and	in	a	context	in	which	it	affects	his	own	action”.		
According	to	Dasgupta	(1992),	 trust	can	be	understood	as	a	commodity	governed	by	specific	
market	rules.	For	instance,	when	there	are	deviations	from	normal	practices,	punishments	such	
as	 social	 stigma	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 enforcement	 are	 applied.	 If	 trust	 in	 the	 enforcement	
mechanism	 is	 low,	 the	 possibility	 of	 entering	 into	 agreements	 also	 becomes	 low.	 In	 the	
Somaliland	case,	trust	towards	the	state	is	undermined	by	the	lack	of	equitable	access	to	justice	
and	enforcement	mechanisms	free	from	corruption	and	nepotism	and	hence	people	no	longer	
see	it	fit	to	honour	a	social	contract	with	the	state	as	their	experience	with	the	state	is	mainly	
negative.	Trust	is	therefore	influenced	or	determined	through	a	process	in	which	an	agent	acts	
in	 a	 relationship	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 [ibid].	 In	 other	 words,	 trust	 here	 can	 be	
understood	as	a	 commodity	held	by	 the	public	 and	 traded	 for	a	particular	outcome	of	 state	
governance.	 The	 price	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 reasonable	 arrangements	
acceptable	to	both	sides	are	negotiated.	In	the	case	of	Somaliland,	the	current	arrangements	
are	not	acceptable	to	the	public	and	this	can	help	explain	the	spatial	concentration	of	people	in	
particular	geographical	locations	partly	to	resist	the	state.	This	conceptualisation	of	trust	seems	
to	be	based	on	familiarity,	which	makes	the	latter	a	key	attribute	of	trust.	But	Luhmann	(1992,	
p.	95)	points	out	the	need	for	distinguishing	trust	and	familiarity,	suggesting	that	“familiarity	is	
an	unavoidable	fact	of	life;	whereas	trust	is	a	solution	for	specific	problems	of	risk”.	Here	the	
“specific	problems	of	risk”	are	the	government’s	actions	which	either	enhance	or	erode	trust.			
Historically,	 colonial	 legacies	 and	 the	 manipulation	 of	 state	 instruments	 for	 the	 control	 of	
subjects	 can	be	considered	as	a	major	explanatory	 factor	 for	 the	 loss	of	public	 trust	 in	 state	
institutions	 (Mamdani,	 1996).	 Equally,	 postcolonial	 continuity	 of	 governance	 malpractices	
further	 undermined	 public	 expectations	 of	 independent	 African	 states,	 as	 they	 failed	 to	
constitute	 ruling	 arrangements	 different	 from	 those	 experienced	 during	 the	 colonial	 period	
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(Samatar,	1985).	The	absence	of	significant	trust	in	state	institutions	has	been	worsened	in	many	
African	 contexts	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 military	 dictatorships	 that	 overthrew	 the	 colonially	
induced	fragile	African	democracies	partly	because	of	public	discontent	over	how	those	in	power	
behaved	or	governed.	Most	of	these	military	regimes	did	not,	however,	perform	any	better	than	
those	they	replaced.	According	to	Menkhaus	(2006b),	distrust	towards	the	Somali	state	is	rooted	
in	the	repressive	manner	through	which	public	order	was	constituted	and	implemented.	This	
had	 left	 a	 lasting	 scar	 in	 public	 confidence	 in	 state	 institutions,	 and	 many	 people	 remain	
reluctant	to	see	the	state	resuming	old	powers.	By	implication	this	has	facilitated	or	entrenched	
urban	segregation.		
2.3.2 Conceptualising	Urban	Segregation		
The	terms	of	urban	fragmentation	and	segregation	are	interchangeably	used	in	the	literature	to	
describe	the	urban	form	and	related	social	realities	that	result	from	the	residential	separation	
of	social	groups	on	the	basis	of	identity	i.e.	tribe,	ethnicity,	race,	religion,	ideology,	economic	or	
other	social	statuses.	While,	I	mostly	stick	to	using	segregation,	I	occasionally	also	use	the	term	
fragmentation,	by	which	 I	mean	the	same	as	segregation.	My	aim	below	 is	 first	 to	provide	a	
conceptual	 understanding	 of	 segregation.	 I	 then	 move	 onto	 discussing	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	of	 segregation.	 In	 the	 final	 subsection,	 I	provide	an	overview	of	 the	history	of	
urban	segregation	in	Hargeisa.	Given	the	lack	of	literature	on	segregation	in	Somali	studies,	this	
section	relies	mainly	on	wider	geographical	and	sociological	studies	on	the	concept,	its	causes	
and	its	consequence	in	urban	places.			
Urban	 segregation	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 where	 specifically	 defined	 groups	
occupy	particular	spaces	in	the	city,	voluntarily	or	involuntarily	maintaining	a	distance	from	one	
another	 for	 social,	economic	and	political	 reasons	 (Kaplan	and	Woodhouse,	2005,	Battersby,	
2004,	Muhammad	et	al.,	2015).	 It	 is	a	concept	which,	 from	a	social	and	political	perspective,	
reflects	changing	urban	socio-spatial	realities	as	well	as	the	dynamics	of	power	relations	within	
and	between	people	and	the	state	and	non-state	actors.	From	a	physical	perspective,	it	seeks	to	
account	for	the	changing	geographical	and	territorial	structures	of	places	and	the	impact	this	
could	have	on	urban	liveability	(Navez-Bouchanine,	2002	cited	in	Deffner	and	Hoerning,	2011,	
Dauskardt,	 1993).	 According	 to	 Massey	 and	 Denton	 (1988),	 urban	 segregation	 can	 be	
understood	as	the	outcome	of	social	and	economic	processes,	and	it	can	be	measured	within	a	
basic	 framework	consisting	of	at	 least	 five	main	components.	These	are	the	extent	to	which:	
groups	are	dispersed	across	spatial	units;	group	members	are	exposed	to	each	other	in	urban	
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spaces;	group	members	are	oriented	 towards	a	particular	 central	 residence;	particular	 social	
groups	 are	 concentrated	 in	 a	 physical	 space;	 and	minority	 groups	 are	 clustered	 in	 adjacent	
places.		
A	salient	feature	of	the	debates	over	segregation	 is	the	binary	form	in	which	distinctions	are	
made	between	the	wealthy	and	poor	neighbourhoods	of	the	city,	often	rooted	in	the	historical	
development	trajectories	of		old	and	new,	or	‘traditional’	and	modern	cities	(Muhammad	et	al.,	
2015).	Furthermore,	segregation	can	be	judged	to	be	‘good’	or	‘bad’.		The	former	is	associated	
with	people’s	ability	to	increase	their	chance	of	negotiating	a	better	life	in	urban	places	through	
social	networks	with	neighbours.	 	The		 latter	 is	associated	with	negative	features	such	as	the	
exclusion	of	the	poor	from	opportunities	available	in	the	city	(Peach,	1996).	Van	Kempen	(1994)	
points	 to	 some	of	 the	main	weaknesses	 in	 these	dualistic	 framings,	 chief	among	 them	being	
whether	 segregation	 should	 be	 considered	 at	 the	 city	 or	 conurbation	 level,	 and	 whether	 it	
should	be	considered	as	static	or	dynamic.	Equally,	segregation	studies	are	characterised	by	an	
epistemological	bias,	as	the	focus	tends	to	be	placed	on	areas	populated	by	the	poor,	which	by	
default	makes	wealthy	areas	escape	scrutiny	of	academic	and	policy	debates	over	how	spaces	
should	be	organised	and	inhabited.	Kaplan	and	Woodhouse	(2005)	criticises	the	literature	for	
overlooking		segregation	within	the	same	groups	along	class	lines.	Visser	(2013)	argues	that	this	
can	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 bringing	 about	 integrated	 spaces,	 as	 lack	 of	
understanding	of	the	relatively	wealthy	areas	can	 lead	to	misdiagnosis	and	 ineffectiveness	of	
city-wide	policy	efforts.		
Several	 distinct	 strands	 of	 academic	 writing	 can	 be	 distinguished	 on	 segregation.	 The	 first	
investigates	segregation	as	a	spatial	phenomenon	where	the	city	consists	of	different	segments	
occupied	 by	 various	 sections	 of	 the	 urban	 population	 (Balbo	 and	 Navez-Bouchanine,	 1995,	
Navez-Bouchanine,	 2003,	Navez-Bouchanine,	 2002	 cited	 in	Michelutti,	 undated).	 The	 second	
looks	 at	 urban	 segregation	 from	 a	 social	 perspective	 where	 service	 provision	 is	 analysed	 in	
relation	to	infrastructural	development	and	its	impact	on	disintegration	or	integration	(Coutard,	
2008,	Graham	and	Marvin,	2001).	The	third	considers	segregation	from	an	economic	perspective	
looking	at	the	polarisation	of	urban	economic	spaces	and	the	differential	access	to	opportunities	
and	 services	 (Sassen,	 2002,	 Van	 Kempen,	 1994),	 while	 the	 fourth	 strand	 looks	 at	 political	
segregation	 where	 exclusion	 and	 inclusion	 are	 perpetuated	 through	 power	 relations	 and	
administrative	instruments	used	to	do	or	undo		policy	based	or	non-policy	based	institutional	
practices	(Navez-Bouchanine,	2002,	Pieterse,	2006,	Watson,	2009,	Parnell,	1991).	This	brings	us	
to	 the	 final	 thread	 of	 the	 debate,	 looking	 at	 urban	 segregation	 from	 social	 and	 cultural	
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perspectives	where	conflicting	identities	coexist	and	interact	within	the	same	territory	shaping		
urban	residential	patterns	according	to	cultural	and	ethnic	identities	(Harrison	et	al.,	2003).		It	is	
important	to	point	out	that	the	above-mentioned	themes	are	situated	within		broader	attempts	
to		identify	segregation	dynamics,	its	causes	as	a	phenomenon	and	its	impact	on	urban	liveability	
as	 well	 as	 the	 possible	 means	 through	 which	 its	 negative	 consequences	 can	 be	 mitigated	
(Michelutti,	undated).		
2.3.3 Causes	and	Impact	of	Segregation		
Segregation	 is	 generally	 cast	 as	 	 the	 result	 of	 two	 main	 processes:	 “social	 prejudice”	 and	
economic	malfunctioning’	 	 (K’Akumu	and	Olima,	 2007).	 Social	 segregation	 in	African	 cities	 is	
largely	attributed	to	the	colonial	manipulation	of	space	(Macoloo,	1998).	Mbembe	(2004,	p.	384)	
argues	that	urban	segregation	was	a	“biological	protection	of	the	so-called	white	race	…	[where]	
various	policies	and	regulatory	frameworks	aimed	at	protecting	the	white[s]	from	the	rest	of	the	
population	[were	introduced,	making]	the	…	arts	of	city	building	and	of	inhabiting	…	synonymous	
with	the	creation	of	an	illusory	harmony	and	purity	based	on	the	ﬁction	of	racial	distance”.	In	
addition	 to	such	rationalisations	of	protection,	 segregation	 in	many	cities	during	 the	colonial	
period	 was	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 health	 risks	 such	 as	 malaria	 (Muhammad	 et	 al.,	 2015,	
Murunga,	2012).	Indigenous	people	in	the	continent	were	displaced	from	their	homes	on	the	
basis	of	this	politically	motivated	view	on	hygiene12	(Parnell,	1991).	Policy	instruments	such	as	
urban	planning	and	design	practices	were	used	to	bring	about	domiciliary	separation	between	
social	groups	for	the	benefit	of	one	group	over	another	(Spinks,	2001,	Myers,	2003).		
An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 South	 Africa	 (Dauskardt	 (1993),	 where	 residential	 segregation	 was	
implemented	through		legislation	including	the	Group	Areas	Act,	which	resulted	in	the	removal	
of	many	inner	city	communities	to	urban	fringes.	Similarly,	in	Nairobi,	local	communities	were	
also	removed	from	strategic	parts	of	the	city	to	remote	peripheries	in	the	1910s	(Turton,	1972).	
Postcolonial	cities	often	retained	this	segregated	urban	form	as	they	failed	to	break	away	from		
colonial	mechanisms	of	making	urban	policies	and	places	(Myers,	2010).	As	a	result,	“segregation	
and	 segmentation	 in	 colonial”	 urban	 form	 translated	 into	 a	 high	 level	 of	 inequality	 among	
																																								 																				
12	Regardless	of	how	segregation	 is	 justified,	 in	some	cases,	such	colonially	 induced	segregation	found	
currency	in	the	local	cultures.	For	instance,	in	some	Muslim	cities,	the	indigenous	communities	did	not	
mind	 segregation	 primarily	 because	 they	 wanted	 to	 protect	 their	 values	 from	 colonial	 influence	
(Muhammad,	et	al,	2015).	
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African	populations	as	elites	inherited	the	exclusive	white	areas	while	the	poor	were	left	out.	As	
the	gap	between	the	rich	and	poor	increased,	class	became	in	important	factor	influencing	urban	
segregation	in	Africa,	and	also	led	to	processes	of	self-segregation.		
Lewinson	 (2007)	 provides	 an	 example	 in	 which	 segregation	 came	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	 class	
difference	in	an	East	African	context,	where	office	workers	socially	segregated	themselves	from	
those	 in	the	community	they	considered	as	backward.	Aside	from	class,	community	 interests	
can	 influence	 the	 emergence	 of	 voluntarily	 segregated	 residential	 patterns	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
‟strong	 taste	 for	 sharing	 a	 church	 or	 temple,	 preserving	 customs,	 trading	 with	 each	 other,	
borrowing	 from	 or	 lending	 to	 each	 other,	 speaking	 their	 language	 and	 teaching	 it	 to	 their	
children,	or	enjoying	each	other’s	company	in	day-to-day	affairs”	(Anas,	2006,	p.	542).		Spatial	
segregation	may	 also	 occur,	 either	 deliberately	 or	 inadvertently,	 on	 the	basis	 of	 land	use	or	
following	 infrastructural	 developments.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 cities	 where	 primary	 and	
secondary	 use	 of	 land	 exhibits	 differentiation	 in	 the	 location	 of	 residential	 and	 commercial	
spaces	(K’Akumu	and	Olima,	2007).		
Elaborating	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘splintered	 urbanism’,	 Graham	 and	 Marvin	 (2001)	 posit	 that	
investment	 in	 infrastructural	 networks	 underpinned	 by	 differentiation	 in	 land	 use	 leads	 to	
segregation	 in	urban	spaces,	and	can	negatively	affect	 the	provision	of	services	across	cities.	
Their	 argument	 rests	 on	 four	 key	 points.	 Firstly,	 urban	 development	 tends	 to	 be	 advanced	
through	 the	 provision	 of	modern	 infrastructural	 networks	 across	 national	 economic	 spaces.	
Secondly	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 information	 technologies	 has	 challenged	 the	 assumed	
inevitability	of	connections	through	physical	infrastructure,	as	these	new	technologies	have	to	
some	 extent	 ‛unbundled’	 infrastructural	 development,	 leading	 networks	 to	 be	 segmented.	
Thirdly,	 infrastructural	development	 strategies	 led	 to	 the	emergence	of	premium	networked	
spaces	where	wealthy	people	 live	 in	closed	off	 sections	of	 the	city	most	often	referred	to	as	
gated	communities.	Fourthly,	this	produces	resistance	in	the	form	of	social	movements	opposed	
to	the	inequalities	of	premium	spaces	and	commoditised	networks.		
However,	 the	 idea	 of	 splintered	 urbanism	 was	 heavily	 criticised	 for	 being	West-centric	 and	
ignoring	experiences	from	Non-Western	settings	which	in	most	cases	deviate	from	the	aforesaid	
theorisation	of	urban	segregation	(Coutard,	2008).	Splintered	urbanism	was	also	criticised	for	
the	implication	that	segregation	is	a	new	phenomenon,	which	resulted	from	recent	changes	in	
global	 economic	 interaction	 and	 governance	 practices.	 Kooy	 and	 Bakker	 (2008)	 refute	 this	
44	|	P a g e 	
	
	
suggestion	and	point	out	that	cities	in	many	developing	countries	have	long	been	divided	along	
ethnic	and	socio-economic	lines	prior	to	the	rapid	globalisation	of	economic	and	cultural	flows.		
One	 of	 the	most	 fundamental	 questions	 underpinning	 segregation	 discussions	 is	 that	which	
relates	to	its	impact.	This	is	important	because	segregation	is	not	only	produced	by	particular	
social,	 economic	 and	 political	 realities	 but	 it	 also	 produces	 particular	 social,	 economic	 and	
political	impacts	which	shape	experiences	of	urban	liveability.	These	include	both	negative	and	
perhaps	to	a	lesser	extent	positive	impacts.	Among	the	negative	impacts	of	segregation	include	
the	 political	 marginalisation	 of	 certain	 groups	 that	 can	 flow	 from	 their	 concentration	 in	
particular	areas.	Segregation	can	in	these	cases	lead	to	collective	violence	when	‟discrimination,	
spatial	mismatch,	and	demographic	change	combine”	(Kaplan	and	Douzet,	2011).	Similarly,	Abu-
Lughold	and	Race	(2007)	argue	that	racial	and	ethnic	conflict	can	arise	from	rivalry	over	space	
and	access	to	resources.	The	author	observes	that	conflict	arising	in	such	situations	often	leads	
to	two	tendencies;	either	individuals	move	to	areas	perceived	to	be	safer	for	them	or	they	get	
trapped	within	a	close	circle	of	their	families	or	communities,	often	cutting	themselves	off	from	
the	social	fabric,	a	condition	of	self-isolation	where	children	and	adults	in	the	families	spend	less	
time	 in	 the	 streets.	 	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	 the	 former	 has	 particularly	 relevance	 for	 the	 case	 of	
Hargeisa.	
Moreover,	segregation	can	also	entrench	undesirable	economic	conditions,	as	poor	people	who	
live	in	low	income	areas	are	likely	to	have	less	social	and	economic	mobility	than	poor	people	
living	 in	 non-poor	 locations.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 “particular	 form	 of	 the	 spatial	
configuration	that	arises	in	a	city	shapes	the	horizons	of	possibility.	If	the	horizon	is	extremely	
limited,	spatial	configuration	continues	to	produce	segregation	and	exclusion.	Alternatively,	if	
the	horizons	are	more	open,	we	are	more	inclined	to	use	the	rich	multiplicity	of	spatial	practices	
to	 unleash	 new	 ways	 of	 interaction	 and	 engagement”	 (Pieterse,	 2005,	 p.	 3).	 In	 urban	
management	terms,	segregation	places	a	burden	on	local	authorities’	quest	for	equitable	service	
delivery,	where	such	effort	exists.	For	example,	services	provided	in	low	income	locations	might	
be	lower	than	other	areas	as	municipal	authorities	pay	less	attention	to	areas	with	lower	levels	
of	revenue	generation.		
Segregation	may	also	have	positive	impacts.		Kaplan	and	Douzet	(2011)	observe	that	segregation	
may	 	 have	 contributed	 to	 political	 empowerment	 in	 some	 instances,	 as	 spatial	 separation	
formed	the	basis	on	which	particular	groups	fighting	for	greater	rights	are	incubated	in	areas	
predominantly	occupied	by	their	own	social	groups.	While	some	positive	 impacts	may	follow	
45	|	P a g e 	
	
	
from	voluntary	segregation,	Anas	(2006,	p.	13)	points	out	that	its		crucial	to	identify	the	level	at	
which	 this	 occurs.	 The	 author	 distinguishes	 between	 optimal	 and	 non-optimal	 level	 of	
segregation.	The	former	can	be	understood	as	the	condition	in	which	‟adding	one	more	person	
to	a	[segregated	area]	creates	social	marginal	beneﬁts	and	costs	that	are	equal”.		The	latter	is	
when	the	addition	of	one	or	more	members	to	the	segregated	area	do	not	add	“social	marginal	
beneﬁts”.		Although	such	optimal	separation	may	mitigate	some	of	the	negative	externalities	of	
segregation,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	social	integration	based	on	strong	group	identity	
such	 as	 clan	 or	 regional	 affiliations	 can	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 possible	 instability.	 This	 is	
because	it	creates	an	environment	where	distancing	others	is	the	principle/goal	through	which	
advancement	of	social,	economic	and	political	interests	rotate,	hence	laying	the	foundation	or	
exacerbating	existing	divisions.	In	the	case	of	Hargeisa,	the	spatial	concertation	of	people	along	
clan	 lines	enabled	people	to	resist	 the	state	both	politically	and	violently	when	their	 interest	
are/perceived	to	be	endangered.	
2.3.4 Hargeisa	as	a	Segregated	Space	
In	an	attempt	to	historicise	how	segregation	developed	over	time	in	Hargeisa,	I	briefly	discuss	
the	emergence	of	urban	segregation	during	the	colonial	period.	I	argue	that	urban	segregation	
was	 not	 necessarily	 inevitable	 as	 some	 of	 the	 Somali	 settlements	 prior	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	
colonial	administration	had	signs	of	traversing	clan	and	lineage	boundaries.	I	also	argue	that	the	
postcolonial,	 including	 the	 post-conflict,	 development	 trajectory	 reinforced	 the	 existing	
segregated	nature	of	urban	settlement	in	Hargeisa.	For	the	most	part	during	the	colonial	era,	
Hargeisa	was	not	as	administratively	and	economically	important	for	the	colonial	administration	
as	were	the	Eastern	and	coastal	town.	As	a	result,	the	seat	of	government	for	three	and	half	
decades	was	in	Berbera	and	occasionally	Sheikh.	This	initial	concentration	of	state	structures	in	
Berbera	was	attributable	to	a	range	of	factors.	Firstly	Berbera	was	the	only	all-weather	harbour	
in	Somaliland	(War	Office	General	Staff,	1907)	and	secondly,	it	was	the	biggest	urban	centre	in	
the	country	and	thirdly,	little	was	known	at	the	time	about	the	settlements	in	the	interior	parts	
of	the	country	(See	Swayne,	1996).	More	importantly,	the	coastal	towns	were	perceived	to	be	
more	civilised	and	cosmopolitan	than	the	interior	parts	of	the	country,	as	a	result	of	Indian	and	
Islamic	influences.13		
																																								 																				
13	Capt.	Malcolm	McNeil	of	Somaliland	Field	Force	wrote	in	1902	about	coastal	towns	that	“Indian	ways	
and	customs	(and	with	them	Aden	prices)	came	into	vogue	in	the	Somali	country	where….	the	coinage	is	
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The	colonial	government’s	views	on	cosmopolitanism	were	characterised	by	binary	oppositions	
where	on	the	one	hand	it	considered	cosmopolitan	spaces	as	less	susceptible	to	harbouring	local	
resistance,14	 but	 on	 the	 other	 it	 encouraged	 clan	 segregation	 due	 to	 the	 ease	 with	 which	
administration	functions	were	operable	through	precolonial	institutions,	particularly	the	Akils.	
Prior	to	the	arrival	of	colonial	powers,	Hargeisa	was	a	rural	settlement	populated	by	nomadic	
clans	who	seasonally	migrated	in	and	out	of	the	area.	Permanent	settlement	in	Hargeisa	began	
with	the	arrival	of	Islamic	clerics	in	the	mid-19th	century,	whose	authority	was	cast	as	taking	a	
cosmopolitan	 non	 clannish	 form	 (War	 Office	 General	 Staff,	 1907,	 p.	 51).	 	 Hargeisa’s	 urban	
nucleus	is	attributable	to	Islamic	clerics	who	often	hailed	from	different	clans	and		commanded	
high	levels	of	respect	among	the	nomads	allowing	them	to	“settle	down	and	form	permanent	
villages”	in	any	space	of	their	choosing	regardless	of	their	clan	backgrounds	(Irons,	2013,	p.	20).		
In	addition	to	the	respect	for	the	religion	embodied	by	these	agents	of	God,	tolerance	towards	
Islamic	clerics	was	fostered	by	their	provision	of	educational	and	health	services,	in	many	cases	
free	of	charge	(Briggs,	2012).	Such	services	attracted	people	of	different	backgrounds	seeking	
Islamic	 knowledge	 and	 treatment,	 making	 cleric-dominated	 urban	 places	 cosmopolitan.	
Throughout	the	early	years	of	British	rule,	urban	development	in	Hargeisa	remained	modest	and	
segregated	along	racial,	ethnic	and	clan	lines.		Government	quarters	were	located	in	the	West	
and	served	as	the	area	where	the	whites	and	their	Indian	subordinates	resided,	while	the	Somali	
population	was	mainly	confined	to	the	East	and	the	North	of	the	town.	Maj	Rayne,	who	visited	
Hargeisa,	described	it	as	a	“town	of	sticks/and	native	mats	[and]	a	few	sun-dried	brick	houses”	
and	a	government	quarters	(1921).	The	government	quarters	consisted	of	“district	headquarters	
[with]	European	accommodation	for	officials	and	government	offices	and	other	installations”.15	
The	estimated	population	of	Hargeisa	was	1000	in	1907	(Swayne,	1996)	but	in	little	more	than	
a	decade	this	number	grew	to	2000	making	the	settlement	the	biggest	of	a	half	a	dozen	cleric	
dominated	villages	in	the	interior	parts	of	the	country16		(FOHS,	1919).		
																																								 																				
in	 rupees,	and	Hindustani	been	spoken	by	very	many	Somalis	 is	practically	 the	official	 language	of	 the	
country”	(Fergusson,	2013).	
14	This	is	so	because	the	first	resistance	to	colonial	rule	was	instigated	in	Berbera	by	the	man	later	labelled	
as	the	‘mad	mullah’,	but	he	failed	to	win	the	hearts	and	the	minds	of	the	town’s	elites	who	consisted	of	
people	from	different	ethnic	and	racial	groups.		
15	TNA	CO	535/141/7	The	seat	of	government.	
16	The	estimated	population	of	the	protectorate	at	the	time	was	about	300,000.		
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The	 urban	 significance	 of	 Hargeisa	 was	 boosted	 in	 1942/3	 when	 it	 became	 the	 seat	 of	 the	
protectorate’s	administration	 following	 the	destruction	of	 the	government	offices	 in	Berbera	
during	the	war	with	the	Italians	(Millman,	2013).	The	movement	of	the	capital	was	attributable	
to	a	number	of	factors	that	include:	firstly	the	fact	that	Hargeisa	was	in	close	proximity	to	major	
trade	routes	such	as	Ethiopia	and	Djibouti;	 secondly,	military	attention	shifted	 from	the	east	
following	the	defeat	of	the	Mullah	because	of	the	Italian	presence	in	Ethiopia;	thirdly	Hargeisa’s	
weather	conditions	were	friendlier	than	Berbera	which	gets	extremely	hot	during	the	summer;	
fourthly,	the	Western	part	of	the	country	had	a	higher	population	density	than	the	East;	and	
lastly	Hargeisa	was	by	now	the	largest	interior	settlement	in	the	country.17	Being	the	new	seat	
of	 government,	 Hargeisa	 received	 greater	 infrastructural	 development	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to		
independence	(British	Somaliland	Protectorate,	1945).	These	new	projects	further	entrenched	
the	 spatial	 character	 of	 the	 town	 as	 they	 followed	 the	 previous	 settlement	 patterns.	
Government	offices,	stores,	camps,	and	housing	for	expatriates	(many	of	whom	came	from	the	
other	British	dependencies	in	Asia),	were	built	in	the	Western	side	of	the	city	(British	Somaliland	
Protectorate,	1954,	British	Somaliland	Protectorate,	1958)	while	the	Somali	sections	remained	
underdeveloped	and	neglected.		
The	 spatial	 segregation	 of	 the	 city	 was	 manifest	 not	 only	 in	 physical	 but	 also	 social	 terms.	
According	to	Laurence	and	Thomas	(2010)	there	was	a	clear	social	demarcation	between	the	
European	quarters	of	the	city	and	the	Somali	section.	For	instance,	it	was	a	taboo	for	a	European	
woman	to	visit	the	Somali	populated	part	of	the	town	unaccompanied	or	on	foot.	Moreover,	the	
European	 population	 of	 the	 town	 was	 itself	 also	 divided	 along	 ethnic	 lines	 socially	 and	
economically.	While	Europeans	of	British	descent	mainly	occupied	prestigious	government	jobs,	
Italians	(many	of	whom	were	from	Italian	Somalia)	were	often	engaged	in	non-office	based	jobs	
such	 as	 mechanics	 and	 low-profile	 engineering	 occupations.	 The	 internal	 segregation	 of	
Europeans	was	 not	 limited	 to	 economic	 differences	 but	 also	 social	 disparities.	 Little	 cultural	
interaction	existed	between	the	Italians	and	the	British.	Equally,	the	Somali	population	in	the	
city	was	divided	along	clan	lines.	The	Garhajis.	Arab,	Awal,	and	Ayub	belong	to	the	Isaaq	branch	
of	the	Somali	clans	where	as	Gaboye	belongs	to	the	minority	clans	of	the	Somalia.		
Postcolonial	Hargeisa	retained	the	same	spatial	character	developed	under	colonial	rule.	It	was	
divided	into	quarters;	the	government	quarter	and	the	civilian	quarters.	The	former	housed	the	
																																								 																				
17	TNA	CO	535/141/7	The	seat	of	government.	
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civil	servants	and	other	government	officials	and	unlike	the	rest	of	the	town,	this	section	was	
well	built	by	the	standards	of	the	time	and	it	had	steady	water	supplies	and	electricity	as	well	as	
some	paved	roads.	The	Eastern	civilian	quarter	consisted	of	two	major	neighbourhoods	divided	
by	the	river	bed,	with	the	North	being	a	little	more	built	up	than	the	South.	The	deteriorating	
economic	situation	 in	Somaliland	after	 independence	has	also	 further	entrenched	the	spatial	
segregation	of	the	city.	Four	days	after	independence,	Somaliland	united	with	Somalia	and	this	
dawned	a	new	era	for	Hargeisa	as	meagre	state	resources	were	channelled	to	developing	the	
capital,	 Mogadishu,	 making	 it	 the	 prime	 city	 and	 central	 focus	 of	 action	 for	 all	 sorts	 of	
opportunities.	As	a	result,	the	handful	of	British-trained	skilled	men	and	to	lesser	extent	women	
from	Somaliland	 left	 for	 the	new	seat	of	government.	Equally,	businessmen	from	Somaliland	
increasingly	shifted	their	focus	to	the	South,	leaving	Hargeisa	for	those	unable	or	unwilling	to	
relocate	 for	whatever	 reason.	Soon	after	 independence,	 the	urban	elites	 from	the	North	 felt	
side-lined	 	 notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 believed	 that	 they	 were	more	 qualified	 than	
Southerners	(Gulaid,	undated).		
This	discontent	resonated	with	the	broader	population	in	the	North	who	were	also	increasingly	
realising	that	the	union	was	less	fruitful	than	anticipated.	The	marginalisation	of	the	Northerners	
was	more	visible	in	Hargeisa	than	in	any	other	towns	in	the	country	due	to	the	fact	that	Hargeisa	
in	 the	 latter	 years	 of	 the	 British	 colonial	 power	was	 progressively	 becoming	 a	 capital	 in	 the	
making	 for	 a	 future	 Somaliland	 state.	 In	 the	 two	 decades	 after	 independence,	 however,	
unprecedented	 numbers	 of	 development	 projects	were	 implemented	 in	 the	 South.	 The	 first	
major	 resistance	 to	 this	marginalisation	 came	 in	1962	when	military	officers	 from	 the	North	
staged	 a	 coup	 in	 Hargeisa.18	 Although	 this	 failed,	 there	was	 a	 backlash	 in	 the	 form	 of	 state	
repression	 of	 the	Northern	 population.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 after	 effect	 of	 this	 coup	 further	
entrenched	the	marginalisation	of	Hargeisa.	Civil	servants	from	the	North	were	replaced	with	
Southerners.	This	fuelled	tension	in	the	city	as	people	could	no	longer	identify	with	the	state,	
and	felt	swamped	by	a	larger	and	more	populous	Southern	brother.	It	is	important	to	note	that	
the	 social	 support	 system	 that	 the	 clan	 structure	 provides	 became	 an	 effective	 response	
mechanism	 for	 the	harsh	economic	 reality	 in	which	Northerners	 found	 themselves	 after	 the	
Union.	As	limited	urban	employment	opportunities	made	it	difficult	for	many	Somalis	to	survive	
																																								 																				
18	Capitalising	on	the	discontent	among	the	people	in	the	north,	Col	Hasson	Keyd	Abdille	Walanwal	who	
returned	 from	 Sandhurst	Military	 College	 in	 the	UK	 led	 25	 junior	 officers	 to	 take	 over	major	military	
barracks	and	the	radio	in	Hargeisa.	
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in	Hargeisa,	social	networking	and	clan	contacts	became	the	basis	on	which	newcomers	survived	
the	harsh	economic	 reality	of	 the	 town.	 In	other	words,	 it	was	more	 likely	 for	 somebody	 to	
survive	in	a	neighbourhood	populated	by	his	or	her	kinsmen/women	than	areas	where	that	is	
not	the	case.		
In	the	1980s,	a	civil	war	broke	out	in	the	Northern	regions	of	Somalia	(as	stated	elsewhere	in	
Chapter	2).	The	war	began	as	a	result	of	a	 long-term	marginalisation	of	not	only	the	political	
class	but	also	the	ordinary	people	from	the	North.	Employment	opportunities	became	relatively	
scarce	 in	 the	 northern	 cities	 and	 the	 meagre	 service	 delivery	 inherited	 from	 the	 colonial	
authorities	deteriorated	significantly.	The	Northern	discomfort	however	subsided	in	the	early	
years	of	the	military	coup	which	in	the	beginning	gained	a	significant	public	support	across	the	
country.	As	the	brutality	of	the	military	regime	increased,	the	public	support	started	to	dwindle	
in	the	mid	1970s	and	Northern	discomfort	resurfaced	again.	The	regime’s	war	with	Ethiopia	in	
1977	also	precipitated	the	emergence	of	major	cracks	within	the	military	ranks	partly	because	
of	 clan	politics	and	division	 in	 the	 system.	SNM,	which	capitalised	 significantly	on	defections	
from	the	regime,	strengthened	its	military	capability	as	a	guerrilla	movement	between	1981	and	
1988	when	 it	 launched	a	surprise	attack	on	government	bases	 in	major	urban	centres	 in	 the	
North.								
Hargeisa	 became	 the	 epicentre	 of	 the	 war	 Hargeisa	 and	 it	 was	 heavily	 bombarded	 by	 the	
government	 forces	 using	 both	 heavy	 artillery	 and	 air	 power	 (Gilkes,	 1989).	 Almost	 all	 the	
residents	 in	 the	city	 fled	to	the	neighbouring	countries,	as	well	as	 to	Asia,	Europe	and	North	
America	(Bradbury,	2008,	Hammond,	2014).	When	Mohamed	Sayyad	Barre	was	removed	from	
power	in	1991,	the	displaced	residents	returned,	reconstructing	what	was	left	of	their	homes.	
The	 precarious	 security	 situation	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Barre’s	 removal	 from	 power	 made	 it	
difficult	for	people	of	different	clan	backgrounds	to	reside	in	the	same	neighbourhood	as	many	
feared	falling	victim	to	revenge	attacks	against	 their	clan	 for	earlier	offences.	This	reinforced	
clan-based	division	of	the	city	on	the	one	hand	but	on	the	other	hand	it	contributed	significantly	
to	the	resilience	of	the	city	at	a	time	when	it	was	emerging	from	a	conflict.	For	 instance,	the	
clan-based	spatial	character	of	the	city	firstly	made	it	easier	for	people	to	live	in	areas	where	
they	could	access	state	services	through	available	social	networks.	Secondly,	it	enabled	the	city	
to	cope	with	the	high	level	of	 inter-urban	migration	as	well	as	rural-urban	migration	because	
newcomers	 negotiated	 space	 and	 survival	 in	 areas	 populated	 by	 their	 clan.	 And	 thirdly,	 it	
contributed	 to	 the	construction	of	 the	city	by	 the	diaspora	who	remit	 substantial	amount	of	
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money	and	tend	to	target	neighbourhoods	populated	by	their	own	clan	primarily	because	of	
perceived	lower	risks.	
2.4 Conclusion		
In	this	chapter,	I	have	reviewed	the	literature	on	hybrid	state	building,	state	legitimacy,	public	
trust,	and	urban	segregation,	 in	an	attempt	 to	understand	how	 identity-based	occupation	of	
particular	urban	spaces	can	to	some	degree	be	explained	by	governance	practices.	I	have	argued	
that	 there	 is	 a	need	 to	go	beyond	hybridity	 if	we	are	 to	understand	 the	 spatial	 character	of	
Hargeisa	 and	 the	 drivers	 and	 dynamics	 underpinning	 its	 segregation	 along	 clan	 lines.	While	
state-practices	are	 important	 in	 the	development	of	 segregation,	 I	 also	argued	 that	negative	
perceptions	of	state	legitimacy	and	the	erosion	of	public	trust	in	formal	institutions	can	become	
a	catalyst	which	drives	people	to	reside	in	areas	predominantly	occupied	by	people	with	whom	
they	share	 identity	and	relations	based	on	kinship.	 In	much	of	the	 literature	on	African	cities	
(outside	South	Africa),	and	particularly	in	understanding	of	Somali	cities,	authors	have	paid	little	
attention	 to	 identity-based	 segregation.	 This	 gap	 in	 scholarship	 is	 replicated	 in	 policy	 and	
practice.	 In	 contexts	 where	 efforts	 have	 been	made	 to	 dismantle	 geographical	 segregation,	
bridging	the	gap	in	spatial	inequality	often	became	a	monumental	task	with	few	tangible	results.	
The	 problem	 partly	 lies	 in	 misplaced	 priorities,	 as	 there	 has	 been	 a	 blatant	 failure	 of	 the	
intervening	authorities	to	transform	the	conditions	that	 initially	eroded	public	trust	 in	formal	
institutions.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 policy	 efforts	 in	 the	 Somali	 context	 aimed	 at	 bringing	 about	
greater	 social	 cohesion	 above	 the	 clan	 identity,	 during	 both	 postcolonial	 and	 post-conflict	
periods,	 failed	 because	 of	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 state	 behaved.	 For	 instance,	 the	 state	
breached	 water	 but	 drank	 wine	 during	 the	 postcolonial	 period,	 as	 it	 failed	 to	 live	 by	 the	
principles	it	rhetorically	advocated	i.e.	equitable	access	to	resources	and	services	regardless	of	
one’s	identity.	Similarly,	the	post-conflict	hybrid	order	has	become	bogged	down	in	governance	
malpractices	 (nepotism,	 corruption	 and	 cronyism)	 that	 undermined	 trust.	 The	 spatial	
manifestation	of	 this	 is	a	 segregated	settlement	pattern	based	on	clan	 identity.	 	To	see	how	
these	theoretical	arguments	explaining	the	development	of	urban	segregation,	arise	out	of/are	
rooted	in	empirical	dynamics	of	urban	governance	in	Hargeisa	in	recent	years,	it	is	first	necessary	
to	spell	out	the	research	methods	of	the	thesis.	
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CHAPTER	3 NEGOTIATING	DATA	COLLECTION	IN	A	SEGREGATED	CITY		
3.1 Introduction		
This	chapter	outlines	the	urban	ethnographic	methods	through	which	the	data	for	this	thesis	
was	collected.	Urban	ethnography	traces	its	root	to	the	Chicago	School	(Cobb	and	Hoang,	2015),	
and	its	foundation	is	largely	credited	to	Robert	Park	and	Ernest	Burgess		who	made	significant	
contribution	to	the	studies	of	urban	poverty	in	the	late	1920s,19	at	a	time	when	social	science	
scholarship	 was	 shifting	 its	 focus	 to	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 rapid	 urban	 transformation	 and	
population	growth	in	cities,	particularly	in	the	USA	(Gubrium,	2007).	In	its	most	basic	definition,	
urban	ethnography	can	be	understood	as	a	qualitative	research	technique	aimed	at	capturing	
the	“ways	in	which	city	dwellers	experience	the	urban	environment—how	they	perceive,	cope,	
act,	or	fail	to	act”	(Auyero	and	Jensen,	2015,	p.	361).	In	this	study,	however,	my	focus	was	not	
solely	 on	 urban	 dwellers’	 experience,	 but	 also	 to	 explore	 urban	 institutional	 dynamics	 and	
investigate	 the	 history	 of	 city	 governance,	 which	 is	 important	 in	 shaping	 urban	 residents’	
perceptions	and	actions.		The	data	for	this	study	was	gathered	over	a	period	of	nine	months.	
The	 duration	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 accessibility	 and	 availability	 of	 data,	
institutional	arrangements	and	my	own	familiarity	with	the	field.	The	chapter	is	organised	into	
five	sections.	In	the	first	section,	I	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	data	sources	–	ethnographic,	
oral	historical	and	archival.	In	the	second	section,	I	discuss	my	experience	of	gathering	data	from	
state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 in	Hargeisa.	 In	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	 sections,	 I	 discuss	my	 use	 of	
teashops	in	the	city	as	key	sites	of	data	gathering,	as	well	as	my	endeavours	of	tracing	former	
public	 officials	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 In	 the	 final	 section,	 I	 explore	 the	 limitations	 and	 ethical	
considerations	of	the	research.					
3.2 Brief	Overview	of	Data	Sources		
Primarily,	 this	 study	 relies	on	 three	main	 sets	of	data.	The	 first	 set	 consists	of	oral	histories,	
observations,	 interviews,	 informal	 conversations,	 and	 focus	 group	 discussions,	 which	 are	
conventional	to	urban	ethnographic	studies.	The	second	set	consists	of	newspapers,	blogs,	and	
websites.	The	final	set	consists	of	local	government	records,	court	records,	NGO	reports,	colonial	
archives	 and	 other	 documentary	 materials.	 Using	 snowball	 sampling	 from	 initial	 contacts,	 I	
conducted	a	total	of	91	interviews	(not	all	of	which	are	cited	directly),	namely	key	informant	and	
																																								 																				
19	See	(Park	et	al,	1925).	
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personal	interviews.	The	key	informant	interviews	were	conducted	with	people	deemed	to	have	
specialist	 knowledge	 and	 insight	 into	 urban	 land	 and	 conflict	management	 as	 well	 as	 other	
relevant	urban	governance	elements	such	as	development	planning	and	management.		
I	selected	the	interviewees	from	the	predominant	clans	in	the	city,	namely	Habar	Awal	(which	
includes	Sa’ad	Muse	and	Isse	Muse),	Garhajis	(which	includes	Habar	Yonis	and	Eidagale),	Arab,	
Ayub	and	Gaboye20.	Clan	representation	for	this	study	was	particularly	important	in	a	number	
of	ways.	Firstly,	identity	plays	a	crucial	role	in	how	people	navigate	through	service	provision	in	
the	city,	 largely	because	of	governance	malpractices,	which	reinforces	clan	 identity	as	will	be	
seen	in	the	empirical	chapters.	Secondly,	clan	balance	is	crucial	for	representing	divergent	views	
and	to	construct	an	overall	narrative	of	city	dynamics.	Thirdly	and	more	importantly,	I	felt	that	
my	attempts	for	clan	balance	could	shield	me	from	being	accused	of	bias	towards	a	particular	
clan,	more	so	 since	 I	hail	 from	a	 local	 clan,	Habar	Yonis.	However,	 I	do	not	 see	clan	or	even	
Somali-ness,	 for	 that	matter,	as	a	 significant	 shaper	of	my	 identity;	nor	would	 I	want	 to	cast	
myself	as	essentially	Westernised	or	urbanite	(in	contrast	to	Lewis’s	(1961)	characterisation	of	
those	who	do	not	 identify	with	clannism	as	Westernised	or	Lulling’s	 (2006)	depiction	of	such	
groups	as	urbanites).		
While	I	can	neither	claim	nor	refuse	to	be	urbanite	or	rural,	Westernised	or	Non-Westernised,	
what	I	can	assert	and	insist	is	that	my	life	experience	more	than	anything	else	constitutes	my	
identity.	However,	the	problem	with	my	life	experience	is	that	it	keeps	on	changing	and	breaking	
all	 the	 rules	of	 fixed	 identity,	 taking	me	across	many	boundaries	 i.e.	my	 trajectory	has	been	
transurban,	transrural,	transnational,	and	transcivilisation.	In	a	nutshell,	my	life	experience	and	
sense	of	belonging	traverses	the	dominant	forms	of	belonging	such	as	clan,	tribe,	nation,	and	
nationality.	 Like	many	others	 on	 the	move,	 I	 alternately	 acquire	 and	 shed	off	 aspects	 of	my	
identity	as	my	life	changes	–	young-old,	rural-urban,	citizen,	refugee-citizen	–	or	as	is	required	
by	a	particular	context	at	a	particular	point	in	time.	Key	triggers	of	these	changes	include	both	
social	and	economic	influences.	For	instance,	living	in	different	countries	equipped	me	with	the	
ability	 of	 acquiring	 a	 set	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 skills	 as	 well	 as	 experiences	 that	 were	 not	
essential	 for	 negotiating	 space	 in	 the	 host	 societies	 but	 which	 were	 also	 important	 for	
broadening	my	scope	of	worldviews.		
																																								 																				
20	Clan	groupings	in	Somaliland	are	mainly	Dir,	Daarood	and	Gabooye.	Dir	includes	Isaaq,	Gedabuursi,	Issa,	
and	Akisha	whereas	Daarood	includes	Dhulbahante	and	Warsengeli.		
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My	position	on	clan	is	important	here	at	a	time	when	the	Somali	identity	recently	took	the	centre	
stage	in	a	heated	debate	about	knowledge	production	in		Somali	studies:	controversy	hinged	on	
whether	or	not	it	was	possible	for	Somali	researchers	to	rise	above	their	own	clan,		objectively	
analyse	political	realities	in	their	own	country	(s)	and	produce	unbiased	knowledge		(Aidid,	2015,	
Hoehne,	2015,	Mirre,	2015,	Mohamud,	2015,	Serunkuma,	2015).	
Besides	clan	background,	 I	also	selected	 interviewees	 from	particularly	 relevant	occupational	
categories.	They	included	Ministers,	Parliamentarians,	civil	servants,	judges,	traditional	leaders,	
religious	leaders,	NGO	workers,	and	former	public	officials,	including	some	based	in	the	diaspora	
(See	table	2).	The	age	groups	of	the	participants	ranged	from	18s	to	70s	(these	ages	are	based	
on	my	own	estimations).	The	personal	interviews	were	conducted	with	people	who	had	direct	
experience	of	 issues	 related	 to	urban	 land	management	and	urban	 land	conflicts.	This	 set	of	
interviewees	 include	 land	owners	 or	 claimants	 as	well	 as	 relatives	 of	 those	 affected	by	 land	
conflicts	or	related	violence.	While	I	generally	tried	to	interview	as	diverse	a	range	of	people	as	
possible	 to	 gain	 different	 perspectives	 on	 urban	 matters,	 the	 voice	 of	 women	 is	 not	 well	
represented	in	this	research	due	to	inaccessibility	challenges.	Only	three	key	informants	and	a	
focus	 group	 discussion	 consisting	 of	 five	 women	 were	 interviewed	 for	 this	 research.	 To	
compensate	 for	 this	 underrepresentation,	 most	 court	 cases	 I	 selected	 for	 analysis	 involved	
women.		
The	 interviews	 and	 other	 research	 material	 were	 used	 variedly	 in	 the	 research.	 Some	 case	
studies	explored	in	greater	depth	relied	on	a	narrower	selection	of	interviews	while	others	had	
a	 larger	 range	of	 interviews	 and	other	 secondary	materials.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 case	 study	 of	
conflict	 around	 the	 airport	 relied	 on	 a	 less	 diverse	 range	 of	 informants	 because	 it	 pitted	
members	of	predominantly	one	clan	(the	Eidgale	clan)	and	against	the	state.	As	a	result,	most	
of	my	informants	in	this	regard	were	from	this	clan.	
Table	2:	The	range	of	key	informant	and	general	interviews	
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
KEY INFORMANTS PERSONAL INFORMANTS  
Politician (2) Land Owner - Taxi driver 
Policeman Land Owner - Farmer (2) 
Police Station Commander Land Owner – Agro-pastoralist (2) 
Hargeisa Local Government Councillor Hargeisa Resident - involved in land dispute (2) 
Opposition Member of Parliament Relatives of one of the attackers (3) 
Member of Parliament Relatives of one of the attackers (2) 
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Official - Ministry of Public Works Relatives of one of the attackers 
Official - Ministry of Aviation and Air Transport Land Broker (2) 
Ministry of Public Works Official (2) Farmer 
Ministry of Aviation – Official Famous Playwright 
Military Official Unemployed 
District Officer Student 
District Court Judge (2) SNM Fighter 
Director of Civil Unit - Legal Aid Clinic Lawyer - Farmer's Son (2) 
Director General of the Ministry of Public Works Lawyer - Farmer's Son 
Director General - Ministry of Aviation and Air 
Transport 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
Director UNDP – JPLG Somali Official 
Civil Servant UNHABITAT – International Staff  
Chairman of Land Commission NGO Worker 
Former Minister of Interior. Activist for displaced people (2) 
Former Mayor of Hargeisa (2) Activist and Social Researcher. 
Solicitor General of Somaliland IT Specialist in an NGO 
Prosecutor Religious Leader 
Criminal Lawyer TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
Legal Advisor for Electoral Commission Sultan (2) 
Lawyer (2) Elder (2) 
Oral Historian, Artist and Radio Presenter. Clan Elder 
Local Resident Involved in Land Dispute Son of a Chief Akil and Lecturer at the University of Hargeisa 
Academic INFORMANTS IN THE DIASPORA  
Retired Agricultural Economist Former Governor of North Western Province. 
 Former District Commissioner of Hargeisa 
 Former Chairman of Somaliland Atrocities Commission. 
 Seaman21 from Hargeisa 
	
The	 above-mentioned	 interviews	were	 complemented	by	 four	 focus	 group	discussions.	 Each	
focus	group	consisted	of	at	least	of	6	individuals	from	a	diverse	range	of	backgrounds,	selected	
for	their	shared	experience	and	interest	in	a	particular	theme	(Tracey	and	Burgess,	2001).	Like	
the	 interviews,	 I	 selected	 the	 focus	 group	
participants	 from	varying	 social	 and	 interest	
groups	 such	 as	 the	 youth,	 business	 people,	
women’s	 groups,	 members	 of	 the	 religious	
community,	 and	 predominant	 clans	 in	 the	
city,	namely	Habar	Awal,	Garhajis,	Arab	and	
Ayub.	Most	of	my	interviews	and	focus	groups	
																																								 																				
21	There	were	only		
LIST OF FOCUS GROUPS 
Traditional Leaders Focus Group (8 Participants) 
Religious Leaders Focus Group (5 Participants) 
Women’s Focus Group Discussion (5 Participants)  
Preliminary Focus Group on Land Conflict (7 Participants) 
Table	3:	The	list	of	focus	groups	
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discussions	were	drawn	from	the	Isaaq	clans	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	 I	also	 interviewed	
few	people	from	other	clans.	This	is	so	because	Hargeisa	is	predominantly	populated	by	Isaaq.	
Moreover,	Hargeisa’s	identity	is	increasingly	becoming	exclusionary	partly	because	of	the	fact	
that	the	city’s	pre-conflict	history	is	under	emphasised.	For	instance,	there	are	few	monuments	
in	the	city	such	as	the	jetfighter	in	front	of	the	former	Commercial	Bank	of	Somalia,	a	tank	on	a	
roundabout	 in	 from	 of	 Bar	 Hargeisa	 and	 a	 hand	 holding	 the	map	 of	 Somaliland	 in	 Kaalinta	
Sideedaad:	all	of	which	signify	conflict	and	or	immediate	post-conflict	Isaaq	centred	historical	
references.	 This	makes	 the	 city	 identity	 Isaaq	 centred	 and	 it	 has	 to	 some	 extent	 influenced	
availability	and	access	to	information.		
Among	 the	 social	 groups	 included	 in	 the	 study	were	 also	 returnees	 from	 the	 diaspora.	 The	
intention	 was	 to	 be	 inclusive.	 As	 focus	 groups	 tend	 to	 either	 become	 consensual	 where	
participants	mostly	agree	on	the	discussed	issues	or	dissentient	where	they	disagree	significantly	
(Tracey	and	Burgess,	2001),	 I	employed	careful	moderation	 so	as	 to	ensure	 that	 issues	were	
debated	by	their	merit.	The	first	focus	group	took	place	in	the	early	stage	of	my	fieldwork,	with	
the	aim	of	getting	a	general	picture	of	key	issues	and	the	current	and	historical	trends	of	urban	
governance	 in	 the	 city.	 The	 second	 and	 third	 focus	 groups	 examined	 the	 interface	 between	
urban	institutional	dynamics	and	urban	land,	as	it	emerged	that	controls	over	urban	land	were	
very	significant	source	of	conflict.	These	latter	focus	groups	were	particularly	dedicated	to	the	
roles	of	traditional	and	Islamic	institutions	in	relation	to	land	accessibility,	land	administration,	
and	conflict	management.	The	 last	 focus	groups	examined	how	women	are	affected	by	 land	
conflict	and	their	resolution	mechanisms.	Input	from	the	focus	groups	are	cited	as	groups	rather	
than	individuals.	
One	of	the	major	challenges	I	faced	with	the	interviews	and	focus	groups	related	to	the	process	
of	 interviewing	women.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 I	 feared	 that	when	 interviewing	women	with	 the	
consent	of	 their	household	 leaders,	 it	might	diminish	 the	quality	of	 the	 information	because	
female	participants	may	give	me	versions	of	 the	story	with	which	they	think	their	household	
leaders	would	be	happy.	On	the	other	hand,	if	women	were	interviewed	in	the	absence	of	their	
household	leaders	that	may	pose	a	greater	risk	of	a	dispute	where	the	relationship	of	the	family	
might	be	at	a	risk.	This	concern	was	addressed	through	prior	consideration	and	assessment	of	
particular	interviewees’	circumstances	and	by	asking	views	of	their	family	about	the	interviews.		
Given	 the	 unequal	 power	 relations	 between	 men	 and	 women	 in	 Somali	 settings,	 careful	
selection	of	venues	was	crucial	for	women	interviewees.	I	tried	not	to	make	assumptions	and	
sought	 to	mitigate	 these	power	 relations	by	 attempting	 to	hold	 interviews	 in	 a	woman-only	
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session	in	the	location	of	their	choice.	I	asked	them	to	suggest	a	venue	but	they	insisted	I	should	
also	propose	some	locations	for	them	to	choose	from.		Among	the	sites	I	recommended	included	
the	University	of	Hargeisa’s	Law	Department,	the	OCVP	office,	restaurants	with	private	meeting	
rooms,	 and	 a	 notary	 firm	 in	 the	 city	 centre.	 They	 unanimously	 chose	 the	 latter	 for	 its	
convenience	 for	 public	 transport	 and	 proximity	 to	 shops	 where	 many	 of	 them	 wanted	 to	
proceed,	and	the	firm’s	meeting	rooms	with	which	at	least	one	of	the	participants	was	familiar.		
While	conducting	the	discussions,	I	observed	that	women	found	it	difficult	to	talk	about	their	
experience	in	front	of	other	women	for	fear	of	peer	labelling	and	pressure.	Social	status	such	as	
employment,	 age	 and	 household	 positions	 also	 influenced	 the	 interviews	with	women.	 	 For	
instance,	I	found	that	discussions	were	more	open	and	frank	where	I	conducted	interviews	with	
high-ranking	female	officials	in	NGO	and	Government,	as	well	as	with	the	older	women.	Another	
challenge	I	faced	with	interviews	and	focus	groups	related	to	finance.	In	an	environment	where	
NGOs	 conduct	 assessment	 exercises	 regularly,	 it	was	 often	 difficult	 to	 get	 interviewees	who	
were	willing	to	share	information	without	being	paid.	In	some	cases,	I	was	able	to	overcome	this	
by	informing	the	participants	about	my	status	as	a	student,	emphasising	that	I	was	there	to	learn	
and	share	knowledge	about	“our	people”	in	academic	fora.		But	in	many	instances,	I	had	to	pay	
transportation	and	refreshment	expenses	for	interviewees	and	focus	group	discussants,	using	
the	OCVP	 financial	 infrastructure	 to	 issue	 receipts	 to	ensure	 transparency	and	accountability	
(and	I	then	reimbursed	the	OCVP).					
In	 addition	 to	 the	 focus	 groups	 and	 interviews,	media	 sources	 also	 proved	 to	 be	 important	
platforms	 for	 gathering	 information	 about	 the	 city.	 I	 monitored	 issues	 relating	 to	 land	
administration	and	conflict	in	the	popular	Somali	websites	and	blogs,	as	well	as	related	YouTube	
channels,	which	are	 increasingly	becoming	a	popular	method	of	disseminating	 information	in	
the	Somali	context.	This	made	me	more	aware	of	a	wide	array	of	social	and	political	issues	not	
necessarily	 directly	 connected	 but	 relevant	 to	 my	 study.	 Among	 the	 websites	 I	 monitored	
included	 salaanmedia.com,	 qarrannews.com,	 hadhwnaagnews.com,	 somaliland.org,	
somalilandpress.com,	 and	 others.	 I	 often	 stored	 videos	 and	 articles	 from	 these	 sources	 in	 a	
thematically	organised	playlist	to	be	able	to	access	later.	The	data	obtained	from	these	sources	
was	particularly	important	for	gaining	insight	into	the	dynamics	of	the	land	conflict	at	the	airport	
and	the	military	base	in	the	east	of	the	city.		
In	 addition,	 I	 monitored	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	 climate	 in	 the	 city	 through	
participating	 in	 discussions	 in	 teashops,	 which	 are	 important	 public	 places	 where	 people	
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socialise	and	discuss	various	issues	ranging	from	politics	to	sports.	The	political	aspects	of	such	
discussion	are	often	 termed,	 in	 the	Somali	 language,	 fadhi	ku	dirir.	This	 loosely	 translates	 to	
engaging	 in	 conflict	 while	 sitting.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 a	 form	 of	 public	 discourse	 in	 which	
participants	intimately	(or	seemingly	so)	debate	about	topics	ranging	from	social	and	religious	
issues	 to	 economic	 and	 political	 issues.	 	 Such	 debates	 provided	 particularly	 a	 significant	
opportunity	for	gaining	urban	ethnographic	data.		
The	above-mentioned	interviews,	focus	groups,	teashop	discussions,	and	media	sources	were	
supplemented	with	 reports	and	other	 recent	post-conflict	archival	materials	 collected	 locally	
from	 NGOs	 and	 independent	 consultants.	 	 I	 also	 draw	 on	 important	 historical	 materials,	
collected	from	the	National	Archives	and	the	British	Library.	These	colonial	reports	and	archives	
were	important	for	historicising	urban	governance	in	Hargeisa.	Historical	documents	are	hard	to	
come	by,	as	the	city	was	almost	entirely	levelled	to	the	ground	in	the	late	1980s	when	war	broke	
out	between	SNM	and	the	military	regime	of	Mohamed	Siyad	Barre.	Of	course,	these	colonial	
documents	and	archives	were	written	from	particular	political	and	administrative	orientations	
that	require	careful	scrutiny.	One	of	the	ways	in	which	I	tried	to	overcome	these	limitations	was	
to	use	oral	historical	narratives	as	a	counter-balance	to	colonial	sources.	In	the	next	section,	I	
will	 outline	 the	 key	 dynamics	 and	 contours	 of	 assembling	 data	 from	 the	 above-mentioned	
sources.	
3.3 Institutional	Affiliation	and	Accessibility	of	Informants	
My	fieldwork	began	in	 late	February	2014,	when	I	arrived	in	Hargeisa	from	London.	 	 It	was	a	
familiar	environment	both	at	the	personal	and	professional	level.	At	the	personal	level,	I	grew	
up	in	this	city,	having	as	a	result	both	family	and	friend	networks,	while	at	the	professional	level,	
I	 worked	 with	 the	 Observatory	 of	 Conflict	 and	 Violence	 Prevention	 (OCVP).	 The	 PhD	was	 a	
collaborative	doctoral	 study	co-sponsored	by	 the	OCVP	and	 the	University	of	Sussex.	On	 the	
OCVP	 side,	 the	 funding	 was	 a	 small	 part	 of	 £1.8	 million	 grant	 from	 the	 United	 Kingdom’s	
Department	 of	 International	 Development	 (DFID)	 for	 research	 into	 conflict,	 governance	 and	
justice	in	Somalia.	My	affiliation	with	the	Observatory	served	as	an	asset.	It	provided	me	with	
status	and	a	visible	and	known	base,	as	the	organisation	has	a	history	of	research	in	the	city.		It	
also	permitted	me	to	have	access	to	various	networks	in	governmental	and	non-governmental	
agencies	as	well	as	research	facilities	and	logistical	support.		
In	the	first	week	of	my	stay	in	Hargeisa,	I	arranged	a	meeting	with	the	Director,	Abdullahi	Odowa,	
of	the	OCVP	to	update	him	about	my	study	and	discuss	the	role	I	could	play	in	the	organisation’s	
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research	activities,	while	not	losing	focus	on	the	data	collection	for	the	PhD,	as	well	as	how	the	
organisation	 could	 support	me	 in	my	 study.	My	 second	meeting	was	with	 the	 Logistical	 and	
Human	Resources	manager,	Safia	Ahmed.	We	discussed	ways	in	which	I	could	share	access	to	
the	organisational	 facilities	and	networks.	The	central	 focus	of	 the	meeting	was	office	space,	
meeting	venues	and	transportation.	At	the	time	of	my	arrival,	the	OCVP	had	several	vacant	desk	
spaces	and	two	meeting	rooms.	In	light	of	this,	access	to	meeting	venues	and	allocation	of	desk	
space	were	relatively	straight	forward,	but	the	same	was	not	the	case	for	transportation	as	there	
were	only	two	vehicles,	a	minibus	and	a	four-wheel-drive,	shared	by	all	members	of	the	staff	for	
their	day-to-day	duties.	As	a	result,	the	manager	rightly	asked	me	to	provide	her	with	advance	
notice	of	my	research	activities,	so	as	to	prioritise	access	to	transportation.		
One	 problem	 I	 encountered	 in	 fulfilling	 this	 requirement	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 many	 cases	
appointments	were	made	on	ad	hoc	basis	often	requiring	me	to	be	flexible	and	meet	informants	
at	a	time	and	place	of	their	choice,	mostly	with	very	short	notice.	This	was	made	all	the	more	
difficult	 by	 the	 fact	 that	meetings	 were	 constantly	 cancelled	 or	 delayed	 by	 the	 informants,	
particularly	 key	 informants	working	 for	 the	government.	 Furthermore,	 the	absence	of	public	
transport	that	could	complement	my	access	to	the	OCVP	transportation	was	also	a	hindrance.	
In	order	to	overcome	these	problems,	there	were	two	choices.	Rent	or	buy	a	car.	I	opted	for	the	
latter	 and	 bought	 a	 second	 hand	 car	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 $2100,	 payable	 in	 instalments.	 This	was	
moderately	 cheaper	 than	 renting	 car	 at	 a	 cost	 of	 $600	 per	 month.	 Being	 from	 the	 local	
community,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 mention	 that	 my	 experience	 with	 logistical	 issues	 and	 their	
interface	 with	 safety	 and	 security	 was	 relatively	 cheaper	 than	 that	 of	 foreign	 researchers	
negotiating	 data	 collection	 in	 Somaliland.	 The	 latter	 are	 required	 to	 hire	 armed	 escort	 from	
special	 police	 units	 established	 to	 protect	 foreigners	 with	 	 two	 4x4	 vehicles	 outside	 the	
immediate	borders	of	the	city22	(Gandrup,	2014).		
In	the	second	week	of	my	stay	in	the	field,	I	turned	my	attention	to	mapping	out	the	institutions,	
places	and	people	that	could	shed	light	on	urban	governance	dynamics	and	their	interface	with	
segregation.	The	institutions	and	people	I	identified	included	both	state	and	non-state	actors.	
Chief	 among	 the	 state	 actors	 were	 officials	 in	 local	 government,	 the	 statutory	 courts,	 the	
Ministries	 of	 Public	 Works,	 Interior,	 Aviation,	 and	 Planning.	 The	 non-state	 actors	 included	
traditional	leaders,	such	as	Akils	and	Sultans,	as	well	as	religious	leaders,	such	as	the	clerics	and	
																																								 																				
22	This	limits	foreign	researchers’	ability	to	meet	relevant	informants	in	the	nearby	villages	surrounding	
the	city.				
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informal	 Islamic	courts.	They	also	 included	non-governmental	organisations	both	at	 the	 local	
and	 international	 level.	 At	 the	 international	 level,	 I	 was	 interested	 in	 the	 United	 Nations	
Development	 Program	 (UNDP),	 particularly	 the	 Joint	 Program	 on	 Local	 Government	 (JPLG),	
which	supports	initiatives	aimed	at	improving	local	governance;	and	the	United	Nations	Habitat	
Program,	which	supported	some	development	planning	exercises	in	Hargeisa.	At	the	local	level,	
I	was	 interested	in	getting	connections	with	the	Academy	for	Peace	and	Development	(APD),	
which	has	 in	 the	past	done	 significant	 research	on	 land	 conflicts;	 and	 the	 Social	 Research	&	
Development	Institute	(SORADI),	which	also	has	a	history	in	research	on	local	governance	and	
advocacy	 for	human	 rights;	 and	 the	 Legal	Aid	Clinic,	which	provides	 legal	 assistance	 to	poor	
people	who	cannot	afford	legal	representation.		
3.4 Negotiating	Research	in	State	and	Non-State	Spheres		
I	began	my	inquiry	with	selected	public	officials	in	local	government	and	the	Ministry	of	Planning.	
I	assumed	that		elite	members	of		society	would	be		difficult	to	access	(Hertz	and	Imber,	1993),	
as	researchers	in	African	contexts	have	pointed	to	the	difficulty	in	obtaining	information		from	
public	officials		because	they	are	either	unused	or	unwilling	to	give	data	(Gokah,	2006).	In	the	
second	week	of	my	fieldwork,	I	formally	approached	the	local	government	Executive	Secretary,	
who	is	the	second	most	powerful	figure	in	the	Municipality.	After	briefing	him	about	my	research	
over	the	phone,	he	gave	me	an	appointment	to	meet	him	at	10	o'clock	on	the	4th	of	March	2014.	
However,	when	I	reported	to	his	offices,	he	was	not	available.	I	tried	to	call	and	inform	him	about	
my	presence	but	he	did	not	pick	up	the	phone.	I	spent	the	day	in	and	around	the	offices	of	local	
government	in	Hargeisa,	hoping	to	check	him	again	in	his	office.	The	problem	of	locating	public	
officials	during	the	formal	hours	is	made	all	the	more	difficult	by	the	fact	that	the	working	hours	
in	Somaliland	are	only	08:00	am	until	12	pm.	As	there	was	no	sign	of	him	coming	to	the	office,	I	
went	back	to	my	station	at	1:00	pm.	The	following	day,	I	called	the	Executive	Officer	and	politely	
told	him	about	the	fact	that	I	had	waited	in	his	office.	He	told	me	that	he	would	be	able	to	meet	
me	the	following	day.	But	the	same	happened	on	the	next	day	and	I	had	to	return	to	the	OCVP	
empty-handed.		
The	following	week,	 I	went	to	the	Ministry	of	Planning	and	spoke	to	the	reception	about	my	
research.	After	carefully	looking	at	the	list	of	the	office	bearers	on	the	notice	board,	I	asked	for	
the	names	and	contact	details	of	 those	 I	 thought	 to	be	potential	key	 informants.	However,	 I	
went	through	the	same	experience,	as	I	was	unable	to	locate	them,	except	the	Minister	whom	I	
found	to	be	not	only	punctual	but	also	engaging.	These	hiccups	convinced	me	that	I	needed	to	
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change	 tactics.	 I	 imagined	 that	 social	 networking	 and	more	 informal	 ethnographic	methods	
would	be	more	effective	in	locating	key	public	officials	than	formally	approaching	them	in	their	
offices.	 In	 the	 third	week	 of	my	 research,	 I	 reoriented	my	 strategies	 and	 contacted	 the	 key	
people	that	I	needed	through	informal	social	networks.	The	change	in	strategy	worked	for	me	
in	a	very	significant	way.	When	I	located	individuals	informally	through	social	networks,	I	was	
able	to	save	time	and	resources	as	my	appointments	were	very	rarely	cancelled.	This	approach	
also	enabled	me	to	bypass	the	red	tape	bureaucracy	of	formal	appointments.		So	I	concentrated	
my	efforts	on	getting	key	public	officials	in	local	government	in	this	manner.	Local	government	
in	 itself	 was	 important	 to	 understand	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 insight	 to	 how	 recent	 urban	 politics,	
governance	and	planning	in	Hargeisa	works,	and	its	impact	on	urban-dwellers’	lives.	In	addition,	
local	 government	 offices	 were	 important	 as	 they	 housed	 the	 Land	 Tribunal	 –	 or	 Land	
Commission	 as	 it	 is	 popularly	 known	 -	which	 deals	with	 land	 issues	 in	 the	 city,	 and	which	 I	
regarded	as	a	key	source	of	information.		
Through	informal	social	networks,	I	managed	to	get	hold	of	three	councillors,	one	of	whom	was	
responsible	for	urban	land	management	and	conflicts.	Aside	from	providing	me	with	information	
and	 granting	me	 an	 interview,	 he	was	 also	 crucial	 in	 facilitating	 further	 contacts	within	 the	
municipal	 council.	 Having	 secured	 key	 contacts	 and	 interviews	 from	 the	municipal	 council,	 I	
turned	my	attention	to	the	Land	Commission.	I	approached	a	legal	practitioner	in	my	contacts	
to	help	me	locate	some	of	the	key	judges	and	Commissioners	in	the	Land	Commission.	He	was	
able	to	put	me	in	contact	with	the	chairman	of	the	Commission	who	was	trained	as	a	lawyer	at	
the	University	of	Hargeisa	and	who	also	worked	with	 the	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	Our	 first	
meeting	 occurred	 in	 a	 city	 centre	 restaurant,	 Hadhwanaag,	 where	 we	 had	 informal	
conversations	 about	my	 research	 as	well	 as	 the	 general	 political	 climate	 in	 the	 country.	My	
familiarity	with	local	politics	allowed	me	to	engage	with	him	informally,	which	in	turn	facilitated	
my	later	relationship	with	the	Commission.	He	set	me	an	appointment	within	a	couple	of	days	
at	the	Land	Commission	offices	in	the	local	government	premises.	I	had	a	formal	interview	with	
him	and	with	another	two	judges	of	the	same	Commission	in	the	next	week.	I	also	asked	the	
chairman	whether	he	could	allow	me	to	sit	in	some	of	the	hearings	to	which	he	agreed.	I	showed	
up	the	day	of	the	hearing.		
Unfortunately,	however,	this	did	not	go	according	to	plan,	as	one	of	the	judges	threw	me	out	of	
the	court	along	with	some	journalists	who	wanted	to	cover	the	case.	I	waited	for	the	hearing	to	
end	and	then	approached	the	chairman	of	the	Commission	to	introduce	me	to	the	rest	of	the	
judges	including	the	one	who	threw	me	out.	After	formal	introduction	to	those	I	had	not	yet	met	
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before,	I	was	granted	permission	to	listen	to	another	case	in	the	same	week.	As	a	result,	I	was	
able	to	attend	the	subsequent	trial	and	observe	how	the	Commission	operates	and	discharges	
its	duties	when	deciding	cases.	The	judges	also	granted	me	access	to	some	of	the	court	records.	
They	instructed	the	secretary	to	give	me	electronic	copies	of	some	cases	and	also	photocopied	
the	register	for	me.	While	I	was	thus	able	to	get	formal	written	judgements	of	about	100	cases,	
the	secretary	was	too	busy	to	copy	the	full	register,	but	she	allowed	me	to	do	so	myself.		This	
register	of	cases	from	2009	to	2013	was	a	particularly	important	source	for	me,	as	it	enabled	me	
to	see	the	geographical	distribution	of	land	conflicts	in	the	city.	It	also	enabled	me	to	have	an	
idea	about	the	land	conflict	trends	solved	through	the	formal	courts	in	the	5	years	from	2009.		
Following	the	successful	attainment	of	key	contacts	in	state	domains,	I	turned	my	attention	to	
non-state	actors.	I	began	this	endeavour	with	international	and	local	NGOs.	While	my	personal	
networks	and	OCVP	links	were	useful	 in	accessing	local	NGOs,	the	same	was	not	the	case	for	
international	NGOs.	This	was	because	key	officials	in	these	organisations	were	international	staff	
who	could	not	be	accessed	through	my	existing	pool	of	social	networks,	which	mainly	consisted	
of	Somalis.	Where	access	was	possible,	 the	 international	organisations	were	 less	 informative	
and	were	much	stricter	on	information	sharing.	For	instance,	I	requested	access	to	shape	files	
held	by	the	United	Nations	Habitat	Program	in	order	to	make	some	maps	of	urban	segregation	
in	Hargeisa	but	was	unable	to	obtain	them	as	the	UN	Habitat	Program	keeps	a	tight	lid	on	such	
data.	This	might	be	partly	attributable	to	the	fact	that	they	were	unwilling	to	share	sensitive	(or	
even	non-sensitive)	data	which	could	affect	 their	 relationship	with	 the	government.	Another	
reason	why	access	to	international	NGOs	might	have	been	difficult	is	the	fact	that	there	was	a	
sense	of	 competition	between	 researchers	 coming	 from	outside	and	 the	 international	NGOs	
who	 conduct	 their	 own	 research	 tailored	 to	 obtaining	 funding	 from	 donors,	 which	 can	 be	
contradicted	by	funding	from	by	non-NGO	circles	such	as	academia.		
Access	to	Islamic	institutions	was	also	difficult,	primarily	because	of	widespread	feeling	among	
the	religious	community	that	the	West	(and	by	extension	those	educated	in	the	West)	is	often	
biased	against	them.	For	instance,	my	visit	to	the	Islamic	court	and	interactions	with	key	people	
there	was	more	uptight	and	formal	than	the	other	judicial	actors	I	met.	This	was	so	despite	the	
fact	 that	 I	 was	 introduced	 to	 the	 scholars	 operating	 the	 Islamic	 court	 by	 individuals	 they	
respected	 and	 knew.	 I	 tried	 to	 compensate	 for	 this	 up-tightness	 through	 contacts	 who	 had	
insight	into	how	Islamic	courts	operate	and	interact	with	people	involved	in	land	conflicts.	As	
evident	here,	 individuals	who	come	 from	Western	countries,	 regardless	of	whether	 they	are	
Somalis	or	not,	are	often	viewed	with	suspicious	eyes.	More	serious	worries	 included	that	of	
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espionage.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	I	was	not	directly	confronted	with	accusations	of	this	nature,	
I	 was	 made	 aware	 that	 social	 science	 research	 in	 Somali	 settings	 is	 negatively	 affected	 by	
conspiracy	theories	used	by	different	social	forces	to	discredit	researchers.	The	foundation	of	
such	 suspicions	 is	 not	 only	 related	 to	 recent	 world	 politics	 but	 is	 also	 rooted	 historically	 in	
footprints	 left	 behind	 by	 explorers	 who	 disguised	 themselves	 as	 Muslims	 in	 order	 to	 gain	
information	 about	 Somali	 territories.	 For	 instance,	 Richard	 Burton,	 a	 British	 explorer,	 who	
arrived	 in	 the	 Somali	 shores	 in	 1854	 at	 a	 time	when	 Somali	 nomads	 in	 the	 interior	 parts	 of	
Somaliland	had	little	if	any	interaction	with	people	of	European	decent	disguised	himself	as	an	
Arab	merchant	well	versed	with	the	Islamic	knowledge	in	order	to	gain	trust	among	the	locals.	
Somalis	realised	he	was	neither	Arab	nor	a	man	of	religious	background,	as	claimed,	when	he	
had	already	left	the	country.					
On	the	other	hand,	access	to	traditional	leaders	was	relatively	easy.	This	was	partly	because	the	
OCVP	had	a	vast	pool	of	contacts	in	the	customary	domain.	However,	one	problem	I	faced	was	
that	most	of	these	contacts	were	extensively	exposed	to	research	activities	at	the	OCVP.	(The	
OCVP	conducts	continuous	assessment	of	security,	justice	and	governance	and	it	often	contacts	
traditional	 leaders	 to	 provide	 information).	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 bias	 primarily	 induced	by	 their	
familiarity	with	 the	 line	of	work	 the	OCVP	 is	 involved	 in,	 I	 sought	access	 to	other	 traditional	
leaders	 who	 had	 no	 previous	 contact	 with	 the	 OCVP	 in	 the	 recent	 past	 through	 my	 own	
independent	social	networks.		
Having	obtained	crucial	data	on	urban	land	management	and	conflict,	I	turned	my	attention	to	
those	who	are	involved	in	or	affected	by	urban	land	management	and	conflict	at	the	community	
and	neighbourhood	level.	In	the	beginning,	locating	people	involved	in	urban	land	conflicts	was	
difficult	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Land	Commission	did	not	keep	contacts	of	the	people	whose	
cases	 it	 handles.	 Key	 to	 my	 endeavours	 for	 accessing	 particular	 	 communities	 was	 the	
establishment	 of	 trust	 (Tonkin,	 1984).	 For	Hyndman	 (2001)	 creating	 trust	 could	 involve	 	 the	
ethnographer	immersing	him/herself	in	the	reality	s/he	is	studying.	The	researcher	in	this	sense	
becomes	part	of	the	reality	and	hence	gets	more	insight,	help	and	cooperation	in	the	process	of	
conducting	 the	 research.	 This	 immersion	 however	 still	 requires	 overcoming	 people’s	
unwillingness	to	cooperate	or	share	information.	Lindley	(2009)	underscores	the	importance	of	
existing	personal	and	social	networks	as	a	means	to	start	building	trust.		
The	use	of	social	networks	and	volunteering	to	build	trust	were	particularly	appropriate	for	this	
study	given	that	I	was	already	familiar	with	the	political,	social	and	economic	life	of	the	people	
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in	the	city.23	I	approached	the	Institute	of	Peace	and	Conflict	Studies	at	the	University	of	Hargeisa	
about	the	possibility	of	volunteering	to	help	teach	one	of	their	courses.	The	then	Director	of	the	
Institute,	who	was	recently	appointed	for	Chief	 Justice,	 informed	me	about	an	opening	 for	a	
part-time	position	for	teaching	research	methods	to	postgraduate	students.	I	taught	this	course	
along	with	another	colleague	from	University	of	Addis	Ababa,	spending	about	6	hours	a	week	
over	 a	 period	 of	 one	 month.	 Most	 of	 those	 enrolled	 in	 the	 course	 were	 working	 with	 the	
government,	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	 the	media.	 The	 course	was	 taught	 in	 two	
classes,	with	a	total	number	of	120	students	from	various	parts	of	the	city,	who	came	with	a	
significant	degree	of	professional	expertise	and	their	own	social	networks.	 I	was	also	able	 to	
volunteer	for	another	academic	institution,	the	University	of	Beder	in	Hargeisa,	in	order	to	widen	
my	 ability	 to	 gather	 data	 from	 different	 geographical	 areas.	 The	 process	 of	 making	 new	
colleagues	 and	 everyday	 working	 relations	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 insightful	 chatting,	 informal	
probing	and	listening,	which	accumulates	a	lot	more	useful	information	than	formal	interviews.	
Hyndman	(2001)	provides	an	example	in	which	she	volunteered	for	an	organisation	and	was	able	
to	establish	friendship	as	people	got	used	to	her.	In	this	way,	she	was	able	to	gain	information	
that	would	have	been	impossible	for	her	to	get	had	she	not	volunteered	and	tried	to	win	people	
over	by	showing	her	impartiality	to	the	office	and	organisational	politics.	 	 Impartiality	is	even	
more	 important	 in	post-conflict	contexts	where	the	degree	to	which	one	 is	seen	as	 impartial	
plays	a	significant	role	in	the	process	of	establishing	trust	(van	der	Haar	et	al.,	2013).		
My	association	with	the	above	universities	and	their	students	enabled	me	to	access	a	pool	of	
people	and	data	on	urban	 land	administration	and	conflict	management,	 indeed,	the	various	
issues	 that	 surfaced	became	 too	wide	 for	my	 focus	on	understanding	 the	 interface	between	
urban	 governance	 and	 segregation.	 As	 a	 result,	 I	 concentrated	 my	 attention	 on	 particular	
landmark	cases	where	the	state	was	engaged	in	conflicts	with	civilians.	I	singled	out	two	major	
cases.	The	first	case	was	an	active	on-going	conflict	in	the	airport	area	located	in	the	Southern	
part	of	the	city	where	the	government	wanted	to	expand	the	airport	boundary	but	the	land	ear-
marked	for	such	expansion	was	contested	and	claimed	by	local	landowners.	This	led	to	a	conflict	
in	which	the	state	and	landowners	nearly	clashed	on	several	occasions.	A	member	of	the	staff	
at	the	OCVP,	who	is	a	driver	and	recent	graduate	of	law	at	the	University	of	Hargeisa	and	whose	
																																								 																				
23	 Nonetheless,	 the	 author	 notes	 that	 familiarity	with	 context	 is	 not	 a	 guarantee	 for	 easier	 access	 to	
information.	Even	if	one	is	familiar	with	the	research	site,	there	is	a	need	to	re-establish	contacts	as	some	
people	may	have	changed	their	contact	details	s	or	left	the	region/county.	See	(Gokah,	2006).	
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family	was	involved	in	the	conflict,	Mohamed	Saeed,	was	useful	in	my	initial	contact	with	the	
landowners.	
The	second	case	was	a	conflict	between	the	military	and	civilians	in	the	Eastern	part	of	Hargeisa.	
The	government	gave	 the	 land	 in	question	 to	a	 local	businessman	as	 compensation	 for	 land	
confiscated	by	the	military	near	their	headquarters	in	Hargeisa.	But	the	civilians	who	occupied	
and	claimed	ownership	of	the	land	claimed	it	had	been	confiscated	from	them	for	public	use	
during	the	military	regime	and	thus	could	not	be	given	to	the	businessman,	who	was	a	civilian	
just	like	them.	As	the	conflict	deteriorated,	seven	people	lost	their	lives	and	another	five	were	
injured	following	clashes	between	the	two	sides.	A	member	of	the	staff	in	the	OCVP	put	me	into	
contact	with	people	who	were	insiders	in	this	conflict.	Key	among	these	was	the	Sultan	of	the	
area	who	was	crucial	in	mediating	the	conflict	between	the	state	and	civilians.	Although	I	was	
unable	to	get	hold	of	those	who	were	injured	in	the	fight	between	the	two	sides,	I	managed	to	
locate	their	 relatives.	These	two	 landmark	cases	were	 important	 for	my	study	to	understand	
how	governance	practices	foster	urban	segregation	in	the	city.	
3.5 The	‛Conflict	in	Sitting’	Parlours?		Somali	Teashops		
Teashop	discussions	were	particularly	important	in	my	ethnographic	approach	to	understanding	
popular	 attitudes	 and	 identifying	 emerging	 trends	 and	 issues	 related	 to	 urban	 land	
administration,	land	markets	and	conflict.	Although	I	was	already	aware	of	the	importance	of	
teashop	discussions,	their	importance	as	sites	of	research	enquiry	was	brought	to	my	attention	
by	Mohamed	Seid,	a	close	friend	who	is	a	social	researcher	and	a	trained	lawyer.	Bearing	this	in	
mind,	 I	 experimented	with	 these	 sites,	 and	my	 first	 teashop	discussion	was	with	 a	 group	of	
friends	and	 their	associates	whom	 I	had	 interviewed	 in	 the	past.	 I	 agree	with	Seid	 that	 such	
discussions	were	more	open	and	engaging	than	the	formal	interviews.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	
teashop	discussions	should	replace	formal	interviews	but	rather	to	show	that	discrepancies	exist	
between	the	level	of	engagement	and	openness	in	the	two	techniques.		
The	teashop	discussions	often	take	place	between	4	to	6	o'clock,	but	can	also	last	longer.	This	
temporal	frame	is	primarily	 influenced	by	the	high	temperature	in	the	city	which	keeps	most	
people	home	and	most	businesses	closed	between	1	to	3:30	pm.	One	of	my	favourite	spots	was	
a	popular	teashop	in	the	city	centre.	This	teashop	attracted	significant	crowds	for	three	main	
reasons.	Firstly,	it	was	located	in	a	strategic	position	in	the	heart	of	the	city,	with	almost	equal	
distance	 to	 the	 various	 neighbourhoods.	 	 Secondly,	 it	was	 cheaper	 than	most	 of	 the	 formal	
teashops	–	it	was	located	in	public	open	space	in	front	of	a	former	commercial	bank	and	so	the	
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owners	do	not	or	pay	little	rent.	And	thirdly,	the	chance	of	one	finding	someone	they	know	in	
this	 teashop	 without	 necessarily	 having	 a	 prior	 appointment	 was	 higher,	 indeed	 it	 has	 the	
reputation	of	attracting	people	from	all	walks	of	life.	Other	teashops	I	frequented	were	located	
in	Calaamadaha	neighbourhood	in	the	South,	in	the	courts’	area	in	the	Shacabka	neighbourhood	
in	the	West,	and	in	new	Hargeisa	in	the	East.	Most	of	these	teashops	were	operated	informally	
by	 small-scale	 traders	and	did	not	have	names.	 	 I	 also	held	appointments	and	discussions	 in	
hotels	and	restaurants	such	as	the	Shiraaqle,	Star,	Maansoor	and	Ambassador.		
More	 often	 than	 not,	 people	 who	 knew	 my	 contacts	 also	 joined	 us	 and	 provided	 crucial	
information	and	 insight	 into	 the	problem	of	urban	 land	markets,	management	and	conflicts.	
Discussions	of	this	nature	took	more	time	than	normal	interviews.	But	the	longer	I	sat	in	a	tea	
shop	with	people	I	knew,	the	more	likely	that	other	people	I	do	not	know	joined	us	and	provided	
key	 insights	 into	the	topic	under	discussion.	For	example,	 in	one	 instance	we	were	 joined	by	
someone	who	took	offence	at	our	discussions	on	land	grabbing,	taking	issue	with	criticism	of	a	
particular	politician	who	had	criticised	a	public	official	who	hails	from	their	clan.		As	a	result,	the	
visitor	joining	us	felt	obliged	to	shed	light	on	a	number	of	land	allocations	they	knew	involving	
officials	from	other	clans.	A	major	drawback	of	this	technique,	however,	was	the	fact	that	some	
people	 steered	 the	 discussion	 into	 a	 direction	 which	 was	 not	 of	 interest	 to	 the	 research.	
However,	I	was	flexible	and	tolerant	in	such	scenarios,	so	as	to	gain	trust	and	friendship	with	my	
contacts.	Another	downside	of	the	teashop	discussions	was	the	fact	that	a	significant	number	of	
the	points	slipped	away	from	memory	when	neither	notes	nor	recordings	were	made.24	I	often	
wrote	down	what	I	could	salvage	from	memory	when	I	got	home,	often	after	8:00	pm.		
3.6 ‛Over	Here’:	Ex-Public	Officials	and	Archival	Materials			
Some	 of	 the	 key	 individuals	 who	 were	 useful	 for	 shedding	 light	 on	 the	 history	 of	 urban	
governance	 in	 the	 city	 were	 based	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 data	 collection	 in	 England	 and	 the	
Netherlands.		It	was	a	daunting	task	to	try	to	locate	them	as	they	lead	a	low	profile	life.	I	started	
the	journey	of	 locating	them	by	visiting	Woolwich	Arsenal	where	there	is	a	significant	Somali	
community.	I	met	a	close	relative25	of	Bille	Rafle,	the	former	governor	of	Hargeisa	in	the	early	
and	mid-1970s.	I	asked	him	to	call	his	uncle	and	enquire	about	the	possibility	of	an	interview.	A	
																																								 																				
24	 Research	 in	 Somali	 setting	 is	more	productive	when	 tape	 recording	 is	 not	 involved.	 See	 (Balthasar,	
2012).	
25	Who	himself	was	a	former	police	official	in	the	final	years	of	the	military	regime.	
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few	days	later,	close	relatives	informed	me	that	he	was	willing	to	speak	to	me.	As	a	follow	up	to	
this	permission,	I	called	the	public	official	to	confirm	his	consent	as	well	as	asking	him	whether	
he	would	prefer	to	meet	in	person	or	have	a	telephone	interview.	He	opted	for	the	latter.	The	
other	public	official,	Omar	Boss,	who	was	a	District	Commissioner	in	Hargeisa	in	1967,	was	also	
based	in	Woolwich.	I	approached	him	while	sitting	in	a	cafeteria	and	asked	him	whether	he	could	
talk	to	me	about	his	time	in	Hargeisa	to	which	he	agreed.	We	had	a	lengthy	chat	in	a	coffee	shop	
where	we	 discussed	 urban	 governance	 during	 his	 time,	 particularly	 urban	 land	 and	 security	
management.				
Aside	 from	speaking	to	 former	post	 independence	public	officials,	 the	British	Library	and	the	
National	Archives	also	held	historical	documents	on	urban	governance	in	Hargeisa.	I	first	became	
familiar	with	the	British	Library	during	the	early	stage	of	my	study	and	have	since	niched	myself	
a	space	in	this	revered	institution	for	accessibility	and	convenience	(since	I	lived	in	London)	and	
because	it	has	the	second	largest	collection	of	research	materials	in	the	world.	While	the	British	
Library	 was	my	 primary	 base	 for	 reading	 and	writing,	 I	 also	 spent	 two	weeks	 in	 the	 British	
National	 Archives,	 selecting	 and	 scanning	 relevant	 materials.	 The	 acquaintance	 with	 these	
institutions	was	particularly	 important	because	historical	materials	on	urban	governance	are	
hard	to	come	by	in	Somaliland	owing	to	the	fact	that	the	country	went	through	a	civil	war	which	
destroyed	much	of	the	archival	record.		
Except	for	three	interviews	with	international	staff	in	Somaliland,	all	the	interviews	and	focus	
group	 discussions	were	 conducted	 in	 the	 Somali	 language.	 In	 both	 the	 interviews	 and	 focus	
group	discussions,	I	 informed	the	participants	about	their	right	to	withdraw	at	any	point.	The	
data	was	transcribed	in	the	source	language	and	then	translated	into	English.	
3.7 Ethical	Considerations	and	Limitation	of	the	Research	
Ethical	 consideration	 for	 this	 research	 was	 drawn	 from	 the	 six	 principles	 stipulated	 in	 the	
economic	and	social	science	research	council	 (ESRC,	2010).	These	principles	are	 integrity	and	
quality,	informing	research	participants,	confidentiality	and	anonymity,	voluntary	participation	
free	from	coercion,	avoidance	of	harm,	and	independence	and	impartiality	of	the	researcher.	In	
this	 study,	 the	 integrity	 and	 quality	 of	 the	 research	 were	 safeguarded	 throughout	 the	 data	
collection	and	analytical	processes.	I	made	an	explicit	effort	in	collecting	and	analysing	data	to	
capture	different	perspectives.		
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One	way	in	which	integrity	issues	warranted	special	attention	in	this	research	relates	to	what	
Hyndman	(2001)	calls	tribalism	in	the	research	process.26	This	refers	to	the	use	of	social	networks	
and	national	 and	ethnic	 affiliation	 as	 a	way	 to	obtain	 information,	which	 could	have	proved	
difficult	 to	obtain	otherwise.	As	 I	 have	 already	elaborated,	 social	 networks	were	particularly	
important	 in	 this	 study	 and	 I	 exhausted	 both	my	 professional	 and	 other	 social	 networks	 to	
identify	and	locate	interviewees.		
The	research	participants	were	fully	informed	about	the	research.	Each	participant	was	given	an	
opportunity	to	ask	questions,	and	I	answered	these	to	the	best	of	my	ability.	While	formal	signed	
informed	consent	has	been	deemed	obtainable	in	Somaliland,	Mohamed	and	Loewenthal	(2009)	
point	to	the	need	for	considering	historical	background	when	conducting	research	on	Somalis.	
They	point	out	that	Somalis	are	not	used	to	being	interviewed	with	a	signed	consent.	However,	
it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 has	 changed	 significantly	 over	 the	 last	 few	 decades	 where	
Somaliland	 was	 relatively	 stable	 and	 free	 from	 widespread	 repression.	 Nonetheless,	 I	 used	
verbal	consent	in	my	study	primarily	because	it	made	informants	talk	more	openly.	I	was	also	at	
most	times	in	possession	of	an	information	sheet	developed	for	sharing	with	public	officials	if	
requested.	When	using	discussions	at	teashops,	I	tried	to	ensure	that	everyone	knew	that	I	was	
a	researcher,	and	knew	what	I	was	researching.	I	subjected	the	material	collected	in	this	way	to	
close	ethical	scrutiny	before	using	it,	often	approaching	individuals	again	to	ask	their	permission	
to	attribute	views,	or	more	commonly,	making	sure	that	information	was	anonymised.	
Participation	in	this	research	was	voluntary	and	free	from	coercion.	I	paid	particular	attention	
to	how	I	was	using	my	social	networks.	Where	possible,	I	used	highly	influential	people	as	key	
informants	but	I	tried	to	avoid	using	them	as	a	means	of	access	to	other	general	interviewees.	I	
wanted	to	avoid	people	feeling	obliged	to	give	me	interviews	because	of	the	power	relations	
involved.	Where	the	service	of	such	people	became	the	only	way	through	which	access	to	the	
sought	individuals	was	possible,	I	made	every	effort	to	remove	the	impression	of	influence	by	
the	intermediary	person.		
Confidentiality	and	anonymity	were	upheld	 in	the	strictest	manner	possible.	Balthasar	(2012)	
notes	that	anonymity	is	important	as	what	is	being	said	may	have	a	significant	impact	on	not	
																																								 																				
26	Hyndman	2001	shows	how	identity	becomes	important	when	conducting	research.	She	narrates	that	in	
her	 fieldwork,	 the	 colleagues	 at	 the	UN	office	where	 she	was	 volunteering	 suggested	 introduction	 to	
Canadian	colleagues	at	the	UN.	She	sees	the	reason	for	which	this	introduction	was	made	was	essentially	
to	 enable	 her	 get	 access	 to	 better	 facilitation	 and	 help	 for	 her	 research	 through	 her	 nationality	
background.	
68	|	P a g e 	
	
	
only	the	present	but	also	future	careers	of	people.	I	recorded	the	notes	with	an	electronic	pen	
and	uploaded	them	onto	encrypted	cloud	storage	so	as	to	avoid	the	risk	of	the	notes	getting	lost	
with	 traces	 of	 participants.	 This	was	 particularly	 important	 because	 the	 study	 encompassed	
interviews	 from	government	 employees	who	 could	 lose	 their	 jobs	 for	 having	 the	 courage	of	
speaking	candidly	about	the	issues	I	investigated.	
In	a	post-conflict	city	where	discussion	on	land-related	issues	may	evoke	memories	of	atrocities	
committed	during	a	civil	war	that	displaced	most	of	the	residents	in	the	city	(Walls,	2011),	it	is	
important	to	understand	that	some	people	were	unable	or	unwilling	to	share	information.	As	a	
researcher,	 I	was	 fully	aware	of	 this	and	respected	people’s	choice,	as	silence	can	serve	as	a	
coping	strategy	in	post-conflict	context	(Goodhand,	2000).	
As	independence	and	impartiality	are	crucial	for	any	credible	study,	I	made	an	uttermost	effort	
to	 remain	 impartial.	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 important	 to	point	out	 that	 regardless	of	my	effort	 in	
ensuring	impartiality,	I	am	aware	that	I	may	be	accused	of	partiality.	This	is	because	Hargeisa	is	
a	contested	urban	space	where	clan	politics	prevail.	Hassan	(2015)	points	out	that	one	rarely	
conducts	 research	 in	settings	where	 the	 informant	 is	also	 insider	without	making	a	balanced	
compromise	between	responsibility	and	 trust.	 In	 such	a	setting	one	might	be	seen	as	biased	
towards	his	clan	and	hence	this	may	negatively	affect	one’s	image	in	certain	quarters.	Having	
this	 risk	 in	 mind,	 I	 maintained	 my	 independence	 from	 local	 political	 dynamics,	 assuring	
participants	that	I	was	impartial	throughout	the	research	process.		
Some	of	the	limitations	of	the	research	related	to	the	lack	of	shape	files	which	could	have	helped	
me	map	and	visualise	the	settlement	pattern	of	the	city.	 I	was	told	that	some	shape	files	are	
available	to	UN	Habitat	but	I	could	not	obtain	them	from	their	offices	in	Hargeisa,	as	I	was	told	
that	 these	 are	 unavailable	 for	 public	 consumption.	 As	 other	 researchers	 in	 Hargeisa	 have	
experienced	 (See	Omar	 and	Osman,	 2016),	 further	 problems	on	 visualisation	 also	 related	 to	
photos.	 In	other	words,	 taking	photos	 in	Hargeisa	 is	not	welcome,	as	many	people	prefer	 to	
remain	anonymous	both	in	text	and	image.		
3.8 Conclusion		
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	provided	an	overview	of	data	 sources	and	 institutional	affiliation	as	well	as	
accessibility	of	Informants.	I	have	shown	that	the	data	was	collected	through	urban	ethnography	
involving	both	key	informant	participants	and	the	general	public	who	had	personal	experience	
of	the	issues	related	to	urban	land	adminstration	and	conflict	management.	I	have	also	outlined	
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the	usefulness	of	the	teashops	as	key	sites	for	data	collection	and	recounted	my	endeavours	to	
trace	 key	 public	 officials	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	 discussed	 ethical	 issues	 and	
considerations	 for	 the	 study.	Having	 familiarised	 the	 reader	with	 the	methodology,	 the	next	
chapters	deploy	my	empirical	data	to	show	how	urban	governance	shapes	Hargeisa	spatial	form.		
The	following	chapter	begins	by	discussing	findings	on	governance	at	the	municipal	 level	and	
subsequent	 chapters	 zoom	 into	 narrower	 aspects	 such	 as	 land	 administration,	 conflict	 and	
adjudication.			
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CHAPTER	4 HISTORICISING	URBAN	GOVERNANCE	IN	HARGEISA	
4.1 Introduction		
In	this	chapter,	I	analyse	the	trajectory	of	urban	governance	in	Hargeisa,	situating	it	in	a	longer	
history	 of	 urban	 institutions,	 drawing	 on	 oral	 narratives,	 archives	 and	 ethnographic	 field	
research.	 This	 historical	 approach	 is	 important	 because	 history	 in	 Somaliland	 is	 a	 lived	
experience	 where	 particular	 episodes	 are	 often	 used	 as	 a	 point	 of	 reference	 positively	 or	
negatively	for	the	legitimation	of	power	and	authority.	For	instance,	memories	of	how	things	
were	done	 in	the	past	serve	 in	many	cases	as	examples	of	how	a	state	should	behave	 in	the	
present	 or	 the	 future.	 This	 chapter	 will	 explore	 continuities	 and	 changes	 in	 the	 interaction	
between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 intermediary	 customary	 institutions	 through	 which	
centralised	 urban	 governance	 –	 often	 under	 Governor,	 District	 Commissioner	 or	 a	 Military	
Commander	–	was	mediated.		I	argue	that	the	centralised	authoritarian	history	of	governance	
and	the	mediating	role	of	customary	institutions	have	shaped	and	reinforced	Hargeisa’s	spatial	
character	as	a	segregated	city,	often	along	clan	lines.	 	As	the	‘hybridity’	focused	literature	on	
Somaliland	does	not	illuminate	the	complex	dynamics	of	urban	governance	and	its	intersection	
with	segregation,	I	argue	that	it	is	important	to	go	beyond	this	concept	to	understand	the	spatial	
character	 of	 cities	 in	 Somaliland.	 	 Specifically,	 I	 argue	 that	 a	 deeper	 historical	 perspective	 is	
necessary	on	the	contradictory	and	complementary	relationship	between	state	and	non-state	
actors	than	is	usual	in	discussions	of	hybridity,	and	I	also	explore	empirically	how	legitimacy	and	
trust	can	provide	fruitful	insight	to	the	nexus	between	governance	and	spatial	form.		
The	chapter	begins	by	discussing	the	late	colonial	context	and	the	introduction	of	urban	councils,	
which	undermined	the	powers	of	Akils.	 I	 show	that	popular	resistance	to	the	 introduction	of	
local	 governance	 contributed	 to	 the	 growing	 sense	 of	 nationalism	 and	 therefore	 had	 the	
potential	 to	 reduce	 segregation.	 The	 chapter	 then	 turns	 to	 the	postcolonial	 context	 and	 the	
civilian	government’s	continued	misuse	of	power	and	recourse	to	Akils.		It	is	important	to	note	
that	during	the	military	period,	a	significant	break	occurred.	This	break	was	rooted	in	the	state’s	
denunciation	of	clanism.	But	this	effort	was	undermined	in	practice	by	the	state’s	every	day’s	
interaction	with	the	public.	For	instance,	nepotism	thrived	in	public	service	delivery	and	access	
to	 employment	 and	 other	 economic	 opportunities	 did	 not	 emasculate	 the	 resort	 to	 clan	 in	
practice.	 Furthermore,	 I	 argue	 that	 state	 led	 developments	 and	 re-planning	 of	 cities	 –	 i.e.	
through	 self-help	 campaigns	 and	 evictions	 –	 re-segregated	 the	 city,	while	 also	 resulting	 in	 a	
cosmopolitan	 moment	 of	 cross-clan	 opposition	 to	 the	 government.	 I	 also	 discuss	 the	 post-
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conflict	context	of	democratic	local	government	and	the	on-going	role	of	Akils	and	clan	elders	in	
municipal	elections.		Despite	the	brief	historical	rupture,	it	is	therefore	the	continuities	in	urban	
governance	–	shaped	by	Akils	and	clan	mediation	-	that	are	particularly	striking	today.	
4.2 Local	Government	in	a	Late	Colonial	Context:	Policy	and	Resistance		
In	this	section,	I	discuss	the	political	and	administrative	dynamics	of	local	government	in	a	late	
colonial	context.	I	show	that	throughout	the	colonial	period,	customary	institutions	such	as	Akils	
were	key	intermediary	institutions	of	power.	In	contrast	to	Millman’s	(2013)	argument	that	the	
Protectorate’s	 survival	 on	 meagre	 resources	 was	 largely	 attributable	 to	 colonial	 officers’	
effectiveness,	I	argue	a	large	part	of	such	survival	can	be	attributed	to	the	role	Akils	played	in	
the	 administration	 of	 the	 population.	 But,	 as	 independence	 approached,	 the	 colonial	
government	made	concerted	efforts	aimed	at	reorganising	power	as	its	policies	shifted	towards	
the	 creation	 of	 what	 can	 essentially	 be	 understood	 as	 responsible	 governance	 as	 part	 of	
preparation	for	independence.	In	theory,	these	policies	were	meant	to	formalise	power	of	the	
Akils	by	setting	up	urban	councils,	designed	to	foster	conditions	conducive	for	a	transition	to	
civic	 rule	 based	 on	 citizenship	 rather	 than	 subjecthood.	 I	 argue	 that	 opposition	 to	 local	
governance	can	be	interpreted	as	an	attempt	by	Hargeisa	residents	to	reject	the	reorganisation	
of	power	over	space,	providing	them	with	common	cause	traversing	clan	interests	around	which	
they	 could	 unite	 and	 temporarily	 reducing	 segregation.	While	 colonial	 authorities	 were	 not	
intent	on	promoting	national	citizenship	in	place	of	subjecthood	before	independence,	they	also	
wanted	to	begin	a	process	of	transition	away	from	Akils’	prior	powers.	In	short,	the	introduction	
and	 resistance	 to	 local	 governance	 impacted	on	how	people	 related	 to	each	other,	with	 the	
effect	of	mitigating	prior	urban	political	segregation.		
Municipal	 governance	 in	 Somaliland	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 latter	 decades	 of	 colonial	 rule	 in	 the	
protectorate.	In	1948,	the	colonial	government	took	a	decision	that	it	wanted	to	introduce	local	
governance	in	Somaliland,	bringing	nearly	ten	years	of	pre	and	post-World	War	Two	military	rule	
to	an	end.	This	introduction	of	local	governance	was	characterised	by	uncertainty,	mainly	about	
the	 shape	 of	 the	 new	 structures	 and	 the	 role	 of	 customary	 institutions.	 This	 marked	 the	
beginning	of	efforts	aimed	at	devolving	power	in	a	limited	sense	to	local	government	structures	
as	part	of	a	larger	policy	of	Somalising	the	administration	for	eventual	independence.	The	key	
questions	were;	 could	 the	 Somali	 people	 practice	 a	Western	model	 of	 democracy	 and	 elect	
councils	on	the	basis	of	universal	suffrage	or	would	it	be	more	practical	and	cheaper	to	use	the	
existing	 political	 institutions	 to	 introduce	 municipal	 governance?	 Locally	 based	 colonial	
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administrators	were	in	favour	of	the	latter	which	allowed	them	to	create	institutions	that	had	
the	 shape	of	Western	 structures	and	 substance	of	native	orders.	 Further	questions	however	
arose	from	issues	of	legitimacy	as	the	Akil	system	on	which	the	administration	had	so	far	relied	
was	popularly	considered	to	be	a	colonial	invention	and	did	not	enjoy	legitimate	support	locally.		
Post-war	colonial	records	show	there	were	attempts	to	find	a		pragmatic	and	amicable	approach	
to	solving	this	dilemma,	created	by	popular	grievances	against	the	Akils	who	were	increasingly	
becoming	corrupt	(Rayne,	1921).27	Proposals	were	thus	made	in	the	early	1950s	to	reduce	the	
power	 of	 the	 Akils	 by	 drawing	 on	 other	 existing	 traditional	 public	 authorities	 for	 local	
governance,	such	as	the	jilib	shir.	The	jilib	shir	is	a	clan	meeting	of	up	to	200	men	who	gather	to	
discuss	matters	concerning	the	clan	such	as	conflict	and	social	welfare	as	well	as	financially	and	
politically	binding	decisions	on	members	of	the	clan.	While	this	did	not	by-pass	Akils	completely,	
as	they	attend	and	even	presided	in	the	meetings	 in	some	cases,	they	did	not	have	exclusive	
control	over	what	was	to	be	discussed	and	could	only	advance	views	that	were	agreed	upon.	
Vertically,	above	 this	 level	of	public	authority	was	 the	equally	 important	sub	clan	shir	where	
elders	 of	 the	 different	 groups	 congregate	 and	 deliberate	 on	 collectively	 binding	 decisions.	
Correspondence	between	London	and	the	colonial	administrators	in	Hargeisa	show	that	there	
was	a	consensus	about	the	absence	of	effective	public	authorities	suitable	for	local	governance	
introduction	 above	 this	 level	 of	 Somali	 traditional	 decision-making	 platforms,	 except	 when	
greater	clan	groupings	were	needed	for	warfare	or	defence	purposes.	28		
Prior	to	the	Somali	participation	in	formal	urban	governance	in	the	form	of	town	councils	and	
district	 committees,	 an	 Advisory	 Council	 was	 constituted	 in	 1946	 to	 give	 the	 Governor	 a	
consultation	forum	in	which	he	could	seek	the	advice	of	elite	members	of	the	clans	on	matters	
affecting	their	lives	(such	elite	members	were	often	popularly	considered	stooges).29	In	spite	of	
this	instrumentalisation	of	customary	institutions	in	local	governance,	until	1950,	there	was	no	
official	written	government	policy	regarding	the	association	of	Somalis	with	urban	governance.	
In	other	words,	decisions	on	the	involvement	of	Somalis	in	urban	governance	were	made	on	ad	
hoc	basis	by	the	different	colonial	officials	in	different	capacities.	This	was,	however,	changed	
																																								 																				
27	TNA	CAA/23/6/01	Future	organisation	of	town	councils	in	Somaliland.	
28	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 Somali	 traditional	public	 authority	 and	political	 institutions	were	getting	 less	
effective	as	the	hierarchy	goes	up;	a	weakness	partly	attributable	to	the	disruption	caused	to	the	system	
by	the	successive	colonial	powers;	firstly,	the	Egyptians	and	later	the	British.	Ibid.	
29	TNA	CO	535/141/11	Reorganisation	of	administration:	advisory	council	legislation.	
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when	the	government		declared	that	it	aims	“to	evolve	a	simple	and	effective	organisation	which	
will	be	capable	of	remaining	a	government	operated	by	the	people	that	 is	sufficient	for	their	
needs.”30	The	plan	shows	that	the	‘local	authorities	[were	proposed]	to	be	constituted	by	groups	
having	 affinities	 along	 geographical’	 lines.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 constituted	 authorities	would	
consist	 of	 tribal	 leaders	 paid	 by	 the	 government	 and	 assisted	 by	 councillors	 who	 would	
voluntarily	work	for	the	local	government.		
The	next	step	was	the	“setting	up	of	district	councils	composed	of	representatives	of	all	classes,	
including	 the	 local	 authorities,	 [and]	 they	would	 be	 advised	 at	 first	 but	might	 become	 local	
government	 bodies	 later”.31	 Though	 the	 plan	was	 seen	 as	 progress	 by	 locally	 based	 colonial	
administrators,	 London	 was	 concerned	 about	 the	 viability	 and	 sustainability	 of	 such	 local	
governance	 structures	 in	 the	 long	 run.	 It	 worried	 about	 the	 introduction	 of	 complex	 and	
unfamiliar	systems	of	urban	governance,	which	risked	upsetting	the	status	quo	and	undermining	
existing	systems	of	decision-making	and	public	authority.	For	London,	it	was	preferable	to	find	
traditional	leaders	and	to	increase	their	powers	on	condition	that	they	agreed	to	represent	their	
people	in	local	governance	structures.	Officials	also	suggested	that	Akils	should	be	given	greater	
financial	autonomy	and	allowances	for	their	local	expenses	as	they	would	otherwise	inevitably	
be	reluctant	to		serve	as	local	government	structures.32	While	pessimism	characterised	the	views	
of	London,	 local	colonial	administrators	were	more	optimistic	about	the	 introduction	of	 local	
governance	 in	 Somaliland.	 Their	 optimism	 drew	 inspiration	 from	 ‘the	 existence	 of	 tribal	
conferences’	and	the	‘increasing	desire	for	progress	and	advancement’	as	well	as		stereotypical	
characterisations	of	Somalis	as	people	with	a	‘high	level	of	intelligence’.33	
The	local	government	ordinance	was	finally	enacted	in	1950	and	the	Governor	was	empowered	
to	select	those	who	would	become	members	of	the	new	council.	The	aim	was	that	the	Governor	
should	retain	the	ability	of	appointing	individuals	seen	as	friendly	to	colonial	authorities	from	
both	the	traditional	leaders	such	as	Akils	and	elders	and	other	notables	in	the	town	such	as	loyal	
businessmen	and	clerics.	The	primary	function	of	the	new	Town	Council	was	mainly	to	maintain	
																																								 																				
30	TNA	CO	535/152/3	The	reorganisation	of	native	administration:	Somali	representation	and	introduction	
of	local	government.		(The	exact	date	of	this	statement	is	not	stated,	but	it	relates	to	the	1940s).	
31	Ibid.	
32	Ibid.	
33		TNA	CAA/23/6/01	Future	organisation	of	town	councils	in	Somaliland.	
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peace	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 as	 most	 of	 the	 provisions	 in	 the	 Town	 Council	 Ordinance	 were	
inherently	concerned	with	urban	security.		For	instance,	section	5	states	that	“the	duty	of	every	
local	authority	was	to	maintain	order	 in	the	tribe	or	among	the	Somalis	residing	 in	the	area”	
(British	Somaliland	Protectorate,	1951).	The	colonial	government	was	unsure	about	the	social	
and	 political	 consequences	 that	 could	 emerge	 from	 the	 constitution	 of	 local	 councils	 and	
therefore	it	proposed	that	the	introduction	of	local	governance	should	be	piloted	in	major	urban	
settings	before	rolling	it	out	to	the	rest	of	the	country.	This	was	because	it	was	assumed	that	
towns	had	some	cosmopolitan	areas,	and	that	‘tribal	politics’	would	be	less	pronounced	than	in	
rural	areas.34	
Being	 the	 biggest	 towns	 in	 the	 protectorate,	 Hargeisa	 and	 Berbera	 hosted	 the	 first	 Town	
Councils,	established	in	1953.35	In	the	case	of	Hargeisa,	the	nominated	members	of	the	Council	
formed	the	majority	of	the	assembly	and	they	had	limited	‘legal	and	financial	autonomy’.36	The	
District	 Commissioner	 was	 the	 ultimate	 authority	 in	 the	 council	 and	 was	 empowered	 to	
manipulate	 rules	 	 leaving	 no	 room	 for	 deviation	 from	 the	 established	 norm	 of	 colonial	
administration	in	the	Protectorate.	Another	opportunity	for	avoiding	any	significant	devolution	
of	 power	 was	 presented	 by	 the	 scarcity	 of	 skilled	 staff,	 which	made	 the	 staffing	 of	 council	
dependent	 on	 the	 central	 state.37	 	 In	 other	 words,	 civil	 servants	 working	 for	 the	 central	
government	were	transferred	to		local	government	so	as	to	help	these	experimental	structures	
perform	their	duties.		
While	 the	 colonial	 government	 saw	 the	 introduction	 of	 local	 governance	 as	 a	 positive	 step	
towards	the	Somalisation	of	 the	administration,	 the	 local	population	was	sceptical	about	the	
aims	 and	 objectives	 of	 the	 exercise.	 The	 locally-based	 colonial	 administrators	 related	 this	
scepticism	to	temporal	and	aptitude	factors	noting	that:		
this	prompts	the	enquiry	whether	the	Somalis	are	sufficiently	developed	to	
assume	 the	 greater	 responsibilities	 proposed	 at	 so	 early	 date	 as	 1953	 [or	
																																								 																				
34	This	was	so	due	to	the	fact	that	it	was	assumed	that	‘tribal	politics	affected	less	adversely	the	Town	
Council	administration’	in	the	more	cosmopolitan	areas	Ibid.		Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.	
35	Ibid.	
36	Town	Councils	were	encouraged	to	come	up	with	half	of	the	money	needed	for	development	projects	
to	be	undertaken.	
37	TNA	CAA/23/6/01	Future	organisation	of	town	councils	in	Somaliland.	
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whether]	 it	 may	 well	 be	 that	 given	 definitive	 powers	 with	 something	
concrete,	reluctance	to	accept	responsibility	will	gradually	disappear.38	
The	 introduction	 of	 local	 government	 in	 Somaliland	 took	 place	 at	 a	 time	 when	 nationalism	
among	Somalis	was	reaching	its	peak	and	this	had	an	unexpected	effect	on	urban	clan-based	
segregation	in	the	town.	This	was	because	the	existing	political	cleavages	between	the	different	
clans	significantly	decreased	as	a	result	of	the	shared	opposition	to	local	government,	making	
the	project	less	successful	than	envisioned	by	the	colonial	government.	Eventually,	Town	Council	
committees	were	filled	mainly	with	illiterate	colonial-friendly	figures	such	as	former	agents	of	
the	 native	 security	 apparatus,	 messengers,	 translators	 or	 small	 scale	 businessmen	 who	
benefited	 from	 colonial	 rule,	 and	 it	 failed	 to	 bring	 about	 any	 tangible	 changes	 in	 urban	
governance.	Rather,	it	became	a	justification		for	the	District	Commissioner	to	continue	having	
complete	control	over	the	affairs	of	urban	centres,	making	the	process	no	more	than	an	exercise	
of	formalising	and	legitimising	the	status	quo	(British	Somaliland	Protectorate,	1951)	
For	the	protagonists	of	local	government,	clannism	and	“nomadism	inhibited	district	councils,	
while	tribal	incoherence	neutered	tribal	councils	before	they	had	been	formed”	(Millman,	2013,	
p.	207).	But	for	antagonists,	asking	people	to	pay	allegiance	to	a	process	initiated	by	a	polity	they	
did	not	trust	was	naïve	at	 its	best.	Seen	this	way,	the	Town	Council	was	neither	successful	 in	
development	planning	nor	maintaining	law	and	order,	as	people	did	not	see	local	government	
councils	 as	 legitimate	public	 authorities.	 For	 instance,	 in	October	 1953,	 attempts	made	by	 a	
member	of	the	council	called	Gulaid	Samatar	to	disperse	a	crowd	which	was	forming	at	the	town	
centre	was	met	with	severe	beating	by	his	clansmen.	The	colonial	government	took	this	incident	
seriously	and	arrested	seven	men	for	the	assault	of	the	councillor.	Two	of	these	men	received	
18-month	sentences	while	five	received	12	months.	The	sentences	were	mainly	aimed	at	making	
an	example	of	those	who	resist	the	government	and	disrespect	 its	agents	 (British	Somaliland	
Protectorate,	1951).		
This	incident	did	not,	however,	deter	or	reduce	opposition	to	local	government.	According	to	a	
letter	from	the	Governor	of	Somaliland	to	the	Secretary	of	the	State	for	Colonies,	there	were	
three	 categories	 of	 opposition	 to	 the	 government	 plan:	 nationalists	 who	 claimed	 to	 be	 the	
legitimate	 voice	 of	 the	 people,	 individuals	 who	 lost	 government	 jobs	 because	 of	 the	 re-
																																								 																				
38	TNA	CO	535/152/3	The	reorganisation	of	native	administration:	Somali	representation	and	introduction	
of	local	government.	
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organisation	of	the	administration,	and	Islamic	clerics	who		habitually	opposed	everything	that	
the	government	proposed.39	Of	the	three	groups,	opposition	from	the	nationalist	movements	
represented	 the	 most	 forceful	 threat	 because	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 influence	 was	 growing	
exponentially.	Non-violent	nationalist	movements	in	the	Protectorate	were	drawing	inspiration	
from	 Farah	 Omar	 who	 had	 shown	 a	 remarkable	 peaceful	 resistance	 against	 colonial	 rule	 a	
decade	before	the	introduction	of	local	government.	The	nationalist	movement	claimed	to	be	
the	 legitimate	representative	of	 the	people	and	requested	that	any	communication	between	
the	state	and	the	population	should	come	through	them.	But	the	district	administration	had	long	
refused	 to	deal	directly	with	 their	 representatives:	 in	 a	 letter	dated	18	 September	1938,	 for	
example,	the	district	officer	in	Hargeisa	wrote	that	he		
will	not	recognise	any	person	as	a	spokesman	for	any	particular	group,	party,	
district	or	tribe	[and	that]	in	all	such	matters	[he]	will	only	deal	through	the	
district	 officers,	 Akils,	 Jawabdars	 [interpreters]	 and	 recognised	 religious	
leaders.40			
Drawing	inspiration	from	instances	of	civil	disobedience,	supporters	of	nationalist	movements	
such	 as	 the	 Somali	 National	 League	 (SNL)	 and	 Somali	 Youth	 League	 (SYL)41	 	 showed	 strong	
resistance	to	the	introduction	of	local	government.42	The	torchbearers	of	this	opposition	were	
mainly	urbanites	who	were	considered	by	the	colonial	government	as	“detribalised	and	semi-
detribalised	 progressives	 [with]	 a	 disruptive	 influence”	 in	 Hargeisa.43	 For	 these	 nationalist	
leaders,	 	 the	 idea	 of	 national	 self-determination	 stemmed	 from	 cities,	 envisaged	 as	
cosmopolitan	settlements	not	based	on	clan	divisions	and	resultant	urban	segregation.	In	their	
thinking,	the	idea	of	the	state	was	embodied	in	urbanity	and	urbanisation	as	well	as	a	related	
																																								 																				
39	Ibid.	
40	Ibid.	
41	SYL	was	initially	set	up	to	create	brotherhood	among	the	Somalis	and	reduce	the	violence	among	them	
but	 later	 expanded	 into	 a	 nationalist	 organisation	 that	 sought	 self-rule	 for	 Somalis	 and	 eventually	
independence.	
42	TNA	CO	535/152/3	The	reorganisation	of	native	administration:	Somali	representation	and	introduction	
of	local	government.	
43	Ibid.	
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shift	away	from	the	intermediary	systems.	According	to	Jama,	a	nationalist	activist	in	the	1950s	
who	is	presently	a	social	researcher,	the	anticolonial	viewpoints	of	these	young	men	and	women	
was	that:					
if	you're	not	in	cities,	it	is	difficult	to	talk	about	the	formation	of	a	state.	This	
is	a	desire	without	a	foundation.	It	is	easy	to	dress	like	an	urbanised	person	
but	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 become	 a	 son	 of	 the	 city.	 If	 you	 pose	 a	 question	 to	
somebody	 pretending	 like	 an	 urbanised	 person	 and	 ask	 them	 about	 their	
deeper	feeling	on	the	state,	they	will	probably	tell	you	that	at	the	end	of	the	
day	it	is	necessary	to	become	biased	towards	your	clan.44	
The	point	made	here	is	that	urbanisation	and	urbanism	will	shift	people	away	from	the	colonially	
supported	parochial	relationships	based	on	kinship	towards	more	cosmopolitan	relations,	and	
to	national	citizenship	as	a	form	of	belonging.	It	is	alleged	that	the	nomadic	lifestyle	and	mind	
set	inevitably	hinders	the	formation	of	any	relationships	based	on	elements	other	than	kinship.	
According	to	Jama	again,	clan	affiliation:	
undermines	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 united	 political	 vision	 based	 on	
farsightedness	where	people	have	identity	other	than	the	clan.	For	instance,	
in	 urban	 contexts	 it	 was	 usual	 to	 hear	 that	 somebody	 is	 from	 Hargeisa,	
Berbera	 or	 Mogadishu.	 The	 interaction	 between	 the	 two	 groups	 also	
significantly	differ.45		
In	a	bid	to	counter	the	opposition	to	local	governance	and	customary	institutions,	the	colonial	
administration	saw	 it	necessary	 to	create	a	more	British	 friendly	environment	 in	Hargeisa	by	
reinvigorating	broadcasting	facilities.46	Colonial	records	show	that	part	of	the	intention	of	this	
strategy	was	 to	 ‘demystify’	 the	 local	 government	policies	 to	which	 the	 residents	of	Hargeisa	
																																								 																				
44	Interviewee	1	November	6,	2014.	Activist	and	Social	Researcher.	
45	Ibid.	
46	Radio	broadcast	was	 first	aired	 in	Hargeisa	 in	1941.	The	broadcasts	were	used	as	an	administrative	
instrument,	 to	announce	key	government	decisions	affecting	nomads	etc.	This	was	not	 so	 far-fetched	
from	the	traditional	means	of	disseminating	information,	as	information	about	security,	loss	of	property	
and	even	foreign	affairs	was	traditionally	broadcast	in	the	villages	through	gatherings	in	the	centre	of	the	
village.	When	radio	broadcasts	were	established	in	Hargeisa,	people	usually	gathered	around	a	big	radio	
positioned	in	one	of	the	popular	areas	of	the	city	centre	(War	Office,	1946).	
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showed	significant	resistance.	The	objective	of	the	information	dissemination	exercise	was	to	
inform	 people	 about	 the	 intention	 behind	 the	 introduction	 of	 local	 government	 as		
‘development	machinery	whereby	the	people	can	combine	to	improve	their	own	conditions	by	
their	own	efforts	with	government	guidance	on	education	and	health	services	as	well	as	water	
supplies’.47	As	such	 information	alone	may	have	been	 insufficient	 to	convince	Somalis	of	 the	
purpose	of	the	local	government,	the	administrators	suggested	that	‘leading	Somalis	should	be	
taken	to	some	suitable	parts	of	the	Sudan	to	see	for	themselves	what	has	been	achieved	there’.48	
The	 radio	 broadcast	 was,	 however,	 a	 double-edged	 knife.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 enabled	 the	
colonial	administrators	to	advance	support	for	the	introduction	of	local	governance	and	social	
development	 agendas,	 particularly	 education,	 to	 which	 the	 population	 was	 hostile	 in	 the	
beginning.	But	on	the	other	hand,	those	entrusted	with	advancing	these	 initiatives	were	also	
furthering	 nationalist	 ideas	 through	 songs	 and	 poetry	which	were	 full	 of	 idioms	 and	 riddles	
making	a	mockery	of	 the	 system.49	The	 colonial	 administration	was	not	naive	about	 this	but	
faced	a	situation	where		other	regional	powers	such	as	Egypt	were	encouraging	local	nationalism	
in	Somaliland,	by	providing	nationalists	with	means	through	which	they	could	propagate	their	
ideas.	Thus,	they	tolerated	nationalist	figures	and	groups	using	colonial	propaganda	machines	
in	a	limited	way,	provided	that	they	supported	efforts	to	create	a	British	friendly	and	educated	
ruling	class.		
Frederiksen	(2014,	p.	1287)	argues	that	“colonial	governmentality	was	fundamentally	a	project	
of	managing	contradiction	and	difference	and	those	techniques	of	power	that	best	managed	
and	 worked	 with	 this	 produced	 the	 greatest	 stability	 of	 rule”.	 As	 evident	 here,	 to	 borrow	
Frederiksen’s	 framing,	 the	 colonial	 administration	 was	 caught	 between	 a	 need	 to	 maintain	
political	order	and	desire	to	bring	about	British-friendly	social	transformation.	In	other	words,	
local	 government	 was	 used	 as	 a	 way	 of	 bringing	 about	 reorganising	 power	 over	 space	 –	
particularly	 in	 the	 cities	 -	 while	 advancement	 of	 education	 was	 used	 as	 way	 of	 facilitating	
acceptance	for	colonial	paradigms.	But	opposition	to	this	new	form	of	subjectivity	in	the	spatial	
reorganisation	of	power	had	given	people	a	common	reason	to	unite	around	and	resist	the	state.	
																																								 																				
47	TNA	CO	535/126/16	Future	Administration	of	Somaliland.	
48	Ibid.	
49	In	1954,	Mohamed	Ahmed	popularly	known	as	Kuluc	made	a	live	broadcast	of	a	song	that	was	critical	
of	the	government.	This	resulted	in	the	station	operator	fleeing	the	city	to	evade	arrest	and	the	singer	
who	was	on	government	pay	roll	being	suspended	and	exiled	to	his	home	village	of	Khatumo.			
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In	short,	the	introduction	and	resistance	to	local	governance	impacted	on	how	people	related	
to	each	other:	although	evidence	is	sketchy,	I	suggest	that	this	late	colonial	context	of	nationalist	
resistance	had	the	effect	of	mitigating	prior	urban	segregation	along	clan	lines.		
4.3 Bogged	Down	in	the	Colony?	Civilian	Rule	
In	this	section,	I	argue	that	the	postcolonial	Somali	state	was	unable	or	unwilling	to	shift	away	
from	the	colonial	practices	of	urban	governance,	hence	undermining	state	legitimacy	and	public	
trust	 in	 the	state.	 I	 show	that	power	 remained	centralised	and	concentrated	 in	 the	hands	of	
public	officials	such	as	DCs	and	PCs	who	acted	and	behaved	like	the	colonial	masters.	In	other	
words,	 the	political	authorities	 failed	 to	create	a	governance	environment	based	on	national	
citizenship	rather	the	clan-based	and	highly	mediated	statehood	where	customary	institutions	
acted	and	were	used	as	gatekeepers	for	access	to	services.		
Postcolonial	urban	governance	 in	 the	Somali	 republic	was	 characterised	by	 continuity	 rather	
than	change	of	colonial	administrative	practices.	Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	the	mantra	of	
resistance	 to	 the	 colonial	 power	 had	 revolved	 around	 liberation	 and	 transformation,	 little	
changed	regarding	how	the	state	related	to	its	people.		There	were	also	continuities	in	the	social	
and	spatial	organisation	of	the	city.	Pesek	(2011)	attributes	this	to	what	he	calls	the	‘dilemmas’	
of		the	postcolonial	African	state,	which	inherited	the	structures	as	well	as	governance	tactics	of	
colonial	powers	but	did	not	have	the	economic	means	and	political	power	through	which	it	could	
behave	like	the	colonial	powers	without	being	significantly	and	militarily	challenged.	
Furthermore,	the	postcolonial	state’s	lack	of	commitment	to	decentralising	power	reduced	local	
governance	to	no	more	than	a	nominal	structure.	Municipal	government’s	role	was	drastically	
limited	 to	 the	management	of	 the	Zaribas	 (a	 local	urban	market),	maintenance	of	 roads	and	
garbage	collection.	As	such,	it	failed	to	attract	either	capable	politicians	or	skilled	labour	force	
as	most	 of	 those	 qualified	 enough	 for	 running	 a	 city	 had	 taken	 up	 vacancies	 at	 the	 central	
government	 level.	 The	 District	 Commissioners	 and	 Regional	 Governors	 in	 collaboration	with	
intermediary	institutions	ran	the	show.	According	to	Ray	(1996)	one	of	the	reasons	that		chiefs	
were	 formidable	 intermediary	 institutions	was	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 constituted	parallel	 power,	
perceived	mainly	as	illegitimate,	because	they	had	been	used	by	colonial	authorities,	but	they	
were	also	accessible	to	the	postcolonial	state	as	they	derived	their	authority	from	precolonial	
sources	of	legitimacy.	This	created	a	situation	of	institutional	pluralism,	in	which	both	state	and	
traditional	 authorities	 coexist	 in	 the	 postcolonial	 context.	 This	 coexistence	 was	 however	
characterised	by	 tensions.	 In	 the	 case	of	 the	Somali	Republic,	 these	 tensions	were	managed	
80	|	P a g e 	
	
	
differently	 by	 the	 civilian	 and	 military	 postcolonial	 regimes.	 During	 the	 civilian	 government	
(1960	 to	 1969),	 Akils50	 assumed	 greater	 role	 in	 the	 mediation	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 people	
particularly	during	the	election	time.	 It	 is	 important	to	note	that	Akils	played	a	crucial	role	 in	
electoral	processes	as	they	mobilised	people	for	competing	political	parties	and	candidates.	Akils	
organised	people	not	only	because	they	were	agents	of	political	parties	but	they	also	had	vested	
interests	in	maintaining	their	influence	and	power	as	well	ensuring	access	to	state	resources	and	
services	for	themselves	and	for	their	clan	members.		
The	spatial	manifestation	of	 the	role	of	Akils	 in	politics	 is	 important	 for	understanding	urban	
segregation	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways.	 Their	 role	 becomes	 particularly	 clear	when	 one	 examines	
Somali	elections.51	Firstly,	political	elites	may	see	it	as	electorally	strategic	and	beneficial	if	they	
concentrate	their	support	in	a	particular	urban	space,	so	as	to	increase	their	chance	in	political	
participation.	Secondly,	it	is	easier	to	mobilise	financial	resources	when	the	clan	is	concentrated	
in	a	particular	area.	Thirdly,	 it	 is	 logistically	more	efficient	to	reach	supporters	with	messages	
and	update	clan	members	about	the	political	dynamics	for	one’s	advantage.	
The	state	was	often	tolerant	with	the	institutions	of	Akils,	as	it	neither	had	the	capacity	nor	the	
political	will	to	replace	them.	While	they	were	at	times	seen	as	actors	with	disruptive	influence	
for	 bureaucratic	 development,	 they	 were	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 seen	 as	 an	 effective	 way	 of	
controlling	 the	vast	unmanned	 territories	of	 this	young	nation.	As	 sovereignty	and	 territorial	
control	that	comes	with	it	depend	on	the	availability	of	certain	levels	of	resources	(Pesek,	2011),	
the	 postcolonial	 Somali	 state	 lacked	 the	 capacity	 necessary	 for	 maintaining	 territorial	 and	
political	control	over	its	nomadic	and	poverty	stricken	rural	and	urban	populations.	The	state’s	
inability	to	monopolise	the	instruments	of	violence	had	a	major	impact	on	the	spatial	character	
of	Hargeisa.		For	instance,	the	frequent	occurrence	of	violence	in	the	hinterlands	of	Hargeisa	had	
often	caused	many	people	to	fear	for	their	lives	because	of	the	possibility	of	revenge	attacks	by	
relatives	of	the	victims.	Mediation	aimed	at	bringing	clan	skirmishes	to	an	end	had	often	drained	
a	major	part	of	the	government’s	efforts	in	the	maintenance	of	law	and	order.	Hargeisa’s	1967	
																																								 																				
50	 Akils’	 relationship	 with	 the	 state	 was	 determined	 initially	 through	 their	 roles	 in	 the	 struggle	 for	
independence.	Those	individuals	who	were	on	the	side	of	the	colonial	rulers	were	side-lined	by	the	new	
state	 while	 those	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 struggles	 enjoyed	 better	 status	 and	 access	 to	 the	 state	
resources	 and	 power.	 This,	 however,	 was	 not	 sustained	 for	 a	 long	 as	 criticism	 against	 the	 state	
overshadowed	criticism	against	those	who	worked	with	the	colonial	officials.	 Interviewee	7	August	20,	
2014	Oral	Historian,	Artist	and	Radio	Presenter..				
51	These	are	based	on	my	own	observation	in	the	2012	elections		
81	|	P a g e 	
	
	
District	Commissioner	recalls	several	incidents	of	conflict	within	a	short	span	of	time	and	states	
that	the	security	problems	were	one	of	the	major	challenges	the	government	faced	at	the	time.	
The	 DC	 says	 that	 when	 he	 was	 transferred	 to	 Hargeisa,	 there	 were	 51	 cases	 of	 unresolved	
murder	 in	 the	courts	and	another	50	cases	 for	which	sentences	were	 issued	but	 judgements	
were	yet	to	be	enforced.52		
The	murders	resulted	from	a	conflict,	which	lasted	for	nearly	7	years,	between	Sa’ad	Muse	and	
Arab	clans	of	Hargeisa.	The	DC	claims	that	the	reasons	why	this	conflict	was	prolonged	related	
to	revenge	attacks	which	all	began	with	the	killing	of	a	reputable	religious	man	in	the	outskirts	
of	the	city.	This	led	to	a	chain	of	retaliatory	revenge	attacks	where	46	people	from	the	two	clans	
lost	their	lives.	In	order	to	resolve	this	conflict,	the	DC	appointed	a	mediation	team	of	seven	men	
from	each	side.	The	Akils	from	both	sides	agreed	to	this	arrangement.	The	support	of	a	group	of	
religious	men	who	were	actively	engaged	in	resolving	civil	affairs	and	issues	to	do	with	peace	
were	also	enlisted	to	help	resolve	the	issue.		The	last	dispute	involved	the	disappearance	of	5	
men	whose	fate	was	not	known.	Both	sides	denied	knowledge	of	what	happened	to	these	men.	
The	DC	informed	the	meeting	that:	
unless	the	truth	is	told	about	what	happened	to	these	men,	no	one	will	leave	
the	meeting.	Then	a	respectable	old	man	stood	up	crying	and	confessed	that	
his	 clan	was	 responsible	 for	 the	 death	 of	 the	 five	men	 in	 retaliation	 for	 a	
religious	man	killed	by	the	other	clan.	Another	young	man	from	the	other	clan	
also	stood	up	and	said	that	the	religious	man	was	killed	by	his	clan	and	that	
they	 will	 give	 compensation	 for	 him	 and	 20	 additional	 camels	 for	 wrong	
doing.53	
While	the	mediation	was	continuing,	the	DC	issued	a	confiscation	order	to	paramilitary	troops	
for	the	rounding	up	of	livestock	from	both	clans.	According	to	the	DC,	thousands	of	sheep,	goats,	
cattle,	and	camel	were	rounded	up,	and	a	number	of	birkas	(small	mobile	reservoirs	constructed	
with	cement)	were	seized.	The	primary	aim	of	the	confiscation	was	to	force	clans	to	reach	an	
amicable	solution	to	the	security	problem	in	the	city.	Moreover,	the	confiscated	livestock	would	
also	form	part	of	the	compensation	for	the	offences	each	side	had	committed	against	the	other.	
																																								 																				
52	Interviewee	3	Nomember	05,	2014.	Former	District	Commissioner	of	Hargeisa.	
53	Ibid.	
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Following	the	agreement,	the	camels	that	had	already	been	confiscated	were	designated	to	form	
part	of	the	compensation.	Although	the	amount	needed	for	compensation	exceeded	that	which	
was	 in	 government	 hands,	 the	 DC	 proposed	 that	 the	 	 livestock	 in	 his	 possession	 should	 be	
subdivided	as	compensation.54	This	proposition	was	said	to	have	been	readily	accepted	by	most	
elders	as	it	spared	them	from	a	tedious	process	of	compensation	collection	and	it	also	relieved	
the	state	of	worrying	about	further	revenge	emanating	from	impatience	with	the	longevity	of	
collection	time.	
A	similar	case	also	occurred	in	the	South	of	the	city	where	two	sub-clans,	Reer	Guuleed	and	Reer	
Gobdoon	of	the	Eidagale	sub-clans,	clashed	in	1968.	Five	people	were	killed	in	the	clash,	two	
from	each	side	plus	a	wadad	(cleric),	who	was	trying	to	mediate.	The	DC	requested	a	unit	of	
paramilitary	troops	and	a	vehicle	to	confiscate	the	livestock	of	the	warring	clans,	as	well	as	the	
birka.	The	confiscation	included	sheep,	cattle	and	camel.	According	to	the	DC:	
the	reason	why	the	confiscation	was	not	limited	only	to	camel	was	the	fact	
that	the	consequences	of	the	confiscation	will	not	be	felt	at	the	household	
level	if	sheep	and	goats	are	not	included.	But	if	they	are	confiscated	then	the	
pain	will	be	felt	at	the	very	local	level	as	children	will	have	no	access	to	milk.55	
As	in	the	previous	case,	the	support	of	a	religious	group	was	again	enlisted	and	information	on	
the	background	and	clan	dynamics	of	the	conflict	were	obtained.	Clan	elders	were	taken	to	a	
remote	village	in	the	South	of	the	city	near	the	border.	The	District	Commissioner	identified	7	
men	from	each	group	to	mediate	this	problem.	The	mediating	group	were	told	that	they	are	not	
going	anywhere	until	the	issues	were	resolved.	The	religious	group	brought	some	information	
to	the	DC	with	regards	to	the	number	of	people	killed	and	on	what	sides	each	came	from.	The	
compensation	for	the	dead	men	was	agreed	in	the	limited	time	that	the	DC	had	given:	24	hours.		
The	above	cases	demonstrate	that	the	memories	of	past	colonial	ways	of	governance	shaped	
the	 manner	 and	 mechanism	 through	 which	 urban	 governance	 and	 particularly	 conflict-
resolution	was	practiced	in	the	postcolonial	context.	Contrary	to	the	general	rhetoric	against	the	
state	during	the	colonial	times	and	early	nationalist	agendas,	the	postcolonial	state	was	unable	
																																								 																				
54	 The	 clans	 agreed	 to	 this	 arrangement	 except	 for	 one	 sub	 clan	 which	 refused	 to	 accept	 the	
compensation,	alleging	that	their	man	was	killed	without	reason.	The	Akils	of	that	clan	then	told	the	DC	
to	keep	the	camels	for	them	pending	side	talks	with	his	clan.	
55	Interviewee	3	Nomember	05,	2014.	Former	District	Commissioner	of	Hargeisa.	
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to	break	away	from	the	use	of	customary	institutions	as	intermediaries	between	the	state	and	
the	people.	By	contrast,	the	state	continued	to	use	the	intermediary	system	of	Akils	for	almost	
the	same	reasons	and	in	the	same	ways	that	they	were	used	during	colonial	times.		
The	 clan	 conflicts	 and	 insecurity	 seem	 likely	 to	 have	 undone	 some	 of	 the	 prior	 impetus	 to	
cosmopolitan	choice	of	 residence	 in	urban	contexts,	promoting	a	 recourse	 to	segregation.	 In	
other	words,	security	concerns	and	fear	of	revenge	attacks	by	other	clans	as	well	as	the	fact	that	
the	 state	 was	 unable	 to	 guarantee	 safety	 in	 Hargeisa	 made	 it	 difficult	 for	 people	 to	 trust	
neighbourhoods	unpopulated	by	their	clans,	perpetuating	segregation	along	clan	lines.	
4.4 Breaking	with	the	Past?	Military	Rule	
The	 civilian	 era	 thus	 did	 not	 usher	 in	 change	 regarding	 the	 importance	 of	 clan	 and	 the	 first	
notable	break	with	the	past	came	in	1969	when	the	military	took	over.	Of	particular	importance	
in	terms	of	breaking	with	the	past	was	a	set	of	policies	aimed	at	promoting	national	citizenship	
and	 intended	 as	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 highly	 clanised	 belonging	 prevalent	 under	 the	 civil	
leadership.	 In	these	exercises,	 the	military	regime	embarked	on	policies	of	clan	denunciation	
and	militarised	development	campaigns.	
When	the	military	took	over	the	administration	of	the	country,	municipal	governance	in	Hargeisa	
was	 further	 weakened.	 Councillors	 were	 dismissed	 and	 the	 role	 of	 municipality	 in	 city	
management	 remained	 limited.	 Urban	 governance	 was	 militarised	 and	 most	 of	 the	 civilian	
District	Commissioners	were	 replaced	by	Military	Officers.	Neighbourhood	management	was	
also	closely	tied	to	ruling	party	structures.	Each	50	houses	were	put	under	the	management	of	
a	loyal	socialist	supporter	called	tabeele	(sign	holder).56	Orientation	centres	were	also	erected	
in	 most	 of	 the	 neighbourhoods	 where	 people	 were	 called	 in	 on	 weekly	 basis	 to	 hear	 long	
sermons	 about	 how	 the	 state	 was	 different	 from	 that	 which	 existed	 before	 it	 and	 how	
nationalism	can	be	nurtured	through	collaboration	with	the	state.	Subjugation	and	suppression	
of	opinion	became	a	marker	for	the	new	government	and	dissenting	voices	were	punished	in	
the	most	severe	manner	possible.		
There	was	a	specific	rhetoric	and	policy	of	denouncing	clan,	as	the	government	issued	directives	
criminalising	 clan	 identity.	 In	 1971,	 the	 state	declared	 clannism,	 “which	was	 associated	with	
nepotism	 and	 corruption,	 officially	 banned	 and	 ritually	 buried”	 (Lewis,	 1989,	 p.	 573)	 in	
																																								 																				
56	Interviewee	7	August	20,	2014	Oral	Historian,	Artist	and	Radio	Presenter.	
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cemeteries	 across	 the	 country.	 People	 remember	 in	 particular,	 the	 government’s	 symbolic	
‘burial’	of	tribalism	in	an	orchestrated	public	gathering	in	Hargeisa,	which	was	supposed	to	be	a	
sign	of	a	paradigm	shift	from	clannism.	This	rhetoric	was	however	not	accompanied	by	concrete	
action	as	the	state	revived	clanism	and	nepotism	in	its	every	day	governance	practices.57		
Loyalty	 to	 the	 socialist	 party	 was	 maintained	 through	 a	 guulwade	 (guulwadeyaal	 in	 plural)	
system.	Guulwade	in	Somali	is	a	word	which	loosely	translates	as	victorious.	According	to	Gulaid	
(undated,	p.	134)	guulwade	were	designated	as	revolutionary	guardians	and	were	“given	the	
power	to	judge	any	individual	they	encountered,	on	a	daily	basis,	while	they	were	administering	
their	roles	as	guardians	of	the	Revolution….no	other	authority	had	the	power	to	reverse	their	
judgment	once	they	had	formulated	their	perception	of	 those	who	crossed	their	 roads”.	The	
practices	of	 the	guulwade	has	given	 rise	 to	 the	emergence	of	a	concept,	guulwadeyn,	which	
captures	the	culture	of	obedience	created	under	repressive	conditions	where	people	play	to	the	
tune	of	the	oppressor	for	personal	and	political	survival.		
Being	the	second	biggest	town	in	the	republic,	Hargeisa	was	an	important	centre	of	activities	for	
the	revolution.	It	was	also	here	where	resistance	to	the	state	was	most	active.	For	this	reason,	
Hargeisa	 was	 given	 unparalleled	 attention	 by	 the	 security	 forces	 and	 most	 importantly	 by	
guulwadeyaal.	As	 repression	 and	 forced	 compliance	with	 government	directives	became	 the	
norm	rather	than	exception	 in	Hargeisa,	everyone	started	fearing	for	their	 lives	 including	the	
‘hard	headed	nomads’	in	colonial	terms.	This	unprecedented	level	of	fear	led	to	a	reduction	in	
violent	 conflict	 among	 the	 clans	 as	 they	 feared	 the	 dire	 repercussion	 that	 could	 result	 from	
getting	involved	in	conflict.58	For	the	first	time	in	many	years,	violence	in	the	hinterlands	and	
subsequent	revenge	attacks	carried	out	in	major	cities	went	down.	This	reduced	level	of	violent	
conflict	led	to	the	emergence	of	cosmopolitan	spaces	as	people	could	trust	residing	in	spaces	
dominated	by	clans	other	than	their	own.	These	cosmopolitan	mixed	clan	neighbourhoods	were	
comprised	of	relatively	well	to	do	families		–		residents	were	often	middle-class	people	mainly	
consisting	 of	 senior	 government	 officials,	 businessmen	 and	wealthy	 people	 from	 the	 Somali	
Diaspora	–	such	as	the	Red	Sea	neighbourhood	formed	in	the	West	of	the	town.59		As	evident	
here,	 the	 urban	 desegregation	 seen	 under	 	military	 rule	 did	 not	 result	 from	 intentional	 anti	
																																								 																				
57	Participant	in	Agip	Teashop	Discussion	April	11,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
58	Participant	May	13,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	Focus	Group	Discussion.	
59	Participant	in	Star	Area	Teashop	Discussion	May	17,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
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segregation	policy	but	rather	as	a	reduction	of	insecurity	under	repressive	conditions.	Moreover,	
there	is	no	evidence	that	this	desegregation	occurred	in	less	affluent	parts	of	the	town.	
Despite	the	denunciation	and	criminalisation	of	clanism	in	the	early	years	of	the	military	rule	
and	the	creation	of	highly	structured	party	powers,	the	military	government	did	not	break	away	
from	the	use	of	the	intermediary	customary	institutions	but	it	changed	the	parameters	within	
which	 this	 system	 worked.	 Bank	 and	 Southall	 (1996)	 see	 the	 manipulation	 of	 chieftaincy	
institutions	as	attempts	made	at	changing	the	legitimacy	and	autonomy	of	chiefs.	In	the	case	
that	concerns	us	here,	structural	and	semiotic	changes	altering	the	mechanics	and	language	of	
power	were	made	to	the	institution	of	Akils.	This	was	done	by	relabelling	their	titles	to	reflect	
the	functions	that	the	state	 identified	for	them	to	perform.	For	 instance,	the	title	of	Akil	and	
Chief	Akil	(Paramount	Chief)	were	respectively	renamed	Nabadoon	and	Samadoon.	The	former	
translates	as	the	Seeker	of	Peace	whereas	the	second	translates	as	the	Seeker	of	Good.	In	the	
urban	context	of	Hargeisa,	these	new	roles	for	Akils	were	delinked	from	clan	and	instead	tied	to	
a	 specific	 geographical	 area	 –	 a	 town	 neighbourhood	 for	 example	 (or	 a	 village	 in	 rural	
contexts).60	 The	 new	 arrangements	 thus	 spatialised	 and	 territorialised	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
institution	in	such	a	way	that	the	authority	of	the	Akil	was	no	longer	necessarily	confined	to	the	
clan	he	comes	from.		
I	argue	 that	 this	move	can	be	seen	essentially	as	a	way	of	undermining	Akils’	 legitimacy	and	
jurisdiction,	as	the	state	was	far	from	ditching	the	institution	as	it	often	had	a	cause	for	which	it	
could	be	used.	For	instance,	in	addition	to	their	role	in	the	maintenance	of	peace	and	security,	
the	 Akils	 in	 urban	 areas	were	 at	 the	 centre	 of	military	 campaigns.	 One	 of	 these	 campaigns	
focused	on	building	a	major	dam	for	Hargeisa.	The	resources	and	manpower	for	the	construction	
of	this	water	facility	were	raised	through	a	combination	of	government	funds	and	public	support	
in	the	form	of	equipment	and	manpower,	much	of	which	mobilised	by	rebranded	customary	
institutions	such	as	Nabadoon	and	Samadoon	(Akils	and	Chief	Akils).	Essentially,	this	campaign	
can	be	seen	as	an	attempt	aimed	at	 legitimising	and	mobilising	total	support	for	the	socialist	
regime’s	 self-help	 approach	 to	 development	 particularly	 the	 improvement	 of	 education,	
agriculture	and	 infrastructure.	Pesek	(2011,	p.	54)	conceptualises	campaigns	as	a	“temporary	
and	 concentrated	attempt	 to	 change	within	a	 short	 span	of	 time	particular	 aspects	of	 social	
configurations	 of	 a	 given	 society”.	 As	 in	 other	 newly	 independent	 African	 states,	 Barre’s	
																																								 																				
60	Participant	in	Commercial	Bank	Teashop	Discussion	June	13,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
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campaigns	supposedly	aimed	to	break	with	the	past	through	self-sufficiency	rhetoric	through	
which	the	population	was	mobilised	for	undertaking	grand	development	projects	with	resources	
locally	available.		
Akils	were	also	instrumental	in	the	campaign	for	grandiose	state	led	development	and	nation-
building	projects	mentioned	above.	In	Hargeisa,	these	projects	included	the	construction	of	the	
major	socialist	party	building	and	orientation	centres,	schools,	national	museum	and	library	–	all	
of	which	dated	from	this	period.	Aside	from	the	meagre	resources	available	to	the	state,	the	
manpower	and	equipment	necessary	for	constructing	these	projects	were	not	in	the	hands	of	
the	government.	Akils	helped	the	government	pull	up	all	the	regionally	available	resources	from	
private	individuals	voluntarily	or	involuntarily:	they	were	thus	once	again	in	their	(colonial)	role	
of	 state	 agents,	 as	 tax	 collectors	 and	 mobilisers	 of	 labour	 for	 the	 state.	 According	 to	 the	
Governor,	 the	 reason	 for	 which	 the	 revolutionary	 government	 was	 interested	 in	 the	 urban	
development	 in	Hargeisa	was	to	uplift	the	status	of	Hargeisa	so	as	to	bring	 it	at	par	with	the	
image	expected	of	a	2nd	capital	city.	The	Governor	recalled:	
the	government	had	long-term	programme	for	the	city	and	all	my	programs	
are	 interconnected;	wells,	 library,	museum	and	the	airport	as	well.	When	I	
came	to	Hargeisa.	The	airport	did	not	have	a	place	where	passengers	could	
sit,	they	used	to	stand-up	but	I	added	a	VIPs	section.	The	idea	was	that	when	
dignitaries	arrive,	they	will	be	welcomed	there	than	they	should	be	taken	to	
the	museum,	the	library	then	finally	entertained	at	the	National	Theatre.61		
This	urban	development	narrative	is,	however,	challenged	by	many	people62	in	Hargeisa		who	
claim	 that	 far	 from	 promoting	 Hargeisa	 to	 a	 second	 capital	 city,	 the	 government	 had	 an	
unwritten	rule	of	blocking	development,	as	evidenced	by	the	banning	investment	of	buildings	of	
more	than	three	stories	in	the	city.	They	allege	that	the	government	was	less	interested	in	the	
urban	development	of	Hargeisa	for	political	reasons.	
On	the	other	urban	 land	tenure	security	had	 improved	under	military	 rule.	People	no	 longer	
feared	owning	land	in	areas	populated	by	other	clans.	While	this	facilitated	the	integration	of	
the	clans	who	traditionally	hailed	from	Hargeisa,	it	also	increased	the	rift	between	those	who	
																																								 																				
61	Interviewee	10	October	29,	2014.	Former	Governor	of	North	Western	Province.	
62	Participant	in	Commercial	Bank	Teashop	Discussion	July	01,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
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were	associated	with	the	government	and	those	who	were	opposed	to	it.	In	other	words,	non-
Isaaq	 clans	 such	 as	 Daarood	were	 viewed	with	 suspicion	 due	 to	 their	 support,	 or	 perceived	
support,	for	the	regime.	This	led	to	new	concentration	of	people	of	particular	clan	orientation	
i.e.	Southerners	in	a	particular	space.	On	the	other	hand,	this	was	often	used	by	antagonists	to	
show	that	their	city	is	at	risk	for	being	overtaken	by	foreigners	due	to	the	formation	of	new	clan	
spaces.		
This	section	has	shown	that	the	focus	of	urban	governance	during	the	periods	of	civilian	and	
military	 rule	 was	 on	 security	 and	 development.	 Urban	 segregation	 during	 civilian	 rule	 was	
exacerbated	by	 increasing	marginalisation	of	Hargeisa	and	 lack	of	employment	opportunities	
which	forced	many	people	to	stay	areas	closer	to	where	they	could	get	access	to	kinship	based	
communal	support.	Similarly,	insecurity	emanating	from	clan	skirmishes	caused	many	people	to	
watch	their	back	for	possible	revenge	attacks.	Customary	institutions	mitigated	these	problems	
by	helping	the	state	maintain	law	and	order	and	facilitate	access	to	service	for	their	subjects.	It	
is	 important	 to	note	that	while	signs	of	diversity	emerged	 in	 the	spatial	character	of	 the	city	
during	the	military	regime	mainly	due	to	the	improved	security,	the	state	was	unable	to	break	
away	with	 the	past	despite	 repeated	efforts	or	at	 least	 rhetoric	 to	 this	end.	The	contours	of	
governance	in	the	country	and	the	fact	that	cities	were	managed	in	a	militarised	way	for	a	good	
part	of	the	postcolonial	period	led	to	great	continuities	in	the	spatial	character	of	the	city.			
This	episode	of	urban	development	ended	abruptly	with	the	near	complete	physical	destruction	
and	emptying	of	the	city	during	the	war	with	mass	population	flight.	The	conflict		destroyed	its	
physical	 and	 institutional	 structures,	 claimed	 the	 lives	 of	 more	 than	 50	 000	 residents	 and	
displaced	nearly	its	entire	population	in	the	late	1980s	(Bradbury,	2008).		The	next	section	turns	
to	the	next	phase	in	the	city’s	history	and	the	trajectory	of	post	conflict	recovery.	
4.5 Re-establishing	Local	Governance:	Post-Conflict		
Below,	I	argue	that	insecurity	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	Barre’s	ouster	in	most	cities	
reinforced	 the	utility	of	 clan	as	an	 important	element	 in	choosing	where	 to	stay	and	who	 to	
relate	to.	Furthermore,	I	argue	the	role	the	clan	continues	to	play	in	the	democratisation	process	
and	the	way	political	parties	use	it	or	abuse	it	reinforces	the	utility	of	clan	as	a	unit	of	identity.	
This,	 combined	 with	 the	 key	 roles	 the	 customary	 institutions	 continue	 to	 play	 in	mediating	
access	 to	 services	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 context,	 strengthens	 clannism	 and	 hence	 perpetuates	
segregation.				
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For	three	years	following	the	war	in	1988,	the	city	remained	almost	vacant	as	it	was	flattened	to	
the	ground	and	residents	fled	to	the	neighbouring	country	of	Ethiopia	and	elsewhere.	When	the	
military	regime	was	ousted	finally	in	1991,	people	started	coming	back	from	the	refugee	camps.		
Due	to	the	fragility	of	the	state	in	the	early	years	of	the	post-conflict	context,	clan	became	more	
important	 than	 ever	 before	 for	 security	 purposes	 in	 urban	 areas,	 causing	many	 people	who	
owned	land	in	areas	populated	by	other	clans	to	move	to	strongholds	of	their	clans	(APD,	2010).	
In	 other	 words,	 the	 conflict	 seems	 to	 have	 removed	 whatever	 solidarity	 may	 have	 existed	
between	the	clans	in	Hargeisa	and	reconstituted	segregation.	
Refugees	and	other	rural	migrants	aiming	to	take	advantage	of	the	post	Barre	freedom	have	
gradually	refilled	the	empty	and	ruined	spaces	of	the	city.	Reconstruction	began	mostly	through	
remittances	from	the	diaspora	and	emanated	mainly	from	the	Middle	East,	Western	Europe	and	
North	America.	This	ushered	a	new	wave	of	urban	development	or	redevelopment	and	rapid	
growth,	which	made	Hargeisa	more	than	twice	as	big	as	before,	both	in	terms	of	its	geographical	
areas	and	population	size.	This	rapid	post-war	growth63	gave	rise	to	various	urban	governance	
challenges	at	a	time	when	Somaliland	was	struggling	with	post-conflict	institutional	weaknesses	
and	lack	of	capacity	to	deliver	services.		
From	1991	to	1993,	the	weakness	of	the	state	and	its	inability	to	monopolise	power	in	the	post-
conflict	context	had	a	major	 impact	on	the	reestablishment	of	 local	government	 institutions.	
Attempts		at	establishing	local	administrative	structures	were	overshadowed	by	efforts	aimed	
at	 ensuring	 safety	 and	 security	 in	 the	 city	 as	 law	and	order	broke	down	 in	 the	aftermath	of	
Barre’s	removal	from	power	in	1991.64	This	was	attributable	to	political	and	personal	differences	
among	the	SNM	leaders	fuelled	by	the	fact	that	the	clans	were	armed	and	military	command	
had	little	or	no	influence	over	the	affairs	of	the	clan	militias.65		
Politicians	in	the	post-conflict	context	articulated	two	major	views	on	the	role	of	clan	and	Akils	
in	state	structures,	which	had	implications	for	Hargeisa	local	government;	institutionalism	and	
																																								 																				
63	This	rapid	growth	can	be	related	to	three	main	reasons.	Firstly,	Hargeisa	had	been	and	continues	to	be	
a	major	administrative	centre.	Secondly	Hargeisa	is	the	epicentre	of	the	inter-urban	migration	as	well	as	
rural-urban	migration	where	 those	moving	 from	other	urban	or	 rural	areas	 in	 the	country	 stretch	 the	
boundaries	of	the	city.	And	thirdly	Hargeisa	had	in	the	past	four	decades	produced	a	significant	diaspora	
who	contribute	significantly	to	its	rapid	economic	and	spatial	growth.	
64	Interviewee	2	November	8,	2014	Former	Chairman	of	Somaliland	Atrocities	Commission.	
65	Ibid.	
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deferralism66.	 	 These	positions	had	 their	history	 in	 the	context	of	 the	SNMs	military	 struggle	
against	the	regime.	Those	in	the	former	camp	were	concerned	about	the	increasing	influence	
and	authority	of	the	clan	elders	in	the	organisation	and	they	proposed	to	professionalise	and	
detribalise	the	armed	wing	of	the	organisation.	The	idea	here	was	instead	of	the	clans	providing	
rations	and	logistics	to	the	soldiers,	they	should	support	a	centralised	authority	so	as	to	make	
sure	 that	 the	 forces	 fighting	 for	 the	organisation	 are	 accountable	 to	 its	 command.	 If	 people	
wanted	 to	 provide	 supplies	 for	 the	 cause	 SNM	was	 fighting	 for,	 then	 they	 should	make	 all	
contributions	 through	 a	 central	 fund	 managed	 by	 the	 central	 command.	 The	 other	 group	
believed	that	the	priority	of	SNM	was	to	remove	the	military	regime	from	power	at	any	cost	and	
through	any	available	means;	the	assumption	was	that	the	removal	of	Barre	would	lead	to	an	
environment	in	which	the	organisation	would	be	able	to	reorganise	itself	and	put	an	effective	
administration	 in	place.	The	differences	between	the	SNM	leadership	was	mainly	suppressed	
during	the	struggle.	According	to	a	former	SNM	official	during	the	war	with	Barre:			
to	say	things	should	be	done	in	a	proper	manner	was	akin	to	treason.	The	
confidential	discussions	we	had	in	the	central	committee	meeting	were	often	
leaked	to	the	civilians.	Propaganda	would	spread	against	anyone	coming	up	
with	a	different	narrative.	People	would	say	today	is	not	the	day	to	talk	about	
these	 issues	 and	 those	 who	 voice	 their	 concern	 would	 be	 branded	 as	
traitors.67	
These	 pre-incursion	 differences	 between	 the	 SNM	 officials	 created	 a	 hostile	 political	
environment	in	the	post	Barre	administrative	and	political	dispensations.	In	other	words,	Post	
Siyad	Barre	local	governance	was	marred	by	internal	power	struggles	and	insecurity	problems.	
This	particularly	negatively	impacted	the	reestablishment	of	an	effective	local	governance	in	the	
immediate	aftermath	of	Barre’s	fall.	The	spatial	consequences	of	this	was	that	members	of	clans	
who	resided	in	an	area	where	their	clan	is	not	predominant	moved	to	other	areas	where	their	
clan	had	significant	presence	as	that	would	reduce	the	risk	of	being	victimised	by	marauding	
militias	of	other	clans.	For	instance,	many	families	who	were	from	the	Awal	clans	moved	out	of	
																																								 																				
66	Ibid.	
67	Ibid.	
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area	populated	by	the	Garhajis	and	vice	versa.68	The	security	utility	of	the	clan	seems	here	to	
have	undermined	national	belonging	and	citizenship.		Ray	(1996),	and	Skalník	(1996)	argue	that	
there	is	a	tension	between	the	concept	of	citizenship,	which	grants	the	bearer		individualised	
rights	such	that		one	could	theoretically	live	in	any	place	of	his/her	choosing	within	the	polity;	
and	 the	 subjectivity	 inherent	 in	 the	 traditional	 public	 authorities	 where	 the	 individual	 is	
expected	to	pledge	their	allegiance	to	the	customary	institution	of	chieftaincy.	
Such	 division	 in	 allegiance	 became	 a	 recipe	 for	 the	 widespread	 post	 Barre	 deterioration	 in	
security	in	Hargeisa.	As	urban	safety	declined	between	1991	to	1993,	non	SNM	politicians	used	
this	as	an	opportunity	 to	present	 themselves	as	an	alternative	 to	 the	 failed	SNM	 leadership,	
culminating	in	the	election	of	Mohamed	Ibrahim	Egal,	a	former	Prime	Minister	of	Somalia.	The	
new	President	came	to	power	at	a	time	of	insecurity.		He	spent	a	significant	part	of	his	political	
energy	on	undermining	tribal	influence	on	the	armed	forces	as	he	embarked	on	a	demobilisation	
process,	 which	 was	 largely	 successful	 (though	 at	 times	 there	 were	 problems,	 	 e.g.	 the	
government	overlooked	the	fact	that	the	armed	young	men	had	long	made	a		living	out	of	the	
checkpoints	and	any	handover	needed	to	furnish	them	with	a	new	source	of	income).69	The	new	
President	appointed	Mohamed	Hashi	Elmi	from	Awal	clan	in	Northern	and	Western	Hargeisa	as	
a	Mayor	in	1993.	Hashi	was	a	trained	engineer	and	a	key	figure	in	the	SNM	political	structure.	
The	President	made	the	appointment	at	a	time	when	armed	opposition	against	him	was	active	
in	the	city.	This	was	the	first	major	attempt	at	re-establishing	local	government	in	Hargeisa.	The	
new	[Post	SNM	appointed]	mayor	prioritised	law	and	order	and	established	22	police	stations	
and	substations	in	a	corresponding	number	of	newly	restructured	districts	and	sub	districts.70	
The	increase	in		security	installations	were	seen	as	important71	by	the	Post	SNM	government	for	
not	only	maintenance	of	law	and	order	but	also	as	a	prelude	for	the	establishment	of	a	revenue	
base	 in	 a	 hostile	 political	 environment	 where	 people	 were	 armed	 and	 could	 challenge	 tax	
																																								 																				
68	Interviewee	62	May	12,	2014.	Land	Broker	.	
69	Interviewee	2	November	8,	2014	Former	Chairman	of	Somaliland	Atrocities	Commission.	
70	Interviewee	9	August	16,	2014.	Former	Mayor	of	Hargeisa.	
71	Participant	in	Kaah	Restaurant/Tea	Discussion	August	07,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
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collection	 attempts.72	 The	 new	 mayor’s	 rearrangement	 of	 administrative	 structures	 was,	
however,	 heavily	 criticised	 as	 this	 came	 at	 a	 time	when	 the	 government	was	 facing	 	 armed	
resistance	from	disgruntled	Garhajis	clans	in	the	East	and	South	of	the	city.	He	was	accused	of	
taking	advantage	of	this	and	destroying	properties	located	in	the	city	centre	belonging	to	the	
clans	who	fought	with	the	government	between	1994	and	1997	without	due	process.73	
As	 detailed	 in	 chapter	 two,	 traditional	 authorities	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 re-
establishment	of	 law	and	order	 in	 Somaliland	after	 the	war,	 helping	 the	 state	 to	disarm	 the	
militia	and	facilitating	dialogue	between	warring	clans.	As	a	result,	they	are	often	represented	
as	an	important	institution,	and	invoked	as	an	explanation	to	account	for	the	differences	in	state	
building	 processes	 between	 Somalia	 and	 Somaliland(Walls,	 2009).	 Advancing	 this	
representation	 are	 state	 officials	who	 for	 political	 reasons	 seek	 to	 legitimate	 their	 cause	 for	
independence	on	the	basis	of	identity	politics	where	reference	is	made	to	how	Somaliland	is	a	
cultured	nation	with	traditional	authorities	that	saved	it	from	political	catastrophe	as	opposed	
to	the	South	which	lacks	this.74	
Despite	 this	 romanticised	 representation,	 I	 argue	 that	 tensions	 characterise	 the	 relationship	
between	the	state	and	traditional	authorities	in	Somaliland,	and	specifically	in	Hargeisa.	These	
tensions	are	attributed	to	the	inability	of	the	state	and	the	customary	institutions	to	manage	the	
complex	 post-conflict	 political,	 cultural	 and	 social	 dynamics.	 While	 the	 statutory	 system	 is	
accused	of	being	 ineffective	 in	 resource	and	conflict	management,	 the	 traditional	 system	(as	
represented	by	Akils)	is	accused	of	lack	of	innovation	to	keep	pace	with	the	changing	reality	of	
modern	lives	and	being	an	obstacle	to	the	formation	of	state	bureaucracies.	For	instance,	the	
Former	Minister	of	Interior	believes	that	Akils	have	outlived	their	usefulness	as.		
the	 harm	 they	 cause	 is	 more	 than	 the	 good	 they	 do	 for	 governance	 and	
maintenance	of	 law	and	order.	The	problem	now	is	the	fact	that	there	are	
																																								 																				
72	Revenue	 collection	 started	with	a	modest	 levies	 small	 shops	and	hawking	 stands	but	 this	 gradually	
increased	and	the	local	government	finally	managed	to	have	a	source	of	funding	independent	from	the	
presidency.	
73	Participant	in	Star	Area	Teashop	Discussion	May	17,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
74	Interviewee	28	August	12,	2014.	Politician.	
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too	many	of	them	and	when	conflicts	arise	each	side	whether	right	or	wrong	
will	have	an	Akil	on	their	side.75		
In	2001,	a	referendum	was	held	for	a	new	constitution.	While	the	constitution	of	Somaliland	
(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2001)	incorporates	traditional	authority	at	the	political	level,	this	was	
not	the	case	at	the	administrative	urban	level.	For	instance,	apart	from	being	registered	with	the	
Ministry	of	Interior,	the	Akils’	role	in	local	governance	is	not	clear.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	
they	 are	 considered	 crucial	 actors	 in	 peace-making	 and	 a	 formidable	 force	 in	 electioneering	
where	they	mobilise	support	for	the	different	political	parties.		
In	addition	to	the	elections,	services	provided	through	clientalism	and	patronage	necessitates	
clans	to	strive	to	put	one	of	their	own	in	government	positions.	In	other	words,	once	the	clan’s	
candidate	is	in	position	in	a	service	department	for	a	local	authority,	members	of	the	clan	expect	
that	they	will	have	privilege	in	accessing	services	legally	or	illegally.76	Mediated	often	by	Akils,	
this	 kind	 of	 political	 environment	 increases	 the	 need	 for	 clan	 solidarity	 towards	 political	
participation	and	representation	and	this	in	turn	reinforces	urban	segregation.		
The	new	constitutional	provision	for	local	government	elections	in	2001	marked	an	important	
break	with	the	past,	as	there	was	from	then,	a	system	of	 local	government	that	promised	to	
quite	dramatically	alter	local	governance	institutions	with	a	history	of	authoritarian	practice	and	
lack	of	accountability.	While	Akils	retained	their	role	in	the	central	government,	they	were	not	
formally	incorporated	into	the	local	governance	structures.	According	to	the	former	Minister	of	
interior,	1200	Akils	are	now	on	the	government	payroll	across	the	country	while	400	more	are	
on	a	waiting	list	for	approval.77	The	major	function	of	their	pay	is	to	ensure	that	the	state	can	
enrol	 their	 services	 on	 issues	 related	 to	 peace	 and	 security.	 The	 process	 through	which	 the	
appointment	 or	 recognition	 of	 Akils’	 statehood	 is	 achieved	 is	 not	 well	 defined.	 The	 Interior	
Ministry	officials	point	out	that	Akil	candidates	come	with	a	handful	of	members	from	their	clan	
who	demand	recognition	of	the	candidate	of	their	choice.	The	state	sees	this	practice	as	being	
informal	and	for	the	purpose	of	controlling	them	it	is	better	for	the	government	to	reduce	the	
																																								 																				
75	Interviewee	8	August	19,	2014.	Former	Minister	of	Interior.	
76	Participant	in	Star	Area	Teashop	Discussion	May	17,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
77	Interviewee	8	August	19,	2014.	Former	Minister	of	Interior.	
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number	 of	 Akils.78	 While	 officials	 thus	 tried	 to	 control	 and	 reduce	 Akils’	 power,	 politicians	
nonetheless	depended	heavily	on	them.	In	the	local	council	elections	of	2002,	politicians	actively	
engaged	Akils	to	broaden	their	political	base	and	legitimacy.	
	Mayor	Ji’ir,	came	to	power	through	this	first	set	of	municipal	elections	in	2002,	bringing	an	end	
to	more	than	a	decade	of	executive	appointment	of	mayors.	More	than	a	dozen	political	parties		
contested	for	seats	in	the	municipal	elections	but	only	3	political	parties	emerged	as	national	
parties;	 UDUB,	 Kulmiye	 and	 UCID.79	 Eleven	 councillors	 were	 elected	 on	 UDUB	 tickets	 and	
another	6	councillors	joined	them	from	the	parties	which	did	not	make	it	to	the	final	3	national	
parties.	This	made	the	number	of	the	ruling	party	councillors	17,	trailed	by	Kulmiye	which	had	4	
and	UCID	with	3.	 The	Mayor	 and	 the	deputy	mayor	 served	 as	 executive	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
councillors	were	divided	into	4	committees	with	chairs,	deputies	and	secretaries.	The	city	was	
divided	 into	5	districts	and	one	councillor	was	put	 in	charge	of	each	district.	 In	other	words,	
every	councillor	also	had	another	executive	or	 ‘semi	executive’	position.	The	key	committees	
were	 the	 finance	 and	 the	 land	 committees	 but	 equally	 important	 were	 the	 social	 welfare	
committee	 which	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 sanitation	 and	 social	 affairs	 and	 the	 security	
committee	responsible	for	issues	to	do	with	security	at	the	neighbourhood	level.	
For	the	first	few	years,	the	mayoral	seat	of	Hargeisa	was	politically	unstable	as	councillors	often	
made	attempts	to	remove	the	sitting	mayor	for	personal	or	political	differences.	Removal	was	
often	 attempted	 through	 a	 vote	 of	 no	 confidence,	 which	 required	 the	 support	 of	 only	 8	
councillors.	Interestingly,	this	politics	did	not	map	straightforwardly	onto	clan	politics.	According	
to	a	former	mayor,	impeachment	was	often	attempted	for	political	gains	as:	
everybody	wanted	 to	become	a	mayor.	Mayors	may	have	 to	be	dislodged	
constantly	for	the	opportunity	to	come	up.	At	the	time	the	issue	was	less	to	
do	with	clan	politics	as	some	councillors	from	my	own	clan	used	to	oppose	
me.	 It	was	more	to	do	with	other	associations	 like	friendship	and	personal	
interests.80		
																																								 																				
78	Ibid.	
79	Ururka	Cadaalada	iyo	Daryeelka	(Welfare	and	Justice	Party).	
80	Interviewee	9	August	16,	2014.	Former	Mayor	of	Hargeisa.	
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The	focus	of	the	new	elected	council	from	2002	was	on	strengthening	the	tax	regimes.	Previously	
local	 government	 tax	 collection	had	been	done	 through	 informal	practices	heavily	 reliant	on	
individual	collector’s	aptitude	in	using	their	social	network	as	a	potential	source	of	identifying	
key	taxpayers	in	a	highly	segregated	city.		Urban	segregation	served	the	new	town	council	well	
as	they	were	able	to	identify	potential	tax	payers	through	the	clan	and	kinship	based	networks.	
In	other	words,	since	there	were/are	no	addresses	and	personal	documents	for		identification,	
clan	membership	which	assigns	everyone	with	a	lineage	based	identity	label	became	a	useful	
tool	through	which	tax	collectors	locate	potential	taxpayers.81	The	aim		was	to	increase	the	tax	
base	of		local	government	but	by	implication	it	reinforced	service	provision	along	clan	lines.	Local	
government	 staff	 were	 often	 sent	 to	 neighbourhoods	 populated	 by	 their	 clan	 not	 only	 for	
security	reasons	but	also	for	ease	of	access	and	identification	purposes.	Borsdorf	and	Hidalgo	
(2009)	argue	that	segregation	of	urban	space	is	sometimes	bridged	by	the	existence	of	social	
networks	between	actors	who	try	to	mitigate	the	negative	consequences	of	segregation.	In	the	
case	 of	 Hargeisa,	 even	 after	 the	 local	 elections,	 tax	 collectors	 used	 kinship	 based	 social	
networking	to	identify	potential	tax	payers.	One	major	flipside	of	this	mechanism	was	however	
the	fact	that	it	recorded	a	very	low	rate	of	tax	collection	understandable	because	of	nepotism	
and	corruption.		
As	tax	payment	is	a	key	component	for	accountable	governance,	it	is	also	an	important	element	
through	which	state	legitimacy	can	be	measured.	In	situations	like	Hargeisa,	where	the	state	is	
believed	to	misappropriate	revenues	generated	from	tax	payers,	such	taxation	is	used	as	means	
to	discredit	the	state,	and	to	reinforce	a	rationale	of	electing	someone	from	one’s	own	clan.	In	
the	2012	local	government	elections,	an	informer	in	a	teashop	pointed	out	that:		
There	were	two	candidates	from	his	clan	where	as	one	was	a	man	of	integrity	
and	the	other	was	not.	We	elected	the	candidate	with	 less	 integrity	as	tax	
collected	from	us	was/is	anyway	misappropriated…so	let	him	(with	the	guy	
with	less	integrity)	eat	with	them.	Had	we	elected	the	other	guy	he	would	do	
that	and	hence	our	money	would	all	be	eaten	by	people	other	clans.82		
																																								 																				
81	It	is	important	to	point	out	here	that	Akils	are	not	used	to	collect	revenues	from	members	of	their	clan.	
82	Participant	in	Commercial	Bank	Teashop	Discussion	July	01,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
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The	concern	here	is	that	if	a	clan	elects	a	man	of	integrity	but	his	colleagues	from	other	clans	
are	 not,	 he/she	 will	 not	 be	 involved	 in	 irregular	 or	 corrupt	 practices	 or	 sharing	 of	
misappropriated	taxes	or	resources	looted	from	the	state	with	his	clansmen/women	whereas	
others	are	doing	what	he	refrained	from	to	the	disadvantage	of	his	clan.		
The	new	system	of	tax	collection	introduced	by	the	elected	new	mayor,	Ji’ir,	took	the	form	of	an	
incentive,	through	which	tax	collectors	who	recorded	the	largest	number	of	payers	would	be	
rewarded.		However,	this	once	again	had	a	negative	effect	on	the	tax	collection	regime	in	the	
town.	 The	 tax	 collectors	 placed	 their	 focus	 on	 the	 individuals	 that	 pay	most	 taxes	 so	 as	 to	
maximise	 their	 tax	 collection	 strategy.	 As	 the	 previous	 incentive-based	 strategy	 for	 tax	 base	
expansion	failed	to	bring	about	any	tangible	increase	in	the	number	of	tax	payers	in	the	city,	the	
new	mayor	approached	the	United	Nations	Habitat	programme	to	help	with	the	creation	of	a	
GIS	 which	 would	 enable	 the	 local	 government	 to	 record	 the	 cadastral	 boundaries	 of	 the	
properties	and	the	built	environment	in	general	for	revenue	collection	and	planning	purposes.	
UN	habitat	accepted	the	proposal	and	implemented	the	GIS	project	in	3	phases.	The	first	part	
was	completed	in	2005	and	the	2nd	in	2008	when	25,000	properties	were	recorded.	The	data	
was	used	for	three	reasons;	tax	collection,	land	management	and	town	planning.	At	the	end	of	
the	project,	90%	of	the	businesses	in	the	city	were	recorded.	The	recording	of	the	properties	in	
the	 town	 has	 increased	 the	 revenue	 of	 the	 local	 authority	 by	 a	 significant	 margin,	 300%.83		
Though	important	in	terms	of	local	government	capacity,		this	did	not	help	much	with	the	land	
conflict	problems	in	the	city	(as	we	shall	see	in	chapter	6).		
This	 section	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 urban	 governance	 in	 the	 post-war	 period	was	 the	
reestablishment	of	urban	governance	structures	and	transition	 to	democracy,	and	redefining	
the	role	of	the	customary	institutions	such	as	the	Akils	in	the	political	and	security	dynamics	of	
the	 city.	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 existing	 rifts	 between	 the	 SNM	 factions	 complicated	 the	
reestablishment	of	 local	 governance	 in	 the	 immediate	aftermath	of	Barre’s	ouster	 as	efforts	
aimed	at	ending	the	armed	conflict	overshadowed	the	need	for	establishing	local	governance	
structures.	I	argued	that	post-conflict	urban	governance	did	not	shift	from	the	use	of	customary	
institutions	as	a	means	of	delivering	services.	I	have	shown	that	they	played	a	key	role	in	the	
political	 and	 security	 stabilisation	 of	 the	 town.	 They	 also	 continue	 to	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	
municipal	politics	particularly	the	election	and	re-election	of	candidates.		
																																								 																				
83	Interviewee	9	August	16,	2014.	Former	Mayor	of	Hargeisa.	
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4.6 Conclusion		
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 provided	 a	 historical	 narrative	 of	 segregation	 and	 its	 interface	 with	 local	
governance	in	Hargeisa.	I	argued	that	segregation	in	Hargeisa	could	be	understood	as	a	response	
to	political,	economic	and	security	issues	that	persisted	due	to	the	state’s	inability	to	bring	about	
change	and	shift	away	from	the	past.	For	instance,	Hargeisa’s	segregated	spatial	character	was	
entrenched	during	the	postcolonial	period	by	the	state’s	inability	to	deal	with	the	dire	economic	
and	security	problems	in	the	city,	which	made	it	necessary	for	people	rely	on	the	clan	as	a	risk	
mitigation	mechanism.	The	most	significant	sign	of	change	in	urban	segregation	came	during	the	
socialist	 regime	when	militarised	 and	 repressive	 approaches	 to	 urban	 governance	 improved	
security	in	the	early	years	of	the	revolution	and	cosmopolitan	spaces	emerged	in	certain	areas	
of	the	city.	But	this	did	not	last	long	as	the	state	metamorphosed	again	to	its	familiar	patrimonial	
and	clientalist	form	further	exacerbated	by	predatory	and	dictatorial	governance	practices	that	
undermined	what	was	left	of	the	public	trust	 in	the	state.	Urban	segregation	in	Hargeisa	was	
finally	taken	to	a	new	height	by	the	dire	security	situation	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	Barre’s	
removal	from	power	and	the	successive	fragile	transition	to	democracy.	This	historical	trajectory	
of	urban	governance	can	elucidate	the	factors	that	have	entrenched	the	spatial	segregation	of	
Hargeisa	amid	rapid	urban	growth.	While	this	chapter	focused	on	municipal	politics/governance,	
the	next	 chapter	 further	 zooms	 in	on	 land	administration	 to	 reveal	how	specific	 governance	
practices	shape	Hargeisa	spatial	character.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
97	|	P a g e 	
	
	
CHAPTER	5 HISTORIES	OF	TOP	DOWN	URBAN	LAND	MANAGEMENT	
5.1 Introduction		
This	 chapter	 focuses	on	urban	 land	 administration,	 past	 and	present.	 It	 provides	 a	historical	
overview	 of	 the	 colonial	 land	 management	 practices	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 shaping	 people’s	
attitude	 towards	 the	 state	 as	well	 as	 the	 dynamics	 of	 post-conflict	 urban	 land	management	
practices.	I	argue	that	the	weak	state	capacity	and	lack	of	resources	and	skills	to	put	in	place	an	
effective	regulatory	framework	can	explain	the	continued	large	number	of	land	conflicts	in	the	
city.	I	also	argue	that	the	“modern”	land	administration,	which	is	characterised	by	a	weak	state	
and	plural	justice	system,	has	undermined	public	trust	in	the	state.	The	chapter	builds	on	the	
previous	chapter’s	account	of	histories	of	local	government	that	detailed	the	role	of	Akils	and	
urban	 councils	 to	 focus	 on	 urban	 land	 administration.	 I	 provide	 a	 further	 layer	 of	 empirical	
evidence	to	support	my	argument	for	how	urban	local	governance	institutions	have	shaped	the	
city	in	spatial	terms	and	particularly	how	they	have	reinforced	the	spatial	segregation	of	the	city	
along	clan	lines.	Throughout	the	narrative,	I	attempt	to	show	that	urban	segregation	in	Hargeisa	
along	clan	 lines	can	be	viewed	as	a	geographical	manifestation	of	people’s	response	to	state	
policies	and	practices.	As	I	have	argued,	the	present	hybridity	focused	literature	on	Somaliland	
fails	to	provide	adequate	explanation	of	the	relationship	between	governance	and	spatial	form	
at	 the	 urban	 level.	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 brief	 references	 of	 urban	
governance	as	hybrid	to	explore	the	specific	modes	of	land	administration	over	time.	I	also	seek	
to	explore	the	idea	of	segregation	as	a	concept,	which	is	more	useful	in	terms	of	explaining	the	
spatial	character	of	cities	in	Somaliland.			
The	chapter	is	organised	into	three	sections.	In	the	first	section,	I	look	at	the	early	history	of	land	
administration	and	 its	 legacies,	 particularly	 the	association	between	 land	administration	and	
appropriation,	and	the	late-colonial	attempt	to	register	individual	urban	landholding	for	elites	
and	 its	effects.	 In	the	second	section,	 I	present	evidence	for	postcolonial	 legal	continuities	 in	
land	administration.		In	this	postcolonial	period,	I	argue	that	urban	land	was	not	a	priority,	partly	
due	to	a	lack	of	capacity,	but	the	result	was	a	proliferation	of	land	conflicts,	which	reinforced	
the	 importance	of	clan	and	segregated	urban	spaces.	Finally,	 I	discuss	 the	 importance	of	 the	
2001	legal	and	policy	frameworks	for	urban	land	intervention	and	a	series	of	state/NGO	efforts	
to	regulate	urban	land.		
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5.2 Emergence	and	Continuity	of	Top	Down	Land	Management		
Understanding	the	dynamics	of	the	current	state	of	urban	land	management	in	the	post-conflict	
context	begs	for	a	revisiting	of	the	past.	This	will	enable	us	to	see	how	urban	land	governance	
approaches	 during	 the	 colonial	 and	 postcolonial	 periods	 shape	 the	 present	 day	 urban	 land	
management	practices.	As	shown	in	the	previous	chapter	and	is	also	relevant	here,	history	is	a	
lived	experience	in	the	context	of	Somaliland	as	it	is	used	or	abused	to	justify	current	thinking,	
processes	and	practices.	In	my	examination	of	the	past,	I	argue	that	urban	land	management	
during	the	colonial	period	was	highly	centralised:	authorities	did	not	consult	the	Somalis	about	
ways	to	manage	their	cities,	presumably	because	of	an	assumption	that	the	Somalis	were	not	
educated	or	knowledgeable	enough	to	pass	judgement	on	ideas	about	land	management.	I	also	
argue	that	this	authoritarian	form	of	governance	laid	the	foundation	for	the	mistrust	between	
the	state	and	the	public	hence	undermining	state	legitimacy.		I	also	argue	that	the	postcolonial	
state	did	not	shift	away	from	this	practice,	further	entrenching	the	lack	of	trust	in	the	state	and	
by	implication	the	low	level	of	state	legitimacy.	The	response	to	the	lack	of	trust	and	legitimacy	
is	manifest	 in	 the	 form	of	 spatial	 segregation	as	members	of	 the	same	clan	conglomerate	 in	
specific	chunks	of	the	city	to	increase	their	chance	of	survival	in	the	city.		
I	begin	this	examination	with	colonial	land	management	in	Somaliland,	which	can	be	traced	back	
to	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 protectorate’s	 formation	 when	 the	 government	 introduced	 the	
registration	 of	 documents	 ordinance	 in	 1912.	 This	 legislation	 provided	 the	 colonial	
administration	with	a	tool	through	which	they	could	record	and	manage	individual	ownership	
of	land	and	immovable	properties.	The	register	was	lost	during	the	war	with	the	Italians.	This	
led	to	post-World	War	Two	land	conflicts	as	people	made	claims	to	vacant	government	lands.	
Land	claims	were	at	the	time	mostly	submitted	by	elites	who	wanted	to	occupy	important	parts	
of	the	city	or	further	commercial	gains.84	Controls	were	initially	limited	to	the	coastal	towns	but	
as	urban	centres	grew	inland	the	 land	administration	framework	was	also	expanded	 into	the	
interior	parts	of	the	country.		Colonial	officials	introduced	the	township’s	ordinance	in	1924	at	a	
time	when	 the	Protectorate	was	 emerging	 from	a	protracted	 conflict	 following	 the	Mullah’s	
uprising.	This	act	was	minimalist	 in	its	first	version	mainly	focusing	on	political	control,	but	in	
1927	the	government	amended	the	ordinance	to	provide	colonial	officials	with	sweeping	powers	
of	 reordering	settlement	patterns	 in	 townships.	 It	 is	particularly	 relevant	 to	 the	 focus	of	 this	
																																								 																				
84	TNA	CO	535/149/4	Land	Tenure.	
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chapter	on	land	administration	because	it	permitted	the	Governor	to	confiscate	land	required	
for	‘public	purpose’.85	The	public	purpose	for	which	the	amendment	was	justified	included	the	
construction	of	new	roads	and	bridges	as	well	as	 the	realignment	of	existing	streets	and	the	
construction	of	public	offices,	buildings	and	any	other	purpose	deemed	fit	by	the	Governor.		
Compensation,	where	it	existed,	was	often	determined	through	government	led	assessments.	
Land	owners	who	did	not	have	title	deeds	qualified	only	for	the	payment	of	present	value	of	
their	 buildings	without	 regard	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 site	whereas	 those	who	held	 government	
issued	 free	or	 leasehold	qualified	 for	payment	of	 the	 land	value	together	with	any	buildings,	
trees,	cultivation	et	cetera	on	it.86	The	introduction	and	use	over	subsequent	decades	of	these	
expropriation	rules	were	unfathomable	to	the	vast	majority	of	people	in	the	Protectorate,	and	
have	 a	 place	 in	 popular	 historical	 memory.	 This	 apprehension	 and	 memories	 of	 land	
expropriation	that	continue	to	be	retold	can	be	exemplified	by	a	clan	elders’	story	in	which	a:		
senior	Somali	official	named	Ina	Igare,	working	for	the	colonial	government	
issued	an	order	for	the	expropriation	of	land.	An	old	lady	who	was	among	the	
evictees	was	told	the	fact	that	Muse	Igare	acting	on	the	instructions	issued	
by	the	Governor	wants	her	to	vacate	the	land	to	which	she	replied	‘he	who	
speaks	nonsense	is	Ina	Igare.87		
My	argument	here	is	that	this	simple	utterance	became	an	idiom	of	resistance	used	to	dismiss	
state	actions	lacking	credible	rationalisation.	The	endurance	of	this	simple	utterance	across	time	
and	space	sheds	light	on	how	unsophisticated	mundane	language	was	used	to	defy	the	state.	It	
also	 shows	 that	 Somalis	 at	 the	 time	 could	 not	 imagine	 and	make	 sense	 of	why	 the	 colonial	
government	would	want	to	move	people	around	when	there	is	a	plenty	of	vacant	space	with	
which	 it	 could	 do	 whatever	 it	 wanted.	 It	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 land	 administrative	
regulations	both	to	colonial	power	and	to	popular	resistance	and	perceptions	of	its	illegitimacy.	
This	incomprehension	does	not	suggest	that	land	use	management	was	a	foreign	concept	to	the	
Somali	people	 in	 the	 interior	parts	of	 the	country.	Venema	et	al.	 (2009)	observe	 that	Somali	
people	had	a	history	of	land	use	management,	though	this	was	upheld	orally,	varied	over	space	
																																								 																				
85	Ibid.	
86	Failure	to	comply	with	this	stipulation	often	warranted	a	fine	of	500	shillings.	
87	Interviewee	24	August	15,	2014.	Clan	Elder.	
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and	was	not	formally	codified.	For	instance,	pastoralists	often	planned	which	area	of	the	country	
might	 be	 suitable	 for	 migration	 during	 the	 dry	 seasons	 basing	 their	 assessment	 on	 the	
environmental	footprints	of	the	preceding	season	(i.e.	rainfall)	while	farmers	used	to	enclose	
certain	parts	of	their	land	for	use	in	the	dry	seasons	when	supplies	might	be	less	abundant.	An	
intellectual	 represented	 traditional	 land	 management	 in	 the	 following	 positive	 terms,	
emphasising	mutual	consent	and	negotiation,	disrupted	by	colonial	interventions:	
when	people	come	watering	places	such	as	wells,	they	used	to	enquire	about	
whose	turn	is	it	or	whose	clan	is	supposed	to	water	their	animal	in	a	particular	
day	of	the	week.	The	other	clans	used	to	step	back	and	let	that	particular	clan	
quench	 their	 animals.	 So,	 it	 was	 a	 system	 based	 on	 mutual	 respect	 and	
agreement	between	the	clans.	The	problem	 is	 that	 the	traditional	systems	
was	 disrupted	 by	 foreign	 influences	 which	 increased	 the	 competition	 for	
resources.88	
The	 point	 here	 is	 that	 local	 people’s	 approach	 to	 land	 use	 management	 was	 based	 on	
consultation	 and	 voluntary	 adherence	 as	 opposed	 to	 colonial	 actions.	 Colonial	 interventions	
were	often	constituted	through	a	top	down	process	requiring	involuntary	enforcement	mainly	
shaped	 by	 disregard	 for	 local	 knowledge	 that	 cast	 doubt	 on	 people’s	 ability	 to	 govern	 their	
relationship	with	the	environment	in	a	mutually	beneficial	way.	In	relation	to	urban	space,	the	
techniques	 through	 which	 colonial	 urban	 land	 use	 management	 operated	 differed	
fundamentally	from	that	which	was	understandable	to	the	Somalis	whose	land	use	management	
was	based	on	seasonal	calendars	where	certain	grazing	activities	were	not	allowed	in	certain	
times	but	eviction	and	expropriation	of	land	was	unnecessary.		
Hargeisa,	like	other	major	townships,	was	significantly	affected	by	the	introduction	of	the	new	
land	management	ordinance.	According	to	correspondence	between	the	secretary	of	the	state	
Lieutenant	Col	Amery	and	 the	Governor	of	 Somaliland	Kittermaster,	expropriation	of	 land	 in	
Hargeisa	became	necessary	because	of	the	city’s	expansion	in	one	direction.	Prime	land	along	
the	only	main	street	in	the	township	was	identified	for	one	of	the	major	expropriation	exercises	
in	line	with	the	new	rules.	The	land	in	question	was	granted	to	the	owners	in	1922	and	temporary	
traditional	structures	were	thereafter	erected.	The	view	of	the	administration	was	however	that	
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the	land	was	granted	on	a	temporary	basis	and	this	allocation	did	not	entail	guarantee	of	tenure	
security.	Moreover,	 they	argued	 that	 the	occupation	of	 this	 land	 fell	outside	 the	category	of	
private	ownership	as	structures	were	not	permanent	and	owners	held	neither	title	deeds	nor	
paid	 taxes	hence	providing	 government	with	 sufficient	 grounds	 to	 remove	and	pay	 them	an	
amount	of	money	equivalent	to	the	simple	structures	on	the	land	and	not	the	land	value.89		
However,	 the	 colonial	 office	 in	 London	 believed	 that	 private	 ownership	 of	 land	 should	 be	
respected	and	those	who	currently	occupy	the	land	should	be	considered	as	private	land	owners	
as	their	occupational	right	should	remain	during	the	lifetime	of	the	guarantee.90	In	the	end,	the	
local	administrators	proposed	to	compensate	owners	in	a	manner	that	did	not	take	into	account	
the	site	value.91	The	proposed	compensation	therefore	entailed	only	the	labour	and	the	material	
cost	 of	 	 temporary	 structures.	 In	 a	 letter	 dated	 on	 the	 23	 of	December	 1937,	 the	Governor	
announced	 that	 land	 along	 the	main	 street	would	 be	 expropriated	 to	 pave	 the	way	 for	 the	
construction	of	new	blocks	of	permanent	buildings.	Notices	to	this	effect	had	been	served	with	
the	 occupiers,	 giving	 them	 seven	 days	 to	 make	 the	 necessary	 arrangements	 for	 the	
expropriation.	 Sixteen	 dwellings	 were	 affected	 by	 this	 expropriation	 and	 a	 committee	 from	
various	agencies	including	the	Treasurer,	and	Chief	of	Customs,	Director	of	Public	Works	and	a	
‘leading	Somali	resident’	were	put	together	to	evaluate	the	cost	of	the	dwellings.	The	evaluators	
came	 back	 with	 an	 estimated	 compensation	 of	 Rs.2350.	 Occupiers	 were	 notified	 that	 the	
compensation	will	be	paid	to	them	next	year.92		
The	expropriation	of	land	affected	the	spatial	character	of	the	city	in	two	important	ways.	Firstly,	
those	who	were	evicted	from	the	land	had	no	channel	through	which	they	could	complain	about	
the	government’s	position	other	than	the	traditional	institutions	such	as	the	Akils.	As	I	argued	in	
the	previous	chapter,	this	lack	of	other	leverage	against	the	state	inherently	made	people	stick	
to	 the	 parts	 of	 the	 town	 in	 proximity	 to	 particular	 Akils,	 where	 they	 could	 easily	 get	 social	
support	and	solidarity	particularly	if	they	experienced	negative	encounters	with	the	state.		
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This	renewed	effort	in	state	land	management	practices	officially	introduced	a	new	paradigm	
for	 conceptualising	 land	 ownership.	 Conceptually,	 land	 management	 mechanisms	 in	 Somali	
culture	were	rendered	within	a	resource	sharing	framework	resting	ownership	of	 land	 in	the	
domain	of	God.		In	this	approach,	people	were	seen	as	mere	caretakers	with	usufruct	rights	to	
land.	Two	forms	of	ownership	were	recognised	by	this	system	namely	1)	communal	ownership	
of	pastoral	land	where	clans	are	identified	with	a	particular	turf	but	do	not	monopolise	its	use	
exclusively	 and	2)	 private	ownership	where	 individuals	may	 carve	out	 a	 piece	of	 land	 in	 the	
village	or	urban	area	for	cultivation	or	permanent	settlement.	This	bottom-up	traditional	land	
management	approach	was	altered	incrementally	over	a	period	of	85	years	in	which	Somaliland	
was	 part	 of	 the	 British	 Empire	 mainly	 through	 a	 top-down	 process.	 The	 most	 significant	
alteration	 came	 in	 the	 late	1930s	when	 local	 colonial	officials	embarked	on	efforts	 aimed	at	
relieving	London	from	the	financial	burden	of	the	Protectorate93	by	exploring	the	possibility	of	
discovering	mineral	deposits	that	could	support	the	administration	in	the	long	run.	As	a	result,	
in	1939	the	government	introduced	a	new	land	tenure	ordinance	designed	to	respond	to	these	
possibilities.	While	the	colonial	government	consulted	the	traditional	leaders	on	local	political	
issues	such	as	peace	and	security,	the	same	could	not	be	said	for	land	management.	This	lack	of	
consultation	might	have	been	 justified	on	 the	basis	 that	 there	was	 lack	of	 knowledge	about	
urban	 land	 issues	 in	 Somaliland	 as	 there	were	 very	 limited	 number	 of	 towns	 in	 the	 country	
notwithstanding	 the	 typical	 colonial	 mentality	 of	 underestimating	 local	 knowledge	 and	 the	
intellectual	 capacity	 of	 natives.	 In	 the	 late	 1930s,	 London	 became	much	 more	 reluctant	 to	
provide	sufficient	funds	for	development	at	a	time	when	a	number	of	significant	townships	were	
emerging	in	the	protectorate	(Millman,	2013)	
According	to	colonial	records,	the	approach	to	land	ownership	by	the	state	was	initially	justified	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 treaties	 signed	 with	 the	 clans	 in	 Somaliland.	 But	 the	 legal	 officer	 in	 the	
Protectorate	raised	his	concern	about	this,	saying	they	make	no	mention	to	any	acceptance	of	
the	state’s	ownership	rights	over	land.	On	the	contrary,	an	article	in	the	treaty	states	that	the	
tribes	will	“never	cede,	sell,	mortgage	or	otherwise	[dispose	of]	…	any	portion	of	the	territory	
presently	inhabited	by	them	or	being	under	their	control”.	According	to	the	legal	officer,	this	did	
not	provide	the	government	with	a	legal	framework	through	which	transfer	the	state	ownership	
of	land	could	be	justified.94	The	legal	officer,	however,	advised	his	superiors	in	London	that	an	
																																								 																				
93	The	protectorate	was	heavily	reliant	on	funding	from	the	colonial	office	
94	TNA	CO	535/149/4	Land	Tenure.	
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article	in	the	Principal	Order	in	Council	of	1929	(which	replaced	the	Order	of	1889)95	contains	
provisions	that	could	allow	the	state	to	take	ownership	of	land.	According	to	a	letter	signed	by	
Malcolm	Macdonald	on	the	19th	of	August	1939,	landownership	in	this	order	was	divisible	into	
three	categories	namely	crown	land,	public	land	and	tribal	land.		
Crown	land	was	defined	as	“all	public	lands	in	the	Protectorate	which	are	subject	to	the	control	
of	 his	 Majesty	 by	 virtue	 of	 any	 treaty,	 convention	 or	 agreement,	 or	 of	 his	 Majesty’s	
Protectorate”;	 public	 land	 was	 defined	 as	 “all	 lands	 which	 shall	 have	 been	 required	 by	 his	
Majesty	for	the	purpose	of	public	service	or	otherwise	howsoever”,	and	private	land	was	defined	
as	a	land	the	surface	of	which	is	vested	in	an	individual	or	corporation	whether	by	virtue	of	grant	
from	the	Crown	or	otherwise”	but	beneath	of	which,	i.e.	mineral	reserves,	rights	are	vested	in	
the	 Crown.96	 He	 argued	 that	 “the	 only	 crown	 land	 is	 that	 which	 has	 been	 acquired	 for	 the	
purpose	of	public	service	or	 ‘otherwise	howsoever”.	He	contended	that	 the	“meaning	of	 the	
words	‘otherwise	howsoever’	[was	not	clear	but	could	be	taken	as	reference	to	the]	acquisition	
by	a	formal	transfer	from	the	tribes	to	the	Governor	or	by	a	legislative	act	either	declaring	land	
to	be	crown	land,	[or]	to	be	converted	into	crown	…	giving	the	Governor	powers	to	dispose	of	
or	exercise	control	over	it’”.97		
The	legislation,	introducing	different	forms	of	state,	private	and	communal	tenure	challenged	
how	land	ownership	was	conceptualised	among		Somalis	and	the	transfer	of	ownership	from	the	
domain	of	God	to	the	domain	of	government	delegitimised	the	land	management	process		in	
the	 eyes	 of	 the	 public,	 who	 continued	 to	 perceive	 it	 as	 a	 colonial	 project	 designed	 for	 the	
subjugation	 and	 confiscation	 of	 their	 property	 without	 equitable	 compensation.98	 The	
unpopularity	of	histories	of	 land	administration	 in	both	urban	and	rural	contexts,	particularly	
through	 their	 role	 in	 expropriations,	 thus	 contributed	 directly	 to	 nationalist	 resistance.	 	 The	
relevance	of	this	history	to	the	narrative	that	follows,	is	that	as	we	shall	see,	there	are	direct	
continuities	with	modes	of	land	management	in	Hargeisa	over	time	and	into	the	present.		
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As	 evident	 above,	 colonial	 administration	 was	 a	 top-down	 process	 characterised	 by	 lack	 of	
consultation	 with	 the	 public	 and	 local	 authorities.	 This	 authoritarian	 state	 culture	 had	 a	
significant	impact	on	the	future	of	urban	land	management	in	the	country	as	most	of	the	colonial	
land	 policies	 and	 laws	were	 retained	 in	 the	 postcolonial	 period.	 	 The	 continuities	 are	more	
striking	 than	 the	 changes.	 Attempts	 aimed	 at	 change	 often	 failed.	 For	 instance,	 in	 1960	 the	
government	appointed	a	Parliamentary	Commission	to	deal	with	land	reform,		but	after	six	years	
of	work	they	came	up	with	a	draft	which	failed	to	pass	in	parliament	(Besteman,	1990).	From	
the	 beginning	 this	 reform	 initiative	 had	 the	 hallmark	 of	 a	 failure	 as	 it	 was	 laden	 with	 elite	
interests	and	also	was	geographically	skewed	in	favour	of	the	fertile	commercial	farmlands	in	
the	South	as	the	idea	behind	the	initiative	was	to	redress	the	colonial	acquisition	of	significant	
cultivable	land	along	the	rivers	in	Juba	and	Shebelle.	Details	of	the	how	they	wanted	to	do	this	
(i.e.	nationalisations	or	restitution)	could	not	be	obtained.	A	District	Commissioner	in	Hargeisa	
during	this	time	attributes	the	failure	of	this	attempt	to	the	absence	of	national	coverage	and	
consultation	with	local	officials	at	district	level.99	He	stated	that	the	Commission	neither	visited	
nor	consulted	with	him	or	the	people	in	Hargeisa:		
The	legislation	was	cooked	up	in	Mogadishu	and	at	no	time,	while	I	was	in	
the	district,	was	I	consulted	or	asked	to	organise	people	who	could	contribute	
noteworthy	 ideas	 to	 the	 proposed	 legislation	 on	 land.	 At	 the	 time,	 we	 in	
Hargeisa	also	had	significant	 land	management	problems	as	conflict	often	
used	to	arise	from	landownership	disputes	in	the	city…we	could	have	added	
a	substantial	contribution	from	this	part	of	the	country.100		
The	continuation	of	many	of	the	laws	inherited	from	the	colonial	administration	and	the	Somali	
government’s	 failure	 to	 formulate	 new	 land	 management	 regulations	 permitted	 District	
Commissioners	 to	 exercise	 colonial	 style	 powers	 in	 Hargeisa,	 which	 alienated	 people	 and	
fostered	hostility	and	mistrust	towards	the	state.	According	to	a	legal	practitioner	in	Hargeisa,	
land	decisions	were	based	on	the	wishes	and	whims	of	officers	rather	than	laws	and	policies.101	
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This	view	of	arbitrary	decisions	to	resolve	conflicts	is	supported	by	the	former	DC	of	Hargeisa’s	
memory	of	land	disputes	in	this	period.		In	1967,	he	recalled	finding	it	difficult	to	manage	land	
and	 as	 a	 result	 took	 stern	measures	 including	 banning	 issuing	 land	 titles	 to	 applicants	 who	
wanted	to	either	legalise	their	existing	landownership	or	apply	for	registration	of	a	new	plot	for	
two	years.102		This		did	not	increase	confidence	in	state	authority.		I	argue	that	the	way	in	which	
the	state	managed	urban	land	in	Hargeisa	led	many	people	to	lose	faith	in	the	system	and	rely	
on	other	means	of	dealing	with	their	problems.	This	lack	of	faith	in	state	institutions	shaped	the	
way	in	which	people	think	about	and	choose	residential	and	business	settlements	in	the	city.	In	
other	words,	they	located	themselves	in	areas	predominantly	populated	by	their	clans,	to	build	
property	and	worry	about	legalisation	later.	When	the	military	regime	came	to	power	in	1969,	
the	lack	of	consultation	on	land	management	policies	and	legislation	had	not	changed.		
The	most	significant	land	use	change	under	military	rule	came	in	1972	when	Bille	Rafle,	former	
Governor	 of	 North	 Western	 Region	 of	 which	 Hargeisa	 was	 the	 capital,	 removed	 informal	
settlements	near	the	city	centre	in	order	to	improve	the	city’s	image.	Evictees	were	resettled	in	
peri	 urban	areas	 South	of	 the	 city	with	 limited	access	 to	water	 and	other	 essential	 services,	
leading	 to	 a	 mixed	 reaction,	 discussed	 below.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 how	 particular	
episodes	of	 land	management	practices	 such	 as	 this	 shaped	public	 perceptions	of	 the	 state.	
While	this	move	pleased	some,	such	as	those	whom	the	government	provided	with	urban	land	
and	who	gained	a	degree	of	tenure	security,103	many	others	were	disgruntled	because	they	were	
moved	away	from	areas	in	which	opportunities	and	access	to	services	were	higher.	Indeed,	many	
of	the	residents	I	spoke	to	were	not	issued	with	papers	at	the	time,	which	also	contributed	to	
later	land	conflicts	in	the	period	of	rebuilding	after	state	collapse.	
The	 most	 prominent	 such	 scheme	 of	 eviction	 and	 resettlement	 was	 the	 movement	 of	 the	
Dunbuluq	 neighbourhood	 to	 the	 outskirts	 of	 the	 city.	 Dunbuluq	 at	 the	 time	 was	 a	
neighbourhood	consisting	mainly	of	Garhajis	and	Arab	clans.	Critics	point	out	that	the	removal	
of	 people	 and	 expropriation	 of	 land	 was	 done	 in	 a	 manner	 not	 dissimilar	 to	 the	 urban	
governance	 practices	 of	 the	 past	 where	 people	 were	 often	 left	 with	 no	 choice	 other	 than	
accepting	the	government	proposals,	conveyed	as	orders.104	They	complain	that	people	were	
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settled	in	areas	far	removed	from	the	city	centre	and	most	of	the	employment	opportunities.105	
The	 government	 version,	 however,	 brushed	 such	 criticism	 aside.	 According	 to	 the	 former	
Governor,	 under	 military	 rule,	 eviction	 was	 necessitated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 area	 was	
inaccessible	to	the	authorities,	as	the	structures	were	built	very	close	to	each	other	and	posed	
a	danger	to	its	inhabitants	due	to	the	possibilities	of	disease	transmission,	as	well	as	creating	a	
public	health	hazard	for	the	rest	of	the	city.106	The	government	planning	for	the	re-location	of	
people	from	the	city	centre	to	the	outskirts	did	not,	however,	reconfigure	the	clan-based	spatial	
character	of	the	city.	This	is	because	the	area	of	the	city	that	the	evictees	were	moved	to	abutted	
the	neighbourhood	of	 the	city	 in	which	 rural	populations	of	 the	same	clan	background	were	
living.	Stated	differently,	these	evictions	have	further	reinforced	Hargeisa’s	clan-based	spatial	
character.	
According	to	Dauskardt	(1993)	evictions	can	have	profound	socio-economic	and	cultural	impacts	
on	communities.	But	Tröger	(2009)	points	out	that	eviction	 is	not	only	about	exclusion	but	 it	
could	as	well	be	a	mode	of	achieving	inclusion.	In	other	words,	people	are	initially	excluded	from	
a	 particular	 space	 but	 included	 in	 another.	 He	 seeks	 to	 problematise	 the	 representation	 of	
exclusion	and	inclusion	as	two	separate	and	irreconcilable	processes	and	points	out	the	inherent	
interwoven-ness	between	the	two.	The	author	shows	that	conditions	of	evictees	from	the	inner	
city	of	Addis	Ababa	improved	in	a	new	peripheral	location,	which	had	better	access	to	water	and	
road	 networks.	 In	 opposition	 to	 representations	 of	 peripheral	 neighbourhoods	 as	 entirely	
excluded	from	the	social	fabric	of	the	city,	the	study	found	that	various	forms	of	communication	
and	networks	have	enabled	evictees	get	access	to	opportunities	and	services	for	those	living	in	
peripheral	 areas.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	Hargeisa	evictions	 from	Dunbuluq,	 the	Governor	 insisted	
(contra	to	popular	opinion	and	memories	of	the	shift	as	forced	displacement)	that:	
there	were	a	lot	of	praises	for	the	project	and	people	in	the	end	were	quite	
happy	with	what	we	have	done.	Each	family	was	located	a	plot	of	about	20	
m²,	bearing	in	mind	that	families	used	to	leave	in	3	or	4	m	in	their	previous	
locations.	Once	the	necessary	planning	was	undertaken,	representatives	of	
the	people	were	taken	to	the	new	site	so	as	to	see	the	place	for	themselves	
before	they	are	moved.	We	brought	the	people	vehicles	to	move	them.	Each	
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plot	and	family	were	given	a	number.	Once	we	moved	them	with	our	vehicle,	
I	instructed	the	government	officers	to	help	them	with	the	unloading	of	their	
stuff	from	the	trucks.	Once	we	have	completed	the	process,	people	were	quite	
happy	with	it	and	they	started	celebrating	the	moment.107	
The	resettlement	of	evictees	in	the	South	of	the	city	reinforced	the	clan	based	spatial	character	
of	 the	 city	 given	 the	 shift	 to	areas	predominantly	populated	by	 their	 respective	 clans.	Many	
people	believe	that	the	government	had	an	opportunity	to	alter	the	city’s	settlement	pattern	as	
these	 exercises	 could	 have	 been	 used	 to	 promote	 spatial	 integration	 and	 to	 break	 up	
concentrations	of	particular	clans.108	It	is	important	to	mention	that	these	evictions	took	place	
at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 government	 announced	 a	 new	 state	 policy	 on	 eradicating	 and	 burying	
clanism	 in	 public	 life.	 	 Yet	 the	 land	 management	 practices	 of	 the	 state	 were	 in	 practice	 in	
contravention	 with	 this	 policy,	 as	 the	 state	 failed	 to	 promote	 its	 rhetoric	 through	 existing	
government	interventions	such	as	the	movement	of	people	to	areas	populated	by	other	clans.	
Equally,	the	state	also	failed	to	bring	about	meaningful	land	reforms	despite	several	half-hearted	
attempts.		
It	is	important	to	point	out	that	land	management	policies	and	laws	had	a	rural	focus	throughout	
the	postcolonial	period.	But	such	policies	are	nonetheless	relevant	for	the	Hargeisa	context	as	
the	boundary	between	rural	and	urban	is	blurred	in	Hargeisa	(Moolla,	2009).	Aside	from	the	fact	
that	a	significant	number	of	‘urban’	people	lead	a	semi-rural	life	where	they	keep	animals	such	
as	chickens	and	goats	for	milking,	a	major	seasonal	river	flanked	by	farms	runs	through	the	city.	
In	other	words,	the	land	reform	policies	designed	for	rural	based	sectors	such	as	agriculture	and	
livestock	also	had	a	significant	bearing	on	urban	life.	Land	tenure	reforms	in	Somalia	date	back	
to	the	immediate	postcolonial	period	when	the	civilian	Somali	government	made	an	attempt	in	
which	it	sought	to	codify	aspects	of	the	customary	law	on	land	as	part	of	a	greater	attempt	to	
consolidate	the	different	laws	in	the	country	(Contini,	1967).	Subsequent	attempts	followed	in	
1975	when	the	military	regime	issued	a	decree	putting	land	ownership	in	the	hands	of	the	state	
in	a	bid	to	increase	agricultural	production	(Bruyas,	2006).	This	was	premised	on	the	classical	
postcolonial	 assumption	 that	 sees	 land	 rights	 as	 key	 economic	 drivers	 able	 to	 reverse	 	 the	
economic	and	social	problems	in	Africa	(DFID,	2007).	Like	the	rest	of	its	postcolonial	brethren,	
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the	Somali	state’s	attempt	to	reform	land	ownership	was	largely	unsuccessful	and	the	state’s	
intention	of	unlocking	land	as	an	economic	resource	was	not	realised.		
Even	though	the	epicentre	of	postcolonial	 land	reforms	 in	Somalia	ushered	 in	by	the	military	
administration	was	the	fertile	regions	in	the	South,	the	arid	lands	of	the	North	were	not	spared.	
The	reforms	were	mainly	undertaken	in	two	districts,	Erigavo	in	the	East	and	Gabiley	in	the	West.	
In	Gabiley,	the	government	established	a	large	scale	state-owned	farm	as	an	experiment	aimed	
at	 increasing	the	agricultural	production	capacity	of	the	region,	but	this	 	miserably	failed	and	
pastoralists	once	again	informally	regained	control	of	their	lost	land	(Norton	and	Flyktningeråd,	
2008).	 Similarly,	 in	 Erigavo,	 grazing	 reserves	were	 established	 by	 the	 livestock	 development	
agency	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 cooperative	 societies	 aimed	 at	 empowering	 pastoralists.	 The	
cooperatives	were	designed	to	consist	of	45	households	each	contributing	10	sheep	and	1	cow.	
However,	the	programme	was	counterproductive	as	it	was	exploited	by	elites	who	bought	off	
the	 shares	 of	 those	 unable	 to	 contribute	 the	 10	 sheep	 and	 1	 cow	 required	 for	 cooperative	
membership	(Norton	and	Flyktningeråd,	2008).	In	both	cases,	the	land	tenure	reforms	were	seen	
as	government	encroachment	on	pastoralists’	traditional	rights	of	pasture	and	watering.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 urban	 land	management	was	 neglected	 during	 the	military	
regime	in	Somalia,	aside	from	the	evictions	discussed	above.	Robleh	and	Hussen	(1977)	cited	in	
Besteman	 and	 Roth	 (1988),	 observe	 that	 the	 government	 passed	 22	 pieces	 of	 legislation	
governing	the	agricultural	sector,	yet	only	one	law	(the	Urban	Land	Distribution	Law	of	1973)	
dealing	with	urban	land	management,	which	was	not	widely	promulgated,	and	was	amended	
later	 in	1980	 (Democratic	Republic	of	Somalia,	1980,	Democratic	Republic	of	Somalia,	1973).	
This	 lack	of	urban	 focus	was	attributable	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	state	was	 trying	 to	bring	about	
change	in	overdependence	on	pastoral	livelihoods,	perceived	to	be	highly	vulnerable	to	seasonal	
variations.	Agriculture	was	seen	as	a	more	stable	mode	of	livelihood	even	though	the	country	
had	only	limited	fertile	land	along	the	rivers	in	the	South.	Among	the	key	legislation	and	policies	
introduced		were	the	agricultural	land	law	of	1975,	which	according	to	Besteman	(1990)	was	by	
far	 the	most	extensive	piece	of	 legislation	dealing	with	 land	management	 in	the	postcolonial	
period.109	One	of	the	cornerstones	of	the	new	legislation,	which	also	had	implications	for	urban	
contexts,	was	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 not	only	enhanced	 the	authoritarian	 colonial	 approach	 to	 land	
																																								 																				
109	This	legislation	paved	the	way	for	the	establishment	of	development	cooperatives	and	also	enhanced	
the	 existing	 agricultural	 crash	 programmes	 through	 which	 land	 was	 allocated	 land	 to	 government	
employees	and	graduates	of	agricultural	colleges.	
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management	but	 it	also	furthered	the	notion	of	state	ownership	over	 land.	Besteman	(1990)	
points	out	that	the	1975	law	nullified	the	recognition	of	traditional	authority	of	landownership	
as	it	vested	all	land	in	the	hands	of	the	state,	reducing	communal	and	private	ownership	to		mere	
tenancy.	The	renewed	state	interest	in	vigorous	land	management	can	be	seen	as	an	attempt	at	
strengthening	its	grip	on	power	and	implementing	its	socialist	ideologies.	This	land	management	
focus	could	also	be	seen	as	a	prime	opportunity	for	demonstrating	the	shift	from	a	capitalist	free	
market	to	a	socialist	economy	where	cooperatives	rather	than	companies	play	a	central	role	in	
the	economy	(Roth,	1989).		
Another	 key	 corner	 stone	 of	 this	 law	 was	 the	 imposition	 of	 compulsory	 registration	 for	
landownership.	Again,	there	were	ramifications	of	this	policy	in	urban	as	well	as	in	rural	contexts.	
While	this	law	was	justified	through	the	lense	of	poverty	alleviation,	it	alienated	the	poor	and	
empowered	the	elites	in	the	country	at	least	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	 it	enabled	them	to	get	title	
deeds	 for	 unclaimed	 land110	 at	 a	 time	when	 the	 country	was	 going	 through	 steep	 economic	
decline	worsened	by	insurgencies	in	the	North.	Secondly,	it	enabled	them	to	salvage	some	of	
their	savings	at	a	time	when	the	country	was	facing	high	rate	of	inflation.	Roth	(1989)	notes	that	
“high	 price	 inflation	 discourages	 investors	 from	 holding	 financial	 assets,	 and	 increases	 the	
incentive	for	holding	land	or	commodities	(e.g.,	gold	or	livestock).	Price	levels,	as	measured	by	
the	GDP	deflator,	rose	at	an	average	annual	rate	of	10	percent	over	the	period	1965-80,	and	in	
excess	of	45	percent	annually	between	1980-5.	Based	on	a	14	percent	nominal	rate	of	interest	
on	bank	deposits	 in	 1985,	 10	 financial	 assets	 in	 real	 terms	would	have	 yielded	a	31	percent	
negative	annual	return”	(Besteman,	1990).		
Overall,	the	introduction	of	compulsory	registration	was	counter-productive.	For	instance,	the	
prohibition	of	sales	or	transfer	of	 land	negatively	affected	investment	as	owners	were	legally	
unable	to	sell	or	transfer	their	proprietorship	to	others.	Moreover,	it	increased	competition	over	
landownership	and	speculation	as	well	as	commercialisation	of	rural	farmlands	at	the	expense	
of	 the	 poor.	 It	 also	 led	 to	 the	 breakdown	 of	 existing	 traditional	 ways	 of	 managing	 and	
adjudicating	land	conflicts	without	creating	credible	alternatives.	According	to	Besteman	(1990),	
a	more	appropriate	land	management	scheme	could	have	been	found	in	the	enhancement	of	
communal	ownership	of	land	instead	of	the	individualised	ownership	approach	promoted	in	the	
1975	 legislation.	This	would	have	enabled	members	of	 the	community	 to	continue	using	 the	
																																								 																				
110	In	most	cases	the	elites	who	acquired	registration	for	unclaimed	land	in	Somalia	have	had	no	immediate	
intention	or	ability	to	invest	in	the	land.	
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traditional	 systems	 while	 also	 getting	 access	 to	 government	 documentation	 guaranteeing	
security	 of	 tenure	 (Besteman,	 1990).	 Besteman	 (1990)	 defines	 tenure	 security	 in	 the	 Somali	
context	“as	the	[land	owners]	perception	that	s/he	will	be	able	to	sustain	rights	to	use	the	land	
and	 obtain	 continuing	 benefits	 from	 investment	 in	 the	 land”.	 The	 introduction	 of	 land	
registration	 in	 Somalia	 posed	 a	 challenge	 to	 this	 perception	 as	 it	 changed	 land	 rights	 from	
communal	to	individual.	The	idea	here	was	to	alter	the	way	land	owners	see	their	ownership	to	
the	land	and	hence	increase	tenure	security.		
While	in	some	contexts	legal	titling	may	increase	tenure	security,	this	was	not	the	case	in	Somalia	
following	the	military	regimes	registration	policy.		According	to	Besteman,	in	“situations	of	high	
population	 pressure,	 rising	 land	 values,	 land	 speculation,	 unequal	 access	 to	 land	 under	
customary	tenure,	or	encroaching	control	over	land	by	a	dominant	group,	legal	title	conferred	
by	the	state	may	increase	tenure	security”(Besteman,	1990).	But,	under	the	military	reforms,	
this	was	 not	 the	 case	 and	 the	measures	 contained	 in	 the	 agricultural	 land	 law	were	mainly	
counter-productive.	One	of	the	reasons	why	customary	tenure	continued	to	be	seen	as	more	
able	 to	 confer	 security	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 rural	 populations	 were	 dispersed	 and	 the	 level	 of	
urbanisation	was	significantly	low.	But	more	importantly,	ownership	was	governed	by	a	set	of	
principles	that	are	known	to	villagers	and	the	government	alike	(Besteman	and	Roth,	1988).	For	
instance,	customary	tenure	recognised	land	ownership	on	the	basis	of	investment	in	vacant	land	
through	 either	 labour	 or	 other	 ventures	 such	 as	 capital,	 inheritance	 or	 gift(Norton	 and	
Flyktningeråd,	2008).	Even	though	the	introduction	of	the	1975	agricultural	 law	rendered	the	
existing	customary	tenure	null	and	void	in	legal	terms,	in	practice	it	prevailed	in	most	parts	of	
the	country,	including	in	some	urban	areas.	The	challenge	to	the	introduction	of	the	registration	
process	was	therefore	the	fact	that	the	public	did	not	universally	accept	it.	Besteman	and	Roth	
(1988)	argue	that	a	“high	levels	of	tenure	security	can	exist	without	state	recognised	title.	For	
example,	 customary	 land	 tenure	 can,	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	 provide	 individuals	 with	
tenure	 security	 having	 grazing	 and	 cultivation	 rights,	 without	 any	 state	 recognition	 of	 title”	
(Besteman,	1991).	The	formalisation	of	land	registration	in	the	country	did	little	to	prove	that	
customary	tenure	was	an	impediment	to	economic	development.	
In	Hargeisa,	there	was	rush	to	register	urban	land	by	elites	as	a	result	of	these	measures.	The	
imposition	of	compulsory	registration	for	land	in	the	country	was	interpreted	in	the	North	as	a	
measure	 through	 which	 the	 government	 wants	 to	 impose	 further	 punishment	 for	 their	
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resistance	to	the	state.111	As	a	result,	many	elites	who	owned	agricultural	land,	particularly	urban	
farms	along	the	river	running	through	the	centre	of	Hargeisa,	rushed	to	register	their	land	so	as	
to	 deny	 the	 government	 the	 chance	 of	 making	 this	 process	 a	 pretext	 for	 accusing	 them	 of	
disobedience.112	Another	important	factor	which	compelled	land	owners	to	register	their	land	
during	this	period	was	the	fact	that	Hargeisa	attracted	significant	investment	in	the	construction	
industry	as	members	of	its	diaspora	communities	increased	demand	for	land	so	as	to	construct	
residential	houses	mainly	as	a	result	of	increased	outflow	of	migration	to	the	Middle	East	where	
employment	 opportunities	 were	 higher.	 However,	 the	 heightened	 opportunities	 for	 land	
transactions	 in	 the	 city	 led	 to	 a	 rise	 in	 land	 conflicts	 complicated	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 proper	
measurement	of	the	farmland	boundaries.	As	people	had	no	faith	whatsoever	 in	the	military	
regime,	traditional	institutions	often	dealt	with	the	problem	through	the	backdoor	of	the	state.		
These	processes	were	brought	to	a	halt	through	the	war	and	destruction	of	the	city.	They	did,	
however,	have	important	legacies	for	the	period	of	post-conflict	reconstruction,	as	we	shall	see	
in	the	next	section.	
5.3 Development	(s)	of	Post-Conflict	Land	Administration	and	Land	Conflicts		
In	this	section,	I	discuss	the	development	of	post-conflict	land	administration	and	its	relationship	
to	land	conflicts.	I	do	so	by	examining	urban	land	management	law,	which	has	been	criticised	
for	being	complex	and	ambiguous	(Bruyas,	2006)	and	I	show	that	this	law	failed	to	strengthen	
the	urban	regulatory	framework	which	was	and	continues	to	be	weak.	I	also	show	that	the	urban	
land	regulatory	system	in	place	creates	more	confusion	than	it	solves	and	plays	a	key	role	in	the	
rampant	land	conflicts	in	Hargeisa.	As	a	result,	I	argue	that	this	undermines	public	trust	in	the	
regulatory	 system	 and	 hence	 fosters	 the	 continued	 reliance	 on	 the	 clan	 network	 and	 hence	
segregation.			
Prior	to	2004,	each	district	 in	Hargeisa	had	 its	own	land	committee	dealing	with	 land	related	
issues.	Procedures	were	weak	leading	to	multiple	issuance	of	titles	for	the	same	piece	of	land.	
Bruyas	(2006,	p.	19)	notes	that	the	registration	procedures	were	 inherited	from	the	previous	
regime	and	the	legal	regulatory	framework	within	which	they	operated	were	either	“inefficient	
or	disconnected	from	the	reality	on	the	ground”.	The	conflict	itself	reconfigured	and	reinforced	
																																								 																				
111	Interviewee	7	August	20,	2014	Oral	Historian,	Artist	and	Radio	Presenter.	
112	Ibid.	
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the	city’s	clan-based	settlement,	but	the	post-conflict	land	management	exacerbated	insecurity	
and	distrust	of	the	state,	and	hence	reproduced	the	importance	of	a	clan-based	settlement	logic.	
In	1999,	the	government	introduced	an	agricultural	land	law	which	was	equally	important	for	
urban	land	in	Hargeisa	as	the	city	was	(and	still	is)	increasingly	expanding	into	agricultural	and	
pastoral	land	within	its	immediate	vicinity.	The	land	management	regime	in	place	could	seldom	
cope	with	 the	 demand	 and	 pressure	 placed	 on	 it	 by	 such	 rapid	 growth.	 Attempts	 aimed	 at	
bringing	 about	 reforms	 were	 mainly	 unsuccessful.	 This	 was	 partly	 attributable	 to	 the	 non-
existence	 of	 previous	 land	 records	 and	municipal	 bylaws.	 Land	 reforms	 in	 Somaliland	were,	
therefore,	started	from	scratch	as	a	parliamentary-led	 legislative	process	aimed	at	producing	
comprehensive	 laws	 governing	 land	both	 at	 the	 central	 and	 the	 local	 governments’	 level.	 In	
2001,	the	population	of	Somaliland	voted	for	a	referendum	on	a	constitution	which	placed	land	
management	in	the	hands	of	the	state	but	guaranteed	respect	for	private	ownership	(Republic	
of	Somaliland,	2001).		
In	2002,	 the	government	 introduced	the	 first	 land	management	 law	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	
2002a)	exclusively	dealing	with	urban	land	which	was	later	amended	in	2008	as	the	law	attracted		
substantial	criticism	for	its	superficiality	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2002	amended	in	2008).	Such	
criticism	was	carried	over	to	the	amended	version,	which	was	equally	accused	of	being	overly	
concerned	with	plan	management	 rather	 than	 creation.	Nonetheless,	 it	was	by	 far	 the	most	
significant	attempt	at	delineating	the	institutional	boundaries	between	the	local	and	the	central	
state	with	regard	to	land	management.	While	regulatory	and	policy-making	responsibility	were	
given	to	central	authorities,	the	micromanagement	of	land	was	entrusted	to	local	authorities.	
According	to	this	 law,	the	municipal	departments	directly	 involved	 in	 local	 land	management	
are	the	departments	of	land,	physical	assets,	and	land	records	transfer	(Bruyas,	2006).		At	the	
central	 state	 level,	 the	 ministries	 of	 agriculture,	 pastoral	 development	 and	 environment,	
interior,	health,	communication,	mineral	resources	and	water,	the	Ministry	of	public	works,		and	
the	 parliamentary	 subcommittee	 on	 natural	 resources	 and	 environment	 are	 all	 institutions	
concerned	with	urban	land	management	(Farah,	undated	).		
Aside	from	the	large	number	of	ministries	and	departments	involved,	the	provisions	of	the	new	
wide-ranging	urban	land	law	are	numerous	and	detailed.	 	This	 in	 itself	did	not	make	for	easy	
implementation.		Nor	was	the	law	widely	understood.		In	addition,	McAuslan	(2006)	criticises	
this	urban	 land	management	 law	for	 its	 tendency	to	presume	the	existence	of	a	master	plan	
[which	at	the	time	of	data	collection	did	not	exist]	and	its	central	concern	with	revising	plans	
rather	 than	putting	 in	place	guidelines	on	which	 	plans	 could	be	made	and	 land	 registration	
113	|	P a g e 	
	
	
problems	could	be	addressed.	 In	2004,	 the	municipality	of	Hargeisa	 in	collaboration	with	UN	
Habitat	started	a	registration	of	properties	exercise	where	information	was	gathered	through	
GIS		using	satellite	digital	images	and	GPS	devices	(Turkstra,	2008).	The	idea	was	to	strengthen	
the	 local	 state’s	ability	 to	manage	urban	 land	by	developing	a	 reliable	cadastral	 system.113	A	
major	problem	with	the	system,	however,	was	that	it	did	not	record	the	dimensions	of	the	plots	
as	this	was	perceived	as	information	that	would	increase	boundary	conflicts.	This	limited	the	use	
of	 the	 system	 to	 a	 mere	 revenue	 collection	 mechanism	 (as	 shown	 in	 previous	 chapter).114	
Moreover,	the	technical	expertise	necessary	for	the	maintenance	of	such	a	system	is	not	widely	
available	in	the	city	and	those	who	are	trained	to	manage	the	system	take	up	more	lucrative	
jobs	in	the	non-governmental	organisations	sector	(APD,	2010).	At	present,	only	3000	properties	
out	of	60,000	eligible	for	registration	in	Hargeisa	are	actually	listed.	This	attests	to	the	magnitude	
of	the	land	registration	problem	in	Hargeisa.	(Barry	and	Bruyas,	2009)	suggest	the	introduction	
of	a	comprehensive	cadastral	system	as	a	way	of	reforming	the	land	registration	processes	in	
the	country.	They	define	cadastral	system	in	this	context	as	“a	system	incorporating	evidentiary	
documents,	 unrecorded	 community	 knowledge,	 land	 registration,	 boundary	 definition	 and	
cadastral	 survey”.	 They	 advance	 this	 cadastral	 system	 not	 only	 as	 a	 way	 of	 enhancing	 land	
registration	processes	but	also	as	a	way	of	improving	access	to	land.		
The	land	titling	system	is	one	of	the	major	contributors	to	land	conflicts	in	Hargeisa.	Owing	to	
the	 lack	 of	 transparent,	 accountable	 and	 stringent	 land	 registration	 mechanisms,	 irregular	
issuance	 of	 titles	 is	 not	 uncommon.	While	 in	 general	 this	 negatively	 affects	 landowners	 by	
creating	 a	 condition	 in	 which	 they	 have	 to	 bribe	 public	 officials	 to	 obtain	 the	 necessary	
documentation,	marginalised	social	groups	are	by	all	accounts	more	vulnerable.115	The	lack	of	a	
functioning	regulatory	system	that	is	accessible	to	all	as	well	as	the	lack	of	capacity	to	register	
continually	and	re-register	land	ownership	creates	massive	inequalities.	The	problem	is	further	
complicated	by	the	lack	of	unified	coherent	system.	Little	if	any	coordination	exists	between	the	
local	and	central	state	institutions	on	urban	land	management	(Farah	and	Ali,	undated).	
																																								 																				
113	Cadastral	system	here	refers	to	“a	system	incorporating	evidentiary	documents,	unrecorded	community	
knowledge,	 land	 registration,	boundary	definitions	and	cadastral	 survey.	 See	 (Barry,	M.	and	Bruyas,	F.	
2009).	
114	Using	the	cadastral	system,	taxes	are	levied	from	the	occupants	of	the	building	rather	than	the	owners	
of	the	building.	
115	Interviewee	36	August	20,	2014.	Director	of	Civil	Unit	-	Legal	Aid	Clinic.	
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The	most	 important	 institution	 for	 urban	 land	management	 at	 the	 central	 state	 level	 is	 the	
Ministry	of	Public	Works,	which	hosts	the	Land	and	Urban	Management	Institute	(LUMI).		LUMI	
was	set	up	in	accordance	with	urban	land	law	to	work	closely	with	the	National	Urban	Planning	
Board	to	form	the	basis	on	which	central	government	policies	are	translated	into	technical	sets	
of	rules	and	regulations	concerned	with	urban	land	management	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2002	
amended	 in	 2008).	 The	 Institute	 was	 proposed	 to	 have	 various	 sections,	 including	 a	 land	
administration	division	responsible	for	the	provision	of	technical	expertise	on	land	policy	and	
regulation	as	well	as	a	physical	design	section,	which	deals	with	the	preparation	of	master	plans	
and	mapping.	The	master	plans	ought	to	cover	a	radius	of	no	more	than	5	km	beyond	the	fringes	
of	the	city	and	they	are	used	for	zoning	purposes	–	i.e.	residential,	industrial,	commercial	and	
public	–	as	well	as	the	mapping	of	utility	services	such	as	electricity,	water	and	communication	
lines	in	the	city	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	undated).	This	Institute,	however,	exists	only	in	name	
as	it	has	neither	the	technical	capacity	nor	financial	ability	to	discharge	its	duties.		
At	the	local	level,	the	new	urban	land	management	law	of	2002	(particularly	article	2)	made	the	
administration	 and	 the	 allocation	 of	 urban	 land	 (including	 land	 within	 the	 immediate	
surrounding	 of	 the	 city)	 the	 prerogative	 of	 local	 government	 particularly	 the	 executive	
committee	of	the	councils.	Land	located	on	the	fringes	of	the	city,	according	to	this	law,	remains	
in	 the	 hands	 of	 those	 who	 hold	 titles,	 but	 if	 the	 owner	 decides	 to	 convert	 it	 into	 a	 built	
environment	 such	 residential	 or	 business	 buildings,	 30%	 of	 the	 land	 will	 be	 taken	 by	 the	
municipality.	The	mountainous	areas	surrounding	the	city	where	cultivation	is	impossible	cannot	
be	 recognized	as	 farmland	and	 their	occupation	 is	 illegal	and	subject	 to	confiscation	without	
compensation.	 This	 creates	 friction	 between	 the	 adjacent	 local	 authorities	 of	 Hargeisa	 and	
Salaxley	as	each	claims	to	have		legal	jurisdiction	over	the	land	on	the	fringes	of	the	city	(Republic	
of	Somaliland,	2002	amended	in	2008).	Sometimes	these	jurisdictional	disputes	result	in	violent	
deaths	as	happened	in	2013	when	fire	was	opened	by	respective	armed	guards	accompanying	
the	officials	from	the	two	sides,	leading	to	the	death	of	one	security	officer.	Local	governments	
are	required	under	this	law	to	register	properties	within	the	city	based	on	existing	ownership	
papers	and	in	conjunction	with	the	records	held	at	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	as	well	as	the	
municipality	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2002	amended	in	2008),	but	this	leads	to	multiple	issuance	
of	ownership	papers	by	the	respective	municipalities.		
While	 the	urban	 land	 law	makes	a	 significant	attempt	at	delineating	 the	vertical	 relationship	
between	institutions	dealing	with	urban	land	administration,	i.e.	central	and	local	authorities,	it	
fails	 to	 cater	 for	 the	 horizontal	 relationship	 and	 interface	 between	 the	 local	 authorities	
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themselves.116	The	failure	to	separate	political	from	administrative	 issues	further	complicates	
the	 fragile	 regulatory	 system	 in	 the	 country.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 lower	 structures	 of	 the	
government	do	not	function	well	and	do	not	provide	the	badly	needed	services	due	constant	
meddling	and	interference	from	the	centre.	In	many	instances,	this	blurs	the	boundary	between	
the	political	and	administrative	functions	of	the	state,	as	spelt	out	by	the	Solicitor	General:	
if	 the	 local	government	 is	not	happy	with	 the	directives	of	 the	Minister	of	
Interior	and	Ministry	of	public	works,	the	legal	avenue	through	which	this	is	
supposed	to	be	solved	is	to	take	the	matter	to	the	High	Court.	What	however	
happens	is	that	these	legal	jurisdictional	issues	are	often	solved	in	a	political	
way	 by	mobilising	 various	 actors	 that	 include	 the	 traditional	 leaders	 and	
other	 influential	 bodies.	 But	 what	 we	 do	 not	 realise	 is	 that	 this	 kind	 of	
arrangement	are	temporary	and	don’t	last	long	and	this	leads	to	recurrence	
of	the	problem	more	frequently	than	could	be	the	case	if	the	problem	was	
solved	through	legal	means.117	
This	poor	regulatory	framework	and	lack	of	harmonisation	of	land	laws	are	partly	responsible	
for	the	institutional	weaknesses	in	the	country	(Farah	and	Ali,	undated).	Attempts	to	consolidate	
and	strengthen	the	institutional	capacity	of	the	agencies	dealing	with	urban	land	in	the	country	
remain	problematic.	According	to	a	development	worker	for	a	local	NGO,	lack	of	political	will,	
on	the	part	of	the	government	and	political	parties,	hampers	efforts	aimed	at	strengthening	the	
regulatory	 framework	 for	urban	 land	management.	This	produces	both	 lack	of	accountability	
among	officials	and	lack	of	trust	from	the	public.				
This	lack	of	political	will	is	rooted	in	the	way	people	come	to	power	in	the	first	
place.	 People	 are	 not	 voted	 in	 because	of	 their	 political	 agenda.	 They	are	
voted	 in	 because	 of	 their	 affiliation	 with	 clans.	 So	 instead	 of	 politicians	
developing	programs	for	the	public	to	be	able	to	decide,	votes	are	solicited	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 clan	 membership.	 This	 led	 to	 lack	 of	 accountability.	 For	
instance,	if	today	we	are	working	here	and	there	is	no	one	asking	me	about	
																																								 																				
116	Despite	this,	clashes	over	the	 jurisdictions	of	 land	management	between	the	various	governmental	
agencies	are	also	common.	 i.e.	Ministry	of	Agriculture	versus	Ministry	of	Public	Works,	and	Municipal	
Council	versus	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
117	Interviewee	23	August	14,	2014.	Solicitor	General	of	Somaliland.	
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my	work	and	there	is	no	one	to	whom	I	am	accountable,	it	is	most	likely	that	
I	will	earn	my	salary	without	doing	anything.	The	same	is	the	sitting	members	
of	the	council	and	parliament	who	know	that	they	are	not	accountable	to	the	
public	and	 therefore	 they	don't	 care.	The	 senior	 civil	 servants	also	are	 the	
same….they	 do	 things	 as	 they	 wish…..because	 after	 all	 they	 will	 be	
nominated	 to	 their	 positions	 due	 to	 clan	membership	 or	 affiliation	 in	 the	
name	of	representation.118	
Two	major	themes	often	recurred	in	my	discussions	with	interviewees	as	to	why	the	regulatory	
system	for	land	management	is	so	ineffective.	Firstly,	government	agencies	are	susceptible	to	
clan	pressures,	making	the	application	of	rules	and	regulations	difficult.	For	instance:	
if	 government	 officials	 attempt	 to	 implement	 policies,	 their	 effort	 is	
undermined	by	people	going	to	their	seniors	and	saying	official	X	and	official	
Y	are	up	to	no	good	and	they	want	to	make	the	public	go	against	you.119	
Secondly,	 the	 weak	 regulatory	 system	 is	 attributed	 to	 government’s	 susceptibility	 to	
international	 pressure	 as	 officials	 do	 not	 like	 to	 appear	 to	 be	 against	 the	 international	
community,	hence	they	develop	policies	that	are	not	based	on	local	desires	and	circumstances.	
In	a	political	environment	where	international	Non-Governmental	Organisations	(INGOs)	have	a	
significant	financial,	development	and	planning	clout	over	the	state,	externally	funded	policies	
do	not	in	many	cases	arise	from	local	needs	as	they	are	conceived	and	produced	through	outside	
interests,	putting	a	question	mark	on	their	applicability	and	acceptability	in	the	local	context.	As	
a	politician	explained	to	me:	
Donors	have	ideological	and	economic	interests	and	they	often	want	these	
interests	to	be	reflected	in	the	making	of	the	regulations.	In	some	cases,	they	
may	become	an	obstacle	to	the	making	of	regulations	as	particular	clauses	
may	not	be	serving	their	particular	ideological	interests.	They	want	the	final	
product	to	be	in	line	with	particular	visions	they	have	in	mind.	This	makes	it	
																																								 																				
118	Interviewee	29	August	16,	2014.	NGO	Worker.	
119	Interviewee	23	August	14,	2014.	Solicitor	General	of	Somaliland.	
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difficult	 for	 the	 Somaliland	 state	 to	 bring	 about	 regulations	 that	 are	
acceptable	to	the	people.120	
For	their	part,	the	law-making	bodies	claim	that	they	do	not	have	the	necessary	financial	and	
technical	expertise	to	draft	or	scrutinise	bills	submitted	by	the	government	ministries	to	ensure	
that	laws	are	not	based	on	narrow	agendas.	The	MPs	and	members	of	the	local	council	claim	
that:		
they	 can’t	 serve	 their	 constituencies	 because	 of	 lack	 of	 resources	 as	 they	
don't	get	travel	allowance	for	going	back	to	their	constituencies	and	as	they	
also	don’t	have	offices	in	their	constituencies.121	
In	Hargeisa,	lack	of	legal	certainty	emanating	from	the	poor	regulatory	system	has	contributed	
to	low	compliance	levels	with	land	management	rules	among	property	owners.	Unnecessary	red	
tape	bureaucracy	hampers	the	strengthening	of	the	land	regulatory	system	in	the	country	and	
this	negatively	impacts	on	the	city’s	economic	development.		
According	 to	a	 report	on	 the	business	sector	 in	Hargeisa	 jointly	prepared	by	 the	World	Bank	
(WB)	and	the	International	Finance	Corporation	(2012),	Hargeisa	is	ranked	as	86	of	183	when	it	
comes	to	the	bureaucratic	difficulties	of	setting	up	a	business.	The	procedure	for	setting	up	a	
business	in	Hargeisa	goes	through	15	steps	over	a	period	of	56	days.	This	means	Hargeisa	is	more	
bureaucratic	than	many	African	cities	when	it	comes	to	the	establishment	of	businesses.	It	also	
makes	it	more	expensive.	For	instance,	the	“cost	of	dealing	with	construction	permits	in	Hargeisa	
is	1,038.8%	of	income	per	capita.	This	places	Hargeisa	among	the	top	20	most	costly	economies	
globally.	 Only	 16	 economies	 are	 more	 expensive	 i.e.	 Afghanistan,	 Burundi,	 Chad,	 Djibouti,	
Tanzania	and	Zimbabwe”	(WB	and	IBRD,	2012).	It	is	important	to	mention	that	90%	of	the	cost	
incurred	during	the	process	of	getting	the	construction	started	is	spent	on	utility	connections	
and	only	10%	of	the	cost	is	levied	by	the	government.	In	other	words,	the	local	authorities	do	
not	 significantly	 benefit	 from	 the	 red	 tape	 bureaucracy	 in	 place.	 According	 to	 the	 Solicitor	
General,	one	of	the	main	issues	with	the	red	tape	bureaucracy	is	that:	
																																								 																				
120	Interviewee	28	August	12,	2014.	Politician.	
121	Interviewee	79	August	12,	2014.	Member	of	Parliament.	
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it	facilitates	corruption.	The	influence	of	the	clan	and	interference	of	the	due	
process	is	part	of	the	corruption.	Corruption	is	not	only	about	giving	money	
to	someone	in	order	to	achieve	a	particular	aim.	Corruption	could	as	well	be	
interference	 with	 due	 process.	 There	 are	 two	 kinds	 of	 corruptions;	 active	
corruption	 and	 passive	 corruption.	 The	 passive	 corruption	 is	 if	 somebody	
turns	away	from	an	action	he	was	supposed	to	carry	out	in	order	to	benefit	a	
particular	group	of	people	or	person.	The	active	corruption	on	the	other	hand	
is	that	which	the	individual	actively	participates	in	a	corruption	process.122	
In	 addition	 to	 these	 obstructive	 rules	 and	 corruption,	 the	 regulatory	 system	 faces	 serious	
challenges	from	the	long	tradition	of	top	down	processes,	which	undermines	its	legitimacy	and	
makes	enforcement	of	governmental	decisions	mostly	involuntary.	Very	little	attempt	has	been	
made	to	change	this	top	down	culture	except	for	a	few	instances	when	donor	agencies	help	to	
formulate	 plans	 incorporating	 some	 level	 of	 consultation.	 Thus	 far	 the	 only	 plan	 involving	
participatory	 planning	 is	 the	 recent	 constitution	 of	 District	 Development	 Framework	 (DDF)	
documents	 aimed	 at	 identifying	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 as	 well	 as	 physical	 development	
deficiencies	in	the	city	and	priorities	for	intervention.	The	DDF	identified	several	priority	areas	
for	 immediate	 attention	 such	 as	 the	need	 for	 improvement	 in	 physical	 infrastructure,	water	
supplies	and	dilapidated	pipelines	and	access	to	healthcare	(HM,	2010).		
While	 such	participatory	planning	can	 facilitate	change	 in	 the	 top	down	mentality	of	making	
regulations,	it	is	important	to	point	out	the	anomalies	in	such	exercises.	One	major	challenge	is	
the	fact	that	people	rarely	come	to	consultation	sessions	unless	they	are	paid	a	daily	subsistence	
allowance.123	 This	 demand	 for	 money	 developed	 from	 a	 culture	 in	 which	 the	 INGOs	 pay	
participants	 for	consultation	so	as	to	make	their	programs	 look	consultative.	 In	reality,	 those	
who	 report	 for	 such	 forums	are	 a	 group	of	people	who	make	a	habit	 of	 earning	 from	 these	
practices,	undermining	the	value	of	consultation.			
In	 short,	 weaknesses	 in	 the	 regulatory	 system	 have	 undermined	 public	 trust	 in	 the	
administrative	framework	of	urban	land	in	the	city	and	this	negatively	affects	service	provision.	
The	state’s	inability	to	mobilise	the	necessary	resources	for	improving	access	to	services	coupled	
																																								 																				
122	Interviewee	23	August	14,	2014.	Solicitor	General	of	Somaliland.	
123	Interviewee	4	August	16,	2014.	Lawyer	.	
119	|	P a g e 	
	
	
with	 lack	of	political	will	to	bring	about	change	are	believed	to	exacerbate	the	situation.	This	
discredits	the	state	further	and	undermines	what	is	left	of	its	reputation	to	manage	public	life.	
In	other	words,	public	confidence	in	the	system	is	heavily	eroded,	inherently	promoting	people’s	
reliance	on	other	means	of	resolving	land	disputes	and	sticking	to	areas	in	the	city	where	they	
can	access	clan	support	network	necessary	for	access	to	services.	While	this	erosion	of	public	
confidence	cuts	across	the	social	and	economic	spectrum	of	the	people	in	the	city,	the	poor	and	
underprivileged	such	as	minorities	and	women	are	affected	most	severely	as	the	current	land	
governance	 practices	 inhibits	 access	 to	 land	which	 is	 one	 of	 three	major	 obstacles	 to	 urban	
development	in	Somaliland,	according	to	panel	discussion	facilitated	by	the	World	Bank	(WB,	
2014).	 While,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 clan-based	 segregation	 may	 give	 an	 impression	 of	 social	
integration	 transcending	 class,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 this	 can	 also	 be	 viewed	 as	
inconvenient	cohabitation	where	the	rich	often	exploit	the	poor	financially	and	politically.		
5.4 Access	to	Land	and	the	Alienation	of	the	Poor		
Access	to	land	in	Somaliland	is	characterised	by	severe	inequality	between	poor	and	the	rich.	In	
this	section,	I	argue	that	such	inequality	is	not	only	due	to	a	disparity	of	wealth	but	also	structural	
exclusionary	 state	 land	 management	 practices.	 For	 instance,	 the	 legal	 framework	 leads	 to	
differential	 treatment	 of	 the	 poor	 and	 the	 rich.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 law	 imposes	 greater	
restrictions	on	the	poor	than	their	wealthier	counterparts.	An	example	of	this	can	be	found	in	
article	15	of	the	urban	land	law	which	stipulates	that	plots	should	be	allocated	in	a	just	manner	
on	the	basis	of	citizenship	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2002	amended	in	2008).	While	this	would	
appear	egalitarian,	fame	and	privilege	creep	in	because	of	the	difficulty	for	many	to	prove	their	
citizenship.	In	other	words,	while	those	who	are	well	known	are	not	usually	required	to	prove	
their	 citizenship,	 poor	 people	 and	 women	 have	 to	 enlist	 the	 help	 of	 an	 Akil	 or	 prominent	
member	of	their	clan	to	vouch	for	their	citizenship.	Moreover,	while	the	law	permits	the	absence	
of	a	planning	process	for	the	construction	of	non-permanent	structures,124	this	impermanence	
also	forms	the	basis	on	which	such	buildings	are	often	removed.		
The	poor	also	face	further	challenges	when	given	land	in	a	prime	area,	because	security	of	tenure	
is	linked	to	building	and	investment	in	the	land.	The	law	stipulates	that	if	somebody	is	given	land	
																																								 																				
124	Plots	can	be	categorised	into	permanent	residency	plots	consisting	of	materials	such	as	bricks,	cement	
et	 cetera	and	 temporary	 residencies	 consisting	of	 Somali	 traditional	mats	and	houses	made	of	 ceiling	
boards.	Temporary	structures	will	not	require	to	have	plans	whereas	the	permanent	structures	should	
have	building	plans	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2002	amended	in	2008).	
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in	 prime	 area	 facing	 a	major	 road	 and	 he/she	 is	 unable	 to	 build	 on	 it,	 the	municipality	 can	
reinstate	 the	allocation	of	 such	 land	and	 the	occupant	will	 be	given	 land	 in	another	 locality.	
Wealthier	people	do	not	face	these	challenges	as	they	can	often	conform	to	the	conditions	of	
the	law	regarding	new	land	allocations.	Article	19	stipulates	that	anybody	who	is	given	a	piece	
of	land	by	the	state	and	who	invested	in	that	piece	of	land	and	built	a	structure	of	a	permanent	
nature	will	be	recognised	for	owning	that	land	for	ever.125	Similarly	transfer	and	sale	of	land	is	
subject	to	the	ability	of	the	person	acquiring	land	for	permanent	residency	as	stipulated	in	article	
25	which	states	that	anybody	who	is/was	given	land	for	permanent	residency	can	sell,	transfer,	
give	the	land	as	a	gift	or	dispense	the	land	in	any	form	he/she	finds	it	fit	in	accordance	with	the	
law.126	
Further	 challenges	 face	 the	 poor	 living	 in	 peri-urban	 locations	 by	 the	 agricultural	 land	 law	
introduced	 in	1999.	Article	6	of	 this	 law	–	which	also	applies	 to	urban	contexts	as	 the	city	 is	
increasingly	expanding	to	agricultural	and	pastoral	land	in	peri-urban	areas	–		limits	allocation	
of	 land	 to	 one	 plot	 of	 eight	 hectares	 which	 cannot	 be	 sold	 for	 three	 years	 (Republic	 of	
Somaliland,	1999).		For	many	poor	people	waiting	for	three	years	to	sell	their	land	is	a	luxury	
they	cannot	afford.	While	wealthier	people	 in	 the	city	access	peri-urban	 land	 in	 the	name	of	
investment	and	development,	poor	people	do	not	have	 the	ability	 to	organise	 the	 resources	
necessary	 for	 acquiring	 land	 in	 the	 name	 of	 development.	 According	 to	 article	 12	 of	 the	
Somaliland	Investment	policy,	land	given	for	development	should	be	built	up	within	one	year.127	
But	businessmen	rarely	conform	to	this	requirement	yet	are	not	subjected	to	eviction	whereas	
the	 poor	 often	 face	 the	 risk	 of	 expropriation.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 land	 given	 for	 temporary	
residence	must	have	the	necessary	structures	erected	within	three	months	from	the	time	it	is	
granted	(MTI,	2014).	In	many	cases,	poor	people	may	not	have	the	financial	ability	to	fulfil	this	
requirement.	The	law	states	that	if	land	is	granted	for	development	such	as	industry	or	other	
businesses,	it	cannot	be	used	for	residential	purposes,128(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2002	amended	
																																								 																				
125	According	to	the	constitution	of	Somaliland	foreigners	who	are	given	land	in	the	country	have	the	same	
privilege	as	the	locals	when	it	comes	to	land	ownership	and	transfer.	Landownership	title	can	be	given	to	
the	owner	once	the	building	is	above	the	ventilation.	
126	The	above	rights	do	not	extend	to	the	people	who	make	habit	of	trading	land.	
127	If	the	person	fails	to	build	the	land	within	this	time,	a	yearly	tax	is	levied	from	him	or	her.	
128	 Allocation	 of	 plots	 for	 residential	 reasons	 will	 have	 to	 be	 advertised	 in	 noticeboards	 and	 the	
newspapers	so	as	to	allow	those	who	want	a	dispute	the	ownership	time	to	raise	their	concerns.	
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in	2008)	but	wealthy	people	 in	the	city	defy	this	as	 land	allocated	for	business	 is	 turned	 into	
grand	residential	houses.		
As	evident	from	the	above,	the	land	regulatory	system	in	the	country	creates	differential	access	
to	land	and	often	excludes	underprivileged	people.	These	practices	widen	the	gap	between	the	
haves	and	the	have	nots	 in	a	country	where	poverty	 is	the	order	of	the	day	for	the	majority.	
Somaliland	ranks	4th	in	the	league	of	lowest	GDP	per	capita	income	countries.129	There	is	also	
inequality	in	how	men	and	women	access	job	opportunities	in	the	country,	with	an	employment	
to	 population	 ratio	 of	 28%	 for	 males	 and	 17%	 for	 females.	 Urban	 poverty	 in	 Somaliland	 is	
estimated	to	be	in	the	region	of	29%.	The	future	does	not	look	bright,	as	only	50%	of	the	6-13	
age	group	go	to	school.	This	is	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	neighbouring	country	of	Ethiopia	where	
87%	of	the	same	age	groups	are	school	goers	(WB,	2015).	Moreover,	one	in	four	households	are	
unable	 to	 meet	 their	 daily	 basic	 needs	 (WB,	 2014).	 According	 to	 King	 et	 al.	 (2003),	 poor	
households	 in	Hargeisa	survive	on	 roughly	2$	a	day.	A	 recent	 report	by	 the	World	Bank	also	
indicates	that	poverty	in	Somaliland	is	widespread,	a	condition	which	is	compounded	by	lack	of	
recognition	and	absence	of	economic	opportunities.	Access	to	services	is	also	unequal	for	the	
poor	and	the	wealthy	in	the	country	(WB,	2014)	.		
Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 legal	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 land	 in	 the	 country	 is	 managed	
presents	a	far	great	challenge	for	accessing	land	to	the	poor	than	the	rich,	the	poor	often	resist	
the	encroaching	state	through	clan	mobilisation.	In	some	cases,	this	mobilisation	enables	them	
to	access	and	retain	land	illegally.		
According	to	the	World	Bank	(2014),	access	to	land	is	one	of	the		most	important	obstacles	to	
business	 in	 Somaliland.	 Poor	 and	 weak	 regulatory	 and	 enforcement	 systems	 are	 partly	
responsible	for	this	challenge.	According	to	the	Academy	for	Peace	and	Development	(2010),	
the	 state	 in	 many	 cases	 is	 unable	 to	 evict	 people	 from	 government	 buildings	 despite	 the	
existence	of	a	legal	mechanism	allowing	the	state	to	evict	and	confiscate	property	from	these	
people130		(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2002	amended	in	2008).	The	state’s	inability	to	enforce	its	
																																								 																				
129	Surprisingly,	with	a	GDP	per	capita	estimated	at	$347,	Somaliland	is	ahead	of	diplomatically	recognized	
countries	such	as	Malawi,	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	and	Burundi.	
130	For	example,	the	urban	land	law	states	that	the	municipality	has	the	right	to	remove	illegal	settlements	
in	accordance	with	the	master	plan	(article	21).		Such	eviction	could	be	subjected	to	both	permanent	or	
temporary	structures.	But	the	evictees	have	to	be	resettled	in	appropriate	places	and	the	cost	of	removing	
them	will	have	to	be	shouldered	by	the	municipality.	Equally,	the	Mayor	of	the	city	in	consultation	with	
the	National	 Urban	 Planning	 Board	 has	 the	 right	 to	 issue	 orders	 of	 confiscating	 properties	 for	 public	
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land	regulations	 is	 in	many	cases	attributable	to	corruption.	These	malpractices	are	nowhere	
more	evident	than	in	the	multiple	allocation	and	issuance	of	title	deeds	for	the	same	pieces	of	
lands.	This	leads	to	lack	of	faith	in	the	land	management	system	which	in	turn	lead	many	people	
to	build	on	land	and	worry	about	the	consequences	later	(APD,	2007).	A	study	conducted	jointly	
by	the	World	Bank	and	the	International	Finance	Corporation	(2012)	points	out	that	the	high	
cost	 of	 acquiring	 a	 construction	 permit	 forces	 many	 small	 companies	 and	 people	 to	 build	
without	a	permit	and	then	seek	to	legalise	their	ownership	afterwards.	As	access	to	land	in	the	
post-conflict	context	 is	 increasingly	becoming	difficult	 for	 individuals	from	poor	backgrounds,	
evasion	of	authorities	has	become	inevitable	for	many	poor	people	to	put	a	roof	over	their	head.	
The	state	is	particularly	susceptible	to	being	undermined	in	areas	where	individuals	can	have	
access	 to	 greater	 support	 from	members	 of	 their	 clan.	 This	 cements	 further	 the	 clan-based	
character	of	the	city	as	demonstrated	by	a	key	informant	interviewee	who	said	that:		
One	of	the	reasons	why	this	irregular	access	to	land	happens	includes	the	fact	
that	people	themselves	find	a	space	to	settle	in	areas	populated	by	their	clan	
before	legalising	it.	If	the	government	had	the	power	of	giving	the	land	to	the	
applicants	 first	 before	 it	 legalises,	 this	 would	 have	 probably	 altered	 the	
spatial	 distribution	 of	 clans	 in	 the	 city.	 This	 is	 so	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
government	would	then	have	the	opportunity	to	integrate	different	clans	into	
particular	spaces.131	
Being	within	close	proximity	to	areas	dominated	by	one’s	clan	is	important	partly	because	of	the	
fact	that	the	state	is	unable	to	regulate	land	in	an	effective	way	that	safeguards	land	ownership	
and	provides	tenure	security	for	the	poor.	 In	other	times,	rules	are	implemented	in	an	illegal	
way	 alienating	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 urban	 residents	 through	 corruption.	 Affiliation	 to	 and	
membership	 of	 particular	 clans	 and	 remaining	 within	 vicinity	 dominated	 by	 one’s	 clan	 is	
therefore	an	essential	mechanism	to	resist	unfavourable	government	policies	and	decisions.	In	
short,	abject	poverty	coupled	with	the	failure	of	the	state	to	regulate	access	to	land	and	conflict	
in	 a	manner	 that	 is	 favourable	 to	 the	poor	 and	 the	underprivileged	has	 reproduced	 clanned	
spaces	as	a	means	of	dodging	the	odds	against	poverty	and	state	action.	Amid	the	concentration	
																																								 																				
interest.	Land	confiscated	because	of	public	interest	will	only	be	used	for	public	purpose	and	not	any	other	
use	Illegal	settlements	will	have	no	compensation	in	this	regard.	
131	Interviewee	28	August	12,	2014.	Politician.	
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of	businesses,	government	services	and	aid	programs	in	the	capital,	spontaneous	land	disputes	
occur	frequently	and	at	times	spiral	into	major	conflicts	involving	not	only	the	disputing	parties	
but	also	their	respective	clans	often	occur	in	Hargeisa.		
5.5 Conclusion		
In	this	chapter,	I	argued	that	urban	land	management	practices	in	Hargeisa	–	from	early	on	when	
Somaliland	was	formed	as	a	protectorate	till	the	present	time	–	have	consistently	been	based	
on	 top	 down	 processes.	 For	 instance,	 during	 the	 colonial	 period,	 the	 introduction	 of	 land	
management	laws	involved	no	consultation	with	either	the	public	or	the	traditional	leaders.132	
This	top	down	culture	was	carried	forward	through	independence	as	the	state	often	relied	on	
laws	made	during	the	colonial	period.	Neither	the	land	reforms	attempted	during	the	immediate	
postcolonial	 civilian	 government	 nor	 the	 subsequent	 socialist	 land	 management	 regime	
introduced	during	the	military	administration	involved	public	consultation.	Similarly,	during	the	
post-conflict	period,	 land	management	practices	remained	top	down	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	
bottom	 up	 peacebuilding	 process.133	 Very	 little	 has	 changed	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 context	 as	
institutions	remained	centralised	with	policies	“hanging	up	in	the	clouds	with	no	signs	of	coming	
down”;134	a	practice	which	led	to	the	development	of	land	management	instruments	which	are	
divorced	from	the	reality	on	the	ground.	This	has	contributed	to	the	development	of	increasingly	
negative	 public	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 state,	 reproducing	 the	 endearment	 of	 people	 to	
customary	institutions	and	lineage	identity	and	by	implication	settlements	patterns	along	clan	
lines.		
Having	 discussed	 urban	 land	 administration	 in	 Somaliland,	 the	 next	 chapter	 discusses	 the	
dynamics	of	adjudication	mechanisms	for	urban	land	conflict	to	demonstrate	how	resource	and	
conflict	 management	 as	 well	 as	 service	 delivery	 shape	 the	 spatial	 character	 of	 cities	 in	
Somaliland.		
	 	
																																								 																				
132	Note,	as	mentioned	elsewhere,	colonial	authorities	consulted	Akils	and	friendly	elders	on	 issues	on	
issues	to	do	with	law	and	order.	
133	Through	the	bottom	up	approach	for	which	Somaliland	is	notably	praised.		
134	Interviewee	34	August	30,	2015.	Lawyer.	
124	|	P a g e 	
	
	
CHAPTER	6 PLURAL	ADJUDICATION	OF	URBAN	LAND	CONFLICTS		
6.1 Introduction		
Land	conflicts	are	some	of	the	major	problems	facing	urban	places	in	Somaliland.		The	capital	
city,	Hargeisa	 is	particularly	reeling	with	such	problems	because	 it	 is	 increasingly	becoming	a	
magnet	 for	 rural-urban	migrations,	 relocations	and	 investment	 from	 the	diaspora,	as	well	 as	
return	movements	from	refugee	camps	around	the	country.		The	city	also	hosts	refugees	from	
the	South	and	internally	displaced	people.	The	problem	is	exacerbated	by	the	lack	of	coherent	
means	 through	which	 such	 conflicts	 can	be	 speedily	 and	 justly	 resolved.	 This	 is	 because	 the	
justice	 landscape	 in	 Somaliland	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	 coexistence	 of	 plural	 (at	 times)	
competing,	contradictory	and	occasionally	complementary	sets	of	laws	i.e.	statutory,	Islamic	and	
customary	 laws.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	manner	 in	which	 conflicts	 are	 adjudicated	
reinforces	the	city’s	clan-based	spatial	character.	This	is	to	say	that	the	failure	of	the	statutory	
system	 to	 manage	 conflict	 or	 enforce	 judicial	 decisions	 has	 eroded	 and	 undermined	 public	
confidence	in	the	state.	I	also	show	that	this	ineffective	justice	landscape	marginalised	the	poor.	
Consequently,	 the	poor	and	others	who	 lost	 trust	 in	the	system	rely	on	adjudication	by	non-
state	 institutions,	 increasing	the	attachment	of	urban	residents	to	 local	spaces	dominated	by	
their	clan	where	services	and	support	are	more	accessible.	Once	again,	the	concept	of	‘hybridity’	
as	it	has	been	elaborated	in	the	recent	state-building	literature	is	a	blunt	tool,	as	I	have	argued	
in	chapter	2,	and	my	focus	here	is	on	a	plurality	of	discrete,	yet	overlapping	institutions.		
The	chapter	is	organised	into	three	sections.	In	the	first	section,	I	discuss	the	plural	justice	system	
in	 the	 country.	 In	 the	 second	 section,	 I	 turn	 to	 the	 challenges	 facing	 the	 judicial	 system,	 its	
development	trajectory,	the	failure	to	address	urban	land	conflicts	as	well	as	the	impact	such	
failure	has	on	state	legitimacy.	In	the	final	two	sections,	I	discuss	the	establishment	of	the	urban	
Land	Commission	and	the	manner	in	which	it	operates,	arguing	that	red	tape	bureaucracy,	low	
level	of	capacity	and	interference	from	the	state	makes	it	unable	to	bring	about	any	significant	
changes	in	the	quest	for	resolving	proliferating	land	disputes.											
6.2 Plural	Justice:	Harmonisation	and	Reforms			
Land	conflict	adjudication	in	Somaliland	is	underpinned	by	a	plural	legal	system	that	consists	of	
customary	 law,	 Islamic	sharia	and	statutory	 laws.	According	to	UN	(2006,	p.	35),	“traditional,	
religious,	and	secular	(modern)	systems,	functioning	in	parallel,	regulate	a	wide	range	of	affairs,	
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from	 the	 resolution	 of	 constitutional	 disputes	 in	 regional	 political	 administrations	 to	 the	
enforcement	of	business	contracts	and	the	settlement	of	family	disputes”.	This	plurality	dates	
back	to	the	precolonial	Somali	judicial	practices	when	Islamic	sharia	influenced	customary	law	
and	in	many	cases	informed	the	rulings.	The	introduction	of	colonial	laws	created	further	new	
institutions	and	enhanced	the	plurality	of	the	justice	systems	as	both	sharia	and	customary	laws	
were	allowed	formally	to	coexist	and	serve	different	colonial	agendas,	and	were	incorporated	
variously	 into	state	 legislative	frameworks	(as	we	have	seen	with	the	Akils	 in	chapter	4).	 It	 is	
important	to	note	that	prior	to	the	arrival	of	the	colonial	powers,	Somalis	used	customary	laws	
known	as	(Xeer)	which	reeds	in	English	as	heer.	Heer	are	agreements	between	clans	about	their	
interaction	with	each	other:	they	are	not	limited	only	to	conflict	and	justice	but	include	social	
interactions,	marriage,	economic	and	cultural	cooperation.	
Abdile	(2012,	p.	87)	examines	how	heer	works	and	identifies	three	layers	in	which	the	system	
operates	namely	negotiation,	mediation	and	arbitration.	He	argues	that	heer	is	an	“alternative	
dispute	resolution	system	that	facilitates	reconciliation	and	promotes	restorative	justice”.	The	
use	of	the	term	alternative	suggests	that	heer	is	a	substitute	for	something	more	important	than	
itself.	It	reinforces	the	positioning	of	statutory	law	as	the	primary	system	of	laws	in	the	country	
to	which	all	other	forms	of	law	should	conform.	Abdille’s	proposition	of	heer	as	an	alternative	
restorative	justice	system	is	opposed	by	Schlee	(2013)	who	argues	that	negotiations	in	heer	take	
place	 between	 often	 unequal	 opponents	 and	 this	 compromises	 justice.	 He	 criticises	 the	
idealisation	of	the	Somali	statelessness.	He	argues	that	the	strength	of	heer	lies	in	its	ability	to	
maintain	peace,	but	it	does	not	help	in	the	achievement	of	justice.	According	to	Schlee	(2013,	p.	
261)	“mediation	and	compensation	do	not	re-establish	a	moral	order	or	enforce	‘law’,	and	they	
are	not	meant	to	please	higher	authorities	 like	God,	the	State	or	to	conform	to	lofty	 ideas	of	
Justice”.	However,	this	statement	overlooks	the	fact	that	customary	laws	are	informed	by	sharia	
and	could	partly	be	aimed	at	pleasing	God.	This	is	evident	in	the	Somali	saying,	“illahow	eexna	
ha	nagaga	tegin,	garashana	ha	nagu	cadaabin.	Loosely	translated,	this	means	“oh	god	do	not	
forgive	us	if	we	side	with	either	of	the	protagonists,	but	forgive	us	if	our	judgements	are	based	
on	the	extent	of	our	intellect”.		
Owing	 to	 its	 popular	 familiarity,	 heer	 remains	 strong,	 and	 has	 outlasted	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	
country,	playing	an	important	role	in	the	restoration	of	peace	and	stability	in	the	nation.	Thorne	
(2011)	points	out	 that	 the	 informal	 justice	mechanism	 in	Somalia	has	 taken	 the	place	of	 the	
statutory	 system	 or	 complements	 it	 where	 both	 exist.	 The	 author	 rightly	 criticises	 the	
assumption	inherent	in	many	studies	of	a		justice	vacuum	created	by	the	collapse	of	the	state,	
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but	falls	into	the	same	trap	of	seeing	heer	as	an	informal	fall-back	and	inferior	alternative,	by	
saying	“people	will	always	need	ways	of	settling	their	disputes,	and	if	there	is	no	more	formal	
way	of	doing	so,	they	resort	to	other	means”	(Thorne,	2011,	p.	3).	This	supposition	is	further	
reinforced	by	Notten	and	MacCallum	(2005)	who	also	argue	that	Somalis	have	returned	to	their	
customary	 law	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 left	 by	 the	 statutory	 state	 laws.	 This	 problematic	 assumption	
inflates	the	value	of	the	so-called	formal	by	assuming	that	people	were	more	inclined	to	use	the	
statutory	 justice	 system	 than	 the	 customary	 one	 and	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 statutory	 led	
people	to	fill	the	gap	by	applying	customary	laws.	I	argue	that	the	opposite	accords	better	with	
Somali	history,	as	a	critical	mass	of	people	have	at	no	time	preferred	the	statutory	laws	over	the	
customary.				
Le	Sage	(2011)	 	questions	the	extent	to	which	heer	could	be	harmonised	among	the	Somalis	
since	it	 is	often	based	on	clan	arrangements	which	may	differ	from	one	clan	to	another.	This	
concern	is,	however,	undermined	by	the	fact	that	in	many	cases	the	general	principles	of	the	
heer	are	the	same	regardless	of	the	clans	between	which	agreements	take	place.	The	resilience	
of	heer	despite	a	century	long	influence	by	both	the	colonial	and	postcolonial	states	is	notable	
and	can	be	partly	attributable	to	the	universal	nature	of	heer	among	Somalis.		But	Abdile	(2012)	
argues	 that	 universality	 alone	may	 fall	 short	 of	 explaining	 the	 survival	 of	 heer	 amidst	 state	
collapse.	He	emphasises	rather	the	conservativeness	of	Somali	society	and	resistance	to	foreign	
influence;	the	suspicion	and	mistrust	they	direct	at	the	statutory	laws;	and	the	respect	they	have	
for	 their	 own	 customary	 laws,	 which	 they	 regard	 as	 superior	 to	 the	 codified	 statutory	 laws	
introduced	 by	 the	 colonial	 powers.	 Thorne	 observes	 that	 the	 limitations	 of	 	 customary	 laws	
include	their	failure	to	keep	pace	with	changing	urban	contexts	where	“defining	lines	between	
clans	become	blurred”	(2011).	This	is,	however,	contradicted	by	the	evidence	emerging	from	the	
settlement	 patterns	 in	 Hargeisa	 that	 I	 present	 here.	 	 Yet	 there	 are	 drawbacks,	 because	
enforcement	 of	 rulings	 is	 voluntary	 and	 there	 is	 no	 ‘central	 authority’	 to	 resort	 to,	 while	
customary	law	also	places	great	emphasis	on	community	relations	at	the	expense	of	individual	
rights.	For	instance	raped	women	might	be	forced	to	marry	their	tormentors	in	a	bid	“to	protect	
the	woman’s	honour	[and	ensure]	full	payment	of	her	dowry	by	the	attacker’s	clan	to	the	victim’s	
clan”	(Wojkowsk,	2006,	p.	21).			
There	 have,	 however,	 been	 attempts	 aimed	 at	 bringing	 heer	 into	 international	 standards.	
According	to	Namibia	and	Ubink	(2011),	elders	in	Burao	approached	the	Danish	Refugee	Council	
(DRC)	 in	 2003	 with	 an	 idea	 of	 reforming	 	 customary	 law	 so	 as	 to	 bring	 it	 in	 line	 with	 the	
international	 standards.	 The	 conference	 in	 Burao	 agreed	 on	 the	 elimination	 of	 communal	
127	|	P a g e 	
	
	
responsibility,	and	enshrined	protections	for	vulnerable	groups,	and	the	protection	of	the	rights	
of	widows	in	particular.	An	assessment	of	the	impact	of	these	changes	estimated	that	the	result	
was	a	90	percent	reduction	in	murder	cases.	However,	such	assessment	is	problematic	and	could	
have	 been	 related	 to	 other	 social	 changes	 given	 the	 fact	 that	 “awareness	 of	 the	 National	
Declarations	among	the	general	population	was	found	to	be	minimal”	(Namibia	and	Ubink,	2011,	
p.	15).	In	other	words,	if	awareness	of	the	declaration	was	so	low,	it	is	difficult	to	assume	that	
these	 declarations	 had	 made	 changes	 in	 the	 public	 mind-set	 towards	 these	 issues.	 Unlike	
customary	 law,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 statutory	 laws	 is	 a	 relatively	 new	 phenomenon	 in	
Somaliland,	dating	from	the	colonial	contexts.		Yet	the	statutory	laws	are	of	course	important,	
and		as	we	have	seen	already	in	relation	to	chiefs	and	land,	the	present	and	immediate	post-
colonial	judicial	organisation	in	the	Somali	lands	were	modelled	on	the	colonial	system		(Hersi,	
2009).		
The	 adoption	 of	 colonial	 justice	 structures	 and	 their	 post-independence	 application	 were	
complicated	by	the	inheritance	of	two	colonial	systems;	Italian	in	the	South	and	British	in	the	
North.	In	the	ten	years	following	the	independence,	the	judicial	system	in	the	country	continued	
to	follow	these	two	different	systems,	which	at	times	was	ineffective,	and	meant	that	cases	were	
dropped	–	famously	in	the	case	of	an	attempted	coup	by	British-trained	military	officers,	who	
could	not	be	convicted	due	to	loopholes	created	by	a	dual	system.135	Serious	attempts	have	not	
been	made	 to	 rectify	 the	 limits	of	 the	previous	 judicial	 system	 in	 terms	of	both	content	and	
structure	in	the	post-conflict	Somaliland.	The	current	judicial	structure	in	Somaliland	consists	of	
mainly	urban-based	Supreme,	Appellate,	Regional,	and	District	Courts.	The	Regional	Court	hears	
cases	with	3	years’	punishment	while	District	Courts	deal	with	a	sentence	under	three	years.		
The	Appellate	Court	deals	with	all	civil	and	criminal	appeals	from	the	regional	courts.136	It	could	
be	argued	that	the	limitations	of	the	statutory	laws	continue	to	exist	partly	because	they	do	not	
enjoy	 the	 trust	 nor	 the	 resources	 required	 for	 its	 highly	 bureaucratic	 nature.	 This	weakness	
allows	 both	 the	 customary	 and	 the	 sharia	 laws	 to	 compete	 and	 at	 times	 outperform	 the	
statutory	 laws.	 As	 evident	 here	 the	 existing	 plural	 forms	 of	 the	 judicial	 system	 have	 their	
respective	weaknesses	and	strengths	and	future	judicial	reforms	need	to	strike	a	careful	balance	
																																								 																				
135	Interviewee	2	November	8,	2014	Former	Chairman	of	Somaliland	Atrocities	Commission.	
136	Interviewee	34	August	30,	2015.	Lawyer.	
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between	them	so	as	to	bring	out	the	best	features	of	each,	rather	than	prioritising	one	set	over	
another.	
Efforts	aimed	at	reforming	the	justice	system	are	not	new.	The	post-colonial	Somali	government	
had	to	contend	with	the	challenges	of	integrating	plural	justice	systems	consisting	of	statutory	
laws	left	behind	by	the	colonial	powers	and	the	sharia	and	customary	laws	widely	practiced	not	
only	 in	 the	 rural	 areas	 but	 also	 in	 towns.	 	 The	 civilian	 Somali	 government	 established	 a	
Consultative	 Committee	 for	 the	 Integration	 of	 the	 Legal	 System	 who	 put	 forward	 a	 set	 of	
confusing	recommendations	suggesting	the	use	of	the	Italian	penal	code	for	civil	cases,	Indian	
‘penal	code	for	criminal	procedures’,	sharia	for	family	and	minor	cases,	and	heer	for	the	conflict	
resolution	among	the	clans	(Le	Sage,	2011).	This	made	the	dispensation	of	justice	difficult	and	
in	 practice	 Northern	 judges	 used	 their	 previous	 laws	 while	 Southerners	 continued	 with	 the	
Italian	system.	Equally	the	military	regime	made	an	attempt	to	reform	the	system	and	in	1973	
changes	 placing	 responsibility	 for	 crimes	 on	 the	 perpetrator	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 clan	 were	
enacted,	but	this	failed	to	take	effect	as	clans	resisted	implementation.		The	government	had	to	
retract	in	1974	and	allow	the	simultaneous	use	of	both	heer	and	sharia	for	family	matters	and	
maintenance	of	peace	and	security	(ibid).	
As	 shown	 above,	 successive	 Somali	 governments	 failed	 to	 bring	 about	 meaningful	 judicial	
reforms	and	integration	between	the	overlapping	and	competing	forms	of	Islamic	law,	statutory	
and	customary	laws.	Ganzglass	(1996)	argues	that	the	failure	to	establish	an	integrated	judicial	
system	in	Somalia	was	not	just	a	failure	of	the	Somali	state,	but	that	the	UN	also	deserves	some	
of	the	blame.	He	outlines	how	the	UN	failed	to	lay	the	groundwork	for	reforms	as	it	‘missed	the	
opportunity’	of	putting	in	place	proper	mechanisms	to	revive	the	Somali	judicial	system.	At	the	
height	of	the	UN	intervention	in	1993,	plans	were	drawn	to	undertake	transitional	justice,	but	
such	plans	were	‘ambitious’	and	discussed	judicial	structures	along	the	line	of	“the	1962	Somali	
three-tiered	judicial	system	consisting	of	21	District	Courts,	Regional	Courts	in	seven	regions	and	
two	Courts	of	Appeal,	one	in	Hargeisa	and	the	other	in	Mogadishu”	(Ganzglass,	1996,	p.	125).	
The	judicial	system	envisioned	by	the	UN	was	not	creative	enough	to	take	account	of	the	dangers	
of	 recycling	 the	state	of	 justice	 that	existed	before	 the	collapse	of	 the	state.	 In	other	words,	
these	efforts	 failed	to	devise	a	 form	of	 legal	empowerment	different	 from	those	of	the	past.	
Namibia	 and	 Ubink	 (2011)	 point	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 legal	 empowerment	 in	 post-conflict	
contexts,	and	the	need	to	address	characteristically	overlapping	and	sometimes	contradicting	
plural	legal	systems.		
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Reforming	the	plural	judicial	system	has	been	cast	as	key	to	maintaining	stability.	Adam	(1991)	
argues	that	sharia	law	should	be	integrated	formally	into	any	future	Somali	justice	system,	and	
the	same	holds	for	customary	law.	Such	a	move	would	remove	the	concerns	of	many	who	have	
a	higher	level	of	trust	in	that	which	they	know,	customary	and	sharia,	than	that	which	they	do	
not	know,	statutory	law.	Political	movements	in	Somaliland	have	long	recognised	this,	as	almost	
all	 the	 major	 movements	 have	 a	 clause	 in	 their	 charters	 indicating	 that	 the	 customary	 or	
statutory	law	should	be	used	only	when	not	in	contradiction	with	the	sharia	law.	According	to	
Le	Sage	(2011)	historical	footprints	about	the	application	of	sharia,	statutory	and	customary	laws	
in	the	Somali	context	provide	a	basis	on	which	harmonisation	could	be	implemented.		
6.3 Judicial	Challenges	and	their	Effect	on	State	Legitimacy			
Copp	(1999,	pp.	4-5)	writes	that	“when	we	evaluate	a	state	for	its	legitimacy,	our	concern	is	to	
assess	its	moral	authority	to	govern.	The	laws	of	a	state	require	or	prohibit	us	to	act	in	certain	
ways,	and	the	state	typically	enforces	its	law	by	attaching	punishments	or	penalties	to	failures	
to	 comply…The	 problem	 of	 legitimacy	 is,	 then,	 to	 explain	 how	 a	 state	 can	 have	 the	 moral	
authority	 to	 do	 the	 kinds	 of	 thing	 involved	 in	 governing”.	 Like	 other	 key	 services,	 justice	 is	
generally	regarded	as	a	crucial	component	of	state’s	moral	authority	to	govern,	more	so	in	post-
conflict	contexts	where	the	society	is	in	the	process	of	healing	from	devastating	conflict	much	
of	which	was	caused	by	subjectively	perceived	or	objectively	proven	injustice.	In	this	section,	I	
argue	that	the	manner	in	which	the	state	manages	the	plural	landscape	of	the	justice	system	
undermines	its	legitimacy	and	people’s	consent	for	its	moral	authority	to	have	a	monopoly	over	
violence.	
The	challenges	of	the	justice	system	in	Somaliland	are	many.	For	instance,	the	statutory	system	
stands	accused	of	incompetency,	widespread	corruption,	and	subject	to	the	meddling	of	justice	
by	powerful	politicians	and	clans,	while	the	sharia	and	the	heer	are	criticised	for	being	out	of	
touch	 with	 the	 international	 conventions	 on	 equality	 and	 rights.	 Collective	 responsibility,	
unequal	 representation,	and	 immunity	present	problems	 to	 the	 future	 integration	of	 judicial	
systems	 in	 Somaliland.	 Thus	 far,	 attempts	 at	 improving	 justice	 	 	 have	 concentrated	 on	
strengthening	the	statutory	laws	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	very	few	people	either	trust	or	have	
access	to	this	form	of	law.	While	the	importance	of	the	statutory	laws	cannot	be	overlooked,	it	
is	also	important	to	place	the	central	emphasis	on	what	works	best	on	the	ground.	Customary	
law	is	particularly	crucial	because	it	enjoys	relative	legitimacy	and	trust	among	the	populace	as	
it	is	based	on	social,	cultural	and	power	dynamics	with	which	locals	are	familiar.	For	instance,	
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land	 in	 customary	 law	 is	 considered	 a	 symbol	 of	 power	 and	 communal	 property	 to	 which	
everyone	is	entitled	to	have	a	share,	as	opposed	to	a	commodity	to	which	certain	individuals	
own	and	reap	the	benefit.	Bruyas	(2006)	observes	that	customary	law	is	more	adaptable	to	the	
context	in	Somaliland	than	the	other	two	forms,	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	administration	
of	common	properties	such	as	grazing,	water	and	pasture.	The	advantages	of	customary	laws	
include	 that	 they	 are	 cheaper	 and	 less	 time	 demanding	 as	 customary	 decisions	 are	 reached	
within	a	reasonable	timeframe	(APD,	2008).		
The	 mediation	 process	 of	 customary	 laws	 focusses	 mainly	 on	 bringing	 about	 a	 solution	 to	
problems	rather	than	deciding	on	who	is	right	or	wrong	in	a	dispute.	Critics,	however,	argue	that	
mediation	 teams	are	not	neutral	as	 they	are	drawn	 from	the	disputing	parties.137	Moreover,	
further	criticism	is	directed	at	the	fact	that	customary	laws	can	be	reactive	rather	than	proactive.	
Even	 though	 customary	 laws	 are	 highly	 effective	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 conflict	 resolution	 and	
particularly	land	conflicts,	they	have	some	well-documented	weaknesses	(Hashi,	2005,	Hoehne,	
2011).	For	instance,	the	process	lacks	uniformity	in	the	sense	that	different	territories	may	have	
different	precedents.	This	lack	of	uniformity	makes	inter	clan	conflicts	likely.	Another	weakness	
is	the	fact	that	the	traditional	mechanism	prioritises	the	wellbeing	of	the	clan	over	the	right	of	
the	individual.	Despite	these	weaknesses,	customary	laws	remain	the	favourite	choice	for	land	
conflict	resolution	(OCVP,	2014)	mainly	for	their	simplicity	and	familiarity.	In	a	conflict	mediated	
by	customary	law,	close	family	members	of	the	conflicting	parties	are	involved	in	the	mediation	
process,	guaranteeing	the	voluntary	implementation	of	decisions.	The	process	is	also	relatively	
straightforward	 (Bruyas,	 2006).	 Firstly,	 a	 committee	 comprising	 both	 sides	 is	 put	 together.	
Secondly,	the	defendant	and	the	plaintiffs	are	summoned	to	accept	decisions,	as	a	prerequisite	
for	the	case	to	commence.	Thirdly,	the	committee	members	swear	that	they	will	be	impartial.	
Fourthly,	the	plaintiff	is	requested	to	produce	witnesses	for	his/her	claim.	Fifthly,	the	defendant	
is	 given	 an	 opportunity	 to	 accept	 or	 contest	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 claims	 submitted	 by	 the	
plaintiff	and	is	asked	to	present	evidence	for	his/her	objection.	Sixthly,	the	defendant	is	asked	
to	 swear	 in	 the	 name	 of	 God	 that	 the	 property	 belongs	 to	 him/her	 and	 that	 the	 plaintiff’s	
submissions	are	untrue.	Seventhly,	the	committee	decides	on	ownership	of	the	particular	piece	
of	land.	The	last	part	of	the	process	involves	a	harmonisation	process	where	certain	steps	are	
taken	to	normalise	relationship	i.e.	gifts	(APD,	2008).		
																																								 																				
137	Interviewee	4	August	16,	2014.	Lawyer	.	
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Islamic	 law	 in	 relation	 to	 land	does	not	 just	 sit	 alongside	 statutory	 and	 customary	 laws	 as	 a	
separate	 corpus	 of	 rules,	 but138	 is	 also	 a	 significant	 source	 for	 	 the	 two	other	 forms	of	 laws	
governing	urban	land	management	(Bruyas,	2006).	Indeed,	the	constitution	acknowledges	the	
role	of	Islam	in	the	formulation	of	statutory	law.	But	when	it	comes	to	application,	Islamic	law	is	
often	limited,	in	relation	to	land,	to	the	mediation	of	inheritance	related	cases.	Nonetheless,	the	
sharia	courts	enjoy	higher	legitimacy	than	the	other	forms	of	mediation	partly	due	to	the	fact	
that	Islam	is	highly	regarded	as	a	religion	among	Somalis.	According	to	a	religious	leader:	
The	 Islamic	 law	enjoys	overwhelming	 support	 from	 the	public.	 The	 reason	
why	they	enjoy	this	support	is	because	people	respect	religion.	Somalis	do	not	
show	the	same	level	of	resistance	to	the	Islamic	laws	as	the	formal	statutory	
laws.	Those	who	are	against	the	imposition	of	severe	sharia	punishments	do	
not	normally	state	their	 intention	straightforward.	They	often	say	sharia	is	
applied	 without	 sufficient	 evidence.	 The	 reason	 for	 which	 this	 diplomatic	
framing	of	the	situation	is	necessary	is	because	of	the	fact	that	it	is	generally	
unacceptable	 among	 the	 public	 to	 oppose	 Islamic	 sharia	 for	 religious	
reasons.139	
Like	 the	 customary	 institutions,	 the	 Islamic	 court	 places	 emphasis	 on	 harmonising	 the	
relationship	between	the	plaintiff	and	the	defendant	and	they	do	so	by	firstly	reminding	both	
sides	of	the	sanctity	of	the	sharia	laws.	A	defining	feature	of	the	sharia	court	is	the	fact	that	the	
conflicting	 parties	 come	 to	 the	 court	 willingly	 and	 in	 most	 cases	 decisions	 are	 abided	 by	
voluntarily.	Unlike	the	customary	institutions,	the	sharia	courts	follow	a	procedure	where	the	
representatives	of	the	conflicting	parties	are	not	part	of	the	panel	that	decides	on	the	cases.	The	
process	in	sharia	law	is	that	both	parties	are	listened	to	by	a	panel	of	expert	clerics	who	review	
the	facts	and	consult	the	relevant	sharia	sources	to	make	a	judgment.	If	the	defendant	contests	
the	validity	of	the	facts	presented	by	the	plaintiff,	the	court	asks	the	defendant	to	produce	a	
																																								 																				
138	The	sharia	law	categorizes	land	into	seven	discrete	areas:	clearing	a	vacant	land,	receiving	land	as	a	
grant,	 leasing	a	 land	 from	the	state,	 charitable	 land,	 reserved	 land	 for	a	defined	purpose,	“unviolated	
zones	of	land	and	the	office	of	public	inspection”	(APD,	2008).	
139	Interviewee	21	August	15,	2014.	Religious	Leader.	
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witness140	or	swear	in	the	name	of	God	that	the	property	belongs	to	him	or	her.	The	conflicting	
parties	 in	 sharia	 courts	 are	 not	 often	 represented	 by	 lawyers.	 Religious	 leaders	 “who	
participated	in	FGDs	explained	that	the	Sulxi141	mediation	process	[requires]	each	party	in	the	
dispute	[to	bring]	two	male	witnesses	or	if	two	males	are	unavailable	one	male	and	two	female	
witnesses”	(OCVP,	2014).	The	lower	status	women	hold	as	witnesses	suggests	the	”possibility	of	
bias	against	females	in	this	mediation	process”(DS,	2008).	The	study	notes	that	the	Islamic	sharia	
also	has	a	number	of	issues	which	do	not	conform	to	internationally	sanctioned	human	rights	
laws	particularly	concerning	women	as	Islamic	sharia	is	perceived	to	have	differential	treatments	
for	men	and	women	not	only	in	testimonies	but	more	importantly	inheritance.	
The	statutory	laws,	on	the	other	hand,	are	less	flexible	and	mainly	rely	on	pre-conflict	laws	dating	
from	before	the	civil	war	(DS,	2008).	In	the	statutory	system,	the	focus	is	placed	on	reaching	a	
decision	on	 the	basis	 of	 the	 legal	mechanism	available	 to	 the	 judges.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 land	
disputes,	more	often	than	not	decisions	become	unsatisfactory	for	one	of	the	parties	and	this	
jeopardises	 the	 process,	 leading	 in	 many	 cases	 to	 violence	 among	 the	 competing	 parties.	
Moreover,	the	statutory	laws	are	mainly	weak	because	of	the	fact	that	the	institutions	that	were	
supposed	to	produce	laws	are	either	malfunctioning	or	do	not	have	the	capacity	to	do	so	(DS,	
2008).	They	also	suffer	from	a	lack	of	legitimacy	among	the	public	and	they	are	also	inaccessible.	
In	 addition,	 the	 legal	 codes	 and	 complex	 terminology	 used	 in	 the	 statutory	 system	 are	 not	
commonly	understood	by	the	public,	 resulting	 in	apprehension	and	 lack	of	confidence	 in	 the	
judiciary	system.	Moreover,	the	statutory	courts	are	accused	of	being	very	corrupt	in	addition	
to	 being	 time-consuming,	 a	 luxury	 which	 the	 poor	 cannot	 afford	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 a	 key	
informant	interview:	
Poor	people	can’t	afford	to	commute	and	come	back	so	many	times	to	the	
courts.	They	can’t	either	afford	to	pay	for	the	case	adjudication	fee	let	alone	
lawyers.	The	situation	is	even	worse	for	internally	displaced	people	who	are	
																																								 																				
140	 One	 of	 the	 distinctive	 features	 of	 the	 sharia	 law	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 testimonies	 of	male	 and	 female	
witnesses	do	not	weigh	the	same.	While	one	male	witnesses	can	testify	for	a	case,	this	is	not	the	case	for	
females	as	two	female	witnesses	weight	the	same	as	one	male	testimony.	
141	This	is	a	reconciliatory	mediation	where	the	focus	is	placed	at	bridging	the	gap	between	the	sides	by	
seeking	voluntary	compromises.	
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forced	to	seek	help	from	the	statutory	system	as	the	customary	 law	might	
not	be	very	useful	to	them.142	
In	 the	customary	system,	conflicting	parties	are	 represented	by	people	 from	their	 respective	
clans	 and	 the	 process	 has	 some	 degree	 of	 security	 built	 into	 it	 where	 mediators	 consider	
repercussions	that	could	result	from	neglecting	the	interest	of	one	of	the	parties.	Since	internally	
displaced	 people	 do	 not	 belong	 to	 dominant	 clans	 with	 political	 clout	 in	 the	 city,	 they	 are	
marginalised	by	the	customary	institutions.	The	same	is	the	case	for	the	minority	groups.	
Generally,	 judicial	 proceedings	 rely	 heavily	 on	 testimonies	 (as	will	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 court	 case	
discussed	in	detail)	and	it	is	difficult	for	the	poor	to	bring	witnesses	to	court	as	witnesses	usually	
do	not	come	to	the	courts	unless	they	are	paid.	Similarly,	it	is	difficult	for	the	poor	to	gather	the	
documentary	evidence	 required	 for	 filing	 cases	as	 they	are	unable	 to	mobilise	 the	 resources	
necessary	for	undertaking	this	exercise.	As	most	people	in	the	country	are	not	familiar	with	laws	
as	well	as	the	complex	codes	and	terminologies	used	in	courts,	legal	representation	is	essential	
for	winning	cases	but	this	is	beyond	the	reach	of	the	poor	in	the	city.	There	is	also	very	little	help	
available	from	NGOs.	The	Legal	Aid	Clinic,	which	is	a	project	based	in	the	Faculty	of	Law	at	the	
University	of	Hargeisa	and	funded	by	the	UNDP,	 is	one	of	the	few	organisations	that	provide	
help	in	access	to	services	for	the	poor.	It	helps	those	who	cannot	afford	lawyers	with	basic	legal	
representation,	but	due	to	the	limited	resources	available,	the	stringency	of	their	vetting	may	
discourage	many	people	from	seeking	their	help.143	The	clinic	liaises	with	the	courts	and	in	some	
instances	may	obtain	a	waiver	for	court	fees.	One	of	the	 lawyers	working	with	the	clinic	said	
that:		
in	 some	 cases,	 we	 ask	 the	 court	 to	 consider	 cases	 from	 these	 people	
differently	as	they	may	not	be	able	to	afford	the	financial	requirements	for	
																																								 																				
142	Interviewee	21	August	15,	2014.	Religious	Leader.	
143	The	need	of	the	person	to	get	access	to	their	services	is	that	they	ask	them	to	bring	people	who	know	
them	and	who	can	vouch	for	them.	The	centre	only	takes	the	case	of	one	side	and	ask	the	other	side	to	
seek	 a	 different	 avenue	 for	 their	 representation.	 the	 legal	 aid	 clinic	 takes	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 cases	
determined	on	assessment	for	their	need.	
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filing	a	case.	 In	some	cases	the	court's	accept	our	plea	and	allow	the	poor	
people	file	cases.144	
Difficulty	in	access	to	justice	is	also	gendered	as	the	way	men	and	women	access	legal	services	
are	different	in	a	number	of	ways.	For	instance,	interviewees	who	is	a	prosecutor	pointed	out	
that:	
	men	are	often	prepared	 to	pay	 corrupt	officials	or	at	 least	 seem	 to	know	
exactly	how	to	go	about	it	whereas	woman	suffer	because	there	might	be	a	
perception	 among	 the	 officials	 that	 women	 either	 pay	 little	 or	 not	 at	 all	
therefore	they	might	be	subjected	to	more	bureaucracies	than	the	men.145	
Women’s	 ability	 to	 access	 justice	 services	 is	 also	 inhibited	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 judicial	
environment	is	also	gendered	as	most	of	the	staff	working	in	the	justice	system	are	men	who:		
show	 very	 little	 empathy	 for	women	 in	 courts.	We	 are	 the	 first	 cohort	 of	
women	public	prosecutors	in	the	justice	system.	So,	the	problem	is	woman	
are	marginalised	in	the	justice	system	and	this	affects	the	way	in	which	justice	
is	delivered.	Now	we	are	only	six	women	prosecutors	and	there	is	no	single	
female	judge	in	the	city.146	
These	difficulties	in	access	to	justice	reinforce	the	habit	of	bypassing	the	due	process	as	people	
pursue	other	means	of	accessing	services	i.e.	social	networking	where	one	may	seek	the	help	of	
a	member	of	his/her	clan.	Aside	from	clan	relations,	access	to	services,	are	also	determined	by	
who	you	know.	For	instance,		
																																								 																				
144	Interviewee	36	August	20,	2014.	Director	of	Civil	Unit	-	Legal	Aid	Clinic.	
145	Interviewee	19	September	04,	2014.	Prosecutor.	
146	Ibid.	
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in	every	Ministry,	there	are	some	junior	officers	who	are	powerful	and	have	
direct	access	to	the	higher-ranking	officials.	This	people	can	make	you	bypass	
any	formal	requirements	and	have	you	sorted	out.147	
The	 challenges	 in	 the	 judicial	 system	 can	 be	 situated	 in	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 state	 building	
processes	and	its	interface	with	legitimacy.	Some	suggest	that	the	justice	system	got	weaker	as	
the	state	became	more	stable,	gaining	increasing	power	and	economic	clout.148	In	the	beginning	
the	state	was	unable	to	influence	the	justice	system	because	it	did	not	have	full	financial	control	
over	the	affairs	of	the	judiciary	as	judges	operated	voluntarily	without	getting	paid	by	the	state.	
Evidence	for	the	independence	of	judges	from	the	state	is	sometimes	argued	to	reflect	the	fact	
that	 during	 the	 immediate	 post-war	 period,	 judicial	 decisions	were	 at	 times	made	 amid	 the	
presence	of	armed	groups	in	the	doorstop	of	the	justice	chambers.149	In	some	cases,	judges	had	
to	make	decisions	while	militias	supporting	the	plaintiff	and	defendants	respectively	threatened	
to	take	action	if	sentences	were	issued	against	their	person.	Yet	this	did	not	mean	that	judges	
were	 independent	of	 clans.	Quite	 the	opposite,	 as	 judges	may	have	been	dependent	on	 the	
political	clout	of	their	respective	clans	which	implicitly	or	explicitly	provided	them	with	a	degree	
of	protection	for	their	personal	safety	and	security.150		
The	 anomalies	 in	 the	 justice	 system	 attract	 a	 substantial	 level	 of	 criticism	 from	 the	 public.	
Various	state	led	attempts	to	respond	to	this	criticism	have	not	born	fruit.	In	some	instances,	
international	NGOs	have	provided	funding	for	reforms,	but	they	are	seldom	seen	as	a	positive	
influence,	as	spelt	out	by	an	interviewee	in	Hargeisa,	saying	that:	
what's	 this	 NGOs	 are	 doing	 is	 sneaking	 Western	 influence	 and	 blocking	
justice.	An	example	of	these	is	the	government's	inability	to	carry	out	capital	
punishment	sentences	because	of	interference	from	the	international	NGOs.	
This	negatively	affects	the	security	of	the	city.	There	was	a	case	in	which	a	
man	killed	another	man	from	his	clan	and	a	court	issued	a	death	sentence	for	
the	 perpetrator.	 However,	 the	 sentence	 has	 not	 been	 carried	 out	 due	 to	
																																								 																				
147	Interviewee	29	August	16,	2014.	NGO	Worker.	
148	Interviewee	23	August	14,	2014.	Solicitor	General	of	Somaliland.	
149	Ibid.	
150	Ibid.	
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interference	from	the	international	NGOs.	This	led	to	a	greater	instability	for	
which	the	government	was	unable	to	control	as	clans	nearly	clashed	over	the	
inability	of	the	government	to	carry	out	the	death	sentence.151	
For	most	critics,	neither	intervention	from	NGOs	nor	the	government	driven	attempts	have	so	
far	brought	about	a	significant	change	 in	 justice	delivery.	This	 lack	of	change	 is	attributed	 to	
either	 inability	or	 lack	of	commitment	 to	deal	with	 the	problem	effectively.	One	 interviewee	
sums	up	the	situation	saying	that	the	
lack	 of	 seriousness	 about	 the	 judicial	 reforms	 in	 the	 country	 can	 be	
exemplified	by	the	fact	that	the	government	did	not	build	a	single	court	room	
while	almost	every	Ministry	in	the	country	has	new	buildings.	The	High	Court	
is	housed	in	a	dilapidated	colonial	building.	This	shows	the	lack	of	a	political	
commitment	 to	 improve	 the	 judiciary	 infrastructure	 and	 system	 in	 the	
country.	 The	Ministry	 of	 Justice	 which	 is	 just	 an	 administrative	 executive	
branch	of	the	government	is	housed	in	a	decent	building	that	was	constructed	
recently	while	the	judges	in	the	High	Court	and	the	Supreme	Court	don't	have	
proper	chambers	to	work.	There	is	only	one	vehicle	for	the	High	Court	in	the	
country.	 The	 judge’s	mobility	 is	 limited	and	most	of	 the	 courts	don't	 have	
transport	of	their	own.152	
Moreover,	 the	 judicial	 system	 is	 politicised	 and	 subject	 to	 interference	 from	 the	 executive.	
Sensitive	cases	are	allocated	to	judges	who	may	steer	the	case	in	the	direction	the	state	wants.	
Such	interference	happens	in	a	systemic	way	where	the	chairman	of	the	judges	is	called	by	senior	
judges	 who	 order	 him	 to	 allocate	 certain	 cases	 to	 certain	 judges,	 often	 justifying	 their	
interference	on	a	pretext	that	the	case	is	too	complex	for	judge	A	or	B’s	ability	for	adjudication.	
This	is	a	lexicon	for	removing	cases	from	the	docket	of	reluctant	judges.	In	such	instances,	what	
happens	is	that	the:		
chairman	will	call	you	and	ask	you	to	do	something	about	a	particular	case	
as	he	received	a	call	from	the	upper	corridor	of	the	justice	system	hierarchy	
																																								 																				
151	Interviewee	33	May	30,	2015.	Divisional	Manager	of	a	Coorporate	Company.	
152	Interviewee	23	August	14,	2014.	Solicitor	General	of	Somaliland.	
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requesting	that	a	ruling	should	be	made	in	a	particular	way.	This	causes	fears	
among	the	sitting	 judges	and	they	have	to	abide	by	such	request	made	to	
them	through	their	bosses.153	
According	to	key	informant	 interviews	and	group	discussions,	 in	the	case	where	some	judges	
refuse	to	abide	by	the	orders	from	above,	they	are	either	subject	to	harassment	or	removed	
from	office.	It	is	important	to	mention	that	the	judges	do	not	have	entitlements	after	they	leave	
or	are	suspended	from	their	job.	For	this	reason,	the	judges	mostly	concentrate	their	energy	and	
effort	 in	 enriching	 themselves	 and	 protecting	 their	 jobs	 by	 not	 going	 against	 the	will	 of	 the	
executive.	Judges	also	avoid	becoming	jobless	in	the	streets	for	security	reasons,	as	they	may	
have	 passed	 judgments	 with	 which	 many	 people	 may	 have	 not	 been	 happy,	 making	 them	
vulnerable	to	a	revenge	attack	particularly	when	their	protection	is	no	longer	guaranteed	by	the	
state.	Promotions	are	also	made	according	to	the	level	of	obedience	displayed	by	sitting	judges.	
Furthermore,	judges	are	not	appointed	on	the	basis	of	their	competence	for	the	job	but	they	
are	rather	selected	on	the	basis	of	who	they	know	and	to	a	lesser	degree	clan	representation.	
While	high	court	 judges	are	directly	appointed	by	the	President	and	the	prerogative	of	 firing	
them	remains	with	him,	regional	and	district	judges	are	hired	or	fired	by	the	chief	justice	who	is	
also	a	presidential	nominee	approved	by	parliament.	The	chief	justice	heads	the	dysfunctional	
Justice	Commission	used	mainly	for	disciplining	dissenting	judges.	The	Commission	consists	of	
10	people	most	of	whom	hold	key	national	positions	i.e.	the	Chief	Justice,	Attorney	General,	two	
senior	 judges,	 Director	 General	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Justice	 and	 the	 Director-General	 of	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Labour.	 The	 other	 four	 are	 appointed	 by	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 chambers	 of	
Parliament.	 The	 role	 of	 the	 Justice	 Commission	 includes	 improving	 the	 justice	 system	 and	
removing	 and	 transferring	 judges154	 but	 a	 number	 of	 people	 from	 the	 legal	 community	 in	
Hargeisa	told	me	that	the	Commission	is	used	to	manipulate	the	justice	system	as:		
all	those	who	are	represented	in	the	Commission	have	somehow	power	over	
the	 delivery	 of	 the	 justice	 services.	 For	 instance,	 if	 you	 clash	 with	 the	
prosecutors,	 what	 happens	 is	 that	 you	 are	 summoned	 by	 the	 Justice	
Commission	and	you	will	be	suspended	from	the	job.	This	is	so	due	to	the	fact	
																																								 																				
153	Interviewee	38	August	08,	2014.	District	Court	Judge.	
154	 The	 quorum	 is	 usually	 five	 and	 agenda	 is	 proposed	 by	 the	 chief	 justice.	 The	 chief	 justice	 is	 not	
independent	for	his	job	as	he	is	indirectly	controlled	by	the	executive	through	the	Parliament.	
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that	the	prosecution	is	represented	in	the	Justice	Commission	and	they	have	
an	influence	in	who	gets	hired	or	suspended.	This	interferes	with	the	delivery	
of	justice	in	the	courts	and	it	makes	the	job	of	the	judges	difficult	to	perform.	
In	addition	to	these,	there	is	no	mechanism	to	complain	against	the	Justice	
Commission	 and	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Justice	 Commission	 himself	 is	 subject	 to	
political	interference.155	
The	other	form	of	interference	is	that	which	comes	from	clans.	Clan	pressure	can	be	interpreted	
as	a	response	to	the	poor	performance	of	 the	 judiciary	system	 in	the	country.	 In	such	cases,	
people	explore	the	relational	web	of	the	clan	and	try	to	find	somebody	who	is	related	to	the	
judge.	The	practice	is	usually	that:		
you	would	 be	 visited	 privately	 and	 told	 about	 some	 sort	 of	 injustice	 been	
committed	against	the	person	seeking	the	help.	In	that	case	members	of	the	
clan	would	expect	you	to	intervene	and	do	something	about	it	believing	that	
the	case	of	their	member	is	just	one.	Corrupt	judges	help	their	kinsmen	in	any	
available	 way	 but	 those	 who	 resist	 the	 clan	 pressure	 face	 some	 sort	 of	
labelling	in	their	community.156	
Interference	 in	 the	 formal	 judicial	 system	contributes	 to	 the	negative	popular	 conception	of	
state	institutions	not	least	because	such	interference	does	not	exist	in	the	traditional	mechanism	
of	solving	land	conflicts.	Customary	institutions	have	proven	to	be	more	effective	in	resolving	
issues	of	this	kind	because	they	are	highly	accessible	to	the	vast	majority	of	the	public	and	are	
also	 cheaper.	While	 customary	 institutions	 have	 provided	 people	with	 an	 alternative	means	
through	which	 they	 could	manage	 land	 issues,	 it	 has	on	 the	other	hand	 significantly	 eroded	
public	confidence	in	the	statutory	laws.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	clan	mechanisms	of	resolving	
land	conflicts	are	a	fall-back	due	to	the	absence	of	properly	functioning	state	institutions	to	deal	
with	the	problems	of	land,	but	rather	to	acknowledge	the	outperformance	of	one	system	over	
																																								 																				
155	Interviewee	32	August	03,	2014.	Ministry	of	Public	Works	Official.	
156	Interviewee	38	August	08,	2014.	District	Court	Judge.	
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another	 in	 a	 customary	 legal	 environment	 characterised	 by	 multiplicity	 of	 institutions,	
competition	and	coexistence.		
The	above	 challenges	 in	 the	 judicial	 system	emasculates	 state	 legitimacy,	which	was	already	
suffering	from	a	long	history	of	strained	relations,	mistrust	and	negative	perception	among	the	
populace.	While	the	plural	nature	of	the	justice	system	in	Somaliland	helps	the	state	dispense	
services	it	does	not	or	cannot	provide	formally,	the	flipside	of	this	is	the	challenge	presented	by	
the	coexistence	of	the	various	justice	dispensations.	The	manner	in	which	the	complementarity,	
contradiction,	competition,	and	coexistence	of	 this	plural	 justice	 is	managed	to	some	degree	
undermines	the	 legitimacy	of	 the	state.	According	to	 (Lund,	1997,	p.	100),	 the	“legitimacy	of	
state	institutions	implies	a	recognition	and	thus	an	appreciation	of	them,	and	this	is	intimately	
linked	to	the	concepts	of	justice	and	propriety”.	Neither	appreciation	nor	recognition	of	a	sense	
of	justice	exists	among	the	public	in	Hargeisa.157	Such	overreliance	on	the	customary	institutions	
has	arguably	also	further	segmented	the	urban	population,	encouraging	them	to	reside	in	areas	
dominated	by	the	clans	from	which	they	hail.		
6.4 Towards	Specialised	Intervention:	Land	Commission			
Prior	to	2005,	land	conflicts	in	the	city	were	dealt	with	by	a	committee	within	the	municipality	
structure	and	appeals	were	handled	by	the	formal	courts	in	line	with	the	District	Administration	
Law	which	 empowered	 local	 authorities	 to	mediate	 land	 conflicts	 as	 a	matter	 of	 peace	 and	
conciliation	 (Republic	 of	 Somaliland,	 2002b).	 In	 2005,	 however,	 this	 was	 changed	 and	 land	
dispute	 adjudication	 was	 transferred	 to	 the	 formal	 courts	 (APD,	 2008).	 In	 2002,	 an	
administrative	Land	Commission	was	established	in	accordance	with	the	urban	land	law,	which	
was	amended	in	2008.	The	Commission	consists	of	seven	members	from	the	ministries	of	public	
works,	 interior,	 agriculture,	 religion,	 pastoral	 development	 and	 environment,	 and	 the	
municipality	of	Hargeisa.158	The	members	are	nominated	by	their	respective	institutions	and	are	
then	officially	appointed	by	the	Minister	of	Interior.	The	committee	sits	in	Hargeisa	municipality	
																																								 																				
157	Participant	in	Hadhwanaag	Teashop	Discussion	September	19,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident,	Participant	in	
Kaah	Restaurant/Tea	Discussion	August	07,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident,	Participant	in	Maansoor	Hotel/Tea	
Discussion	October	21,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
158	Members	of	the	Commission	are	legally	free	from	the	ministries	that	nominated	them	and	cannot	be	
assigned	with	other	duties	other	than	the	land	adjudication	work	they	are	engaged.	Equally,	the	ministries	
cannot	 change	 a	 member	 and	 replace	 him	 with	 someone	 less	 the	 he	 is	 legally	 discharged	 from	 the	
Commission.	
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premises	and	the	representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	chairs	the	Commission	because	
his	Ministry	is	the	line	Ministry	for	urban	land	management	in	the	country.		
While	the	Commission	is	empowered	to	mediate	land	conflicts	in	urban	places	in	a	variety	of	
contexts,	 there	 are	 limitations	 on	 their	 jurisdiction.	 For	 instance,	 the	 commission	 cannot	
adjudicate	 land	 conflicts	 in	 which	 a	 court’s	 decision	 has	 already	 been	made,	 where	 land	 is	
located	in	an	area	beyond	the	urban	master	plan,		pastoral	land	in	rural	areas,	public	land,	and	
land	disputes	where	a	criminal	offence	 is	committed	and	 is	under	trial	 in	a	court	of	 law.	 It	 is	
important	to	point	out,	however,	that	the	data	collected	from	the	Commission	for	this	thesis,	
shows	that	 in	practice	the	Commission	adjudicated	land	outside	their	 jurisdiction:	nearly	two	
percent	of	the	land	adjudicated	by	the	Commission	falls	outside	the	city	where	the	Commission	
is	not	legally	allowed	to	mediate	and	is	home	to	minority	groups	who	might	have	been	subjected	
to	more	land	disputes	than	any	other	area	in	the	city	(See	figure	2).	
In	some	cases,	the	Commission	adjudicates	conflicts	where	the	local	government	is	party	to	the	
dispute	–	i.e.		if	people	who	own	land	in	peri-urban	areas	refuse	to	give	the	30%	of	their	land	
required	for	public	service	to	the	local	government.	The	Commission	also	adjudicates	cases	in	
which	local	government	submits	an	application	for	the	reacquisition	of	land	whose	owners	failed	
to	build	or	pay	taxes.	In	such	cases,	if	convicted,	the	Commission	orders	land	owners	to	give	part	
of	their	land	equivalent	to	the	tax	owed	to	the	local	council.	Moreover,	wherever	there	is	a	case	
where	 both	 parties	 lay	 claim	 to	 	 vacant	 land	 where	 the	 Commission	 is	 not	 convinced	 that	
ownership	 of	 the	 land	 is	 for	 neither	 parties,	 the	 Commission	 recognises	 such	 land	 as	 public	
land159	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2013).	This	kind	of	ruling	is	rare,	but	when	it	happens,	it	often	
leads	to	greater	security	problems	as	such	decisions	are	violently	contested.		
While	it	is	difficult	to	gauge	the	effectiveness	of	the	formation	of	the	Commission	in	reducing	
occurrence	of	land	conflicts	in	the	country,	security	and	administrative	officials	in	Hargeisa	claim	
that	 land	 conflicts	 have	 been	 reduced	 over	 the	 last	 five	 years.160	 Should	 this	 be	 the	 case,	 a	
number	of	factors	might	have	led	to	this	decrease	besides	the	establishment	of	the	Commission.	
One	of	these	factors	is	that	land	transactions	involve	greater	risk	mitigation	processes	such	as	
the	verification	of	ownership	and	assessment	of	potential	risk	of	disputes	arising	after	the	sale.	
																																								 																				
159	The	Commission	gives	a	copy	of	the	decision	to	the	executive	officer	of	the	local	authority	and	they	will	
also	give	a	copy	to	the	Minister	of	Public	Works	in	order	to	register	the	land	for	government	ownership.	
160	Interviewee	66	August	10,	2014.	Police	Station	Commander.	
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Similarly,	 public	 land	 available	 in	 the	 urban	 periphery	 has	 decreased	 as	 the	 city	 is	 currently	
expanding	 to	 farms	 previously	 owned	 by	 people	 who	 hold	 formal	 title	 deeds.	 Yet	 the	
government	 proudly	 relates	 the	 decrease	 of	 land	 conflicts	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Land	
Commission.	While	this	claim	cannot	be	ruled	out	altogether,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	
the	land	conflict	records	in	the	land	registry	(where	all	land	related	cases	are	recorded)	suggest	
that	the	cases	of	land	conflict	submitted	to	the	Land	Commission	have	been	steadily	on	the	rise	
for	the	last	five	years	(See	Figure	1).		
Figure	3:	The	annual	Distribution	of	Cases	handled	by	the	Land	Commissions,	2009-13		
	
Source:	data	for	this	figure	are	obtained	from	the	land	conflcits	registry	at	the	Land	Commission’s	offices	in	Hargeisa.	
Between	 2009	 and	 2013,	 the	 Commission	 handled	 323	 cases.	 Only	 20	 of	 these	 cases	 were	
handled	in	the	first	year,	2009.	This	number	almost	doubled	in	the	following	year.	Similarly,	2011	
and	 2012	 have	 also	 seen	 a	 sharp	 increase	 as	 the	 Commission	 handled	 74	 and	 86	 cases	
respectively.	In	2013,	the	number	of	cases	handled	by	the	Commission	reached	a	record	of	104.	
As	apparent	from	this	data,	the	cases	submitted	to	the	Commission	were	rising	exponentially.	
The	reason	why	there	was	substantial	 increase	year	by	year	might	relate	to	the	fact	that	the	
Commission	was	not	in	the	beginning	familiar	or	popular	among	the	public	but	as	people	became	
aware	of	 its	existence,	more	cases	were	submitted	for	adjudication.	The	counterargument	to	
this	position	is,	however,	that	cases	were	referred	from	the	courts	to	the	Commission	from	the	
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beginning	 and	 therefore	 awareness	 existed	 among	 those	 interested	 in	 getting	 their	 dispute	
resolved	through	at	least	the	statutory	system.161		
Figure	4:	The	Spatial	Distribution	of	Land	Disputes	Handled	by	the	Land	Commissions,	2009-13	
	
Source:	data	for	this	figure	are	obtained	from	the	land	conflcits	registry	at	the	Land	Commission’s	offices	in	Hargeisa.	
The	land	registry	also	shows	some	discrepancies	in	the	spatial	distribution	of	 land	conflicts	 in	
the	city	(see	figure	2).	According	to	this	data,	Ibrahim	Koodbuur	and	Ga’an	Libaax	had	the	highest	
number	of	 land	conflicts	as	the	two	neighbourhoods	accounted	for	29	and	27	percent	of	the	
total	number	of	cases	submitted	to	the	Commission.	A	number	of	factors	could	help	explain	why	
these	two	neighbourhoods	have	a	greater	number	of	land	disputes	than	other	areas	in	the	city.	
Notwithstanding	their	peculiarities,	one	common	element	between	these	two	neighbourhoods	
is	that	both	areas	are	perceived	to	be	relatively	more	strategic	and	have	higher	land	values	than	
most	other	parts	of	the	city.	For	instance,	Ibrahim	Koodbuur	had	traditionally	better	access	to	
																																								 																				
161	Participant	in	Commercial	Bank	Teashop	Discussion	July	01,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
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water162	 and	 as	 a	 result	 land	 in	 this	 area	 remains	 expensive.	 Equally,	 it	 had	 significant	 state	
properties	 and	 the	 elites	 of	 the	 previous	 government	 were	 mainly	 housed	 in	 this	
neighbourhood.	 At	 present,	 a	 number	 of	 international	 NGOs	 have	 their	 bases	 in	 this	
neighbourhood.	On	the	other	hand,	Ga’an	Libaax	is	within	very	close	proximity	of	the	city	centre	
and	 it	 is	 also	 increasingly	 expanding	 into	 peri-urban	 areas,	 which	 in	 the	 past	 were	 mainly	
mountainous	public	land	in	a	highly	strategic	direction	of	the	city	i.e.	the	road	to	the	important	
national	port	of	Berbera	which	runs	through	this	neighbourhood,	making	land	in	this	area	more	
valuable	than	many	other	parts	of	the	city.		
Land	 disputes	 are	 some	 of	 the	 most	 pressing	 urban	 issues	 that	 the	 post-conflict	 state	 in	
Somaliland	faces.	Urban	authorities	across	the	country	are	confronted	with	serious	land	issues	
ranging	 from	 the	 inadequate	 	 land	 registry	 to	 encroachment	 of	 public	 space	 and	 illegal	
appropriation	 of	 peri-urban	 land	 (King	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 The	 vast	majority	 of	 these	 conflicts	 are	
resolved	 through	 customary	 laws	 as	 indicated	 by	 a	 survey	 conducted	by	 the	Observatory	 of	
Conflict	and	Violence	Prevention,	which	found	that	44%	of	respondents	prefer	resolving	their	
land	disputes	through	customary	institutions	(OCVP,	2014).	But	a	significant	proportion	of	the	
conflicts	are	also	adjudicated	by	the	Land	Commission	which	employs	formal	processes	detailed	
in	government	published	guidelines.		
The	Commission	decides	how	to	handle	cases	based	on	a	 judgement	of	 their	magnitude	and	
complexity.	Non-complex	cases	are	handled	in	a	different	way	involving	few	procedural	steps.	
In	these	cases,	the	Commission	makes	quick	rulings	mainly	based	on	expert	opinion.	Equally,	
Land	Commissioners	request	evidence	of	ownership	from	the	municipality	in	order	to	speed	up	
rulings.	 Provision	 of	 evidence	 is	 governed	 by	 Islamic	 law	 and	 the	 other	 administrative	 laws	
regarding	 land	 management.	 Acceptable	 evidence	 includes	 documentations	 issued	 by	 the	
relevant	authorities,163	testimonies	of	long-time	residents,164	oath,	and	visible	investment	such	
																																								 																				
162	Access	to	water	is	one	of	the	key	factors	that	people	consider	when	buying	land.		
163	Previous	government	issued	documents	have	significant	weight	if	they	cannot	be	proven	to	have	been	
gained	through	corruption.	Equally	documents	will	have	significant	weight	if	a	provable	ownership	did	not	
precede	the	issuance	of	such	documents,	or	if	the	document	is	not	issued	during	the	time	of	the	conflict,	
that	the	document	was	not	 issued	illegally,	and	that	there	has	not	been	visible	 investment	by	another	
party	on	the	disputed	piece	of	land	prior	to	the	conflict.	
164	 Testimonies	 are	 considered	 as	 crucial	 evidence	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Islamic	 law	 when	 proving	 on	 or	
disproving	ownership	of	land.	
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as	 building	 and	 erection	 of	 foundation	 or	 fences.165	 The	 Commission	 makes	 the	 decisions	
through	simple	majority	vote	and	also	gives	the	ruling	in	a	written	form.	The	chairman	of	the	
Commission	communicates	the	decision	to	the	regional	court,	which	has	the	responsibility	of	
enforcing	the	Commission’s	decisions,	within	a	month.		
In	more	complex	cases,	the	chairman	appoints	an	adjudication	committee	consisting	of	three,	
five	or	seven	members	 for	each	case	submitted	to	the	Commission.166	 In	the	first	sitting,	 the	
committee	 sorts	 out	 procedural	 issues,	 i.e.	 both	 sides	 are	 represented	 in	 the	 hearing	 and	
ensuring	 that	 lawyers	 of	 both	 sides	 have	 had	 the	 opportunity	 of	 speaking	 to	 the	 sides	 they	
represent.	This	 is	 followed	by	the	formation	of	a	committee	and	a	visit	 is	paid	to	the	 land	 in	
question	so	as	to	enable	the	committee	to	assess	the	situation	on	the	ground.	The	committee	is	
empowered	to	enlist	expert	opinion.	In	the	initial	stages,	the	committee	often	enquires	about	
the	possibility	of	out	of	court	settlement	drawing	on	a	number	of	options	such	as	that	parties	
resolve	 their	 issues	 by	 1)	 agreeing	 within	 themselves	 through	 negotiation,	 2)	 nominating	 a	
mediation	 team	 consisting	 of	 their	 representatives	 and	 overseen	 by	 a	 member	 of	 the	
Commission,	and	3)	seeking	the	mediation	of	elders.		
Should	the	parties	agree	to	this	out	of	court	settlement	option,	the	Land	Commission	authorises	
the	commencement	of	the	procedures	and	issues	a	decision	supporting	the	resolution	of	the	
case.	If	the	mediation	fails,	a	normal	hearing	of	the	case	commences.	While	the	trials	go	on,	it	is	
very	common	that	the	Commission	issues	restrictions	on	ongoing	construction	or	registration	of	
property.	The	imposition	of	such	restrictions	is	applied	for	by	one	of	the	sides.		If	the	Commission	
is	convinced	to	apply	the	restriction,	 it	asks	 for	the	person	who	submitted	the	application	to	
provide	a	guarantee	for	the	reimbursement	of	the	cost	incurred	as	a	result	of	the	restriction,	in	
case	he/she	loses	the	case.167		
To	understand	not	only	the	procedural	but	also	the	practical	adjudication	of	cases,	it	is	important	
to	review	one	of	the	cases	handled	by	the	Commission	in	detail.	The	case	discussed	below	has	
																																								 																				
165	Existence	of	structures	such	as	fence	or	foundation	can	be	considered	as	an	evidence	if	it	can	be	proved	
that	they	were	not	constituted	by	force,	grabbing	or	other	corrupted	means.	
166	 The	 number	 of	 the	 Commissioners	 for	 mediation	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 case	 to	 be	
mediated.	
167	 There	 are	 two	 forms	 of	 restrictions,	 one	 imposed	 on	 one-party	 or	 another	 imposed	 on	 all	 parties	
involved	in	the	dispute.	The	Commission	can	impose	restriction	on	an	ongoing	construction,	processing	
of	ownership	papers.	
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been	chosen	because	it	shows	the	dynamics	of	the	legal,	institutional	and	skill	gaps	in	resolving	
land	disputes	through	the	statutory	system.			
6.5 Land	Commission:	Adjudication	of	a	Selected	Case				
The	case	discussed	 in	 this	 section	pitted	Mahamed168	 (hereafter	 referred	as	plaintiff)	 against	
Marwo169	(defendant).	The	case	was	opened	for	adjudication	on	December	12,	2010	in	the	Land	
Commission.170	 The	 hearing	 panel	 consisted	 of	 five	 out	 of	 the	 seven	 members	 of	 the	
Commission.			
In	his	opening	remarks,	the	defendant’s	lawyer	contended	that	his	client	was	sold	a	plot	of	land	
by	the	defendant	on	December	19,	2003,	as	shown	in	a	notarised	sale	agreement.	The	lawyer	
argued	that	two	weeks	prior	to	the	date	the	case	was	brought	to	court,	the	defendant	destroyed	
concrete	 blocks,	 commonly	 erected	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 land	 ownership,	 on	 property	 owned	 by	 the	
plaintiff.	When	the	plaintiff	asked	the	defendants	why	they	did	so,	the	defendant	said	that	the	
land	was	purchased	from	them	below	the	market	price.	The	lawyer	argued	that	the	defendant	
sold	 the	 land	 to	 the	plaintiff,	and	her	 son	was	a	witness	 in	 the	notary.	The	 lawyer	 therefore	
requested	the	court	to	rule	the	land	belonged	to	his	client	and	order	the	defendant	to	pay	legal	
expenses.		
In	his	 counterargument,	 the	defendant’s	 lawyer	denied	 these	allegations.	The	 lawyer	argued	
that	his	client	did	not	sell	the	land	to	the	plaintiff	but	there	was	a	verbal	agreement	between	his	
client	 and	 the	 plaintiff.	 The	 agreement	 was	 that	 the	 plaintiff	 should	 help	 the	 defendant’s	
daughter	migrate	to	an	overseas	country.	The	plaintiff	was	also	supposed	to	register	the	land	
for	 the	 defendant,	 and	 contribute	 financially	 to	 the	 upbringing	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 orphan	
children.	In	return,	the	defendant	told	him	that	she	would	give	him	land,	without	specifying	any	
particular	size	of	this	land.	The	plaintiff	did	not	fulfil	the	terms	of	the	verbal	agreement.	He	did	
not	also	offer	her	any	financial	help	other	than	$100	dollars	and	another	$500	sent	through	a	
remittance	company.	The	lawyer	argued	that	when	his	client	was	collecting	the	money,	she	was	
																																								 																				
168	Pseudo	name.			
169	Pseudo	name.			
170	This	is	part	of	the	tribunal	data,	which	I	have	anonymised.	
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made	to	sign	a	paper	presumably	as	a	receipt	for	the	remittance.	The	same	paper	was	presented	
in	the	court	as	a	sale	agreement.	He	argued	that	it	is	impossible	to	suggest	that	200x150	of	land	
could	be	sold	for	$600	in	2003.	He	also	dismissed	the	notary,	as	the	area	was	not	even	at	the	
time	planned	for	residential	purposes.		
The	Hearing		
The	court	convened	four	sittings	on	this	case.	The	first	was	held	on	December	25,	2010.	The	
plaintiff’s	 lawyer	argued	that	the	reason	why	the	land	was	sold	cheaply	to	his	client	was	that	
there	was	no	high	demand	for	land	at	the	time.	He	also	argued	that	the	defendant	approached	
his	client,	who	is	from	the	same	clan	as	him,	and	begged	him	to	buy	the	land	from	her	as	she	
needed	 the	 money.	 Considering	 the	 kinship-based	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 families,	 the	
plaintiff	bought	 the	 land	 from	her	under	one	condition:	 that	 she	will	bring	a	guarantor.	As	a	
result,	she	brought	her	children’s	grandfather	who	has	since	passed	away.		
In	an	attempt	to	pre-empt	possible	questions	about	why	the	defendant	allowed	the	construction	
of	the	concrete	blocks	in	the	property	as	a	demarcation	for	ownership,	the	defendant’s	lawyer	
focused	his	counterargument	on	justifying	the	reason	why	his	client	accepted	the	demarcation	
in	the	first	place.	He	argued	that	as	an	old	person,	his	client	was	feeble	and	unable	to	verify	the	
facts	of	 the	matter.	 The	 lawyer	also	pointed	out	 that	 the	defendant’s	 son	 signed	 the	notary	
thinking	that	his	mother	was	sent	money	by	someone	overseas.	He	also	stated	that	her	son	at	
the	time	of	signing	the	letter	was	underage	and	did	not	know	what	was	going	on.	He	also	argued	
that	the	son	was	illiterate	and	could	not	know	the	content	of	the	latter,	as	he	signed	the	letter	
with	his	thumb.		
The	second	sitting	was	convened	on	December	26,	2010.	 In	 this	hearing,	 the	Commissioners	
were	taken	to	the	 land	 in	question,	 located	 in	G/Libah,	Warabe	Salan,	Aw	Adan.	The	 lawyers	
showed	the	Commissioners	around	the	property.	The	Commissioners	gave	instruction	for	the	
land	 to	 be	 measured,	 which	 was	 recorded	 as	 250x150m.	 They	 also	 identified	 the	 private	
properties	 and	 public	 spaces	 surrounding	 the	 land.	 The	 plaintiff’s	 lawyer	 also	 showed	 the	
Commissioners	concrete	blocks	with	some	scribbling	on	them,	and	an	earthwork	which	has	since	
been	 levelled.	 He	 argued	 that	 these	 concrete	 blocks	 belong	 to	 the	 plaintiff,	 and	 they	 are	
damaged	by	 the	 defendant	 and	 her	 family.	While	 on	 the	 site,	 the	 Commissioners	 asked	 the	
defendant	some	questions	in	the	presence	of	her	lawyer.	These	included		
Q:	Were	you	there	when	the	concrete	blocks	were	erected?	
A:	No	it	was	built	in	the	middle	of	the	night.		
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Q:	Did	your	sons	work	in	the	construction	and	earthwork?	
A:	No.		
Q:	What	is	your	relationship	with	the	plaintiff?		
A:	Nothing.		
Q:	Who	erected	the	concrete	blocks?	
A:	They	are	the	ones	who	constructed	and	came	with	soldiers	chasing	our	children	from	
the	areas.	
Q:	Who	are	‛they’?	
A:	The	plaintiff	and	his	family.		
Q:	Who	bulldozed	the	area	on	the	second	time?	
A:	My	children	did	so	when	we	did	not	see	anyone	coming	for	six	years?						
The	 last	 two	 sittings	were	dedicated	 to	hearing	 the	witnesses.	However,	 they	demonstrated	
serious	legal	incompetence	by	both	the	lawyers	and	the	judges.	This	is	because,	as	will	be	seen	
below,	the	witnesses	were	asked	very	mild	question	which	did	not	challenge	them	enough	to	
reveal	the	truth.	Very	few	background	checks,	if	any,	were	also	done	by	the	lawyers	to	scrutinize	
the	integrity	and	credibility	of	the	witnesses,	as	would	be	the	case	in	any	credible	legal	procedure	
of	this	nature.	The	third	sitting	occurred	on	January	4,	2011.	The	plaintiff’s	lawyer	produced	four	
witnesses	to	support	his	case.	The	first	witness	was	a	34-year-old	construction	worker	who	is	a	
resident	of	Hargeisa.	He	 said	 that	he	worked	on	 the	construction	 site	on	 the	date	when	 the	
concrete	blocks	were	erected,	and	there	was	no	land	dispute	at	the	time.	The	plaintiff	lawyer	
asked	him:		
Q:	There	were	soldiers	at	the	time?		
A:	No.		
Q:	Did	the	children	work	in	the	construction?		
A:	I	have	seen	one	of	her	children	at	the	construction	site.		
The	defendant's	lawyer	did	not	cross-examine	the	witness,	but	the	Commissioners	asked	him	
one	question:		
Q:	Who	was	supervising	them	at	the	time	of	the	construction?			
A:	A	foreman.		
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The	 second	 witness	 was	 a	 50-year-old	 builder.	 He	 said	 they	 were	 taken	 to	 the	 site	 by	 a	
construction	company	under	the	supervision	of	an	engineer	who	has	shown	them	the	site.	He	
said,	at	the	time	there	was	no	any	sign	of	land	dispute.	The	plaintiff	lawyer	asked	him:		
Q:	There	were	soldiers	in	the	site	at	the	time	of	the	construction?		
A:	No.		
Q:	Were	the	defendant’s	family	working	on	the	site?	
A:	Some	of	them	were	working	in	there,	one	is	in	court	now.		
The	defendant’s	lawyer	did	not	cross-examine	the	witness	again.	A	Commissioner	asked	him:		
Q:	How	many	days	there	were	working	in	there		
A:	One	day.		
The	third	witness	was	a	60-year-old	resident	 in	the	area.	She	said	she	was	a	make	shift	 food	
seller,	and	while	she	was	selling	her	food	on	the	construction	site,	she	did	not	see	any	problem.	
The	plaintiff’s	lawyer	asked	her	whether	the:	
Q:	family	who	sold	the	land	to	the	plaintiff	were	present	at	the	time	of	the	construction?		
A:	Yes	
Q:	Do	you	see	anyone	who	was	there	in	this	room?	
A:	Yes,	pointing	at	the	defendant’s	son,	he	was	thinner	at	the	time.		
The	Commission	also	asked	the	witness	some	questions:		
Q:	Where	were	the	family	who	sold	the	land	at	the	time	of	the	construction?	
A:	They	were	resident	in	a	nearby	place.		
Q:	Did	you	see	the	defendant	in	there?		
A:	I	was	there	twice,	and	I	have	seen	her.		
The	 fourth	witness	was	36-year-old	driver	who	said	they	went	there	at	6	 in	 the	morning.	He	
testified	that	there	was	no	land	depute	when	he	went	there	in	the	morning	of	the	construction.	
The	plaintiff’s	lawyer	asked	him	whether:		
Q:	There	were	soldiers	in	the	site	on	the	day	of	the	construction?		
A:	No.		
The	Commissioners	asked	him		
Q:	What	were	you	doing	on	the	site	on	that	day?	
149	|	P a g e 	
	
	
A:	I	was	driving	the	plaintiff	sisters	to	the	construction	site.		
Q:	Do	you	recognise	anyone	who	was	there	on	that	day?	
A:	He	pointed	to	the	defendant’s	son.		
The	 fourth	 sitting	 was	 held	 on	 December	 18,	 2011.	 The	 defendant’s	 lawyer	 produced	 two	
witnesses.	The	first	witness	was	a	55	years-old	neighbour	who	testified	that	the	plaintiff	and	the	
defendant	came	to	her	in	a	teashop.	She	said	to	him	that	she	wanted	to	give	land	to	this	man	
who	was	from	London.	They	went	to	the	farm	together,	and	she	pointed	at	the	Western	part	of	
the	farm,	saying	she	gave	it	to	him.	The	land	given	to	him	was	not	demarcated	at	the	time.	The	
plaintiff	gave	her	$200	and	sent	her	another	$400	later.	The	grandfather	of	her	children	was	the	
guarantor	who	said	they	would	be	responsible	for	any	problems.	The	notary	was	then	signed.	
The	plaintiff	erected	concrete	blocks	on	the	site	to	demarcate	ownership.	A	while	 later,	they	
came	to	know	that	the	concrete	blocks	were	destroyed.	The	plaintiff’s	family	went	to	the	witness	
and	gave	him	some	money	to	hire	a	bulldozer.	They	took	the	bulldozer	there	to	demarcate	the	
land	again,	but	 the	defendant’s	 sons	prevented	 them	 from	doing	 so.	 They	 then	went	 to	 the	
guarantor	and	asked	him	to	intervene,	and	he	told	them	to	go	with	police	officers.	When	they	
went	to	the	site	with	the	police,	there	was	no	one	there,	and	they	continued	their	work.	Despite	
all	this,	the	witness	testified	that	he	does	not	believe	that	the	land	was	sold	to	the	plaintiff.	He	
insisted	that	it	was	a	gift.	The	plaintiff’s	lawyer	cross-examined	the	witness	briefly.	He	asked		
Q:	Was	the	content	of	the	notary	of	which	you	were	a	signatory	read	to	you?	
A:	I	thought	they	were	God	fearing	people.		
Q:	Who	asked	you	to	bring	the	bulldozer?	
A:	The	relatives	of	the	plaintiff.		
The	defendants	lawyer	cross-examined	the	witness.	He	asked		
Q:	Were	you	taking	part	in	the	construction	activity?		
A:	Yes	
Q:	Did	you	see	the	children	of	the	defendant?		
A:	My	eyes	did	not	catch	them.		
Q:	Tell	us	how	much	land	was	demarcated	for	the	plaintiff?	
A:	The	lower	western	parts	of	the	farm.		
Q:	When	you	used	the	bulldozer,	what	was	guiding	you?		
A:	I	followed	previous	demarcations.		
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Q:	Did	the	plaintiff	buy	land	from	you?		
A:	Yes.		
Q:	What	was	the	size	of	the	land?		
A:	100x150.		
Q:	How	much	did	he	give	you?		
A:	$2500.		
Q:	Do	you	have	a	proof?		
A:	Yes.		
Q:	Are	you	one	of	the	signatories	in	the	notary?		
A:	Yes,	I	am,	but	it	was	a	gift,	not	a	sale.		
Q:	If	it	was	not	sale	why	did	the	guarantor	sign	it?		
A:	I	did	not	know,	I	signed	the	notary	later.		
The	 second	 witness	 was	 a	 35	 years-old	 builder.	 He	 told	 the	 court	 that	 they	 started	 the	
construction	 of	 the	 concrete	 blocks	 in	 the	 morning.	 At	 the	 time,	 there	 was	 no	 sign	 of	 the	
presence	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 family.	 But	 two	 guys	 came	 to	 the	 site	 when	 the	 construction	
workers	were	leaving.	He	said	that	he	overheard	them	saying	that	they	will	destroy	the	concrete	
blocks	if	their	dues	are	not	given.	The	Commissioners	asked	him	further	questions.		
Q:	Were	you	one	of	the	construction	workers?		
A:	Yes.	Did	you	see	the	defendant’s	family	in	there?		
Q:	No.		
The	plaintiff	lawyer	cross-examined	the	witness.	He	asked	him		
Q:	When	you	were	taking	part	in	construction,	did	you	see	soldiers?		
A:	No.		
Q:	Was	there	a	dispute	in	the	site?		
A:	No.		
Q:	Who	were	the	defendant’s	two	children?		
A:	Mohamed	and	Abdi.		
The	Commissioners	asked	the	witness:	
Q:	When	you	were	constructing	the	concrete	blocks	which	was	supervising	you?		
A:	An	engineer.		
Q:	Was	the	other	side,	defendant,	represented	in	the	demarcation	process?		
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A:	No		
The	Commission	asked	the	two	sides	to	present	their	concluding	remarks	on	December	23,	2011.	
The	plaintiff’s	lawyer	presented	his	concluding	remarks,	but	the	defendant’s	lawyer	did	not.				
The	Ruling		
Following	the	hearing	of	the	witnesses,	the	Commissioners	deliberated	their	ruling	on	December	
15,	2012.	They	stipulated	that	they	based	their	ruling	on	a	range	of	statutory	and	sharia	laws.	
They	pointed	out	 that,	 in	 line	with	Article	79	and	80	of	XHM,	the	Commission	compared	the	
evidence	presented	by	the	two	sides	in	the	form	of	witnesses	and	documents.	This	is	so	despite	
the	 fact	 the	only	written	document	 submitted	 to	 the	court	was	 the	notary	 sale’s	agreement	
disputed	by	the	defendants.	 	This	makes	the	witnesses	the	only	significant	evidence	for	both	
sides	 of	 the	 land	 dispute.	 In	 the	 ruling,	 the	 Commissioners	 also	 claim	 that	 upon	 a	 close	
examination	of	the	testimonials,	they	were	satisfied	with	the	accounts	provided	by	the	plaintiffs’	
four	witnesses.		
In	 summary,	 the	Commissioners	pointed	out	 in	 their	 ruling	 that	 the	 first	witness	who	was	 a	
construction	worker	testified	that	when	the	construction	started	there	was	no	land	dispute	or	
presence	of	police.	The	second	witness	testified	that	one	of	the	defendant’s	son	was	working	in	
the	construction	and	that	there	was	no	dispute	between	the	sides.	Similarly,	the	third	witness	
who	was	a	cook	for	the	construction	workers	reinforced	that	there	were	no	disputes	between	
the	 sides	 and	 the	 defendant’s	 children	 were	 on	 site	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 construction.	 The	
Commission	was	satisfied	with	these	testimonies.	
The	 defendant’s	 witnesses	 were	 two.	 The	 first	 witness	 testified	 that	 he	 accompanied	 the	
defendant	and	the	plaintiff	to	the	farm	at	the	time	of	the	exchange.	He	testified	that	he	was	also	
aware	of	the	payment,	and	he	was	a	signatory	in	the	notary.	The	only	difference	he	pointed	out	
was	 that	 the	 land	 was	 a	 gift	 and	 not	 sale.	 His	 testimony	 therefore	 does	 not	 support	 the	
defendant’s	 case	 in	 any	way.	 The	 second	witness	who	was	 construction	worker	did	not	 also	
testify	 in	a	way	that	supports	the	defendant.	He	affirmed	that	there	were	no	disputes	at	the	
time	of	the	construction.	The	Commission	was	therefore	satisfied	with	the	testimony	given	by	
the	witnesses,	which	did	not	 in	any	case	support	the	defendant.	Taking	this	 into	account	the	
Commission	accepted	the	testimonies	and	the	notary	as	evidence	by	the	plaintiff.		
The	Commission’s	brief	ruling	on	this	case	was	thus	based	on	laws,	both	Islamic	and	statutory,	
whose	relevance	to	the	case	was	not	explained	at	all	in	the	ruling.	In	essence,	the	ruling	was	four	
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lines	long	and	was	laden	with	references	to	articles	and	sections	of	the	relevant	laws.	The	ruling	
was	issued	in	the	Somali	language,	and	its	transliterates	as	follows:	
The	Commission	–	in	consideration	of	the	above	testimonies	and	in	accordance	with	articles	82,	
80,	117,	119	of	the	XHM;	as	well	as	articles	92,	193,	and	272	section	1	of	XHM;	read	together	
with	723	of	XM	and	article	25	section	1	of	Law	No:	17/2001;	and	in	conformance	with	the	Islamic	
Sharia	Law,	particularly	 the	Qur’an,	Chapter,	1	 (Baqara),	 verse	275,	282	and283	–	 issued	 the	
following	ruling:		
1. The	Commission	ruled	the	case	against	the	plaintiff.	
2. The	size	of	the	land	ruled	for	the	plaintiff	is	200x150.	
3. The	Commission	ordered	the	defendant	to	pay	the	legal	expenses		
4. The	ruling	was	made	on	December	15,	2012.		
5. The	chairperson	chaired	the	sittings	and	attended	by	four	Commissioners			
I	 have	 detailed	 this	 case	 at	 length	 because	 it	 shows	 the	 absence	 of	 proper	 documentation,	
adequate	 legal	 training,	 sufficient	 financial	 resources,	 and	 investigative	 capacity.	 Taken	
together,	this	leads	to	over-reliance	on	witnesses.	It	also	points	to	the	grave	weaknesses	in	the	
land	registration	system	of	the	city.	Furthermore,	it	explains	the	reason	why	the	adjudication	
system	relies	on	other	means	of	proving	ownership	such	as	through	witnesses.	Both	sides	of	the	
dispute	mobilised	witnesses	to	defend	their	case.	Neither	had	evidential	documents	other	than	
a	notary	signed	agreement,	which	one	side	presented	as	evidence	and	the	other	disputed.	One	
major	 problem	 with	 the	 reliance	 on	 witness	 accounts	 relates	 to	 their	 authenticity.	 Sources	
knowledgeable	about	the	land	disputes	in	the	city	informed	me	of	the	existence	of	a	group	of	
people	who	are	commonly	known	as	dheer	beenaalayaal,	which	can	be	 loosely	translated	as	
false	 oath	 takers.	 The	 group	 benefits	 from	 the	 over-reliance	 on	 witness	 accounts	 as	 a	 key	
mechanism	of	proving	or	disproving	land	ownership.	They	take	Islamic	oaths	on	behalf	of	their	
clients	who	enlist	their	service.		
Moreover,	the	state	fails	to	check	claims	through	alternative	formal	means.	For	 instance,	the	
Commissioners	 have	 overlooked	 the	 possibility	 of	 verifying	 disputant	 claims	 from	 the	 police	
records.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 police	 could	 have	 been	 requested	 to	 check	whether	 they	 sent	
officers	 to	 the	construction	site	as	claimed	by	one	of	 the	disputants.	Such	poor	coordination	
between	the	various	agencies	involved	in	land	conflicts	makes	adjudication	processes	weak	but	
also	compromises	revelation	of	the	truth.		
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The	manner	in	which	judgments	are	passed	indicates	a	lack	of	sophistication	and	shallowness	
not	only	on	the	part	of	the	Land	Commission	but	also	other	statutory	courts.	The	judgments	are	
justified	on	the	basis	of	a	range	of	statutory	legal	instruments	and	sharia	law,	but	scant	details	
are	given	about	the	meaning	of	these	articles	and	section	of	laws	and	verses	of	the	Qur’an,	or	
how	 they	 relate	 to	 the	 case.	 This	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 law	 discourages	many	
people	from	using	the	statutory	system	as	they	are	confused	by	the	complex	legal	organisation	
whose	details	are	buried	deep	in	books	that	are	barely	accessible	or	available	to	the	vast	majority	
of	people	 in	 the	city.	The	way	 this	case	was	handled	echoes	 issues	 raised	 in	 focus	groups,171	
which	 support	 my	 interpretation	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 process	 and	
judgements.	 Taken	 together,	 the	 above-mentioned	 weaknesses	 undermine	 the	 state’s	
credibility	and	legitimacy	to	govern,	encouraging	people	to	rely	on	other	means	and	networks	
to	mediate	their	conflict	and	defend	them	against	the	state.	The	spatial	manifestation	of	such	
mistrust,	I	argue	once	again,	is	segregation,	aspects	of	which	enable	people	to	resist	the	state’s	
attempt	to	enforce	rulings	and	other	regulatory	decisions.							
6.6 Weak	State?	Dynamics	and	Dilemmas	of	Enforcement		
The	above	case	demonstrates	that	weak	state	capacity	in	delivering	justice	may	exacerbate	land	
disputes	that	can	have	serious	security	implications	for	the	city,	as	claimants	may	come	armed	
to	 the	 teeth	 fighting	 on	 the	 disputed	 site.	 In	most	 cases,	 armed	 violence	 happens	 after	 the	
adjudication.172	This	suggests	that	the	problem	arises	from	the	weakness	of	the	state	to	enforce	
court	rulings	and	other	government	decisions.	The	reason	why	the	government	cannot	enforce	
sentences	varies	depending	on	the	case	and	context	but	one	common	element	that	recurs	in	
the	discussion	on	the	justification	for	the	poor	enforcement	is	that	it	jeopardises	the	security	of	
the	city	as	clans	may	mobilise	themselves	on	a	large	scale.	This	undermines	the	judiciary	and	the	
executive	arm	of	government,	which	is	entrusted	with	enforcing	judicial	decisions.	One	former	
security	official	told	me	what	happens	when	courts	issue	them	with	decisions	for	enforcement:	
when	 a	 warrant	 reaches	 the	 station	 commander,	 he	 communicates	 the	
divisional	commander	and	then	the	divisional	commander	communicates	the	
police	Commissioner	and	 then	 the	police	Commissioner	 communicates	 the	
																																								 																				
171	Focus	Group	Discussion	August	31,	2014.	Various	Participants.	Hargeisa	Residents.	
172	Participant	in	Kaah	Restaurant/Tea	Discussion	August	07,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
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Minister	 and	 then	 the	 decision	 comes	 from	 the	 Minister	 saying	 that	
enforcement	of	court	sentence	could	cause	greater	political	repercussion	and	
therefore	there	is	no	need	to	enforce	it.173	
As	 evident	 here,	 the	 key	 challenge	 facing	 the	 Land	 Commission	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 enforcement.	
Similarly,	 clan	 mobilisation	 makes	 it	 difficult	 politically	 for	 the	 state	 to	 take	 action	 against	
individuals.	Some	of	the	reasons	that	make	clans	render	support	their	kinsmen	is	that	many	of	
the	judgments	are	perceived	to	have	been	issued	through	corruption	or	nepotism.	But	it	is	also	
important	 that	 sometimes	 the	 clans	 side	 with	 people	 from	 their	 own	 ranks	 without	 any	
justification.	A	retired	agricultural	economist	pointed	out:	
What	people	want	is	that	they	get	their	rights	but	deny	the	right	of	the	state.	
People	go	to	government	officials	and	if	they	don't	find	what	they	want	from	
them	they	bypass	the	system	and	go	to	someone	and	above	them	through	
social	networks	and	try	to	impose	their	orders	from	above.	This	kind	of	bypass	
weakens	the	rule	of	law	as	officials	will	have	a	tendency	of	not	keeping	the	
law	as	their	orders	will	be	cancelled	by	higher	authorities.174	
The	other	problem	is	lack	of	capacity	on	the	part	of	the	state.	Those	who	are	
working	for	the	state	can	be	corrupted	because	of	the	fact	that	they	don't	get	
enough	 benefits	 to	 take	 care	 of	 their	 families.	 There	 are	 also	 lack	 of	
administrative	skills	for	civil	servants	to	discharge	their	duties.	This	therefore	
causes	a	problem	to	the	enforcement	process.	In	many	cases	you	will	see	a	
small	plot	of	land	causing	havoc	in	a	neighbourhood	as	people	dispute	and	
sometimes	use	violence	mainly	because	of	lack	of	enforcement	on	decisions	
made	through	courts.175	
Aside	 from	 the	 fears	 of	 the	 destabilising	 repercussions	 resulting	 from	
enforcement,	security	forces	exercise	extreme	caution	in	enforcements	due	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 if	 they	 harm	 somebody	 in	 the	 line	 of	 duty,	 they	 are	 held	
																																								 																				
173	Interviewee	23	August	14,	2014.	Solicitor	General	of	Somaliland.	
174	Interviewee	35	August	16,	2014.	Retired	Agricultural	Economist.	
175	Interviewee	27	August	12,	2014.	Politician.	
155	|	P a g e 	
	
	
responsible	personally	for	these	acts	by	the	clan	from	which	the	victims	hail.	
Recently,	the	government	adopted	a	new	policy	in	which	it	pays	blood	money	
to	the	clans	on	behalf	of	its	security	officers	but	the	amount	of	compensation	
is	 lesser	 than	 the	 standard	 clan-based	 arrangements	 and	 this	 leads	 to	
unacceptability	of	government	compensation.176	
Enforcement	 is	 also	 weakened	 by	 the	 mutual	 exploitation	 of	 government	 and	 traditional	
institutions/Akils.	 In	other	words,	 the	government	exploits	 the	 traditional	 system	 in	order	 to	
enforce	 its	 rules	 and	 regulations	 and	 the	 traditional	 authorities	 exploit	 the	 government	
structures	 by	 exerting	 political	 clan-based	 pressure	 on	 the	 government	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	
particular	goals	and	interests.	An	example	of	this	could	be	found	in	an	instance	where	a	sitting	
judge’s	authority	was	defied	in	court	by	an	Akil	representing	a	member	of	his	clan.	The	judge	
recalls:	
I	instructed	the	police	in	the	court	to	take	him	out	of	my	chambers	but	while	
they	were	trying	to	do	so,	he	pulled	a	pistol	and	fired	one	shot	in	the	air	and	
then	fled.	I	issued	an	arrest	warrant	for	him	and	police	sieged	his	house	but	
the	lead	officer	received	a	call	from	the	Provincial	Commissioner	(PC)	saying	
that	he	should	withdraw	his	forces	from	the	area.	The	officer	 informed	his	
boss	that	he	 is	under	court	 instruction	to	arrest	 the	man	and	bring	him	to	
court	but	was	challenged	that	he	will	be	responsible	for	any	insecurity	that	
results	 from	this	attempt.	The	 following	day,	a	group	of	Akils	 came	to	me	
requesting	 a	 mediation	 between	 me	 and	 the	 man	 who	 challenged	 my	
authority.	I	told	them	this	is	not	an	issue	of	Akils.	I	instructed	the	judges	and	
other	staff	in	the	court	to	take	leave	since	the	government	is	unable	to	ensure	
their	safety.		
Following	this,	the	provincial	prosecutor	and	the	police	divisional	commander	
came	to	me,	asking	that	I	should	recall	the	court	staff	and	judges	on	condition	
that	they	will	bring	the	Akil	who	caused	the	problem	in	court.	I	told	them	if	
you	can't	bring	those	I	tell	you	to	bring	to	court	then	I	cannot	take	those	you	
bring	to	court	on	your	own.	The	man	was	in	hiding	for	few	days	then	he	came	
																																								 																				
176	Interviewee	28	August	12,	2014.	Politician.	
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out	of	the	hiding	after	a	week	and	he	accidentally	met	the	police	divisional	
commander	in	the	local	government	offices.	One	of	the	soldiers	recognised	
him	and	he	was	arrested	on	the	spot.	Clan	elders	tried	to	intervene	but	I	told	
them	that	the	man	challenged	the	rule	of	law	and	authority	of	the	state	and	
for	this	reason	he	is	under	arrest	for	the	state.	My	point	was	to	ensure	that	
the	due	process	is	followed.	Of	course,	that	was	when	the	judiciary	was	more	
independent	for	at	least	petty	cases	back	in	the	late	1990s.177	
While	elites	and	public	officials	rhetorically	dismiss	clanism,	it	is	rare	to	see	direct	confrontation	
over	instances	where	clans	have	undermined	judicial	authority,	particularly	in	issues	where	the	
political	stakes	are	not	high.	The	reasons	why	elites	and	public	officials	avoid	clashes	with	clan	
elders	 is	 not	 only	 about	 security,	 but	 also	 relates	 to	 social	 and	 political	 interests.	 Since	 the	
introduction	of	multi-party	politics	in	Somaliland,	it	 is	common	to	see	clans	gathering	in	their	
strongholds	and	making	political	deliberations	in	support	or	opposition	to	political	 leaders.	 In	
some	instances,	clans	have	been	instrumental	in	the	making	of	power.	The	current	government	
for	instance,	came	to	office	through	fierce	mobilisation	of	Habar	Jelo	and	significant	proportion	
of	Awal	clans.	It	can	be	argued	that	this	mobilisation	of	clan	support	weakens	the	development	
of	political	parties’	ability	to	compete	on	the	basis	of	 ideological	differences.	This	can	lead	to	
security	 concerns	 as	 the	 different	 clan	 based	 political	 forums	 and	 gatherings	 can	 issue	
inflammatory	statements	that	can	fuel	conflict	between	the	clans	and	the	state	or	within	the	
clans	themselves.		
																																								 																				
177	Interviewee	37	March	30,	2014.	District	Court	Judge.	
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Figure	5:	Active	Conflict	on	a	Plot	of	Land	in	Masalaha,	a	neighbourhood	in	Southern	Hargeisa178	
	
Source:	Photo	taken	by	author	
While	the	establishment	of	the	Commission	on	the	one	hand	may	have	had	a	significant	impact	
on	the	way	 land	conflicts	are	resolved	through	the	statutory	system	by	speeding	up	cases,	 it	
faces	serious	challenges	that	undermine	public	confidence	in	its	ability	to	resolve	land	conflicts	
in	the	city.	Many	people	accuse	the	system	of	being	as	corrupt	as	the	courts	while	also	significant	
interference	exists	from	different	sources	such	as	the	government	agencies	as	well	as	the	clan	
pressures.	But	by	far	the	most	important	issue	that	makes	people	doubt	the	functionality	of	the	
Commission	is	the	fact	that	there	is	a	serious	lack	of	enforcement	of	decisions	it	makes.179	This	
makes	public	confidence	swing	in	favour	of	customary	and	Islamic	institutions,	which	have	some	
sort	of	voluntary	enforcement	mechanism	built	into	them	as	family	members	of	both	sides	take	
part	in	the	mediation	process	and	provide	guarantees	that	the	verdict	is	accepted	by	all.		
																																								 																				
178	I	have	taken	this	photo	in	May	when	I	came	across	a	group	of	people	fighting	over	a	piece	of	land.	One	
of	the	sides	came	to	construct	a	demarcation	foundation	in	a	contested	plot	of	land.	This	was	stopped	by	
another	group	of	men	who	also	claimed	the	ownership	of	the	plot.	The	police	intervened	the	conflict	and	
prevented	the	two	groups	from	becoming	violent	towards	each	other.			
179	Participant	in	Hadhwanaag	Teashop	Discussion	September	19,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	
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As	can	be	seen	in	the	above	narrative,	the	importance	of	clan	membership	that	is	perpetuated	
through	the	plural	and	overlapping	judicial	structures,	has	developed	as	a	product	of	the	struggle	
between	customary	and	statutory	institutions.	Such	struggle	rests	on	antagonistic	practices	of	
legitimation	and	delegitimation	of	authority	(as	will	be	demonstrated	in	the	next	chapter)	where	
land	conflict	management	is	the	field	in	which	aspects	of	the	struggle	take	place.	I	suggest	in	this	
thesis,	 that	 the	way	 the	 Land	 Commission	 and	 other	 legal	 institutions	 operates	 is	 thus	 also	
implicated	 in	 the	perpetuation	of	 territorial	 segregation.	 This	 is	because	 the	way	urban	 land	
conflicts	are	managed	to	a	significant	degree	can	change	or	reinforce	the	spatial	character	of	the	
city.	For	instance,	if	the	constitution	of	a	specialised	Commission	for	land	conflicts	succeeded	in	
bringing	 about	 tenure	 security,	 such	 that	 land	 owners	 did	 not	 live	 in	 continual	 fear	 of	
unnecessary	disputes,	this	could	have	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	non-clan	based	attitudes	
to	choice	of	settlement.	The	opposite,	however,	seems	to	be	the	case,	as	the	state’s	failure	to	
enforce	judicial	decisions	arguably	reinforces	the	current	clan	based	spatial	pattern	of	the	city	
as	people	see	no	alternative	to	staying	in	an	area	where	they	can	access	other	means	of	resolving	
their	land	issues.	
6.7 Conclusion		
Given	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 statutory	 system	 has	 at	 no	 time	monopolised	 the	 local	 governance	
landscape	in	urban	places,	customary	institutions	have	successfully	positioned	themselves	as	a	
better	alternative	to	resolve	land	conflicts.	This	happened	against	a	backdrop	of	a	relationship	
characterised	by	 inconvenient	coexistence	and	constant	struggle	 for	governing	spaces.	While	
the	statutory	institutions	have	the	upper	hand	in	such	struggle,	in	the	sense	that	the	state	often	
sanctioned	them,	the	customary	institutions	enjoyed	much	higher	legitimacy	and	popularity.	In	
my	narrative	above,	which	cuts	across	historical	and	recent	land	management	practices,	I	argue	
that	the	clan	based	spatial	segregation	of	Hargeisa	is	partly	a	geographical	manifestation	of	the	
struggle	between	the	statutory	and	customary	institutions.	In	other	words,	the	greater	the	level	
of	legitimacy	and	access	to	customary	institutions,	the	more	likely	that	people	will	make	their	
choices	of	abode	in	areas	where	they	could	get	access	to	such	informal	justice	arrangements.		
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	adjudication	mechanism	discussed	in	the	chapter	neglects	land	
conflicts	in	which	the	state	is	party.	While	the	statutory	system	is	reeling	with	problems	resulting	
from	both	formal	and	informal	interference	from	the	executive,	the	traditional	institutions	are	
also	subjected	to	a	significant	level	of	manipulation.	Such	manipulations	are	multidimensional.		
Some	are	formal	such	as	the	fact	that	a	significant	proportion	of	the	traditional	structures	are	
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on	the	government	pay	roll	and	hence	are	seldom	trusted	as	independent	mediators.	Others	are	
informal	in	the	sense	that	the	state	uses	various	mechanisms	to	undermine	traditional	leaders	
who	do	not	play	to	their	tune.	This	includes	the	creation	of	parallel	traditional	figures	who	hail	
from	the	same	clan	as	that	of	the	dissenting	elder	to	break	up	their	support	base.	This	creates	
mistrust	not	only	between	the	state	and	customary	institutions	but	also	the	state	and	the	public.	
In	the	long	run,	such	mistrust	undermines	state	legitimacy.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	examine	further	
how	this	struggle	for	legitimacy	contributes	to	urban	segregation	in	Hargeisa.			 	
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CHAPTER	7 LEGITIMATION	FUNCTION	OF	URBAN	LAND	CONFLICTS		
7.1 Introduction		
In	 2012,	 the	 government	 of	 Somaliland	 embarked	 on	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 expanding	 Egal	
International	 Airport	 in	 Hargeisa,	 following	 an	 infrastructural	 development	 grant	 from	 the	
Kingdom	of	Kuwait.	The	proposed	expansion	included	the	construction	of	a	runway	as	well	as	
the	 demarcation	 of	 a	 boundary	 and	 security	 fence	 around	 the	 airport.180	 One	 of	 the	major	
challenges	facing	this	project	was	however	the	fact	that	the	land	surrounding	the	airport	was	in	
the	hands	of	local	land	owners/claimants	who	were	mainly	low-income	people	from	the	Eidagale	
which	is	one	of	the	major	clans	in	the	city.	This	led	to	a	land	conflict,	pitting	the	state	against	
land	owners.	 In	several	 instances,	this	conflict	almost	translated	into	violent	confrontation	as	
the	 state	 threatened	 land	 owners	 with	 eviction	 and	 land	 owners	 warned	 the	 state	 of	 dire	
consequences.	Evidently,	the	two	sides	were	engaged	in	a	legitimacy	struggle	in	which	each	side	
sought	to	legitimise	its	actions	and	delegitimise	those	of	the	other.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	
this	 legitimacy	 struggle	 marginalises	 the	 poor	 due	 to	 unequal	 power	 relations,	 undermines	
public	trust	in	the	state,	and	forms	the	basis	on	which	violent	resistance	is	justified.	Insecurity	
and	 lack	 of	 trust	 contributes	 to	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 clan-based	 settlement	 patterns	 where	
resisting	individuals	or	groups	favour	to	locate	themselves	in	areas	dominated	by	their	clans	so	
as	to	mobilise	support	and	resources	for	challenging	authorities.	The	dispute	documented	in	this	
chapter	that	pitted	the	land	owners,	in	the	airport	who	all	but	few	belonged	to	the	Eidagale	clan,	
against	the	state	worked	to	reinforce	their	clan	identity	as	a	prime	source	of	protection,	while	
the	coverage	of	this	dispute	in	the	media	also	encouraged	others	not	to	neglect	their	investment	
in	clan	networks	as	a	source	of	security.	The	dispute	also	worked	to	increase	popular	sentiment	
that	the	state	could	easily	become	the	enemy.	
This	 chapter	 relies	 on	 key	 informal	 interviews,	 archival	materials,	 and	media	 sources.	While	
discussions	on	the	concept	of	hybridity	make	references	to	the	dynamics	of	state	legitimacy	and	
the	essential	single	nature	of	legitimation	through	the	fusion	of	state	and	customary	institutions,	
the	 spatial	 manifestation	 is	 neglected.	 Simply	 casting	 institutions	 that	 shape	 the	 spatial	
character	of	 the	 cities	 in	 Somaliland	 as	hybrid,	 thus	works	 to	obscure	 rather	 than	 illuminate	
important	social	and	political	processes.	The	chapter	is	organised	into	five	sections.	In	the	first	
																																								 																				
180	 The	northern	direction	 is	 exempted	 from	 the	 expansion	due	 to	 the	 existence	of	 substantial	 urban	
development	consisting	of	both	commercial	and	residential	areas.	
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section,	I	discuss	the	history	of	airport	expansion.	In	the	second	and	third	sections,	I	discuss	the	
significance	of	the	airport	and	territorial	control	as	well	as	the	importance	of	the	airport	for	state	
legitimation	amid	a	long	history	of	negative	perceptions	towards	Somali	state	building.	In	the	
fourth	 and	 fifth	 sections,	 I	 discuss	 how	 the	 state	 rationalises	 and	 seeks	 to	 implement	 land	
expropriation	as	well	as	how	 land	owners	 rationalise	and	organise	 their	 resistance.	Equally,	 I	
examine	the	processes	and	practices	of	conflict	mediation	as	well	the	valuation	of	properties	
and	compensation.	
7.2 Pushing	the	Boundary:	The	Past	Airport	Expansions		
Legitimacy	lies	at	the	heart	of	modern	state-building	discussions.	Despite	this,	the	legitimacy	of	
public	authorities	attracts	inadequate	attention	in	the	literature	on	Somali	state-building.	The	
limited	 available	 literature	 on	 legitimacy	 places	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 national	 and	 regional	
subnational	levels	overlooking	the	local	and	more	specifically	the	urban	(Pegg	and	Kolstø,	2015,	
Richards,	 2015,	 Wiuff	 Moe,	 2011).	 Hoffman	 and	 Kirk	 (2013)	 underline	 the	 importance	 of	
localising	legitimacy	debates	as	they	are	shaped	by	the	everyday	interaction	between	people,	
influenced	 by	 cultures	 and	 beliefs.	 Moreover,	 legitimacy	 discussions	 at	 the	 local	 level	 are	
important	for	understanding	the	rationales	through	which	people	may	assess	legitimacy,	which	
is	largely	shaped	by	the	meaning	citizens	attach	to	state	behaviour	(Gupta	and	Sharma,	2006).	
According	 to	 Nora	 and	 Réginas	 (2014)	 differentials	 in	 how	 people	 may	 rate	 legitimacy	 and	
ascribe	different	 levels	to	various	 institutions	within	a	state,181	can	be	accounted	for	through	
examination	of	 the	 local.	Thus,	examining	the	 localised	conflict	over	 the	airport	expansion	 in	
Hargeisa,	will	enable	us	to	understand	more	closely	the	political,	economic	and	social	factors	
underpinning	the	various	ways	in	which	perceptions	towards	the	state	legitimacy	are	formed.182		
As	 legitimacy	 is	 characterised	 as	 a	 continuous	 process	 of	 social	 and	 political	 construction	
conditioned	by	constant	interaction	and	contestation	between	various	social	and	institutional	
actors	(Lund,	2006),	the	airport	expansion	in	Hargeisa	can	best	be	understood	as	an	attempt	by	
the	state	to	increase	its	political	legitimacy	and	state	viability	both	locally	and	internationally,	
facing	in	the	process	a	stiff	resistance	from	other	social	actors		i.e.	local	residents	who	oppose	
the	airport	expansion	 for	various	reasons.	The	proposed	expansion	mainly	seeks	 to	push	the	
																																								 																				
181	i.e.		local	and	national	or	executive	and	legislative	institutions.	
182	For	instance,	there	may	be	difference	in	how	the	elites	and	masses,	interest	or	social	groups,	or	people	
from	different	regions	may	evaluate	legitimacy.	
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airport	 boundary	 towards	 Uubaale	 settlement	 whose	 formation	 preceded	 the	 airport	
establishment,	dating	back	to	the	mid	1940s.	According	to	an	old	lady	in	her	70s	who	spent	most	
of	her	 life	 in	the	area,	the	space	on	which	the	airport	stands	used	to	be	a	playground	where	
young	people	perform	Somali	traditional	dances	during	spring.183	The	growth	of	the	settlement	
gained	momentum	in	the	early	1950s	when	Sultan	Abdullahi	Dirie	of	the	Eidagale	clan	registered	
33	 farms	with	 the	 colonial	 government	 on	 grounds	 that	 he	wanted	 to	 diversify	 his	 clan’s184	
nomadic	lifestyle	so	as	to	make	them	resilient	to	environmental	hardships	by	settling	some	as	
farmers	in	close	proximity	to	the	city	where	greater	opportunities	existed.185		
Pioneers	of	the	settlement	included	the	family	of	a	famous	playwright,	Ahmed	Suleiman	Bidde,	
and	others	such	as	Aw	Tahir,	Aw	Farah,	Ali	Barre,	Bodle,	Leh	Tur,	Salan	Jirde,	Adan	Iman,	and	
Saqafale.	The	settlement	grew	 incrementally	as	other	nomadic	 families	 joined	the	previously	
small	band	of	settlers.186	Infrastructural	development	in	the	area	begun	in	the	early	1950s	at	a	
time	when	the	colonial	government	was	preparing	the	country	for	possible	attainment	of	self-
rule	 or	 full	 independence	 subject	 to	 the	 then	 ongoing	 local,	 regional	 and	 global	 political	
dynamics.	 Among	 the	 most	 significant	 of	 these	 developments	 was	 the	 construction	 of	 the	
airport	in	1952.		Prior	to	this,	the	colonial	government	constructed	a	semi-tarmac	road	on	the	
Southern	side	of	the	airport	in	1951.187	For	the	first	few	years,	airport	activities	remained	limited	
due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 scant	 facilities	 and	equipment	were	 available	 for	 airline	operations.	 For	
instance,	there	were	no	firefighting	machines	and	accommodation	to	house	ambulances	at	the	
airport.	The	situation	was,	however,	improved	in	the	run-up	to	the	independence	in	1960	when	
the	Protectorate’s	treasury	included	the	provision	of	firefighting	machines	for	the	airport	in	its	
1956/7	 budget.	 Despite	 conflicting	 advice	 on	 the	 issue	 between	 the	 various	 departments	
concerned	 (Treasury,	 1958),	 the	 treasury	 approved	 a	 grant	 of	 14,180	 to	 finance	 95%	 of	 the	
construction	 cost	 for	 a	 new	 airport	 terminal	 in	 1956/7	 fiscal	 year.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 1958,	 the	
																																								 																				
183		Interviewee	45	April	22,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
184	It	is	however	important	to	note	that	individuals	from	other	clans	are	also	found	in	the	area.	But	it	is	
not	clear	whether	they	took	advantage	of	the	Sultan’s	proposal	or	settled	in	the	area	on	their	own.		
185	Interviewee	39	June	05,	2014.	Playright.	
186	Ibid.	
187	Interviewee	51	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
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terminal,	 main	 building,	 garage	 and	 access	 roads	 for	 the	 airport	 were	 completed	 (British	
Somaliland	Protectorate,	1958).	
The	airport	was	thereafter	expanded	several	times.	The	first	expansion	occurred	in	1965	when	
a	unit	of	the	Somali	Armed	Forces	established	a	base	near	the	airport.	They	constructed	few	
houses	on	the	Western	side	and	installed	radars	on	the	right	side	of	the	airport.	The	military	
base	was	further	expanded	under	the	leadership	of	Mohammed	Midah	who	served	in	the	army	
at	different	capacities	and	later	became	a	senior	official	 in	the	Defence	Ministry.	A	few	more	
military	 facilities	 were	 added.	 These	 included	 stores	 for	 light	 arsenals	 and	 fuel	 tanks.188	
According	to	local	residents,	the	initial	expansion	of	the	airport	did	not	encounter	stiff	resistance	
from	landowners	in	the	area	partly	because	of	an	understanding	that	the	military	will	not	further	
their	position	towards	the	farmers.	The	landowners,	for	their	part,	also	were	expected	not	to	
encroach	on	the	government	properties	in	the	area.	The	expansion	only	affected	a	few	farms,	
so	 this	 probably	 compromised	 any	 greater	 resistance	 to	 the	 expansion	 at	 that	 time.	
Furthermore,	 the	Governor	of	 the	 then	North-Western	Province	 for	which	Hargeisa	was	 the	
capital	refurbished	the	airport	facilities	and	added	resting	rooms	in	the	early	1970s.189	
Aside	from	the	fact	that	the	airport	was,	and	still	is,	a	valuable	transport	hub	in	the	country,	it	
was	also,	and	remains	a	strategically	 important	 focal	point	 for	state	 legitimacy.	For	 instance,	
during	the	conflict	between	Ethiopia	and	Somalia	in	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s,	the	city	of	
Hargeisa	was	vulnerable	to	Ethiopian	airpower	due	to	its	close	proximity	to	the	border.	As	the	
airport	 is	 located	on	higher	ground	than	most	parts	of	 the	city,	 it	 served	as	one	of	 the	most	
important	strategic	places	where	air	defence	systems	aimed	at	preventing	Ethiopian	jetfighters	
from	 bombarding	 the	 city	 could	 be	 installed.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Somali	 government	 placed	 a	
significant	arsenal	 in	and	around	 the	airport.	 The	airport	also	became	a	 strategic	ground	 for	
political	control	and	power.	This	strategic	role	became	more	apparent	during	the	civil	war	 in	
1988	when	the	airport	became	a	major	hub	 for	 the	military	activities	of	 the	 former	dictator,	
Mohamed	Siyad	Barre,	who	used	the	airport	as	a	key	base	for	hosting	his	air	power	and	artillery	
aimed	at	shelling	the	city	in	a	bid	to	bring	the	SNM	rebellion	to	an	end.			
Upon	the	disintegration	of	the	Somali	state,	the	airport	became	a	significant	base	for	some	of	
the	clan	militia	 in	 the	city	 for	almost	 three	years	before	Mohamed	 Ibrahim	Egal,	 the	 second	
																																								 																				
188	Interviewee	39	June	05,	2014.	Playright.	
189	Interviewee	10	October	29,	2014.	Former	Governor	of	North	Western	Province.	
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President	of	Somaliland,	came	to	power	in	1993.	One	of	the	most	daring	episodes	of	resistance	
the	 President	 faced	 during	 his	 time	 in	 office	 came	 from	 militias	 based	 in	 the	 airport.	 This	
resistance	 finally	 resulted	 in	a	 stalemate	emanating	 from	 the	President’s	 attempt	 to	 forcibly	
demobilise	 the	militias	 and	gaining	 control	 over	 the	 airport	 not	only	because	of	 its	 strategic	
transportation	vitality	but	also	for	its	 importance	in	strengthening	state	control	over	the	city.	
Militias	in	the	airport	who	were	unconvinced	about	the	legitimacy	of	the	President’s	ascent	to	
power	and	the	means	 through	which	he	wanted	to	gain	control	over	 the	airport	 resisted	his	
attempt,	leading	to	an	inter	clan	civil	war	that	lasted	for	almost	three	years.190	Even	though	the	
conflict	initially	began	as	a	low	level	skirmish	involving	clan	militia	fighting	over	the	distribution	
of	state	resources,	it	later	degenerated	into	a	bigger	political	struggle	involving	politicians	with	
varying	views	and	agendas.	The	conflict	was	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	a	significant	number	
of	the	security	personnel	defected	to	their	respective	clans	and	their	militia.	The	clash	displaced	
more	 than	 150,000	 people,	 and	 most	 of	 those	 fleeing	 the	 war	 sought	 refuge	 in	 areas	
predominantly	populated	by	their	clans	(Bryden,	1994a).	This	war	came	to	an	end	in	1997	when	
the	President	agreed	to	meet	some	of	the	demands	put	forward	by	resisting	clans,	Garhajis	of	
which	Eidagale	is	part,	and	their	militias,	and	sacked	some	of	his	key	political	allies	who	were	
considered	as	spoilers	 in	the	peace	process.	The	culmination	of	the	war	enabled	the	nascent	
state	to	impose	effective	control	on	almost	all	the	major	government	facilities	such	as	the	ports	
and	airports	in	the	country.		
7.3 Territorial	Control	and	Significance	of	the	Airport		
Territorial	 and	 state-owned	 property	 control	 was	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 state	 building	 in	
Somaliland	 throughout	 its	 post-conflict	 history.	 It	was	 particularly	 a	 priority	 for	 Abdirahman	
Ahmed	Ali	(Tuur)191	and	Mohamed	Ibrahim	Egal,	the	first	and	second	Presidents	of	Somaliland	
whose	central	themes	for	re-establishing	the	state	revolved	around	demobilisation	of	militias	
and	control	of	essential	revenue	generating	properties.	In	an	interview	with	Matt	Bryden,	a	long	
time	 humanitarian	 worker	 and	 researcher	 in	 the	 region,	 Egal	 said	 “we	 are	 very	 much	
handicapped	by	lack	of	resources,	but	my	government	has	to	establish	itself	as	being	completely	
in	control	of	the	country	before	we	can	embark	upon	an	international	campaign	for	recognition”	
																																								 																				
190	This	conflict	denied	the	state	the	ability	to	exercise	control	over	most	parts	of	the	country.	
191	Abdirahman	Ahmed	Ali	(Tuur)	attempted	to	take	control	of	Berbera	port	as	a	revenue	generating	state	
property	but	encountered	stiff	resistance	from	some	of	the	local	militia.	
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(Bryden,	1994b,	p.	4).	As	evident	here,	full	territorial	control	was	a	necessary	precondition	for	
the	quest	of	state	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	the	international	community,	but	it	was	also	used	for	
bringing	about	local	legitimacy	as	the	state	sought	to	show	its	effectiveness	to	the	Hargeisa	and	
broader	Somaliland	public.	The	subsequent	administrations	in	Somaliland	built	on	this	focus	of	
controlling	revenue-generating	properties	and	treated	ports	and	airports	as	important	sites	for	
national	development.	For	 instance,	the	National	Development	Plan	bands	the	airport	with	a	
range	of	other	key	transport	infrastructures	as	vital	drivers	for	economic	growth	(MNPD,	2011).	
Hargeisa	 airport	 in	 particular	 continues	 to	 receive	 significant	 attention	 from	 authorities	 in	
Somaliland	 partly	 because	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 traffic	 in	 the	 airport	 has	 seen	 significant	 growth,	
generating	a	greater	 level	of	 revenues	 for	 the	 state.192	 For	 instance,	 flights	 from/to	Hargeisa	
have	increased	from	1422	to	2581	between	2006	to	2007,	a	sharp	rise	of	82%193	(See	table	1).		
Correspondingly,	both	the	cargo	and	passengers	in	the	airport	have	increased.		For	example,	in	
2006,	 the	number	of	 incoming	passengers	stood	at	34566	while	 the	number	of	 the	outgoing	
passengers	 stood	 at	 10519.	 In	 2007,	 this	 number	 has	 increased	 by	 125%	 for	 the	 incoming	
passengers	and	542%	for	the	outgoing	passengers.	This	increase	however	slightly	decreased	in	
the	following	year	for	both	the	incoming	and	outgoing	passengers	by	19%	and	17%	respectively.	
As	for	the	freight,	the	incoming	and	outgoing	cargo	in	2006	rose	by	4%	and	46%	respectively.	
While	in	general	these	figures	show	fluctuations	(where	they	decrease	in	some	years	by	small	
margins),	the	overall	picture	suggests	that	traffic	in	the	airport	increased	significantly.		
Table	4:	Number	of	flights	in	Hargeisa	Egal	International	Airport	
Year	 Flights	 Percentage	Increase	
2006	 1422	 0%	
2007	 2581	 82%	
2008	 2783	 8%	
2009	 2131	 -23%	
Source:	(MNPD,	2012)	
																																								 																				
192	Graphs	are	reconstructed	from	a	table	in	the	National	Development	Plan	(	see	MNPD,	2012).		
193	This	increase	continued	in	the	following	year	but	at	a	much	smaller	margin	of	8%.	In	2008,	the	number	
of	flights	have	decreased	by	23%	possibly	due	to	the	global	financial	crisis.	
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Table	5:	The	Volume	(Kg)	of	cargo	Handled	at	Hargeisa	Airport	
	
Source:(MNPD,	2012)						
Table	6:	The	Number	of	Passengers	Handled	at	Hargeisa	Airport		
	
Source:	(MNPD,	2012)	
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Authorities	in	Somaliland	envisage	that	the	increased	demand	for	airport	services	will	have	to	
be	accompanied	by	a	corresponding	increase	in	investment	in	the	range	of	9-11	percent	per	year	
(Hassan,	2012).	The	Minister	of	Aviation	observes	that	 if	the	airport’s	role	as	a	key	economic	
driver	in	the	region	was	to	be	enhanced,	such	investment	needs	to	be	in	the	region	of	25	million	
dollars,194	which	can	be	mobilised	through	a	combination	of	local	resources	and	international	
aid	(MCAAT,	2016).	Nonetheless,	Akwei	et	al.	(2012)	argues	that	the	enhancement	of	airports	
performance	as	key	aspects	of	national	infrastructures	should	not	be	focused	on	financial	gains	
alone,	 but	 attention	 has	 to	 be	 also	 directed	 at	 quality	 of	 services	 where	 airports	 take	
environmental	aspects	of	development195	and	performance	into	account.	Equally,	community	
relations	 with	 the	 airport	 is	 also	 vital.	 In	 other	 words,	 while	 conforming	 to	 international	
standards	and	passenger	rating	are	crucial	for	appraisal	of	airport	performance	and	image,	what	
is	equally	important	is	how	communities	see	and	feel	about	airports	within	their	vicinities.	This	
is	 because	 community	 life	 is	 affected	 and	 shaped	 by	 airport	 operations.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
economic	dimensions	of	the	airport	(MCAAT,	2012	)	cited	in	(Gandrup,	2014),	the	current	focus	
of	 airport	 development	 in	 Somaliland	 is	 primarily	 targeted	 at	 the	 legitimisation	 of	 de	 facto	
statehood	 in	an	environment	where	 	de	 jure	 status	 is	denied.	Similarly,	 the	airport,	as	a	key	
revenue	generating	facility,	also	serves	as	a	site	of	 interaction	for	state	viability,	visibility	and	
legitimacy.		
According	 to	Goodstein	 and	Velamuri	 (2009),	 states	may	 legitimise	 their	 power	 by	 attaining	
exclusive	property	rights	so	as	to	incorporate	such	rights	in	the	state	bureaucracy.	They	may	also	
legitimise	their	power	through	collaboration	with	"other	centres	of	power"	such	as	corporations	
and	customary	institutions.	Similarly,	they	also	"engage	in	various	strategies	of	institutional	work	
to	disrupt	or	maintain	existing	structures	and	practices	of	institutional	control"	(ibid	p.	506).	For	
instance,	 post-conflict	 leaders	 use	 land	 as	 a	 way	 of	 legitimising	 their	 rule	 by	 promising	 to	
implement	comprehensive	 reforms	aimed	at	 redressing	past	 injustice.	This	 is	particularly	 the	
case	in	situations	where	the	institutions	of	the	ousted	regime	suffered	from	a	crisis	of	legitimacy	
brought	 about	 by	 administrative	 malpractices	 such	 as	 corruption,	 nepotism	 and	 unequal	
exploitation	of	resources	resulting	in	a	widespread	poverty	and	rampant	economic	inequality.	
																																								 																				
194	Saying	that	he	is	hoping	to	secure	funding	through	government	initiatives	and	international	aid.	
195	Attempts	aimed	at	responding	to	the	need	for	focusing	the	environmental	aspects	of	improving	airport	
services	quality	have	been	largely	driven	by	donors.	Through	funds	provided	by	USAID,	the	airport	has	for	
short	 period	 operated	 on	 power	 provided	 through	 renewable	 energy	 project	 but	 the	 facilities	 were	
paralyzed	by	lack	of	maintenance	(Somalilandgov,	2013).	
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In	such	cases,	post-conflict	administrations	seek	to	 improve	their	political	 legitimacy	through	
narratives	of	greater	transparency	and	accountability.		
Political	legitimacy	in	Somaliland	was	weak	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	Barre’s	ouster,	mainly	
because	of	the	inter-factional	skirmishes	between	militias	loyal	to	various	clans	in	the	country.	
The	 state’s	 inability	 to	 deal	 effectively	 with	 these	 problems,	 for	 almost	 six	 years	 following	
Somaliland’s	unilateral	declaration	of	independence	from	the	rest	of	Somalia	in	1991,	led	to	loss	
of	 trust	 in	 the	new	order.	The	 termination	of	 the	war	 in	1997	however	enabled	 the	state	 to	
initiate	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 improving	 its	 image	 and	 control	 over	 state	 territories.	 This	 exercise	
began	with	installation	of	the	first	post-conflict	basic	fence	around	the	airport,	along	the	lines	
inherited	from	the	military	regime.	This	was	followed	by	several	renovations	aimed	at	enhancing	
the	 airport’s	 capacity	 for	 handling	 increased	 numbers	 of	 travellers	 at	 a	 time	when	 diaspora	
communities	from	the	region	were	significantly	increasing	connections	with	their	homeland	due	
to	 sustained	 peace	 and	 stability.	Most	 of	 the	 airlines	 using	 the	 airport	 were	 Somali	 owned	
companies	who	made	regular	flights	to	the	Middle	East	where	travellers	could	transit	mostly	to	
international	 connections	 to	 North	 America	 and	 Western	 Europe.	 More	 recently,	 the	
commercial	 viability	 of	 these	 movements	 has	 attracted	 the	 attention	 of	 giant	 international	
carriers	such	as	Ethiopian	Airlines.		
7.4 Airport	as	a	Site	for	State	Legitimation		
The	increased	commercial	viability	of	the	airport	served	the	quest	for	state	legitimacy	on	three	
fronts.	Firstly,	it	boosted	the	image	of	Somaliland	as	a	trustworthy	economic	partner	with	which	
international	companies	could	deal.	Secondly,	it	enabled	the	administration,	which	was,	and	still	
is	 struggling	with	 the	burden	of	non-recognition,	 to	have	access	 to	 international	connections	
without	 having	 to	 go	 through	Dubai	when	 travelling	 for	 diplomatic,	 commercial	 or	 personal	
reasons.	And	thirdly,	it	provided	the	state	with	the	tools	necessary	for	arguing	that	it	is	doing	a	
good	job	in	taking	the	country’s	development	forward.	The	increased	commercial	viability	of	the	
airport,	however,	came	with	greater	responsibilities	for	authorities	 in	Somaliland.	 In	order	to	
ensure	 that	 carriers	 operate	 in	 a	 safe	 and	 acceptable	 operational	 environment,	 aviation	
authorities	have	to	comply	with	international	regulations	scattered	over	more	than	19	annexes	
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(ICAO,	 1974),	 various	 manuals	 (ICAO,	 2013b,	 ICAO,	 2013c,	 ICAO,	 2003,	 ICAO,	 2014)	 and	
treaties196	(ICAO,	1944).	
These	treaties,	annexes	and	manuals	provide	recommendations	ranging	from	runway	specific	
guidelines	 (ICAO,	 2005)	 to	 principles	 and	 policy-making	 strategies	 for	 general	 airport	 safety	
standards	(ACI,	2009).	The	aim	is	to	standardise	rules	and	regulations	governing	airport	safety.	
Standardisation	here	refers	to	the	“uniform	and	consistent	implementation	of	[Standards	and	
Recommended	Practices]	SARPs”	(ICAO,	2013a,	p.	6).	For	instance,	in	the	Global	Aviation	Safety	
Plan	 of	 2014–2016,	 states	 are	 required	 to	 achieve	 “implementation	 of	 an	 effective	 safety	
oversight	system”	by	2017;	full	implementation	of	the	ICAO	State	Safety	Program	framework	by	
2022;	 and	 advanced	 safety	oversight	 system	 including	predictive	 risk	management”	by	 2027	
(ICAO,	2013a,	p.	4).	These	targets	are	set	and	informed	by	a	narrowly	defined	concept	of	safety	
as	a	“state	in	which	the	possibility	of	harm	to	persons	or	of	property	damage	is	reduced	to,	and	
maintained	 at	 or	 below,	 an	 acceptable	 level	 through	 a	 continuing	 process	 of	 hazard	
identification	and	safety	risk	management”	(ICAO,	2013c,	pp.	2-1).	
In	 order	 to	 implement	 this	 narrowly	 defined	 view	 of	 safety,	 states	 are	 required	 to	 develop	
processes	 and	 train	 skilled	 personnel	 for	 their	 implementation.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 are	 the	
development	 of	 country	 specific	 safety	 guidelines,197	 which	 include	 the	 formulation	 and	
maintenance	 of	 State	 Safety	 Programs	 (SSP)	 (ICAO,	 2013c).	 This	 entails	 the	 preparation	 and	
enactment	of	rules	and	regulations	aimed	at	ensuring	efficient	and	effective	delivery	of	aviation	
services	which	include	the	development	of	Visual	and	Instrument	of	Flight	Procedures	(VIFP)	for	
the	 navigation	 of	 aircraft	 as	well	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 other	 equipment	 deemed	 essential	 for	
aircraft	 operations	 (ICAO,	 2006).	 Additionally,	 states	 are	 required	 to	 provide	 aeronautical	
information	service	to	aircrafts	using	their	airports	or	airspaces	(ICAO,	2003)	and	also	conform	
to	certain	charging	standards	(ICAO,	2013b).	The	pressure	emanating	from	the	need	to	conform	
to	such	standards	is	experienced	variedly	by	the	member	states.	Countries	emerging	from	post-
conflict	 contexts	 go	 through	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 pressure	 not	 only	 because	 of	 their	 lack	 of	 the	
necessary	resources	to	implement	these	standards	but	also	resistance	from	their	mainly	poor	
																																								 																				
196	The	state	of	Somaliland	was	not	a	signatory	to	these	treaties	due	to	the	fact	that	it	is	not	recognised	
by	the	united	nations	of	which	ICAO	is	a	specialised	agency.	
197	informed	by	the	treaties	and	annexes	enacted	successively	since	the	first	Chicago	convention	in	1944.	
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populations	 affected	 by	 the	 conformance	 related	 exercises.198	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Somaliland,	 a	
significant	 proportion	 of	 this	 conformance	 is	 managed	 by	 the	 ICAO	 office	 in	 Nairobi,	 Civil	
Aviation	Caretaker	Authority	 for	 Somalia	 (CACAS),	partly	because	of	 the	 lack	of	 capacity	and	
partly	 because	 of	 disagreement	 between	 Somaliland	 and	 Somalia	 regarding	 the	 control	 of	
airspace	(ICAO,	2013b).		
Informed	 by	 the	 aforementioned	 requirements,	most	 international	 airlines	 tend	 to	 evaluate	
airports	before	they	start	operations.	Various	teams	are	dispatched	to	assess	the	situation	on	
the	ground.	Some	of	the	key	aspects	they	 look	at	 include	the	 level	of	demand,	nature	of	the	
airport	operations,	security	of	the	terminals,	existence	of	exterior	fences	and	boundaries,	and	
capacity	for	responding	to	emergencies		i.e.	the	availability	of	firefighting	machines,	existence	
of	sufficient	water	tanks	as	well	as	skilled	emergency	personnel.199	Since	its	establishment	in	the	
late	1950s,	Egal	International	Airport	enjoys	a	relatively	good	safety	record.	The	only	incident	
reported	in	which	the	airport	name	was	mentioned	is	an	accident	which	occurred	in	1989	when	
a	Somali	Airlines	flight	which	flew	from	Hargeisa	crashed	10	minutes	after	taking	off	from	the	
airport,	killing	all	aboard	(Ranter,	2016).		
While	the	airport	already	met	some	of	these	specifications	i.e.	the	availability	of	terminals	and	
provision	of	adequate	emergency	equipment	ICAO	(2014),	compliance	with	other	aspects	of	the	
recommended	 standards	 such	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 secure	 fence	 and	 boundaries	 are	 still	
underway.	Of	particular	safety	concern	for	authorities	are	“freely	roaming	animals”,	which	pose	
a	 danger	 to	 the	 operation	 of	 aircrafts	 in	 the	 airport.	 According	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	 National	
Planning	 and	 Development,	 lack	 of	 “navigational	 aids	 and	 proper	 airfield	 lighting	 facilities”	
hamper	the	ability	of	the	airport	to	handle	airlines	during	low	visibility	conditions	such	as	rainy	
and	non-daylight	times	(MNPD,	2012,	pp.	123-4).	In	addition	to	these	infrastructural	deficits,	the	
priorities	 identified	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Aviation	 in	 the	 National	 Development	 Plan	 include	
“introduction	and	implementation	of	flight	safety	rules	and	standards,	review	of	all	existing	rules	
and	regulations	to	meet	FAA	and	ICAO	standards,	formulation	and	implementation	of	a	national	
air	transport	policy,	and	improvement	of	the	overall	regulatory	framework”	of	aviation	(MNPD,	
2012,	pp.	124-5).		
																																								 																				
198	Given	the	fragile	security	situation	in	the	region,	the	most	pressing	conformance	in	this	regard	which	
Somaliland	seeks	to	implement	in	that	which	relates	to	safety.	
199	Interviewee	70	September	05,	2014.	Senior	Official	-	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
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As	 can	 be	 seen	 here,	 these	 priorities	 are	 designed	 to	 enable	 the	 state	 to	 conform	 to	 the	
international	 standards	 for	air	navigation.	As	 such,	 they	can	be	understood	as	an	attempt	 in	
which	the	state	is	trying	to	legitimise	its	presence	in	international	arenas.	The	airport	authorities	
argue	that	they	would	be	regionally	competitive	if	they	take	the	level	of	compliance	to	grade	9	
within	four	months.200		
7.5 Expropriation	Rationale	and	Resistance		
In	the	light	of	the	above,	the	authorities	are	pursuing	to	implement	two	forms	of	boundaries,	
the	first	of	which	is	the	immediate	airport	security	fence	at	a	distance	of	approximately	400m	
away	from	the	runway.	The	second	is	the	airport	boundary	requiring	an	additional	1200m.	While	
unoccupied	land	for	meeting	these	requirements	 is	not	available	on	the	Northern	side	of	the	
airport	 due	 to	 the	 heavily	 built	 up	 nature	 of	 the	 area,	 vacant	 land	 for	 possible	 expansion	 is	
available	in	all	the	other	three	directions	but	this	is	mostly	privately	owned	land,	except	for	few	
areas	–	such	as	the	Eidagale	clan	settlement	area	-	in	which	the	government	contests	legitimacy	
of	ownership.201	The	claims	to	the	land	were	both	formal	legal	entitlements	as	well	as	traditional	
customary	rights.		Claimants/owners	can	be	categorised	into	1)	people	who	bought	the	land	and	
hold	papers	from	both	the	government	and	the	sellers,	2)	people	who	inherited	the	land	from	
their	parents	and	claim	that	they	have	been	staying	in	the	land	as	far	back	as	during	the	colonial	
time	but	who	do	not	hold	papers	to	ascertain	their	claims,	and	3)	people	who	hold	legal	papers	
from	 the	 previous	 governments	 but	 the	 grounds	 on	 which	 the	 land	 was	 given	 remains	
dubious.202	As	stated	above,	most	of	these	people	were	unemployed	members	of	the	Eidagale	
clan	(plus	some	prominent	Eidagale	figures	and	a	few	non-Eidagale).	
In	2012,	the	government	ordered	the	demarcation	of	the	airport	boundary	and	construction	of	
a	security	fence.	Seven	senior	government	officials	were	appointed	as	a	select	committee	for	
this	 task	 (Somaliland	 Post,	 2015).	 These	 included	 the	Ministers	 of	 Aviation,	 Defence,	 Public	
Works,	 Interior,	 Presidency,	 and	 Health	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Director	 General	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Aviation’s	and	 the	Mayor.	Soon	after	 its	 formation,	 the	committee	called	 for	a	meeting	with	
landowners	around	the	airport.	They	put	forward	two	points	for	discussion:	1)	the	rerouting	of	
																																								 																				
200	Ibid.	
201	Ibid.	
202	Papers	obtained	due	to	corruption	or	other	administrative	malpractices	such	nepotism.			
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the	white	road,	which	is	a	gravelled	rough	road	connecting	Somaliland	with	the	Ethiopian	Somali	
region	 and	 2)	 the	 demarcation	 of	 the	 airport	 boundaries.	 Initially,	 the	 landowners’	
representatives	were	adamant	to	engage	in	the	discussion	about	the	expansion	of	the	airport,	
as	they	sensed	that	they	were	losing	land	gradually	to	the	ever-shifting	boundary	of	the	airport.	
According	to	one	of	the	land-owners	who	attended	the	meeting,	they	told	the	officials	that:			
decisions	regarding	the	white	road	involve	much	more	than	the	communities	
in	and	around	the	airport	as	the	route	goes	as	far	as	Ethiopia.	On	the	other	
issue	 of	 demarcation,	 we	 told	 them	 that	 the	 airport	 boundary	 has	 been	
demarcated	 three	 times	 before	 by	 various	 administrations	 including	 the	
colonial,	post-colonial	 Somali	administration	and	post-conflict	government	
under	the	leadership	of	Egal.	We	cannot	continue	losing	our	land	all	the	time	
because	 of	 policies	 introduced	 by	 every	 new	 regime	 in	 the	 name	 of	
development.203	
According	to	Munene	(2012),	development	projects	serve	as	a	means	through	which	state	image	
is	 improved	 and	 deficit	 in	 political	 legitimacy	 is	 mitigated.	 For	 instance,	 the	 central	 state	
tolerance	for	political	elites’	mobilisation	of	local	resources	for	universities	in	Kenya	via	ethnic	
communities	was	seen	as	a	means	of	trying	to	fill	the	legitimacy	gap	in	the	state.204	The	airport	
development	project	can	be	viewed	through	a	similar	lens	as	it	was	advanced	on	the	basis	of	
national	interest	while	the	real	motive	may	have	been	to	achieve	a	greater	political	legitimacy.	
Evidence	for	this	can	be	found	in	the	manner	in	which	the	state	sought	to	convince	land-owners	
to	accept	the	need	for	expansion.	The	land-owners	demand	was	to	retain	their	land	rights	or	get	
full	 compensation	 in	 line	with	 urban	 land	market	 values.	 In	 a	 bid	 to	 loosen	 the	 community	
representatives’	stand	on	the	issue,	the	state	overemphasised	the	greater	development	good	
that	can	result	from	the	airport	expansion	in	a	meeting	[whose	exact	date	interviewees	did	not	
recall	but	approximated	at	Feb	2012]	between	government	officials	and	land	owners.	However,	
as	land-owners’	representatives	were	increasingly	unconvinced	about	the	generic	discussion	on	
the	greater	good	and	economic	growth	advanced	in	the	meeting,	government	representatives	
																																								 																				
203	Interviewee	53	March	30,	2014.	Farmer.	
204	The	state	suffered	from	lack	of	political	legitimacy	since	its	establishment	in	1963.	See	(Munene,	2012).	
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felt	 compelled	 to	 divulge	 some	 of	 the	 specifics	 of	 such	 benefits.	 According	 to	 one	 of	 the	
attendees	in	the	meeting,	the	state	officials	pointed	out	that	some	of	the	land	in	question:		
would	 be	 used	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 major	 hotels	 and	 other	 executive	
housing	 schemes	 which	 will	 boost	 the	 image	 of	 the	 city	 and	 provide	
dignitaries	and	other	 important	guests	a	secure	environment	within	which	
they	could	undertake	their	dealings	in	Somaliland.205	
Nonetheless,	 most	 of	 those	 in	 the	meeting	 remained	 unconvinced	 about	 the	 government’s	
claims.	The	government	attempted	from	the	beginning	to	involve	traditional	leaders.	According	
to	 Bennett	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 in	 circumstances	 where	 the	 state	 is	 emerging	 from	 a	 post-conflict	
context,	traditional	authorities’	power	and	legitimacy	is	reduced,	resulting	in	defiance	of	their	
orders.206	This	does	not,	however,	mean	that	legitimacy	shifts	to	elected	bodies,	partly	because		
traditional	authorities’	power	emanates	primarily	from	their	 lineage	and	therefore	cannot	be	
replaced	by	elected	representation.	While	on	the	one	hand	some	strands	of	the	literature	point	
to	increasing	concern	about	the	reduced	public	image	of	traditional	institutions	in	post-conflict	
contexts	(Gundel,	2006),	their	vitality	is	on	the	other	hand	emphasised	significantly	(Jeng,	2014).	
It	is	also	important	to	acknowledge	that	this	largely	depends	on	the	context,	as	in	some	cases	
traditional	authorities	emerge	with	 increased	 legitimacy.	Regardless	of	whether	 legitimacy	of	
customary	institutions	is	reduced	or	not,	non-state	actors’	cooperation	with	the	state	is	vital	for	
voluntary	compliance	with	rules	and	regulations	in	a	context	of	fragility.	In	the	case	of	the	airport	
expansion,	 such	 cooperation	 is	 however	 unlikely	 to	 produce	 voluntary	 compliance	 as	 the	
relationship	 between	 land-owners	 and	 the	 state	 is	 characterised	 by	mutual	mistrust.	 This	 is	
because	of	the	history	of	expansion,	in	each	three	phases	of	which,	land-owners	in	the	area	were	
negatively	affected.		
One	of	the	land-owners	who	spoke	in	a	press	conference,	on	the	16th	of	December	2013,	pointed	
out	that	they	are	fed	up	with	the	expansions	as	they	keep	on	loosing	land	to	the	state,	all	in	the	
name	of	development.	Another	old	man,	Tahir	Ali	Barre	added	that	 the	colonial	government	
asked	 for	 a	 land	 in	 which	 it	 could	 build	 an	 airport	 and	 they	 provided	 space.	 The	 post-
independence	Somali	government	also	asked	for	further	space	to	store	military	hardware	and	
																																								 																				
205	Interviewee	44	April	18,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
206	For	example,	some	people	may	remove	fences	or	refuse	to	honour	orders	banning	them	for	entry	in	a	
particular	piece	of	public	land.	
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they	also	granted	their	request.	And	because	of	this	they	cannot	accept	any	further	loss	of	land	
and	will	defend	against	anybody	who	tries	to	force	them	out	(Hussein,	2013).	Much	of	the	land-
owners’	resistance	is	informed	by	growing	suspicions	about	the	legitimacy	of	state	claims	-		not	
only	the	nature	of	the	expansion	itself,	but	the	extent	to	which	the	government’s	rationale	for	
land	expropriation	is	genuine.	In	other	words,	this	suspicion	provides	land-owners	grounds	on	
which	 they	 can	 resist	 the	 government’s	 intention	 to	 expropriate	 their	 land.	 They	 allege	 that	
prominent	politicians	want	to	take	advantage	of	the	situation	and	expropriate	land	greater	than	
what	is	needed,	so	as	to	misappropriate	them	later.207		Another	interviewee	who	is	also	a	land-
owner	added:	
they're	telling	us	the	government	may	need	this	land	in	the	future	so	it	has	to	
remain	vacant	but	we	don't	know	how	long	that	future	is	going	to	be…	is	it	
100	years,	10	years,	or	eternal.	This	is	unacceptable.	It	doesn't	make	sense.	
Worst	of	all,	consideration	for	foreign	guests	 is	not	something	that	can	be	
justified	for	the	expropriation	of	land	from	the	public.208	
Poor	 strategies	 and	 coordination	 coupled	 with	 inconsistent	 land	 administrative	 practices	
provided	the	land-owners	with	the	necessary	justification	for	entrenching	their	doubt	over	the	
legitimacy	of	state	actions.	This	is	because	planning	permission	for	urban	residency	was	granted	
for	some	of	the	land	in	question	(particularly	that	which	was	previously	classified	as	agricultural	
land).	 It	 involved	designating	30	percent	of	the	planned	land	for	public	purposes,	 in	 line	with	
urban	development	guidelines.	Despite	conforming	to	these	rules	and	obtaining	the	necessary	
papers	for	turning	this	land	into	residential	settlements,	some	of	the	land-owners	are	furious	
with	 the	 prospect	 of	 facing	 eviction.	 Moreover,	 multiple	 institutions	 are	 involved	 in	 the	
proposed	land	expropriation,	confusing	the	mainly	illiterate	land	owners.	On	the	one	hand	the	
military	 is	 putting	 pressure	 on	 the	 land	 owners	 by	 extending	 their	 bases	 beyond	 the	 main	
security	fence	while	on	the	other	the	Ministry	of	Aviation	in	tandem	with	the	Ministry	of	Public	
Works	are	pushing	the	airport	boundaries.	Dealing	with	these	institutions	separately	puts	the	
residents	in	the	area	under	a	great	deal	of	pressure,	as	each	one	of	them	requires	the	fulfilment	
of	certain	regulations	and	bureaucracy.	One	of	the	land-owners	pointed	out	that:	
																																								 																				
207	Interviewee	44	April	18,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
208	Interviewee	53	March	30,	2014.	Farmer.	
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to	register	land,	legalise	rightful	ownership	and	then	threaten	to	evict	people	
are	things	that	cannot	logically	go	together.	There	are	20	different	laws	and	
institutions	 from	which	we	 had	 to	 seek	 legalisation,	 bearing	 in	mind	 that	
whenever	we	need	something	from	them,	they	all	required	revenues	for	the	
services	provided,	yet	compliance	with	these	rules	do	not	give	any	protection.	
How	are	we	then	expected	to	trust	the	state?	.209	
As	the	mistrust	between	the	state	and	land	owners	grew,	public	officials	adopted	a	dual	strategy	
in	which	on	 the	one	hand	 they	engaged	 in	a	dialogue	with	 land	owners,	acknowledged	 local	
people’s	 land	 ownership	 and	 sought	 a	 negotiated	 settlement.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 they	 also	
threatened	 land	 owners	 with	 forceful	 eviction	 and	 threw	 doubt	 on	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 local	
people’s	land	ownership	by	saying	that	the	government	has	the	right	to	use	public	land	for	public	
use,	 insinuating	 that	 the	 land	 is	 not	 owned.210	 Furthermore,	 they	 also	 made	 inflammatory	
remarks	through	the	media,	increasing	the	rift	between	the	two	sides.	For	instance,	the	Minister	
for	Civil	Aviation	was	allegedly	quoted	in	an	article	published	in	a	local	newspaper,	as	saying	that	
the	local	people	want	to	loot	the	airport	land.	Such	remarks	had	allegedly	dire	consequences	on	
the	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	local	people	whose	cooperation	is	deemed	vital	for	
airport	safety	at	a	time	when	the	state	security	apparatus	are	ill	equipped	to	deal	with	the	recent	
threats	 in	 the	 region,	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 necessary	 training	 and	 equipment	 resulting	 from	 the	
country’s	 lack	of	 international	recognition.211	From	1997	to	2012	before	the	conflict	erupted,	
the	people	in	the	area	had	a	cooperative	relationship	with	authorities	as	they	often	informed	
them	about	any	security	problems	in	the	area.	Another	land-owner	asserts	that:	
people	 [land	 owners]	 have	 always	 been	 a	 protection	 for	 the	 airport	 from	
1997.	 They	 guaranteed	 the	 security	 of	 the	 airport	 and	 therefore	 security	
cannot	 be	 used	 as	 a	 justification	 for	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 very	 people	who	
protected	the	airport.212		
																																								 																				
209	Ibid.	
210	Ibid.	
211	Interviewee	70	September	05,	2014.	Senior	Official	-	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
212	Interviewee	51	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
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While	 land-owners	 complain	 about	 the	 government’s	 lack	 of	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 role	 the	 local	
communities	 play	 in	 the	 security	 of	 the	 airport,	 the	 government	 on	 its	 part	 insists	 that	 it	 is	
making	compromises	precisely	in	order	to	safeguard	trust	and	cooperation	with	the	locals.	For	
instance,	the	government	officials	claim	that	there	is	a	significant	delay	to	the	implementation	
of	the	airport	expansion	project	partly	as	a	result	of	avoiding	actions	that	could	jeopardise	their	
relationship	with	the	local	people.	One	of	the	officials	said:		
compromises	are	made	on	the	grounds	that	we	need	the	people	for	security	
purposes.	We	 also	 give	 jobs	 to	 the	 local	 people…all	 the	 people	 doing	 the	
menial	jobs	come	from	the	local	area.	Nobody	competes	with	them	as	far	as	
the	menial	jobs	are	concerned.	That's	basically	to	create	a	relationship	based	
on	trust	between	the	ministry	and	the	people.213		
Contrary	to	the	government’s	claim	of	caution	and	care,	the	construction	of	the	airport	has	cut	
off	people	in	the	area	from	accessing	not	only	job	opportunities,	but	also	essential	services	such	
as	zaribas	(local	grocery	markets),	schools	and	health	facilities.	This	is	because	the	routes	they	
used	 to	 use	 for	 accessing	 the	 city	 are	 now	 closed	 and	 alternative	 routes	 have	 not	 been	
provided.214	 Speaking	 to	 the	 media,	 residents	 in	 the	 area	 claim	 that	 they	 have	 raised	 their	
concerns	with	the	authorities	but	nothing	was	thus	far	done.	One	of	the	residents	pleaded	with	
authorities	to	grant	“passage	for	their	children,	sick	people,	and	those	who	want	to	go	to	the	
city	for	basic	services	which	are	not	available	in	the	area"(Togaherer	News,	2016).	Civil	aviation	
officials	however	claim	that	they	are	working	on	these	issues	and	they	have	already	written	to	
relevant	authorities	to	make	essential	services	available	in	the	area.	For	instance,	they	claim	that	
they	requested	the	local	government,	Ministry	of	Health	and	an	Islamic	NGO215	to,	respectively,	
construct	a	zariba,	Mother	and	Child	Health	Centers	(MCH)	and	mosque	for	the	people	in	the	
area.	 Discussions	 were	 also	 underway,	 according	 to	 airport	 officials	 at	 the	 time	 of	 data	
collection,	 for	 hiring	 a	 bus	 that	 takes	 children	 in	 the	 area	 to	 their	 respective	 schools	 while	
awaiting	provision	of	these	amenities.216		
																																								 																				
213	Interviewee	70	September	05,	2014.	Senior	Official	-	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
214	Interviewee	51	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
215	Led	by	Sh	Mohamed	Ali	Geddi,	a	prominent	local	figure	in	the	non-profit	sector.		
216	Interviewee	70	September	05,	2014.	Senior	Official	-	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
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These	promises	 are	mostly	 disregarded	by	 the	predominantly	 Eidagale	 residents	 in	Uubaale,	
who	see	the	state	as	uncaring	and	unsympathetic,	which	only	takes	from	the	citizens	but	doesn’t	
give	back.	This	view	is	partly	created	by	the	government’s	traditional	poor	service	delivery	in	the	
area	but	was	more	 recently	 activated	by	 the	anticipated	 land	expropriation	process	 that	 fell	
short	 of	 people’s	 expectation	 from	 the	 post-Barre	 administrations.	 According	 to	 Nora	 and	
Réginas	(2014,	p.	23),	perception	of	“state	legitimacy	depends	on	the	degree	to	which	specific	
societal	expectations	are	perceived	as	being	met	by	a	specific	state	institution	in	the	eyes	of	a	
specific	 group	 of	 people	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 specific	 process	 in	 comparison	 with	 specific	
alternatives”.	Such	particularities	of	experiences	and	how	these	shape	people’s	perception	of	
the	 state	 resonate	 well	 with	 the	 situation	 in	 Somaliland	 where	 experiences	 with	 past	
administrations	are	used	as	key	signifiers	for	how	governments	should	or	should	not	behave.	
This	is	because	some	of	the	land-owners	point	out	that	this	is	the	first	time	they	faced	a	large-
scale	eviction	over	a	period	of	three	different	governments.	One	of	the	farmers	was	quick	to	
point	out	that	the	current	situation	compares	unfavourably	with	the	colonial	era	as:		
the	colonial	government	never	used	to	bother	us….and	they	never	pressured	
us	to	register	land.217	
Another	aged	resident	in	the	area	reinforced	this	claim,	saying	that	a	white	man	visited	them	
during	the	colonial	time	and	asked	them:		
who	owns	the	camel	in	there?	and	we	replied	that	it	belongs	to	a	disabled	
man.	 Then	 he	 asked	 further	 how	 is	 it	 possible	 that	 a	 disabled	man	 herds	
camel,	to	which	we	replied	he	is	assisted	by	his	wife	and	brothers-in-law.	He	
then	went	to	the	disabled	man	and	requested	him	to	move	out	of	the	airport	
vicinity	because	of	the	fact	that	his	camels	wonder	about	the	runways.	But	
the	disabled	man	told	him	that	he	cannot	move	out	of	the	area	because	of	
the	fact	that	this	is	his	land	and	all	his	ancestors	are	buried	in	the	area.	Then	
the	white	man	left	him	alone	and	said	to	him,	please	keep	your	animals	out	
of	the	runway.218		
																																								 																				
217	Interviewee	45	April	22,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
218	Interviewee	43	April	22,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
178	|	P a g e 	
	
	
Struggles	 against	 the	 military	 regime	 and	 associated	 memories	 which	 resonate	 with	 many	
people	in	the	city	are	also	used	as	a	way	of	legitimising	people’s	right	for	opposing	expropriation	
and	retaining	land	ownership.	The	state	in	this	regard	is	painted	as	being	guilty	of	committing	
the	same	governance	malpractices	that	undermined	the	previous	regime.	One	of	the	farmers	
pointed	out	that:	
The	reason	why	we	fought	against	Barre	was	injustice….	we	finally	managed	
to	liberate	our	land	and	properties	from	those	who	occupied	or	expropriated	
them	illegally.	We	were	not	expecting	the	same	from	this	government.	Let	
them	know	that	we	cannot	give	up	our	land	which	our	brothers,	cousins,	and	
uncles	have	died	for	liberating.	Each	meter	of	this	land	costs	us	blood.219	
Similar	sentiments	are	echoed	by	the	famous	playwright	Ahmed	Suleiman	Bidde	who	told	the	
media	that	many	of	the	forefathers	of	 the	current	residents	died	"trying	to	 liberate	this	 land	
from	the	military	regime.	He	asserts	that	he	cannot	fathom	how	could	anybody	dare	to	tell	them	
to	move	away	from	their	land".	He	concluded	that	if	the	President	was	made	to	sign	a	decree	
ordering	the	removal	of	people	from	their	 land	by	some	Ministers	with	ulterior	motives,	“we	
have	God	on	their	side	who	signed	the	land	for	us”	(Hussein,	2013).	Moreover,	the	role	the	local	
clans	played	 in	 the	 construction	of	 the	airport	 is	 also	evoked	as	 reminder	 that	 the	airport	 is	
rooted	in	the	history	of	the	community.220	One	of	the	land-owners	said	that:	
people	from	here	contributed	to	the	construction	of	the	airport	as	the	colonial	
government	enlisted	workers	from	this	clan.	The	whole	airport	you	see	today	
was	only	consisting	of	the	tower	and	un-tarmacked	runway.	It	is	surprising	
that	this	government	wants	to	remove	the	settlement	that	contributed	to	the	
airport	development	and	wants	to	evict	us	without	compensation.221		
																																								 																				
219	Interviewee	45	April	22,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
220	Ibid.	
221	Interviewee	39	June	05,	2014.	Playright.	
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7.6 Mediation,	Valuation	and	Compensation		
As	the	conflicts	between	the	state	and	local	Eidagale	landowners	deteriorated,	the	government	
embarked	on	an	effort	aimed	at	defusing	 the	 tension	 through	 intermediary	 institutions.	This	
divergence	from	its	previous	course	indicates	that	the	government	realised	the	low	level	of	trust	
it	enjoys	among	the	people	(mainly	Garhajis	clans	in	general	and	Eidgale	in	particular)	in	the	area	
and	decided	to	legitimise	the	process	by	bringing	in	other	actors	who	might	help	in	this	regard.		
Johnson	and	Hutchison	 (2012)	argue	 that	hybrid	political	orders	where	 statutory	 institutions	
work	in	tandem	with	non-state	actors	such	as	the	customary	institutions	can	result	in	greater	
legitimacy	as	they	increase	people's	trust	in	the	state.	In	the	same	move,	the	state	in	Somaliland	
also	enlisted	the	help	of	various	community-based	committees	to	improve	the	legitimacy	of	the	
process.	These	included	Neighbourhood	Development	Committees,	Clan	Elders’	Committee	and	
Akils’	and	Sultans’	Committee.	Among	the	Akils	and	the	Sultan	involved	included,	Rashid	Jambiir,	
Abdirizaq	Mohamed	Askar,	Akil	Abdi	Weli,	and	Akil	Hersi.	The	Director	General	of	the	Ministry	
of	Aviation	pointed	out	that:	
the	reason	we	involved	all	these	committees	was	to	ensure	that	if	the	land	
owners	are	wrong	they	should	be	contained	and	if	we	are	wrong	we	should	
be	 told	 that	we	are	wrong.	 So	 in	many	cases,	 these	 third	party	mediators	
were	able	to	confront	the	land	owners	and	tell	the	truth.	They	were	also	able	
to	reach	us	with	complaints	from	the	land	owners.222	
The	 legitimacy	of	 the	 third-party	mediation	was	however	undermined	by	suspicions	 that	 the	
state	was	using	 them	 instrumentally	 (or	 indeed	of	 setting	 them	up	as	 tools)	with	 the	aim	of	
smoothening	the	stance	taken	by	 land-owners.	For	 instance,	the	government	was	accused	of	
financing	the	Committee	for	the	Resolution	of	the	Airport	Conflict	whose	existence	land-owners	
became	 aware	 of,	 after	 members	 of	 another	 neighbourhood	 development	 committee	 they	
contacted	 to	mediate	 informed	 them	that	 the	government	was	unwilling	 to	meet	 them	as	 it	
endorsed	 another	 committee	 for	 the	 mediation	 process.223	 At	 one	 point,	 members	 of	 this	
government-endorsed	 Committee	 for	 the	 Resolution	 of	 the	 Airport	 Conflict	 approached	 the	
local	communities	but	failed	to	make	any	meaningful	breakthrough	partly	because	land-owners	
																																								 																				
222	Interviewee	71	September	05,	2014.	Ministry	of	Aviation	-	Official.	
223	Interviewee	42	April	15,	2014.	Lawyer	-	Farmer's	Son.	
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saw	them	as	a	proxy	through	which	the	government	wants	to	take	their	land.	One	of	the	land-
owners	asserted	that:	
there	 was	 a	 substantial	 disagreement	 between	 us	 and	 this	 committee.	
Charging	from	the	way	they	were	speaking,	we	thought	that	these	people	
were	representing	the	government	rather	than	being	mediators.	We	do	not	
recognise	their	impartiality	to	mediate	between	us	and	the	government.	They	
have	 not	 been	 fair	 from	 the	 beginning.	 They	 were	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	
government.	 Usually	 Akils	 should	 be	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 people	 not	 the	
government	and	we	cannot	accept	their	mediation.224	
The	mediation,	 compensation	and	valuation	process	 for	 the	 land	and	property	expropriation	
around	the	airport	was	characterised	by	a	struggle	for	legitimacy.	At	the	heart	of	this	struggle	
lay	the	state’s	attempt	to	take	over	land	in	the	most	efficient	and	effective	manner	amid	stiff	
opposition	from	dedicated	group	of	vocal	land-owners	who	are	avowed	to	retain	their	land	or	
get	 the	 highest	market	 value	 in	 the	 shortest	 time	possible,	 and	who	 also	 spoke	 for	 broader	
community	of	local	poor.	In	the	beginning	the	government	seemed	to	have	favoured	a	process	
in	which	it	deals	with	land-owners	on	an	individual	basis.	But	the	state	soon	changed	its	mind	
when	it	realised	that	it	would	be	administratively	easier	to	deal	with	representatives	not	only	
for	negotiating	with	the	land-owners	in	the	mediation	process	but	also	registering	the	number	
of	land	owners	in	the	area.	Additionally,	the	government	may	have	feared	that	people	will	take	
the	law	into	their	hands	and	wanted	to	have	a	channel	through	which	communication	could	be	
maintained	to	calm	the	situation	down.	Nevertheless,	this	change	in	mind	coupled	with	growing	
realisation	among	the	land-owners	about	the	danger	apparent	in	lack	of	unity	paved	the	way	for	
the	 formation	 of	 the	 Land	 Owners	 Committee.	 As	 the	 government	 did	 not	 have	 an	 easily	
searchable	record	of	land	ownership	in	the	areas,	the	land	owners’	committee	helped	it	enlist	
the	list	of	claimants/owners.	
As	 the	 current	 formal	 judicial	 landscape	 in	 the	 country	 is	 ill	 equipped	 to	 deal	with	 disputes	
between	the	government	and	the	public,	the	newly	formed	Land	Owners	Committee	realised	
that	very	 limited	formal	options	exist	 if	any	for	the	 land-owners	to	complain	about	or	 legally	
resist	 the	 state’s	 intention	 to	 expropriate	 their	 land.	 As	 a	 result,	 they	 considered	 various	
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mechanisms	 to	 mitigate	 the	 expropriation	 threats	 including	 both	 customary	 and	 statutory	
adjudication	systems.	But	one	of	the	key	obstacles	to	accessing	state	institutions	was	that	they	
were	unable	to	affords	the	lawyers’	fees.	According	to	one	of	the	committee	members,	they:		
were	 unable	 to	 access	 state	 institutions…only	 those	 who	 have	 influence	
among	the	society	are	welcomed	in	government	offices.	It	is	difficult	for	us	to	
meet	government	officials.	State	courts	are	corrupt	and	we	do	not	believe	
that	 they	 will	 bring	 about	 any	 resolution	 to	 this	 conflict.	 If	 we	 have	 had	
effective	statutory	justice	system,	we	would	have	not	needed	committees	or	
elders	for	mediation.225	
Given	the	landowners’	scepticism	about	the	ability	of	the	formal	judicial	system	to	address	their	
problem,	they	have	on	several	occasions	made	attempts	aimed	at	exploring	the	possibility	of	
bringing	about	political	intervention,	but	they	often	had	difficulties	in	getting	audience	with	key	
decision	makers.	At	one	point	in	early	2013,	they	managed	to	register	their	complaint	with	the	
then	powerful	Minister	of	 the	Presidency,	Hersi	Haji	Ali.	This	was	 followed	by	meetings	held	
approximately	in	May	2013	(facilitated	by	influential	clan	elders,	politicians	and	religious	figures	
from	Garhajis),	in	which	the	government	accepted	that	there	were	some	malpractices	in	the	way	
the	case	was	handled	by	both	the	Ministry	of	Aviation	and	the	Ministry	of	Defence.	But	those	
negotiations	stalled	due	to	the	departure	of	some	key	Ministers	–	who	were	instrumental	in	the	
mediation	–	from	the	government.	The	failure	of	these	attempts	seems	to	have	convinced	land-
owners	 that	 they	 do	 not	 stand	 a	 good	 chance	 of	 resolving	 their	 case	 through	 the	 formal	
government	institutions.	Moreover,	they	also	seemed	sceptical	of	the	statutory	judicial	system	
due	to	the	existence	of	legal	loopholes	that	the	government	can	use	against	them.	For	instance,	
the	Agricultural	Land	Law	stipulates	that	anybody	who	did	not	pay	taxes	for	his/her	land	cannot	
claim	compensation	for	such	land	from	the	government.		
As	land-owners’	manoeuvres	for	intervention	from	both	the	state	and	non-state	actors	failed	to	
bring	about	any	meaningful	resolution	to	the	problem	and	the	prospect	of	violent	encounter	
loomed,	the	Minister	of	Aviation,	Mohamoud	Hashi,	called	for	a	meeting	with	those	affected	by	
the	airport	expansion	on	the	22nd	of	February,	2013.	He	informed	them	about	the	government’s	
intention	 to	 buy	 the	 land	 at	 current	market	 values.	 The	Minister	made	 such	 remarks	 in	 the	
																																								 																				
225	Interviewee	42	April	15,	2014.	Lawyer	-	Farmer's	Son.	
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presence	of	Sultan	Mohammed	and	other	notable	figures	from	the	Eidagale	clan.	He	also	said	
that	 they	 will	 process	 payment	 for	 the	 land-owners	 who	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 initial	 400m	
expansion	while	 those	affected	by	 the	1200m	expansion	will	have	 their	 claims	 recorded	and	
negotiations	 about	 possible	 solution	 will	 commence	 soon.226	 For	 the	 land-owners	 this	 was	
welcome	but	while	awaiting	further	details	on	the	specifics	of	this	proposal,	the	Minister	made	
provocative	 remarks	 in	 the	 media,	 accusing	 Eidagale	 clan	 members	 of	 undermining	 the	
government’s	effort	to	expand	the	airport,	a	charge	that	infuriated	the	Uubaale	residents	and	
prompted	doubts	over	the	seriousness	of	the	state	about	the	resolution	of	the	issues	amicably.	
Many	 felt	 this	was	 a	U-turn	 in	 the	 government’s	 position	 in	 the	 land	 conflict,	which	 greatly	
undermined	their	trust	in	the	government.	
Lack	 of	 financial	 resources	 for	 adequate	 legal	 representation	 is	 also	 one	 of	 the	 other	major	
obstacles	that	inhibit	land-owners	from	using	the	formal	judicial	system.	This	makes	customary	
institutions	 the	 most	 crucial	 avenue	 of	 mediation	 available	 to	 land	 owners.	 It	 is	 however	
important	 to	point	out	 that	 the	manner	 in	which	 traditional	 authorities	 resolve	 issues	 is	not	
always	just	or	convenient	for	poor	people.	In	other	words,	traditional	institutions	at	times	reach	
decisions	without	consulting	the	stakeholders.	For	instance,	in	May	2013,	the	Sultan	of	Eidagale	
clan,	Mohamed,	stated	that	his	people	(landowners)	are	willing	to	give	up	some	of	their	 land	
(i.e.	that	which	is	located	within	400m)	subject	to	the	government’s	acceptance	to	compensate	
land	within	the	1200m	radius.	Land-owners	point	out	that	the	Sultan	made	a	huge	mistake	by	
issuing	 this	 statement	 and	 they	 do	 not	 share	 his	 views.	 One	 of	 the	 reasons	why	 this	 is	 not	
practical,	they	say,	is	the	fact	that	there	are	people	who	will	not	have	any	land	remaining	for	
them	when	the	400m	is	given	to	the	government	free	of	charge.	For	instance,	there	is	a	guy	who	
sold	his	land	to	48	different	people	holding	notary	signed	agreements.	His	only	remaining	land	
is	 located	within	 the	400m.	 If	 the	government	expropriates	 this	 land	without	 compensation,	
people	like	him	will	go	empty	handed.	
This	latest	meeting	followed	by	an	increased	presence	of	security	forces	in	the	area.227	Several	
warnings,	stating	that	land-owners	will	face	dire	consequences	should	they	try	to	stop	or	tamper	
with	the	construction	of	the	new	airport	fence,	were	issued.	These	threats	were	apparently	not	
only	aimed	at	softening	the	land-owners’	stand	in	the	mediation	process	but	also	designed	to	
																																								 																				
226	Interviewee	39	June	05,	2014.	Playright.	
227	In	a	bid	to	show	how	serious	the	government	is	about	expanding	the	airport	boundary.	
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change	their	perception	of	the	state	as	weak.	While	there	is	evidence	in	the	literature	about	the	
relationship	 between	 states’	 capability	 and	 people’s	 perception	 thereof	 (Hutchison	 and	
Johnson,	2011),	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	threats	of	this	nature	contributed	to	adverse	
perceptions	of	the	state	as	they	are	associated	with	the	former	socialist	dictatorial	regime	which	
often	used	force	to	implement	policies	and	decisions.	As	such,	they	form	the	basis	on	which	the	
legitimacy	of	state	governance	practices	are	questioned.	The	stalemate	between	land-owners	
and	 the	state	was	 further	exasperated	by	 the	 issuance	of	a	presidential	decree	 in	 June	2014	
prohibiting	sale,	inheritance,	subdivision,	and	transfer	of	land	within	1200m	of	the	airport.	Land-
owners	in	Uubaale	saw	this	as	infringing	on	their	right	and	life	in	the	city,	bearing	in	mind	the	
fact	that	land	is	the	only	source	of	income	for	some	of	the	residents	in	the	area.		But	the	fact	
that	land	is	increasingly	becoming	an	important	way	of	negotiating	economic	space	in	the	city	
provided	the	government	with	a	line	of	argument	to	discredit	land	ownership	claims.	One	of	the	
Ministry	of	Public	Works	officials	said:			
These	people	are	not	 legitimate	 land-owners.	They	are	 just	people	who	do	
not	have	other	sources	of	income	and	who	just	live	off	selling	public	land.	In	
the	past,	there	used	to	be	a	powerful	government	and	people	used	fear	the	
state	but	this	is	no	longer	the	case.228		
Taking	the	fact	that	land	is	inevitably	one	of	the	means	through	which	improvement	of	life	is	
sought	 in	 a	 city	 ravaged	 by	 poverty,	 many	 people	 regard	 the	 government’s	 attempt	 to	
expropriate	land	without	tangible	compensation	as	“moral	bankruptcy	on	the	part	of	the	state”	
according	to	both	Somali	cultural	values	and	the	Islamic	faith.	One	such	critic	of	the	state	pointed	
out	that	these	people:		
don’t	 own	 livestock	 or	 property	 and	 they	 don’t	 have	 someone	 supporting	
them	from	outside.	It	is	not	right	for	a	Minister	to	say	that	he	will	close	off	
their	land.	All	they	have	is	pieces	of	land	from	which	they	get	their	livelihoods.	
It	is	a	moral	obligation	for	the	state	to	give	reasonable	compensation,	instead	
of	stretching	its	muscle	on	these	poor	people.229		
																																								 																				
228	Interviewee	10	May	29,	2013.	Official	-	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
229	Interviewee	36	August	20,	2014.	Director	of	Civil	Unit	-	Legal	Aid	Clinic.	
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Compensation	 and	 property	 valuation	 remained	 thorny	 issues	 in	 the	 airport	 expansion	 row.	
While	the	state	sought	to	be	as	economical	as	possible	in	minimising	the	amount	of	money	spent	
on	the	compensation,	land-owners	sought	to	maximise	the	value	for	which	they	can	get	their	
land	and	property,	often	insisting	that	any	compensation	should	be	on	the	basis	of	market	value.	
In	order	to	achieve	this,	the	process	remained	not	only	controversial	in	the	sense	that	each	side	
wanted	to	legitimate	its	desires	but	also	fluid	in	the	sense	that	the	dynamics	of	the	issue	changed	
over	 time.	 For	 instance,	 the	 government	 was,	 in	 the	 beginning,	 adamant	 it	 would	 provide	
compensation	for	land	within	400m	radius.	According	to	residents	who	participated	in	some	of	
the	earlier	meetings	discussing	the	airport	expansion,	the	Minister	of	Aviation	insisted	that	the	
government	will		consider	compensation	for	built	structures	within	the	400m	radius,	albeit	only	
on	 the	basis	of	 investment	 size.230	 The	government’s	position	was	 reinforced	 in	a	 statement	
made	by	a	Sultan	speaking	on	behalf	of	land-owners	who	tried	to	bargain	with	it,	saying	they	
will	 give	 away	 land	 within	 the	 400m	 radius	 if	 the	 government	 comes	 up	 with	 reasonable	
compensation	 plan	 for	 the	 1200m	 radius.	 Land-owners	 however	 rejected	 this	 proposition,	
lambasting	the	Sultan	for	making	decisions	without	consulting	those	who	would	be	negatively	
affected	and	demanding	that	they	should	be	given	a	full	compensation,	the	absence	of	which	
will	 result	 in	 a	major	 conflict	with	 the	 government.	 Equally	 the	 land-owners	 rejected	partial	
compensation	proposed	in	the	earlier	discussions,	saying	that:	
what	the	government	is	proposing	is	that	they	will	compensate	any	structure	
within	 the	 400m	 but	 they	will	 not	 compensate	 for	 the	 land	 on	which	 the	
property	stands.	This	does	not	make	sense.	How	can	you	separate	property	
and	the	land	on	which	it	is	built?	We	acquired	the	land	before	building	the	
property	on	it.231		
For	its	part,	the	government	contests	that	the	properties	were	built	on	public	land	illegally	and	
hence	 they	 do	 not	 qualify	 for	 full	 compensation.	While	 resistance	 to	 this	 position	 remained	
strong,	 land	 owners	 have	 also	 shown	 willingness	 to	 accept	 what	 they	 called	 a	 multi-level	
compensation	strategy	in	which	the	government	firstly	compensates	or	swaps	land	with	similar	
value	 for	 original	 landowners;	 secondly,	 addresses	 possible	 tension	 between	 original	 land-
																																								 																				
230	Subject	to	variations	in	what	people	have	built	within	this	land.	Some	built	one	or	two	rooms	and	other	
built	three	rooms.	Some	also	built	small	birkas	while	others	built	big	birkas.	
231	Interviewee	44	April	18,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
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owners	and	those	who	bought	land	from	them	by	compensating	the	latter	for	both	land	value	
and	investment	made	since	then;	and	thirdly	deal	delicately		with	those	whose	land	will	entirely	
be	swallowed	by	the	airport	extension	as	such	people232	cannot	be	subjected	to	the	same	rules	
as	 those	who	may	have	greater	pieces	of	 land	 from	which	 the	government	can	obtain	 some	
through	negotiations.233	This	was	however	rejected	by	the	government	on	grounds	that	it	does	
not	have	the	financial	resources	for	making	such	a	comprehensive	compensation	for	the	400m	
radius.	It	instead	proposed	that	it	will	only	provide	compensation	for	the	1200m	of	land	when	it	
manages	to	get	the	money	needed	for	the	purchase	(It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	the	land	in	the	
1200m	radius	is	cheaper	than	the	land	within	the	immediate	surrounding	of	the	airport,	due	to	
being	further	from	the	city).	Even	though	the	government	went	on	record	to	say	that	it	lacks	the	
financial	resources	necessary	for	immediate	compensation,	land-owners	claim	that	they	were	
informally	told	that	directives	for	compensation	will	be	issued	within	four	to	six	months.	This	
promise	 was	 mainly	 interpreted	 as	 a	 delaying	 tactic	 for	 eventual	 expropriation	 without	
compensation.	As	a	result,	land-owners	insist	if	the	government	is	unable	to	provide	them	with	
compensation	within	reasonable	timeframe	(i.e.	1-12	months),	they	should	let	the	people	retain	
ownership.	Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	concrete	plans	are	yet	to	be	shared	publicly,	sources	
close	 to	 government	officials	 involved	 in	 the	process	 pointed	out	 that	 compensation	will	 be	
provided	 in	 a	 50/50	 ratio	 of	 monetary	 and	 land	 exchange.234	 In	 2014,	 the	 government	
announced	 that	 it	will	 go	 ahead	with	 the	 expropriation	 of	 land	within	 the	 400m	 radius	 and	
compensate	for	any	structures	built	in	there	for	values	determined	through	a	government-led	
land	valuation	process.	Being	one	of	the	most	challenging	aspects	of	the	compensation	process,	
the	valuation	exercise	was	heavily	contested	by	the	land-owners	who	termed	it	an	exclusivist	
process	 designed	 and	 led	 by	 government	 institutions	 without	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 land-
owners.	 The	 key	 ministries	 involved	 in	 the	 process	 were	 the	 Public	 Works,	 Aviation	 and	
																																								 																				
232	Additionally,	these	propositions	are	also	made	due	to	the	fact	that	some	people	are	unwilling	to	sell	
their	land	for	inheritance.	For	instance,	some	of	the	interviewees	said	that	“we	inherited	this	land	from	
our	forefathers	and	our	identity	is	ingrained	in	this	land.	We	also	want	to	leave	the	same	piece	of	land	to	
our	children	and	then	their	children”	it.	Interviewee	53	March	30,	2014.	Farmer.	
233	Interviewee	46	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner	-	Taxi	driver.	
234	In	other	words,	50%	will	be	compensated	for	money	while	another	50%	would	be	compensated	for	
land	of	similar	value.	
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Agriculture.235	Evaluators	listed	the	land	and	shared	copies	with	the	local	government	and	the	
Ministry	of	Public	Works.	While	 land-owners	 reject	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	evaluation	process,	
officials	involved	in	the	process	claim	that	they	have	overrated	the	properties	for	political	and	
personal	reasons.	The	Director	General	in	the	Aviation	Ministry	stated	that:		
the	evaluators	have	included	in	their	report	that	I	have	given	the	people	some	
surplus	 in	addition	to	what	was	theirs.	 If	they	had	one	traditional	mat,	we	
valued	it	as	two.	If	they	had	two	we	made	them	three.	For	instance,	we	have	
evaluated	 a	 house	 belonging	 to	 an	 old	 lady	 whose	 name	 is	 Raha	 for	
US$30,000.	If	today	she	goes	to	a	private	evaluator,	they	may	give	her	a	lot	
lesser	value.	I	was	doing	this	because	I	also	had	a	personal	responsibility	to	
the	local	people	from	whom	I	hail	236	
In	spite	of	assurances	 that	 land-owners	have	the	choice	of	consulting	private	evaluators,	 the	
government	 put	 in	 place	 strict	 guidelines.	 These	 guidelines	 require	 that	 any	 follow	 up	
evaluations	must	be	conducted	by	people	with	a	track	record	of	appraisal	exercises.	One	of	the	
officials	in	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	pointed	out	that:	
If	you	just	call	someone	from	your	clan	who	then	just	argues	I	spent	a	lot	of	
money	in	the	cement	of	your	house	therefore	it	 is	more	valuable	than	was	
given	to	you,	that	is	not	going	to	be	acceptable	means	of	evaluation	for	us.	
So	they	have	the	right	of	calling	in	an	independent	evaluator.	The	elders	will	
also	be	present	in	the	process.237		
However,	many	people	 interpret	these	requirements	as	a	strategy	aimed	at	 limiting	people’s	
ability	in	finding	land	surveyors	who	might	have	the	skills	necessary	for	property	evaluation	but	
who	do	not	meet	 the	government	benchmark	 for	expertise.	Moreover,	many	people	 cannot	
afford	this	expertise.	So	far,	the	authorities	announced	that	they	compensated	for	about	90%	of	
the	 buildings,	 birkas	 (cemented	water	 reservoirs),	 bali	 (non-cemented	water	 reservoirs)	 and	
																																								 																				
235	These	institutions	have	undertaken	the	evaluations	process	and	determined	compensation	for	various	
properties	including	farms,	birkas,	baliyo,	and	buildings.	
236	Interviewee	70	September	05,	2014.	Senior	Official	-	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
237	Interviewee	10	May	29,	2013.	Official	-	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
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farms	within	the	immediate	vicinity	of	the	airport.	They	point	out	that	11	families	were	given	a	
total	of	$300,000	while	another	30	families	await	land	swaps.	The	remaining	land	amounting	to	
800,000	m²,	was	 documented	 and	 copies	were	 sent	 to	 the	 relevant	ministries	 and	 the	 local	
council	respectively	(Somaliland	Post,	2015).	The	source	of	the	money	for	this	compensation	is	
contested.	While	 the	 government	 officials	 claim	 that	 the	 treasury	 provided	 the	 funds,	 land-
owners	 charge	 that	 the	Ministry	 of	Aviation	was	provided	with	 funds	 by	 the	 government	 of	
Kuwait	 for	 not	 only	 the	 construction	 but	 also	 for	 the	 compensation	 of	 the	 land	 to	 be	
expropriated	for	the	expansion.	The	Director	General	of	the	Ministry	of	Aviation,	Omar	Sayid	
Abdullahi	Adam,	categorically	denied	this,	saying	that	Kuwait	donated	$10m	for	Hargeisa	and	
Bebera	airports	but	 this	was	only	 for	 the	construction	of	 the	 fences	and	runways	 (Togaherer	
News,	2015).		
Those	who	fail	to	agree	to	the	government	compensation	or	refuse	to	sell	their	land	are	faced	
with	 the	harsh	 reality	of	being	evicted	 forcefully.	 The	government	 is	by	 large	unsympathetic	
about	the	use	of	force	to	implement	its	decisions.	Widespread	feelings	among	the	public	officials	
indicate	that	too	much	democracy	is	to	blame	for	the	slow	motion	of	the	expropriation	process.	
One	of	their	major	points	of	contention	in	legitimating	such	feeling	is	that	previous	regimes	had	
no	difficulties	 in	expanding	the	airport.	The	 last	of	these	was	Siyad	Barre	who	moved	people	
away	from	their	land	in	order	to	pave	way	for	the	addition	of	a	second	runway.	Land-owners	are	
quick	to	point	out	that	there	is	no	reasonable	comparison	to	be	drawn	here	because	of	the	fact	
that	the	military	government	at	the	time	was	intent	on	jailing	people	for	political	resistance	on	
the	slightest	pretext	and	did	not	dispute	land	claims	closely.	People	remembered	they	did	not	
care	 about	 whether	 the	 government	 expropriated	 land	 from	 them	 as	 it	 was	 increasingly	
becoming	apparent	that	the	regime’s	time	was	over.	They	claim	that	they	always	knew	that	the	
regime	will	be	toppled	and	people	will	get	their	land	back.238		
As	evident	above,	 the	attempt	 to	 resort	 to	 force	by	a	 supposedly	democratic	administration	
forms	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 post-conflict	 urban	 governance	 practices	 are	 delegitimised.	 For	
instance,	 forceful	 eviction	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 tantamount	 to	 authoritarianism	 akin	 to	 that	
experienced	 during	 the	 military	 regime,	 a	 formidable	 period	 through	 which	 government	
administrative	practices	are	both	legitimised	and	delegitimised.	On	the	one	hand,	this	period	is	
associated	with	state	effectiveness	and	bureaucratic	development	as	the	state	was	presumably	
																																								 																				
238	Interviewee	46	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner	-	Taxi	driver.	
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able	 to	 implement	 its	 policies	 and	 practices	 to	 the	 book,	 amid	 divided	 perception	 of	 the	
legitimacy	of	such	actions	among	the	populace.	On	the	other	hand,	this	period	is	associated	with	
suppression	and	absence	of	dialogue	between	citizens	and	the	government	as	the	state	often	
employed	 repressive	means	 to	 subdue	 any	 resistance	 to	 its	 policies	 or	 politics.	 The	 current	
state’s	 determination	 to	 show	 its	 capacity	 for	 implementing	 decisions	 and	 the	 people’s	
determination	 to	 resist	 such	 moves,	 makes	 violent	 confrontation	 almost	 imminent.	 In	 one	
instance,	 eleven	 people	 accused	 of	 breaking	 a	 deal	 which	 the	 aviation	 authorities	 have	
apparently	reached	with	land-owners	were	arrested.	Four	other	suspects	charged	with	the	same	
offense	were	also	wanted	by	the	security	agencies,	and	sought	refuge	in	the	house	of	a	Sultan	
who	requested	the	security	agencies	to	pardon	the	suspects.	This	crime	was	in	relation	to	the	
prohibition	against	tampering	with	the	airport	fence,	breach	of	which	will	allows	officials	from	
the	 Ministry	 to’	 seek	 their	 rights	 from	 the	 state’.	 Land-owners	 deny	 the	 existence	 of	 this	
agreement.239	In	another	instance,	serious	violence	almost	erupted	between	land-owners	and	
security	 forces	as	the	government	tried	to	stop	the	digging	of	birka	 in	a	 land	adjacent	to	the	
Southern	side	of	the	airport.240		
The	residents	in	the	area	and	military	units	almost	clashed	in	late	2012	when	the	government	
officials	side-stepped	ongoing	discussions	and	deployed	surveyors	and	construction	workers	in	
contradiction	 to	 earlier	 understanding	 that	 the	 government	 will	 not	 take	 unilateral	 action.	
According	 to	 a	 local	 resident,	 government	 officials	 came	with	 construction	 technicians	 who	
started	surveying	the	area	without	the	consent	of	the	local	land-owners.	When	residents	asked	
about	what	is	going	on,	they	were	told	that	the	officials	will	come	back	for	discussion.	In	a	few	
days’	time,	military	units	moved	in	the	area	and	set	up	a	fence,	saying	that	they	will	not	allow	
any	 body	 to	 trespass.	 Some	 of	 the	 residents	 defied	 this	 order	 and	went	 to	 see	 the	military	
officials	to	enquire	about	their	presence	but	were	detained	for	breaching	the	government	order.	
One	of	the	people	who	was	detained	in	the	skirmish	said:			
I	was	arrested	in	the	barrack	and	threatened	because	of	my	opposition	to	the	
military	presence.	The	problem	started	when	I	was	told	to	move	away	but	I	
resisted	and	I	told	them	that	I	am	not	going	to	be	a	balloon	that	goes	with	
the	wind.	I	was	born	here	and	I	have	had	children	here	and	the	rest	of	the	
																																								 																				
239	Interviewee	70	September	05,	2014.	Senior	Official	-	Ministry	of	Public	Works.	
240	Interviewee	45	April	22,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
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people	are	like	me.	As	the	issue	dragged,	reinforcement	was	called	in	and	our	
children	and	women	were	beaten.	The	military	was	removed	briefly	from	the	
area	only	to	be	replaced	with	a	commando’s	unit.241	
The	reinvigorated	military	presence	in	the	area	has	further	fuelled	suspicions	and	fears	about	
imminent	use	of	force.	Airport	authorities	are	aware	of	these	suspicions	but	insist	on	the	role	of	
the	military	in	the	airport	security.242	Local	people	however	contend	that	the	Ministry	of	Aviation	
is	pushing	the	military	from	behind	using	them	as	a	proxy	to	further	its	interest.	They	claim	that	
the	Aviation	Minister	once	told	them	that	they	will	have	no	problems	with	the	military	if	they	
agree	 with	 him.243	 These	 accusations	 gained	 momentum	 when	 	 reports	 emerged	 about	
disagreement	between	the	military	and	the	Civil	Aviation	Ministry	(Somaliland	Post,	2015).	Even	
though	 the	 main	 points	 of	 their	 contention	 remain	 unrevealed	 officially,	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Aviation’s	intention	to	register	its	complaint	against	the	military	was	reported	in	the	press.	This	
complaint	 apparently	 emanates	mainly	 from	 aviation	 authorities’	 concern	 about	 the	 limited	
space	available	at	the	airport	for	not	only	meeting	international	standards	but	also	developing	
additional	facilities	which	are	necessary	for	the	continued	growth	of	the	airport.		
To	this	end,	aviation	authorities	were	apparently	advocating	for	the	relocation	of	the	military	
barracks	 to	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 city	 so	 as	 to	make	 the	 land	 exclusively	 airport	 property.	 The	
differences	between	 the	Ministry	of	Aviation	and	 the	military	 forces	was	made	all	 the	more	
difficult	by	the	President’s	reluctance	to	appear	to	be	siding	with	one	institution	over	another,	
particularly	in	a	case	involving	powerful	individuals	whose	clans	are	important	for	his	political	
survival.		This	is	so	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Minister	comes	from	the	President's	clan	while	the	
chief	of	the	armed	forces	comes	from	equally	important	clan	for	the	ruling	political	party,	making	
it	difficult	for	the	President	to	take	a	decision	which	may	have	negative	political	consequences	
for	his	future.	The	division	in	government	institutions	has	not	borne	any	meaningful	impact	on	
how	the	government	relates	to	the	land	owners	in	Uubaale	and	their	risk	of	forceful	eviction.	
The	danger	apparent	here	is	that	the	lack	of	political	power	and	the	financial	resources	necessary	
																																								 																				
241	Interviewee	53	March	30,	2014.	Farmer.	
242	 They	 charge	 that	 the	 airport	 does	 not	 face	 a	 threat	 from	 outside	 the	 country	 and	 hence	military	
presence	in	this	civilian	installation	is	not	necessary.	
243	Interviewee	46	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner	-	Taxi	driver.	
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for	land-owners’	defence	of	their	case	in	court	may	lead	to	greater	desperation	and	therefore	
violent	resistance.	One	of	the	land-owners	in	the	area	said:		
We	will	defend	our	land	from	those	people	even	if	it	is	going	to	lead	to	major	
conflict.	The	ant	 is	a	very	small	 insect	and	you	may	know	how	painful	 it	 is	
when	it	stings,	I	can	assure	you	that	our	fight	is	not	going	to	be	less	stingier.244		
The	 soldiers	 should	be	 told	 that	 they	 should	 stay	away	 from	our	 land	and	
contain	themselves	within	their	bases	which	does	not	go	beyond	the	airport	
fence.	This	is	not	a	war	time.	The	General	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Armed	Forces	
does	not	have	the	right	to	extend	the	base	into	our	farms.	We	are	going	to	
organise	ourselves	and	we	will	do	something	about	this.	The	result	of	these	
might	be	very	catastrophic.	He	should	keep	his	soldiers	off	our	land.	No	more	
bulldozers	and	no	more	foot	soldiers	running	around	our	farms.	
The	people	who	will	be	affected	by	our	violence	are	poor	people	who	are	used	
by	 the	 government	 such	 as	 the	 soldiers	 or	 junior	 officials.	 Those	who	 are	
violating	our	rights	and	wanting	to	expropriate	 land	are	never	affected	by	
the	actions	we	take	and	the	induced	violence.245	Now	land	is	in	the	place	of	
camel	that	people	used	to	fight	over.	There	is	no	land	that	does	not	belong	
to	someone.	A	wrong	doing	must	not	be	done	to	anyone.	It	is	best	that	they	
(government)	come	with	a	good	heart,	not	evictions	and	illegal	expropriation	
threats.246		
The	land	expropriation	around	the	airport	can	thus	be	understood	as	a	way	in	which	the	state	is	
trying	to	increase	legitimacy.	At	the	heart	of	this	exercise	is	the	state’s	determination	to	show	
its	strength	and	ability	to	control	land	and	implement	development	plans	and	policies	without	
any	form	of	impediment.	But	the	danger	apparent	in	such	an	approach	to	state	legitimacy	is	the	
fact	that	it	can	facilitate	further	loss	of	public	support	and	trust	in	the	state.	Huntington	(2006)	
rejects	the	notion	that	the	strength	of	 the	state	 is	a	major	 indicator	of	 legitimacy	and	rather	
																																								 																				
244	Interviewee	44	April	18,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
245	Interviewee	46	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner	-	Taxi	driver.	
246	Interviewee	53	March	30,	2014.	Farmer.	
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places	the	emphasis	on	the	relationship	between	the	institutions	and	those	who	elected	them.	
Some	of	the	key	pointers	through	which	the	health	of	such	relationship	can	be	measured	are	
found	in	the	way	the	state	seeks	to	bring	about	consensus	on	regulatory	conformance	as	well	as	
the	means	 through	which	 it	 overcomes	 social,	 economic	 and	 legal	 obstacles	 to	 its	 policy	 or	
development	proposals.	In	the	case	of	the	airport	expansion,	the	residents	in	the	area	seem	to	
have	lost	trust	in	the	state.	This	is	because	people	in	Uubaale	are	poor	and	marginalised	by	the	
system	through	its	costly	and	frustrating	red	tape	bureaucracy.	As	their	marginality	is	reinforced	
by	the	government’s	efforts	aimed	at	improving	political	legitimacy,	the	poor	are	forced	to	turn	
to	 other	 avenues	 for	 justice	 and	 governance.	 The	 consequence	 is	 that	 state	 institutions	 are	
weakened	 and	 people	 are	 obliged	 to	 make	 “further	 investment	 in	 non-state	 institutions	 as	
potential	channels	of”	service	delivery	(Berry,	2007)	and	protection	against	state	aggression.	The	
geographical	 manifestation	 of	 this	 marginalisation	 of	 the	 poor	 emanating	 partly	 from	 the	
struggle	for	legitimacy	can	partly	explain	the	perpetuation	of	the	clan	based	spatial	segregation	
evident	in	the	city.		
Similarly,	 the	 mediation	 and	 compensation	 processes	 were	 characterised	 by	 a	 legitimation	
struggle	and	mutual	mistrust.	At	the	heart	of	this	struggle	was	the	land-owners’	reluctance	to	
accept	expropriation	 in	government	 terms	and	the	state’s	 inability	 to	meet	 the	 land	owners’	
demands.	Nonetheless,	due	to	the	unequal	power	relations	between	the	two	sides,	the	state	
often	had	the	upper	hand	in	the	process.	For	instance,	it	either	controlled	or	manipulated	the	
instruments	of	mediation	such	as	the	committees	and	elders.	Equally	the	evaluation	process	was	
controlled	and	led	entirely	by	the	state.	Taking	these	factors	into	account,	it	is	fair	to	argue	that	
the	limited	mediation	space	for	land	conflicts	involving	the	state	and	the	inability	of	non-state	
actors	such	as	the	traditional	leaders	to	adjudicate	these	conflicts	in	a	manner	independent	from	
state	manipulations	marginalises	the	poor.		It	leads	to	further	concentration	of	clans	in	discrete	
geographical	 locations,	 which	 is	 itself	 one	 of	 the	 single	 most	 serious	 obstacles	 to	 the	
implementation	of	policies	and	plans,	as	group	identity	is	used	to	mobilise	people	and	resources	
to	resist	the	state.	
7.7 Conclusion		
In	this	chapter,	I	have	shown	that	the	control	of	state	property	is	used	as	a	means	to	legitimise	
new	political	orders.	But	equally,	these	are	also	the	sites	in	which	resistance	to	such	orders	is	
mostly	demonstrated,	often	denying	fragile	states	the	legitimacy	they	so	desperately	need	to	
show	 that	 they	 are	 not	 only	 in	 power	 but	 also	 a	 better	 alternative	 to	 those	 they	 deposed.	
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Hutchison	and	Johnson	(2011)	observe	that	institutional	performance	in	governance,	security	
and	justice	play	a	significant	role	in	how	people	ascribe	legitimacy	to	the	state.	The	manner	in	
which	the	institutions	behave	often	underpins	the	trust	that	people	may	have	in	the	state.	As	
shown	 in	 this	 chapter,	 land	 and	 property	 owners	 in	 Hargeisa,	 particularly	 those	 involved	 in	
conflicts,	 seldom	trust	 the	 state.	Evidence	 for	 this	 can	be	 found	 in	 the	 fact	 that	a	 significant	
proportion	of	the	land	conflicts	in	the	city	are	solved	through	personal	negotiations	or	customary	
mediations.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	whereas	 people	may	 have	 resort	 to	 customary	
institutions	as	one	of	many	possibilities	when	dealing	with	one	another,	the	same	cannot	be	said	
when	the	state	 is	one	of	the	disputants	due	to	the	fact	that	customary	 institutions	are	often	
susceptible	to	state	manipulation.	These	manipulations	shrink	the	mediation	space	available	for	
urban	land	conflict	in	which	the	state	is	a	part.	As	a	result,	clan	is	often	seen	as	an	arena	in	which	
people	can	seek	shelter	not	only	 from	the	hostility	of	other	clans	but	also	from	injustice	and	
aggression	by	the	state.		
The	legitimacy	struggle	profiled	in	this	chapter	heightens	endearment	towards	collective	clan	
identity	and	reinforces	the	manner	in	which	people	make	decisions	about	their	choices	of	abode.	
In	 other	 words,	 individuals	 who	 are	 concerned	 about	 state	 violence	 are	 likely	 to	 maintain	
properties	in	areas	predominantly	populated	by	their	clan	so	as	to	mobilise	the	public	support	
and	 resources	 necessary	 for	 resisting	 against	 the	 state.	 This	 is	 not	 however	 to	 say	 that	
concentration	 of	 clans	 in	 certain	 geographic	 locations	 is	 a	 complete	 deterrent	 against	 state	
aggression.	In	many	instances,	the	state	attempts	to	enforce	decisions	in	area	where	resisting	
clans	made	a	strong	foothold.	Such	attempts	are	however	bloody,	resulting	in	serious	security	
repercussions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 airport	 expansion,	 attempts	 aimed	 at	 implementing	
government	decisions	may	on	the	one	hand	result	in	people	putting	up	violent	resistance,	which	
can	cause	death	and	destruction	of	properties,	while	on	 the	other,	airport	 security	might	be	
compromised.	 This	 is	 because	 airport	 security	 was	 dependent	 for	 a	 long	 time	 on	 the	 local	
people’s	collaboration	with	authorities	as	they	used	to	inform	the	authorities	of	any	problems	
posed	to	the	security	of	the	airport.	If	this	issue	is	not	resolved	amicably,	people	in	the	area	will	
see	no	reason	why	they	should	cooperate	with	a	state	that	marginalises	them.		
In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 I	 discuss	 the	 breakdown	 of	 security	 that	 can	 result	 from	 the	 limited	
mediation	space	for	urban	land	conflicts	in	which	the	state	is	one	of	the	disputants.		
193	|	P a g e 	
	
	
CHAPTER	8 SECURITY	IMPACT	OF	VIOLENT	URBAN	LAND	CONFLICTS	
8.1 Introduction		
Stability	 in	 Somaliland	 fairs	 better	 than	 most	 parts	 of	 what	 used	 to	 be	 called	 the	 Somali	
Democratic	Republic	which	disintegrated	in	1991	(Ali,	2014,	Bradbury	et	al.,	2003).	This	is	partly	
attributable	to	the	fact	that	security	was	often	and	still	remains	to	be	prioritised	over	the	other	
functions	of	the	state,247	under	an	assumption	that	if	Somaliland	is	to	be	considered	a	legitimate	
polity	in	the	region,	it	has	to	monopolise	security	provisions	in	its	territory,	at	times	even	at	the	
expense	of	civil	liberty	(Stremlau,	2013).	In	urban	contexts,	this	relative	stability	is	however	faced	
with	a	threat	emanating	from	state	involved	land	conflicts,	which	induce	a	significant	level	of	
violence,	pitting	authorities	against	local	land-owners	or	claimers.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	
limited	or	lack	of	credible	means	of	adjudication	for	these	conflicts	leads	to	desperation	among	
local	and	often	poor	disputants	who	as	a	result	take	the	law	into	their	hands,	jeopardising	the	
relative	security	in	the	country	at	large	and	Hargeisa	in	particular	and	cementing	clan-based	self-
segregation.	The	chapter	is	organised	into	three	sections.	In	the	first	section,	I	look	at	the	urban	
security	dynamics	in	a	Somali	setting	while	in	the	second,	I	demonstrate	how	violence	emanating	
from	urban	land	conflicts	in	which	the	state	is	a	party	can	threaten	urban	security.	In	the	final	
section,	I	show	how	state	law	enforcement	is	mitigated	by	other	social	actors	and	briefly	discuss	
the	implication	of	this	for	urban	security.	These	complex	urban	security	dynamics	are	obscured	
than	illuminated	by	simply	invoking	'hybridity'	and	the	idea	of	a			fusion	of	institutions	at	all	level	
of	governance.			Indeed,	in	this	instance,	clan	elders	appear	not	as	manipulated	or	used	by	the	
state	 (as	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter),	 but	 rather	 provided	 recourse	 from	 outside	 the	 state	 to	
mediate	in	the	wake	of	violent	conflict	to	which	the	state	was	party.			
8.2 Urban	Security	in	a	Somali	Setting:	The	Status	Quo	
Security	in	Somaliland	operates	in	a	context	of	plural	institutions	–	i.e.	clan,	Islamic	and	state	–	
as	I	have	detailed	in	earlier	chapters.	Prior	to	the	arrival	of	the	colonial	powers	on	the	Somali	
shores,	 individual	and	communal	 security	was	provided	 through	contractual	agreements	and	
clan	membership	(Lewis,	1958).	Being	a	member	of	a	clan,	provided	one	with	a	sense	of	safety.	
In	other	words,	his/her	rights	could	not	be	violated	without	a	repercussion	from	the	clan	he/she	
																																								 																				
247	Some	commentators	have	criticised	this	secure-centric	approach	to	governance	and	termed	 it	as	a	
nation	hostage	for	peace.	See	(Stremlau,	2013).	
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belongs.	This	is	to	say	that	if	someone	was	harmed,	revenge	often	used	to	follow	quickly	unless	
a	 peaceful	 resolution	was	 reached	 before	 the	 incident	 deteriorates	 into	more	 violence.	 The	
arrival	of	the	colonial	powers	added	a	new	dimension	to	this	tradition	of	security	provision	as	
they	introduced	centralised	and	hierarchical	state	security	institutions.	Salaried	standing	armies	
and	police	with	which	people	were	not	familiar	were	established	mainly	in	the	urban	centres	in	
the	coast	at	the	beginning	but	these	were	later	expanded	to	the	interior	parts	of	the	country.	As	
I	elaborated	in	chapters	2	and	4,	the	new	security	agencies	did	not	however	replace	the	existing	
traditional	mechanism	not	only	because	the	colonial	administration	opted	to	use	them	as	an	
indirect	rule,	but	also	due	the	fact	that	the	new	institutions	lacked	the	legitimacy	required	for	
people	to	trust	them.248	In	chapter	4,	I	showed	how	successive		postcolonial	attempts	to		remove	
the	clan	 from	the	arena	of	communal	and	personal	security	provisions	 in	the	country	 left	no	
noticeable	behavioural,	cultural	and	social	change	among	the	Somali	people,	not	least	because	
of	the	utility	of	Akils	as	state	agents.	Even	at	the	height	of	the	dictatorship	where	clannism	was	
denounced	and	acts	of	disobedience	to	state	policies	were	met	with	a	swift	and	severe	response,	
traditional	institutions	remained	a	key	provider	for	security,	justice	and	governance.		
In	this	context	of	the	2012	violent	conflict	between	clan	militia	and	the	state	I	analyse	here,	it	is	
worth	 invoking	 the	 various	 explanations	 for	 the	 persistence	 of	 clan	 loyalty	 for	 reasons	 of	
security.	 	 Lewis	 (2008b)’s	 contention	 that	 both	 violence	 and	 its	 resolution	 mechanism	 are	
inherent	in	Somali	culture	and	therefore	the	state	had	to	accept	the	clan	as	a	reality	through	
which	people’s	social	and	security	needs	are	managed,	is	one	pertinent	view.	Yet	it	is	contested	
by	 Samatar	 and	 Samatar	 (1988,	 1997)	 who	 blame	 a	 dishonest	 elite	 for	 preventing	 the	
advancement	of	civic	governance	where	the	security	agencies	can	earn	the	trust	of	the	people	
and	promote	citizenship	as	opposed	to	clanship.	His	proposition	that	poor	governance	practices	
are	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 an	 explanatory	 factor	 for	 endearment	 to	 clan	 ideals	 and	 identity	
appears	relevant	in	the	case	discussed	here	where	landowners	resorted	to	arms	to	try	to	prevent	
their	land	being	appropriated	by	the	military	and	granted	to	another	individual.	
To	understand	the	dynamics	of	the	military	base	conflict,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	key	
actors	 and	 dynamics	 of	 urban	 security	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 context.	 Scholars	 have	 invoked	 a	
trajectory	 from	the	heightened	era	of	 clan	protection	 in	 the	 immediate	aftermath	of	Barre’s	
																																								 																				
248	 For	 instance,	 it	 could	 not	make	 sense	 to	 trust	 a	multi	 clan	 police	 force	where	 in	 some	 cases	 the	
perpetrator	could	belong	to	the	same	clan	as	a	member	of	a	police	investigating	a	case	involving	a	victim	
from	another	clan.	
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removal	from	power	through	the	time	when	the		SNM	administration’s	lack	of	organisational	
cohesion	 and	 capacity	 to	 maintain	 public	 order,	 necessitated	 the	 use	 of	 clan	 elders	 as	 the	
ultimate	security	providers		in	the	country	(APD,	2010).	As	I	detailed	in	chapter	2,	they	cast	this	
as	marking	the	beginning	of	a	‘hybrid’	process	in	which	the	state	formalised	by	relying	heavily	
on,	and	incorporating	existing	traditional	institutions	in	order	to	legitimise	itself	and	bring	about	
law	and	order.	There	is	a	debate	as	to	whether	this	has	defused	clan	conflict	or	given	clan	identity	
has	gained	a	renewed	momentum	in	the	post-conflict	context.		My	argument	in	this	thesis,	is	
that	what	I	see	as	the		renewed	role	of	clan	has	undermined	the	prospects	of	cosmopolitanism	
in		urban	places	as	people	in	multi	clan	neighbourhoods	have		self-segregated	and	move	to	areas	
predominantly	 populated	 by	 their	 clans	 (APD,	 2010).	 The	 primary	 motivation	 for	 this	 self-
segregation	was	security	grounds,	as	people	surrounded	by	their	own	clan	members	perceive	
themselves	to	be	less	vulnerable	to	criminal	hooligans	than	those	in	less	clanned	spaces.							
While	the	co-existence	of	plural	security	providers	in	Somaliland	may	have	played	a	crucial	role	
in	 the	 post-conflict	 state	 building	 processes,	 their	 role	 is	 ambiguous,	 and	 they	may	 equally	
become	an	obstacle	to	progress	partly	due	to	the	lack	of	clarity	on	their	respective	roles	and	
responsibilities.	So	far,	very	few	attempts	have	been	made	to	consolidate	the	various	security	
providers	in	the	country	and	these	attempts	have	so	far	failed	to	provide	a	framework	within	
which	 these	 institutions	 could	 be	 enhanced	 to	 complement	 each	 other.	 The	 existing	
administrative	practices	fail	to	delineate	the	necessary	boundaries	and	convergences	between	
the	state	and	other	actors	such	as	traditional	and	religious	leaders.	While	emphasis	is	placed	on	
the	decentralisation	of	the	state	security	services	through	the	Regional	Governors	and	the	use	
of	the	traditional	leaders	who	are	on	government	payrolls,	it	sets	no	guidelines	around	which	
their	working	relationship	could	be	shaped.	Such	lack	of	clarity	on	the	relationship	between	the	
various	actors	involved	in	security	provision	is	dangerous	in	a	country	where	gun	ownership	is	
high	(Hammond,	2013),	249	making	violent	confrontation	between	clans	and	the	state	and	within	
clan	more	imminent.		
According	 to	 a	 report	 by	 the	 Danish	 Demining	 Group	 (2009,	 p.	 35),	 some	 of	 the	 [key]	
“characteristics	 of	 the	 internal	 safety	 and	 security	 environment….in	 Somaliland…are	 the	
overlapping	 responsibilities	 and	 competencies	 of	 different	 security	 providers	 that	 have	
																																								 																				
249	According	to	Hammond	(2013),	41	percent	of	the	respondents	surveyed	in	Burao	claim	that	they	own	
firearms.	These	weapons	are	mainly	automatic	rifles	which	have	the	potential	of	forming	a	formidable	
militia	should	some	of	the	clans	choose	to	resist	the	state	violently.	In	addition	to	this	high	rate	of	gun	
ownership	in	the	cities.	
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developed	as	a	response	to	the	initial	–	and	to	some	extent	remaining	–	capacity	gaps”	in	state	
security	provisions.	 In	addition	 to	 the	 traditional	 and	 religious	 leaders,	 this	 capacity	gap	was	
more	recently	filled	by	youth	groups	who	have	emerged	as	new	actors	in	the	post-conflict	urban	
security	landscape.	These	youth	groups	patrol	the	neighbourhoods	for	a	small	fee	and	claim	to	
protect	residents	from	petty	criminals	who	often	snatch	mobile	phones	and	burglarise	homes.	
They	charge	the	customers	a	fee	ranging	from	$5	to	$30,	depending	on	the	size	of	the	property	
and	 the	wealth	 of	 customer.	 	Moreover,	 various	 other	 –	more	 serious	 -	 challenges	 face	 the	
provision	of	urban	security	in	Somaliland.	These	include	the	security	threats	posed	by	extremist	
organisations	based	in	the	South,	which	have	received	the	most	international	attention.	In	2001,	
an	Italian	aid	worker	was	killed	in	Borama	while	a	year	later	two	English	teachers	were	slain	in	
Sheikh.	The	biggest	threat	came	in	2008	when	a	major	attack,	claiming	the	lives	of	more	than	20	
people	was	carried	out	against	the	Ethiopian	consulate,	UNDP	compound	and	the	Presidential	
House	in	Hargeisa	(APD,	2010).	These	incidents	have	led	to	a	rapid	increase	in	the	emergence	of	
gated	communities	in	the	city	as	a	response	to	the	threats.	Almost	all	the	major	governmental	
offices,	 aid	 agencies	 and	 the	major	 hotels	 in	 the	 city	 have	 fortified	 gates	 surrounding	 their	
immediate	vicinities.	Nonetheless,	according	to	local	security	officials,	violence	and	insecurity	
emanating	from	urban	land	conflicts	presents	authorities	with	more	immediate	urban	security	
challenges	than	the	occasional	terrorist	related	threats.250		
8.3 Upsetting	the	Status	quo:	The	Early	Morning	War	Call		
A	case	in	point,	which	can	illustrate	the	precarious	dynamics	of	urban	security	in	Somaliland	and	
ready	recourse	to	clan	occurred	in	Hargeisa	in	2012,	where	clashes	between	security	forces	and	
armed	militia	sent	shock	waves	through	the	city.	The	problem	was	rooted	in	the	confiscation	of	
a	 piece	 of	 land,	 located	 in	Malka	 Durduro	 near	 the	 Somaliland	 Army	 headquarters,	 from	 a	
prominent	Ethiopian	Somali	politician,	Abdikarim	Aw	Rali.251	The	move	was	said	to	have	been	
necessitated	by	the	fact	that	the	army	needed	extra	space	for	storing	its	military	hardware.	Upon	
finding	out	that	his	land	was	confiscated	by	the	government,	the	Ethiopian	Somali	politician	who	
was	at	the	time	based	in	Addis	Ababa,	came	to	Hargeisa	to	get	explanation	for	the	confiscation	
of	 his	 land.	 He	 held	 high	 profile	 meetings	 with	 senior	 politicians	 and	 government	 officials	
																																								 																				
250	Interviewee	66	August	10,	2014.	Police	Station	Commander.	
251	The	land	they	confiscated	from	him	was	about	600	x	600	m	whereas	the	land	they	gave	him	was	400	x	
400m	in	where	the	dispute	has	arisen.	
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including	the	then	President	of	Somaliland,	Dahir	Rayale	Kahin.	Following	these	meetings,	the	
government	 decided	 to	 compensate	 him	 with	 alternative	 land	 located	 in	 a	 military	 barrack	
towards	the	East	of	the	city.252	The	barracks	were	established	in	the	area	in	the	late	1970s	when	
the	socialist	military	regime	expanded	its	security	presence	in	the	city	and	confiscated	land	for	
establishing	military	bases	from	the	people	in	the	area.	According	to	local	resident,	the	land	used	
to	be	farms	owned	by	semi	nomadic	families	whose	settlement	in	the	area	dates	back	to	nearly	
70	years.253	While	the	government	constructed	buildings	and	military	facilities	in	some	parts	of	
the	 confiscated	 land	 (i.e.	 factory	 that	 fixes	 broken	 weapons,	 firearm	 testing	 facilities,	 and	
military	 training	 grounds),	 other	 parts	 remained	 vacant.	 The	 post-conflict	 administration	
followed	suit,	limiting	themselves	to	the	facilities	established	by	their	predecessors.	According	
to	a	Sultan	who	hails	from	the	area,	this	state	of	vacancy	seems	to	have	provided	reason	for	the	
reoccupation	of	the	land	by	the	previous	civilian	owners:	
When	people	came	back	from	the	refugee	camps,	they	resettled	in	the	area	
which	 was	 confiscated	 from	 them.	 The	 land	 was	 vacant…	 they	 never	
constructed	buildings,	they	never	fenced	it...in	other	words	it	was	as	vacant	
as	when	it	was	confiscated	from	them.254	
Claimants	of	this	 land	contend	that	the	transfer	of	the	land	confiscated	from	them	for	public	
purposes	to	another	person	is	illegal	and	unacceptable.	Attempts	aimed	at	resolving	the	issue	
peacefully	did	not	yield	results.	Some	of	the	government	officials	who	were	sympathetic	to	the	
civilian	 claimants	 covertly	 advised	 them	 that	 the	 only	 mechanism	 through	 which	 they	 can	
pragmatically	 open	 a	 case	 against	 the	military	 establishment	was	 through	 their	 own	 courts.	
Heeding	this	advice,	they	tried	to	open	a	case	in	the	military	courts	but	the	courts	refused	to	
accept	their	submission.	As	suing	the	army	through	its	subsidiary	organs	did	not	bring	about	any	
change,	 they	 then	made	an	attempt	 to	bypass	 the	 court.	According	 to	 close	 relatives,255	 the	
claimants	have	visited	all	the	major	figures	in	the	military	establishment	including	the	General	
Chief	of	Staff,	the	Deputy	General	Chief	of	Staff,	and	the	Head	of	the	Military	Operations.	Their	
																																								 																				
252	Interviewee	52	June	15,	2014.	Sultan.	
253	Interviewee	40	April	25,	2014.	District	Officer.	
254	Interviewee	52	June	15,	2014.	Sultan.	
255	Interviewee	83	June	21,	2013.	Relatives	of	One	of	the	Attackers.	
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pleas	with	the	military	officials	did	not	however	result	in	any	intervention.	Realising	that	they	
will	get	no	help	or	solace	from	the	military	establishment,	they	tried	to	take	their	case	to	the	
Supreme	Court,	the	highest	court	in	the	land,	but	their	request	for	opening	a	case	against	the	
Armed	Forces	was	again	declined.	Frustrated	by	the	judicial	system	in	the	country,	they	tried	to	
get	a	political	intervention,	writing	a	letter	outlining	their	grievances	to	the	Ministry	of	the	Office	
of	the	Presidency.	They	also	apparently	sought	audience	with	the	President	but	six	months	after	
their	request,	they	were	still	unable	to	see	him.		
In	the	early	morning	of	Tuesday,	15th	of	May	2012,	the	land	claimants	staged	a	surprising	but	
daring	attack	on	the	military	barrack	in	question.	Seven	people	lost	their	lives	and	nine	others	
were	injured	in	the	attack	(BBC	Somali,	2012).	The	casualties	included	three	military	personnel,	
two	militia	men	and	two	civilian	bystanders	who	were	apparently	early	risers	preparing	for	their	
next	day’s	activities.	According	to	police	and	military	chiefs	who	called	for	a	press	conference	on	
the	following	day,	the	militia	were	armed	with	various	types	of	small	arms	including	automatic	
machine	guns.	This	is	hardly	surprising	in	Somaliland	where	availability	of	small	arms	is	among	
the	highest	 in	the	region.	The	security	chiefs	reported	in	the	meeting	that	28	people	were	 in	
custody,	nine	of	whom	were	injured	(Haatuf	News,	2012b).	One	of	the	attackers,	who	identified	
himself	as	Saeed	Mohamed	Abdullah,	spoke	to	the	Voice	of	America’s	Somali	Service	following	
the	attack	and	argued	that	they	carried	out	the	attack	because	the	government	occupied	land	
they	owned	for	generations.	He	said	the	land	was	forcibly	confiscated	from	them	by	the	previous	
military	regime	for	public	use	only	to	be	given	to	a	businessman	(Haatuf	News,	2012b).		
Competing	 narratives	 surround	 the	manner	 in	 which	 the	 incident	 began.	 The	 government’s	
version	is	that	the	civilians	attacked	the	military	base	without	provocation.	On	their	part,	the	
assailants	contest	that	they	did	not	go	to	attack	the	military	but	rather	to	reoccupy	their	land.	
When	the	military	saw	them	camping	in	the	contested	land,	they	requested	them	to	vacate	but	
the	armed	civilians	refused	to	abide	by	the	military	orders.	Nevertheless,	the	incident	took	the	
city	by	surprise	and	politicians	were	cautious	about	their	remarks	due	to	the	clan	dynamics	of	
the	situation.	It	is	important	to	remember	here	that	the	incident	had	two	dimension.	On	the	one	
hand,	 the	 conflict	was	between	 the	 state	and	 the	 landowners.	But	beneath	 this	 layer	of	 the	
conflict	is	the	clan	dynamics.	Surprisingly,	the	soldiers	who	lost	their	lives	all	came	from	the	Sa’ad	
Muse	of	the	Awal	clans.	Equally,	the	attackers	all	came	from	the	Habar	Yonis	sub-clan	of	the	
Grahajis	clans.	Both	clans	have	major	presence	in	the	capital	and	inflammatory	remarks	could	
have	sparked	a	clash.	The	Mayor	of	the	city	who	spoke	shortly	after	the	attack	on	a	national	
television	encouraged	people	not	to	take	the	law	into	their	hands.	The	Minister	of	Defence	also	
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condemned	the	attack	but	spoke	in	a	conciliatory	manner	making	a	mention	to	the	fact	that	the	
people	who	are	fighting	over	the	land	now	are	the	same	people	who	fought	together	against	
the	 previous	 military	 regime	 (Berbera	 News,	 2012).	 Similarly,	 a	 former	 Minister	 in	 the	
government	Ali	Mohamed	Waranadde256	who	spoke	to	the	media	said	that	"I	want	to	tell	the	
people	that	we	have	come	this	far	through	dialogue	and	compromises	and	I	am	urging	people	
not	to	abandon	this....	I	am	aware	of	this	problem	and	I	am	pretty	sure	that	it	has	reached	this	
far	because	of	mismanagement	but	I	do	not	believe	that	it	should	have	reached	to	the	point	of	
violence".257	(Faarax,	2012a).	
8.4 Court	Martial	and	Post	Violence	Customary	Mediation			
The	military	and	the	rest	of	the	state	institutions	were	embarrassed	and	furious	about	the	attack	
staged	against	a	key	military	base	in	the	heart	of	the	country.	Part	of	this	anger	was	rooted	in	a	
concern	about	possible	damage	to	the	state’s	image.	This	shaped	not	only	the	manner	in	which	
the	 state	 responded	 heavy-handedly	 to	 the	 incident	 but	 also	 the	 swiftness	 with	 which	 it	
prosecuted	suspects.		For	instance,	disproportionate	level	of	security	personnel	and	machinery	
were	used	to	bring	the	situation	under	control	while	prosecution	was	speedily	put	together	and	
military	court	convened	within	unrealistic	 timeframe	 (in	 the	Somaliland	context)	of	12	hours	
from	the	time	when	the	 incident	 took	place.	On	the	 following	day,	 the	court	passed	a	death	
sentence	to	17	people	while	5	others,	who	were	underage,	were	sentenced	to	life	imprisonment.	
Three	more	 people	who	were	 treated	 for	 injuries	 sustained	 during	 the	 attack	 awaited	 trial.	
Speaking	to	the	media,	the	chairman	of	the	first	level	military	court	in	Hargeisa	Col.	Yusuf	Farah	
Sharmarke	said	that	the	court’s	sitting	began	in	the	early	morning	of	16	May	2012	and	came	to	
an	end	at	about	4	o'clock	in	the	same	day	(Haatuf	News,	2012a).	He	added	that	the	trial	was	
fast-tracked	due	to	assailants’	confessions	for	their	crimes.		
Concerns	have	been	raised	about	the	manner	and	swiftness	within	which	the	sentences	were	
handed	down	(BBC	World,	2012).	Critics	argued	that	it	is	surprising	for	a	death	sentence	to	be	
issued	 within	 24	 hours	 without	 proper	 investigation	 to	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 the	 problem.	
Moreover,	the	legality	of	trying	the	case	in	a	military	court	was	also	questioned.	According	to	a	
criminal	 lawyer	 in	 Hargeisa,	 civilians	 cannot	 be	 tried	 in	 a	 military	 court	 under	 the	 existing	
																																								 																				
256	He	is	now	the	current	Minister	of	Interior		
257	The	Minister	also	denied	allegations	levelled	against	a	prominent	businessman	called	the	DAHASHIL	to	
have	bought	the	place.	
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Somaliland	criminal	 laws.258	The	military	however	contested	if	a	military	action	is	committed,		
military	rule	must	be	applied.259	One	of	the	ways	in	which	the	security	personnel	sought	to	justify	
their	position	was	the	fact	that	they	displayed	the	military	weapons	used	by	the	suspects	in	a	
press	conferences	held	soon	after	the	attackers	were	detained	(See	figure	1	and	2).		
Figure	6:	Weapons	used	in	the	attack,	as	claimed	by	security	officials	
	
Source:	(Faarax,	2012b)	
																																								 																				
258	Interviewee	88	June	14,	2014.	Criminal	Lawyer.	
259	Interviewee	86	June	1,	2014.	Millitary	Official.	
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Figure	7:	Government	officials	speaking	to	the	media	in	the	aftermath	of	the	incident	
	
From	right	to	left:	Defence	Minister,	Ahmed	Haji	Ali	Adani,	Interior	Minister,	Mohamed	Nur	Arale	(Du)r,	Army	Chief,	
Ismail	Shaqale,	and	Police	Commissioner,	Abdullah	Fadal	Iman.	Source:	(Faarax,	2012b)		
The	sentences	caused	widespread	fear	about	possible	deterioration	of	the	situation.	According	
to	Qaran	News	(2012),	tension	was	running	high	in	the	city	as	people	were	shocked	about	both	
the	attack	on	the	barracks,	but	also	the	passing	of	such	a	harsh	sentence	against	civilians	in	a	
military	 court.	 This	 website,	 which	 is	 run	 by	 a	 blogger	 who	 hails	 from	 the	 Eastern	
neighbourhoods	 of	 the	 city,	 reported	 that	 a	 demonstration	 was	 organised	 in	 New	 Hargeisa	
neighbourhood	in	response	to	the	sentences.	According	to	one	of	the	government	critics,	the	
same	military	court	which	refused	to	accept	their	submissions	and	hear	what	they	have	to	say	
about	the	land	in	question	sentenced	them	to	death.260	
The	 military	 court	 was	 accused	 of	 human	 rights	 violations	 as	 it	 denied	 the	 suspects	 their	
constitutional	 rights	 for	 fair	 trial	 and	 legal	 representation.	 This	 is	 because	 none	 of	 those	
sentenced	was	defended	or	legally	represented	in	the	court.	Some	of	the	other	problems	with	
the	 trial	were	 investigative	 flaws	 relating	 to	 the	prosecutor’s	preparation	of	 the	case.	This	 is	
apparent	in	the	manner	in	which	the	sentence	was	collectively	rendered	without	addressing	key	
																																								 																				
260	Interviewee	87	June	4,	2014.	Opposition	Member	of	Parliament.	
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investigative	questions	such	as	whether	all	the	accused	people	committed	the	crime	or	whether	
they	were	all	armed	or	fired	their	guns	at	the	soldiers.	Moreover,	some	of	the	people	who	were	
sentenced	 to	death	were	underage	boys	whose	age	 ranged	 from	15	 to	17.	The	 irregularities	
apparent	in	the	way	the	case	was	handled	attracted	criticism	from	not	only	within	the	country	
but	 also	 outside	 the	 country.	 For	 instance,	 the	 United	 Nations	 envoy	 in	 Somalia,	 Augustine	
Mahiga,	expressed	his	organisation’s	concern	over	the	violence	between	civilians	and	military	in	
Hargeisa	as	well	as	the	subsequent	mishandling	of	the	case	by	the	Somaliland	authorities.	The	
envoy	in	a	statement	expressed:	
concern	 about	 the	 [manner	 in	 which	 the]	 trial	 of	 these	 civilians	 was	
conducted	 by	 a	 military	 [court]	 in	 contradiction	 of	 both	 applicable	 local	
statutes	and…	[international	laws	and	norms]	….	He	urges[d]	the	immediate	
transfer	of	the	case	to	a	criminal	court	and	encourage[d]	the	authorities	to	
ensure	 that	 fair	 trial	 rights	 are	 respected….	 [finally]	 calling	 for	 a	 full,	
impartial,	 independent	and	transparent	 investigation	 into	the	 incident	and	
its	aftermath	(UN	News	Centre,	2012).	
Relatives	of	those	sentenced	to	death261	suspect	that	the	reason	why	the	capital	punishment	
was	issued	within	a	very	short	period	of	time	is	attributable	to	the	fact	that	all	the	key	figures,	
including	the	head	of	the	army,	the	chairman	of	the	court,	and	the	two	prosecutors	handling	the	
trial,	were	from	the	same	clan	as	those	soldiers	killed	in	the	attack.262	It	is	also	important	to	note	
that	all	the	attackers	were	from	the	same	sub	clan,	Habar	Yonis	of	the	Garhajis,	in	addition	to	
the	local	tensions,	the	case	also	attracted	the	attention	of	the	Somaliland	diaspora	who	used	it	
for	critiquing	the	state	building	process	in	Somaliland.	But	their	opinion	was	divided.	While	some	
supported	the	government	resolve	to	quick	action	against	those	who	staged	the	attack	against	
the	military,	others	were	disappointed	in	the	manner	in	which	the	government	handled	the	case.	
For	instance,	Yare	(2012)	argued	in	an	article	carried	in	a	diaspora	owned	website	that:	
one	would	see	no	reason	why	the	government	maintains	a	military	base	in	
the	 middle	 of	 densely	 populated	 and	 residential	 area.	 The	 military	 is	 the	
defence	forces	of	the	nation	that	are	designed	to	protect	the	country	from	
																																								 																				
261	Interviewee	84	June	15,	2013.	Relatives	of	One	of	the	Attackers.	
262	Interviewee	52	June	15,	2014.	Sultan.	
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external	and	foreign	enemy.	Logically	the	bases	should	have	been	relocated	
in	the	border	area	of	the	country	and	in	arm’s	length	of	civilian	population.	
Only	 dictatorial	 regimes	 keep	 a	 heavily	 fortified	 military	 base	 within	 the	
vicinity	[of	a	civilian	residential	area].		
Some	of	the	messages	carried	in	the	diaspora	websites	were	mainly	aimed	at	raising	awareness	
about	 the	 issue	 and	 bringing	 about	 not	 only	 local	 resistance	 to	 the	 sentences	 but	 also	
international	pressure	on	the	government	to	rethink	its	decisions.	Such	messages	amplified	the	
security	threats	that	can	emanate	from	the	violence	and	the	implications	this	could	have	on	the	
relative	stability	and	democratisation	process	 in	the	country	which	are	both	heavily	aided	by	
Western	donors.263	In	a	blog	posted	on	the	internet	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	attack,	
Yare	(2012)	argued	that:	
what	distinguishes	our	nation	and	the	thing	we	are	proud	of	is	our	tolerance	
and	 respect	 for	 human	 dignity.	 We	 would	 not	 be	 any	 different	 from	 our	
brothers	and	sisters	in	Somalia	if	we	militarise	every	civil	issue.	Civilians	who	
have	been	 frustrated	by	 the	web	of	oppressions	and	systematic	alienation	
would	have	no	option	than	using	all	means	necessary	to	defend	their	right.	It	
is	 from	 the	 government	 we	 have	 to	 expect	 patience,	 tolerance	 and	 fair	
treatment.	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 military	 and	 the	 police	 have	 used	
excessive	 forces.	 [This]	 would	 be	 an	 insult	 to	 [the]	 European	 donors	 that	
finance	the	recurrent	training	and	salary	of	the	special	police	unit.	
Values	and	principles	of	democracy	enshrined	in	the	constitution	were	also	used	as	a	point	of	
departure	for	condemning	the	government’s	action	against	the	assailants.	Ibrahim	Mead	(2012)	
who	is	a	political	analyst	based	in	Canada	and	critic	of	the	ruling	party,	KULMIYE,	points	out	that	
the	constitutions	of	Somaliland	upholds	the	right	of	civilian	to	fair	trial	 in	a	civilian	court.	The	
commentator	suspects	that	the	government	anticipated	these	kinds	of	problems	and	was	intent	
to	 create	 security	 problems	 as	 that	would	 enable	 it	 to	 distract	 the	 public	 attention	 from	 its	
institutional	failures.	He	asks:		
																																								 																				
263	Whose	rule	of	law	values,	according	to	these	bloggers,	were	supposedly	reflected	in	the	relationship	
between	the	people	and	the	state	they	aid.	
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why	 are	 the	 soldiers	 [who]	 were	 sent	 to	 the	 place	 of	 the	 incident	 were	
selectively	from	a	particular	clan	to	face	a	particular	clan?	Many	people	in	
Hargeisa	believe	that	it	was	deliberately	planned	to	create	a	wedge	between	
the	 brotherly	 communities	 [in	 Hargeisa]	 so	 that	 Siilanyo	 could	 fish	 in	 the	
newly	 created	 mistrust	 and	 implanted	 hate	 between	 these	 brotherly	
communities	as	a	benefactor	of	these	evil	activities!		
The	commentator	 further	accused	the	government	of	polarising	the	country	along	clan	 lines,	
contributing	significantly	to	the	widening	rifts	between	clans	in	Somaliland.	An	example	of	this	
is	the	fact	that	some	elders	and	businessmen	from	Gabiley	called	for	the	government	to	speed	
up	 transportation	 of	 the	 bodies	 of	 their	 military	 men,	 also	 echoing	 out	 clan	 inclined	
inflammatory	remarks	in	the	aftermath	of	the	attack.	The	author	asks,	‘the	question	is	who	the	
soldiers	 died	 for,	 for	 a	 merchant	 or	 for	 the	 nation?’	 Following	 both	 local	 and	 international	
pressure	on	the	government,	the	Defence	Minister	revealed	during	a	briefing	to	the	parliament	
that	the	government	was	reviewing	the	death	and	life	imprisonment	sentences	(Hasan,	2012).	
Subsequently,	the	appeal	court	of	the	military	overruled	the	previous	sentences,	reducing	death	
sentences	to	life	imprisonment	and	the	life	imprisonment	to	10	years.		
The	elders	of	the	Habar	Yonis	clan	from	which	the	assailants	hail	were	still	unhappy	about	the	
jailing	of	their	men	and	thus	have	embarked	on	efforts	aimed	at	bypassing	the	state	institutions	
and	 making	 the	 matter	 inter-clan	 issue.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 elders	 used	 their	 network	 in	 the	
customary	institutions	to	bring	about	a	solution	to	this	problem.	They	met	representatives	from	
the	 deceased	 men’s’	 clan.	 The	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 these	 elders	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
assailants’	clan,	Habar	Yonis,	had	no	intention	of	engaging	violently	with	the	Sa’ad	Muse	of	the	
Awal	 clans,	 of	 the	deceased	 soldiers	 therefore	 cannot	be	 subjected,	 according	 to	 customary	
laws,	to	punitive	actions	such	as	revenge	(assailants).	After	a	long	discussion	between	the	elders	
of	the	two	clans,	in	the	end	the	clan	of	the	deceased	soldiers	agreed	to	take	blood	money	for	
their	deceased	members.	The	Sultan	who	led	the	delegation	from	Eastern	Hargeisa	clans	said:	
we	met	their	clan	leaders	such	as	the	Sultan	and	the	Akils	and	we	requested	
them	to	take	mag	or	dia	(blood	money)264	since	the	assailants	did	not	know	
the	clan	background	of	the	deceased.	We	also	told	them	that	they	did	not	
																																								 																				
264	Mag	and	dia	are	Somali	or	Somalisised	words	with	the	same	meaning	interchangeably	used	for	blood	
money.	
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intend	to	kill	them	for	clan	related	purposes.	The	host	elders	were	convinced	
with	our	argument	and	we	agreed	on	a	blood	money	of	300	camels	for	each	
person	killed.	Each	camel	was	estimated	to	cost	$500.265	
The	assailant’s	clan	brought	the	agreement	papers	to	court	demanding	that	their	men	should	
be	released	since	the	two	clans	have	agreed	within	themselves.	The	court,	however,	imposed	
further	conditions	by	instructing	the	elders	to	bring	close	relatives	of	the	people	who	were	killed	
in	the	attack	to	court	so	as	to	ensure	that	they	are	happy	with	the	decisions	made	by	their	elders.	
The	assailant’s	elders	went	back	to	the	deceased’s	clan	elders	requesting	them	to	facilitate	the	
consent	of	the	deceased’s	relatives	in	writing.	A	Sultan	from	the	Habar	Yonis	said	that:			
we	brought	the	notary	signed	by	the	close	family	members	in	order	to	show	
that	the	close	relatives	agreed	to	this	arrangement.	We	paid	about	$600	for	
the	process	of	bringing	them	from	their	home	to	the	city.266	
The	 aforementioned	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 releasing	 the	 jailed	 assailants	 through	 clan-based	
negotiations	were	also	accompanied	by	similar	efforts	aimed	at	convincing	the	state	to	release	
the	 assailants.	 For	 instance,	 six	 people	 including	 three	 Sultans,	 businessman,	 and	 other	 key	
figures	representing	the	clans	in	the	Eastern	side	of	the	city	met	with	the	President	of	Somaliland	
and	 a	 select	 committee	 of	 high	 ranking	 officials	 including	 the	 Government	 Spokesman	 and	
Ministers	of	Interior,	Defence,	Foreign	Affairs,	and	Presidency	to	discuss	possible	solutions	for	
the	violence	and	death	of	soldiers	as	well	as	the	outstanding	land	issues.267	The	meeting	with	
the	President	was	particularly	important	because	of	the	fact	that	the	military	court	complicated	
the	issue	further	by	saying	that	the	only	way	through	which	the	assailants	could	be	released	is	
through	 a	 presidential	 pardon.	 Following	 successful	 lobbying	 the	 President	 finally	 agreed	 to	
issue	a	pardon	on	the	occasion	of	18	May	when	Somaliland	unilaterally	declared	independence	
from	the	rest	of	Somalia.	
																																								 																				
265	Interviewee	49	June	15,	2014.	Sultan.	
266	Ibid.	
267	The	Sultan	again	said	that	they	insisted:	this	time	we	are	only	dealing	with	the	President	since	all	other	
institutions	are	unable	to	do	anything	about	the	problem.	We	also	told	them	that	we	still	didn't	give	up	
our	land	and	we	need	to	talk	about	it	in	another	setting	and	another	time		ibid.	
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Amid	weak	 justice	 system,	 violence	 emanating	 from	urban	 land	 conflict	 is	 the	 single	 biggest	
threat	to	security	in	Somaliland	(OCVP,	2012,	OCVP,	2013a,	OCVP,	2013b).	While	the	traditional	
system	is	criticised	for	inability	to	deal	with	land	disputes	in	complex	urban	settings,	they	proved	
to	be	useful	 in	resolving	disputes	 in	ways	that	are	not	necessarily	 justice-oriented	but	rather	
solution-oriented.	The	state’s	inability	to	deliver	equitable	statutory	system	not	only	empowers	
the	customary	institutions	but	also	undermines	state	legitimacy.	For	Belaunde	et	al.	(2010,	p.	
50),	“competing	legal	regimes	serve	to	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	state	in	the	eyes	of	its	
citizens	due	to	the	lack	of	citizen	participation	in	land	processes	and	to	competing	meanings	and	
uses	surrounding	land	between	and	within	the	local,	national	and	international	levels”.	While	
this	assertion	is	relevant,	dismissal	of	legal	pluralism	in	post-conflict	context,	where	the	state	is	
unwilling	or	unable	to	discharge	public	service	in	an	equitable	manner,	is	simplistic.	The	more	
pertinent	question	relates	to	how	could	their	interaction	be	managed	in	a	many	in	which	they	
could	function	alongside	each	other	with	minimal	negative	impact	on	the	population	they	serve.				
8.5 Conclusion		
The	above	case	highlights	the	danger	apparent	in	the	unresolved	urban	land	conflict	involving	
the	state.	In	other	words,	the	lack	of	a	credible	mediation	avenue	for	such	conflicts	may	lead	to	
a	 violent	 encounter	 and	 undermine	 the	 long-invested	 security	 in	 the	 city.	 This	 may	 in	 turn	
cement	the	spatial	segregation	in	the	city	as	people	will	see	it	beneficial	to	stay	in	areas	where	
they	could	resist	the	state	more	easily	or	escape	conflict	(Bryden,	1994a).268	The	authorities	have	
in	 many	 cases	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 the	 challenges	 presented	 by	 the	 concentration	 of	
groups	in	specific	geographical	locations	to	law	enforcement.	The	high	rate	of	unemployment	
among	the	youth	and	the	exploitation	of	clan	identity	can	fuel	insecurity	in	the	city.		Risk	factors	
that	 could	 draw	 the	 youth	 into	 criminal	 activities	 of	 this	 nature	 are	 “social	 and	 economic	
marginalisation	and	vulnerability”	(Widmer,	2013,	p.	2).	This	coupled	with	state	impunity	about	
the	way	in	which	it	manages	conflicts	can	result	in	a	major	shock	to	the	already	fragile	urban	
security	in	Hargeisa.		Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	the	state	often	enjoys269	the	upper	hand	in	
violent	 encounters	 with	 resisters	 owing	 to	 greater	 availability	 of	 resources	 and	 quicker	
organisational	capacity,	it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	such	individuals	or	groups	may	often	
have	the	ability	to	exploit	existing	social	and	political	cleavages	to	deny	the	state	the	legitimacy	
																																								 																				
268	Many	people	fled	the	city	for	areas	populated	by	their	clans	during	the	civil	between	1994	and	1997.	
269	At	least	for	the	time	being.		
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and	voluntary	compliance	of	rules	and	regulations	it	so	desperately	needs	at	a	time	when	it	is	
grappling	with	the	burden	of	non-recognition.			
In	this	example	of	a	clan’s	recourse	to	violence	in	defence	of	clan	members’	lands	against	state	
appropriation,	one	sees	the	ambiguity	of	plural	institutions	of	protection,	and	a	dynamic	conflict	
the	contours	of	which	cannot	be	explained	by	‘hybridity’	in	so	far	as	this	implies	fused	powers	
within	institutions,	rather	it	presented	a	case	of	opposition	between	clan	defence	of	its	members	
interests	and	state	(the	latter	also	perceived	as	acting	in	a	clannist	manner).	The	resolution	–	if	
it	can	be	termed	as	such,	which	has	met	with	widespread	concern	and	dissatisfaction	–	involved	
attempts	at	clan-based	mediation	to	reduce	the	severity	of	charges	against	civilians	including	
marginalised	youth,	and	has	once	again	undermined	trust	in	the	state	and	raised	concerns	over	
the	legitimacy	of	state	actions.	As	argued	in	the	literature	review	and	shown	in	the	empirical	
chapters,	the	current	debates	about	hybrid	governance	within	which	pluralism	sits,	run	short	of	
explaining	 the	 spatial	manifestation	 of	 the	 quality	 of	 interaction	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	
public.	This	makes	the	use	of	alternative	concepts,	such	as	legitimacy	and	trust,	necessary	for	
capturing	the	dynamics	of	these	imperative.	This	thesis	aimed	to	contribute	in	this	regard.		
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CHAPTER	9 CONCLUSION	
This	 thesis	 is	 the	 first	 analysis	 of	 the	 shaping	of	 city	 space	 in	 Somaliland.	 	 I	 highlighted	how	
current	debates	on	Somaliland	examine	mainly	national	 level	politics	and	governance.	 I	have	
therefore,	 suggested	a	 shift	 in	 focus	 to	 the	neglected	 city	 space	and	authority,	where	urban	
subjects/citizens	encounter	the	local	state	on	a	daily	basis,	and	where	the	manifestation	of	lack	
of	trust	has	repeatedly	fostered	a	trend	towards	spatial	segregation.	The	thesis	shows	that	an	
understanding	 of	 urban	 segregation	 in	 Somaliland	 requires	 going	 beyond	 the	 debates	 over	
hybrid	peace	and	state	building.		It	thus	extends	in	significant	new	ways	the	work	of	key	theorists	
of	hybridity	in	post-conflict	state	building	such	as	(Walls,	2009,	Walls	and	Kibble,	2010,	Hagmann	
and	Péclard,	2010,	Hoehne,	2013)	(reviewed	in	chapter	two).	The	focus	in	existing	debates	on	
the	intersection	between	peace	and	state	building,	I	argued,	can	obscure	rather	than	illuminate	
the	urban	governance	dynamics	that	shape	segregation	of	cities	in	Somaliland.	There	is	a	need	
to	adopt	concepts	that	are	aimed	at	capturing	the	quality	of	interaction	between	the	public	and	
the	 state	 at	 city	 level	 so	 as	 to	 understand	 the	 making	 and	 unmaking	 of	 urban	 places	 in	
Somali/land.	This	focus	on	the	city	is	especially	important	in	the	light	of	alarmist	projections	of	
exponential	growth	in	Somaliland’s	city	populations	(UN,	2014,	The	World	Factbook,	2015b)	yet	
there	is	a	significant	dearth	of	understanding	of	urban	dynamics	and	conflicts	over	land	within	
cities.		
In	this	study,	I	have	used	the	concepts	of	legitimacy,	trust	and	segregation	to	make	sense	of	the	
configuration	and	reconfiguration	of	Hargeisa	and	to	explore	urban	land	conflicts.	To	capture	
how	these	theoretical	arguments	are	rooted	in	empirical	dynamics	of	urban	configuration	and	
reconfiguration,	 I	 examined	 urban	 governance	 in	 Hargeisa	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 explaining	 how	
segregation	has	developed	over	time.	I	approached	this	analysis	historically	and	advocated	an	
urban	ethnographic	approach	(chapter	three).		The	study’s	empirical	discussion	began	with	an	
examination	of	the	history	of	municipal	governance/politics	 (chapter	4).	 I	 then	zoomed	in	on	
particular	aspects	of	urban	governance	 such	as	 land	administration	and	conflict	 adjudication	
mechanisms	(chapters	five	and	six).	I	finally	examined	specific	land	conflicts	–	around	Hargeisa	
airport	 and	 military	 base	 -	 to	 show	 how	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 public	
undermines	trust	and	fosters	urban	segregation	(chapters	seven	and	eight).		
The	overall	thesis	was	guided	by	the	question:	what	are	the	key	historical	processes	and	recent	
socio-political	 dynamics	 underpinning	 Hargeisa’s	 spatial	 character	 as	 clan-based	 segregated	
urban	space?	I	answered	this	question	by	arguing	that	urban	governance	was,	and	still	remains,	
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a	crucial	 factor	 in	understanding	 the	process	and	practices	underpinning	 the	emergence	and	
perpetuation	of	segregation.	Throughout	the	thesis	I	argued	that	the	interaction	between	the	
state	and	the	people	can	provide	important	clues	in	understanding	Hargeisa‛s	spatial	character.	
I	maintained	that	the	political,	economic	and	social	utilities	of	clan	relationships	influence	how	
people	 choose	 spaces	 in	 the	 city.	 For	 instance,	 the	use	of	 kinship	 as	 a	means	of	negotiating	
access	to	services	and	support	shows	how	governance	practices	intersect	with	social	dynamics	
in	 shaping	 the	 configuration	 and	 reconfiguration	 of	 urban	 spaces	 in	 the	 city.	My	 analysis	 of	
Hargeisa	governance	and	special	dynamics	was	guided	by			the	following	sub-questions:	
	
In	the	first	sub-question,	I	asked:		
• How	do	the	historically	rooted	hybrid	municipal	politics	and	the	top	down	urban	
land	administration	explain	the	configuration	and	reconfiguration	of	Hargeisa’s	
spatial	character?	
To	answer	this,	I	examined	the	history	of	urban	governance	and	its	link	with	the	emergence	and	
perpetuation	of	 urban	 segregation.	 I	 discussed	 the	 introduction	of	 local	 governance	and	 the	
urban	 development	 trajectory	 in	 Hargeisa	 over	 time	 (chapter	 four).	 I	 argued	 that	 urban	
segregation	in	the	city	is	the	spatial	outcome	of	the	antagonistic	interaction	between	ruler	and	
ruled	 over	 time:	 an	 interaction	 whose	 foundation	 was	 laid	 during	 the	 colonial	 period	 and	
reinforced	 thereafter.	 In	 other	 words,	 regimes	 in	 Somalia	 continued	 the	 centralised	
authoritarian	 urban	 governance	 practices	 inherited	 from	 the	 colonial	 administrations.	 I	
therefore	argued	that	segregation	can	be	attributed	initially	to	the	colonial	state’s	centralised	
top	down	and	repressive	urban	governance,	and	thereafter	to	the	postcolonial	state’s	failure	to	
break	with	 the	 past.	 	 Postcolonial	 authorities	 have	 not	 Instituted	 effective	 and	 accountable	
control	over	the	arbitrary	territories	inherited	from	the	imperial	powers,	and	remain	unable	to	
deliver	services	in	an	equitable	manner	based	on	national	citizenship.	This	inability	reinforced	
the	need	for	localised	belonging	based	on	clan	as	a	means	to	negotiate	space	in	the	city.	The	
consequence	is	that	most	people	developed	a	tendency	of	locating	themselves	in	areas	where	
they	could	get	access	to	services	and	support	(ranging	from	socio-political	to	socio-economic)	
through	their	clan	networks.	 In	other	words,	segregation	 in	Hargeisa	can	be	understood	as	a	
response	 to	 political,	 economic	 and	 security	 problems	 in	 the	 city,	 persisting	 because	 of	 the	
state’s	 incompetence	 in	managing	public	services.	 In	 the	 few	 instance	where	the	state	made	
concerted	efforts	in	improving	access	to	services	on	a	national	basis,	cosmopolitan	spaces	have	
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emerged	where	 individuals’	 choice	of	 residence	were	 rather	based	on	 factors	other	 than	an	
association	with	a	clan.	I	argued	that	these	brief	historical	episodes	in	which	the	state	made	an	
attempt	to	change	the	factors	underpinning	the	clan-based	character	of	cities	were	undone	by	
the	fact	that	the	state	reverted	to	the	clannish	governance	practices	from	which	it	claimed	to	
have	departed.		
To	further	ground	the	above	argument,	I	focussed	on	urban	land	management	(chapter	five).	I	
argued	 that	 land	management	practices	 in	Somaliland	were	often	underpinned	by	 top-down	
processes	 in	both	colonial	and	postcolonial	periods.	For	 instance,	 the	colonial	administrators	
had	rarely	consulted	the	people	nor	the	intermediary	customary	institutions	about	urban	land	
management.	 The	 underlying	 justifications	 for	 ignoring	 local	 opinion	 hinged	 on	 low-level	
urbanisation	and	the	perception	of	Somalis	as	being	too	ignorant	to	contribute	to	matters	of	
town	planning.	This	top-down	approach	continued	along	the	same	lines	during	the	postcolonial	
period	as	many	of	the	urban	land	management	practices	and	policies	remained	unchanged.	The	
few	attempts	 aimed	at	 bringing	 about	 land	 reforms	 failed.	 The	policy	making	processes	 and	
practices	remain	largely	imposed	from	above.	For	instance,	both	the	National	Urban	Planning	
Board	and	the	National	Urban	Planning	Institute	operate	above	the	local.	The	highly	centralised	
nature	 of	 policy	 making	 instruments	 make	 local	 authorities	 junior	 partners.	 This	 top-down	
process	 and	 the	 inability	of	 the	 state	 to	 consult	 people	 about	 their	urban	destiny	 shape	 the	
persistently	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 state.	 Thus,	 urban	 segregation	 is	 the	 spatial	
manifestation	of	the	dwindling	trust	in	the	state.	The	continuation	of	the	spatial	segregation	of	
Hargeisa	 resulted	 from	a	 long	history	of	 top-down	urban	 land	management	approach,	which	
also	marginalises	the	poor.	Equally,	I	argued	that	the	remaking	of	the	urban	land	management	
regulatory	framework	post-conflict	was	characterised	by	weak	institutions,	which	failed	to	make	
significant	changes	to	the	quality	of	interaction	between	the	state	and	the	public.			
In	the	second	sub-question,	I	asked:		
• What	 are	 the	 drivers	 and	 dynamics	 of	 urban	 land	 accessibility,	 conflicts	 and	
adjudication	and	how	do	they	relate	to	trust/	mistrust	of	the	state	and	the	city’s	
pattern	of	segregation?	
To	answer	this,	 I	showed	that	the	urban	 land	conflicts	 in	Somaliland	are	adjudicated	through	
plural	institutions	-	statutory,	traditional	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Islamic	institutions	(chapter	six).	
The	multiplicity	of	actors	involved	in	conflict	resolution	is	however	characterised	by	competition,	
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complementarity	and	coexistence.	The	relationships	among	them	are	not	accurately	captured	
by	the	idea	of	hybridity.	One	way	in	which	the	institutions	complement	each	other	is	the	fact	
that	the	traditional	institutions	are	endorsed	by	the	state	to	mediate	cases	that	it	is	unable	or	
unwilling	to	resolve	through	the	statutory	system	for	political	or	security	reasons.	In	such	cases,	
the	 traditional	 authorities	 fill	 the	 gap	 in	 the	 state’s	 inability	 to	 deal	 with	 conflict.	 In	 other	
instances,	 however,	 the	 institutions	 contradict	 each	 other,	 as	 the	 traditional	 institutions	
interfere	with	cases	in	the	statutory	system	in	the	interest	of	their	particular	clans.	Customary	
institutions	have	successfully	positioned	themselves	as	a	better	alternative	 for	resolving	 land	
conflicts	for	a	number	of	reasons.	Firstly,	they	are	cheaper	than	the	protracted	and	expensive	
court	processes	which	require	legal	representation.	Secondly,	they	are	more	time	effective,	as	
the	 judgments	 are	 reached	within	 a	 reasonable	 time,	 ranging	 from	one	day	 to	 two	or	 three	
weeks.	Thirdly,	their	level	of	compliance	is	greater	as	the	parties	are	represented	by	key	figures	
from	their	family	who	oversee	compliance.	Hence	my	argument	was	that	the	clan-based	spatial	
segregation	of	Hargeisa	is	partly	also	a	geographical	manifestation	of	the	struggle	between	the	
statutory	and	customary	institutions,	as	people	have	developed	greater	confidence	in	the	latter	
and	choose	a	location	within	the	city	where	they	are	accessible.		
The	third	sub	question	asked:	
• How	do	 people	 navigate	 the	 terrain	 of	 urban	 institutions	 and	 how	does	 this	
shape	the	making	and	remaking	of	urban	space	in	Hargeisa?	
The	investigation	of	this	sub-question	in	many	ways	lay	at	the	heart	of	the	thesis	and	cross-cuts	
its	chapters,	as	the	answer	hinges	on	the	resort	to	clan	and	disaffection	with	state	institutions	
both	local	and	national.	Popular	responses	to	state	urban	governance	have	helped	produced	the	
clan	based	spatial	form	that	I	have	sought	to	explain	throughout.	 	 I	showed	how	this	popular	
disillusion	with	state	municipal	institutions’	authoritarianism,	lack	of	capacity	or	corrupt	practice	
was	reproduced	at	different	junctures	in	the	city’s	municipal	history	(chapter	four),	and	in	the	
disputes	over	land	brought	before	the	Land	Commission,	or	which	occurred	over	the	airport	and	
military	base	where	 the	 state	was	party.	 	When	 investigating	either	municipal	 elections,	 the	
workings	of	the	Land	Commission	or	the	violence	that	flared	up	over	the	state’s	expansionist	
endeavours	at	the	airport	and	military	base,	my	approach	depended	on	investigating	Hargeisa	
residents’	views	and	practices	in	relation	to	state	institutions	and	their	impact	on	urban	space.	
The	 city’s	 inhabitants’	 resort	 to	 clan	 and	 greater	 confidence	 in	 customary	 institutions,	 the	
efficacy	of	the	latter	in	some	instances	of	conflict	resolution,	and	the	prominent	role	of	Akils	and	
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clan	 elders	 in	 mediating	 state	 practice	 at	 local	 level	 remain	 important	 in	 explaining	 the	
persistence	of	segregation	over	time.	
In	the	final	sub-question,	I	asked:	
• What	are	the	security	implications	of	unresolved	urban	land	conflicts	in	the	city,	
how	do	they	influence	state	legitimacy	and	affect	the	city’s	spatial	character?		
The	thesis	showed	how	the	control	of	public	properties	and	infrastructure	plays	an	important	
role	in	the	legitimation	of	new	political	orders.		This	was	particularly	transparent	in	the	disputes	
over	 land	at	 the	airport	and	military	base	 (chapter	 seven	and	eight).	On	 the	one	hand,	 such	
properties	are	the	sites	in	which	state	visibility	and	effectiveness	is	demonstrated,	while	on	the	
other	they	are	the	sites	in	which	state	legitimacy	is	contested.	This	struggle	can	best	be	seen	in	
conflicts	where	the	state	 is	at	 loggerheads	with	 local	 land	owners,	as	 in	the	case	of	both	the	
airport	and	military	base.	In	such	conflicts,	intermediary	non-state	institutions	such	as	the	Akils	
and	 elders	mediate	 between	 the	 actors	 in	 the	 conflict.	While	 people	may	 have	 leverage	 on	
customary	 institutions	when	dealing	with	one	 another	 (chapter	 6),	 the	 same	 cannot	be	 said	
when	the	state	is	one	of	the	disputants.	This	results	in	a	legitimacy	struggle	in	which	the	state	
seeks	powers	inherited	from	prior	regimes	and	the	public	regards	this	behaviour	as	comparable	
to	the	regimes	they	deposed,	creating	a	condition	in	which	legitimacy	is	seen	through	different	
lenses.	 Such	 legitimacy	 struggles	 shape	 attitudes	 of	 endearment	 towards	 clan	 identity	 and	
reinforce	the	manner	in	which	people	make	decisions	about	their	choices	of	abode.	Individuals	
who	are	concerned	about	state	violence	are	likely	to	maintain	properties	in	areas	predominantly	
populated	by	their	clan	so	as	to	mobilise	public	support	and	resources	necessary	for	resisting	
the	 state.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 airport	 expansion,	 the	 result	was	 violent	 resistance,	 death	 and	
destruction	of	property.	
I	have	also	shown	that	the	state’s	manipulation	of	the	statutory	judicial	system	limits	the	space	
available	for	urban	land	conflict	adjudications	where	the	state	is	one	of	the	actors	in	the	conflict.	
(It	is	important	to	note	that	the	urban	land	Commission	in	Hargeisa	does	not	mediate	conflicts	
in	which	the	state	is	one	of	the	parties	in	the	conflict,	as	explored	in	chapter	5).		This	reinforces	
clan	and	identity	politics	as	a	means	of	mutual	support	against	the	state.		Violent	encounters	
between	the	state	and	the	public	reflect	the	limited	space	to	engage	with	the	state	through	the	
current	 highly	 corrupt	 judicial	 system.	 This	 creates	 dire	 security	 consequences	 for	 a	 town	
recovering	 from	 many	 years	 of	 poverty	 and	 civil	 war,	 which	 in	 turn	 cements	 the	 spatial	
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segregation	in	the	city	as	people	continue	to	see	benefits	in	staying	in	areas	where	–	thanks	to	
a	 concentration	 of	 fellow	 clan	 members	 -	 they	 can	 resist	 the	 state	 more	 easily.	 While	 the	
authorities	fear	the	escalation	of	conflicts	with	the	public,	seeing	this	as	one	of	the	major	threats	
facing	state	stability	in	general	and	urban	places,	in	particular,	they	fail	to	come	up	with	policies	
that	enable	the	amicable	mediation	and	resolution	of	conflicts.	The	high	rate	of	unemployment	
among	the	youth	and	the	state’s	impunity	about	the	way	in	which	it	manages	conflicts	can	result	
in	a	major	shock	to	the	already	fragile	urban	security	in	Hargeisa,	and	hence	further	entrench	
urban	segregation.		
To	wrap	up	my	argument,	it	is	important	to	remember	that	the	current	focus	of	state	building	
debates	 in	 Somali/land	 are	 concentrated	 at	 the	 national	 and	 subnational	 level	 (i.e.,	 paying	
attention	to	regional	rather	than	urban	contexts).	Key	in	these	debates	are	the	discussions	on	
the	 intersection	 between	 peace	 and	 state-	 building.	 These	 have	 obscured	 rather	 than	
illuminated	the	urban	governance	dynamics	that	shape	segregation	of	cities	in	Somaliland.	The	
hybrid	national	order,	on	which	much	of	the	debate	is	focused,	failed	to	shift	the	country	away	
from	 past	malpractices	 (such	 as	 corruption,	 cronyism	 and	 nepotism	where	 one’s	 economic,	
political	and	social	belonging	 lies	at	 the	heart	of	access	 to	services).	This	cemented	the	clan-
based	spatial	characters	of	urban	spaces	in	Somaliland.	In	other	words,	as	hybrid	governance	
failed	to	present	the	people	with	an	alternative	form	of	belonging	based	on	aspirations	beyond	
clan.	 	 Rather,	 social	 networks	 based	 on	 clan	 remain	 prevalent	 in	 segregated	 urban	 spaces,	
reinforcing	 the	 clan	 as	 a	 prime	way	 in	which	 people	 seek	 to	 negotiate	 relations	 and	 service	
delivery	with	the	formal	state	institutions.		
This	 thesis	 thus	 provides	 greater	 understandings	 of	 the	 plurality	 of	 urban	 governance	
institutions,	 land	 conflicts,	 lack	 of	 legitimacy	 and	 their	 historical	 roots,	 providing	 important	
information	not	only	to	fil	gaps	in	the	academic	literature	on	Somali	studies,	but	also	for	all	those	
engaged	with	trying	to	build	accountable	urban	institutions,	or	citizens	trying	to	hold	them	to	
account.	The	study	hoped	to	redress	a	dearth	of	attention	to	key	urban	issues.	The	scale	of	urban	
land	 conflicts	 necessitated	 academic	 enquiry,	 particularly	 to	 redress	 their	 neglected	 spatial	
aspect.	Moreover,	the	rapidity	of	urbanisation	demanded	greater	understanding	of	the	events,	
policies,	and	historical	episodes	that	have	shaped	current	trends	of	urban	form	in	the	country,	
and	are	likely	also	to	influence	future	dynamics.	I	hope	to	have	begun	to	rectify	the	lacuna	of	
understanding	about	controls	over	urban	space	and	popular	responses	to	city	authorities,	which	
begged	 for	 urban	 level	 academic	 enquiry	 to	 complement	 the	 existing	 state-building	 and	
governance	debates	 in	Somaliland.	 	Finally,	 the	study	provides	an	 important	basis	 for	further	
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research	on	the	relationship	between	spatial	and	socio-economic	 trends	 in	 the	configuration	
and	reconfiguration	of	urban	spaces	in	Somali/land.		Little	is	known,	for	example	about	the	link	
between	urban	and	rural	contexts	and	their	interdependencies,	migration	and	diaspora,	or	how	
the	informal	urban	economy	contributes	to	the	making	and	remaking	of	urban	spaces.	The	thesis	
thus	 ends	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 this	 initial	 investigation	 of	 urban	 governance,	 land	 conflicts	 and	
segregation	in	Hargeisa	and	the	insights	it	has	provided	into	urban	spatial	form	past	and	present	
can	lead	onto	new	research	that	can	deepen	understanding	of	Somaliland’s	cities	and	access	to	
land,	justice	and	security	within	them.	
As	 shown	 in	 the	 rest	of	 the	 thesis,	 segregated	urban	 spaces	 can	have	major	 implications	 for	
urban	 governance	 in	 Somaliland.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 these	 implications	 are	 the	 issues	 of	 state	
legitimacy	 and	 trust.	 The	 two	 are	 interdependent:	 for	 state	 legitimacy	 cannot	 be	 achieved	
without	laying	the	foundation	for	public	trust	in	the	state.	The	Somali	state-building	processes	
has	so	far	 failed	to	win	the	trust	of	the	public,	 resulting	 in	the	emergence,	development	and	
perpetuation	 of	 survival	 mechanisms	 (at	 the	 front	 of	 which	 stand	 segregation)	 aimed	 at	
negotiating	 life	 in	 unfavourable	 spaces	 governed	 by	 untrusted	 state.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
segregation	might	 enable	 new	migrants	 to	 negotiate	 space	 (s)	 in	 the	 city	 through	 their	 clan	
networks	 and	enable	disadvantaged	 communities	 to	mobilise	people	and	 resources	 to	 resist	
against	 government	 policies	 which	 do	 not	 reflect	 their	 interests.	 But	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
segregated	 urban	 spaces	 might	 undermine	 security	 and	 political	 stability	 as	 they	 might	 be	
exploited	by	individuals	(mainly	elites)	hiding	behind	clan	identity	for	personal,	economic	and	
political	gains.		
Having	 argued	 throughout	 the	 thesis	 that	 urban	 governance	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 the	
segregation	in	Hargeisa,	it	is	also	important	to	note	that	urban	governance	has	the	potential	of	
undoing	such	segregation	in	the	city.	This	is	so	due	to	the	fact	that	at	the	heart	of	the	residents’	
tendency	to	locate	themselves	in	an	area	populated	by	their	own	clan	is	the	lack	of	trust	for	the	
state	institutions.	I	therefore	argue	that	the	creation	of	a	just,	equitable,	efficient,	and	effective	
service	delivery	system	is	likely	to	bring	about	a	change	in	how	urban	spaces	are	organised	in	
Somali	cities.	In	other	words,	the	state	has	to	behave	in	a	manner	which	can	encourage	people	
to	attach	greater	importance	to	national	citizenship	over	clan	citizenship.	Steps	that	could	be	
taken	include	the	provision	of	unmediated	service	delivery	where	citizens	are	able	to	get	access	
to	 public	 services	 without	 being	mediated	 by	 intermediary	 institutions	 or	 persons.	 This	 will	
reduce	the	significance	and	incentive	of	one	locating	him/herself	in	a	neighbourhood	populated	
by	their	kinsmen	and	hence	cosmopolitan	spaces	are	likely	to	emerge.		
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This	research	was	mainly	concerned	with	showing	the	hitherto	un-researched	urban	geography	
of	Hargeisa.	The	aim	was	not	to	compare	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	segregated	forms	
of	urban	settlements.	This	could	be	the	subject	of	a	future	research	into	the	urban	geography	of	
Somali	cities	in	general	and	Hargeisa	in	particular.		
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APPENDIXES		
I. Consent	Form	for	Project	Partcipants		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
CONSENT			FORM			FOR			PROJECT			PARTICIPANTS	
PROJECT	 	TITLE:	Urban	governance,	 land	 conflicts	 and	 segregation	 in	Hargeisa,	 Somaliland:	
historical	perspectives	and	post-conflict	dynamics	
	
Project		Approval	
Reference:	
	
I		agree		to		take		part		in		the		above		mentioned		research		project.		I		have		had		the		project	
explained	 	 to	 	me	 	and	 	 I	 	have	 	accepted	 	 to	 	participate	 	 in	 	 the	 	study.	 	 I	 	understand	 	 that		
agreeing	to		take		part		means		that		I		am		willing		to:	
-	 Be		interviewed		by		the		researcher	
-	 Allow		the		interview		to		be		video		recorded		/		audio		recorded	
-	 Make		myself		available		for		a		further		interview		should		that		be		required	
I		understand		that		any		information		I		provide		is		confidential,		and		that		no		information		shall	
be		revealed		in		a		manner		that		will		lead		to		the		discovery		of		my		identity		less		otherwise	
allowed.	
	
I		understand		that		my		participation		is		voluntary,		that		I		can		choose		not		to		participate		in		
part	or		all		of		the		study,		and		that		I		can		withdraw		at		any		stage.		
	
Name:	
	
Signature:	
	
Date:	
	
I	believe	that		___________________________		(name)		understands		the		above		project		
and	gives		his/her		consent		voluntarily.	
	
Name:	
Signature:	
Address:	
Date:
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II. Information	Sheet	for	Project	Partcipants		
	
	
	
	
INFORMATION	SHEET	FOR	PROJECT	PARTICIPANTS	
Dear	Sir/Madam,		
	
You	are	invited	to	take	part	in	a	study	on	Post-conflict	institutional	dynamics	and	access	to	land,	justice	
and	security	in	Hargeisa,	Somaliland.			
	
Participation	in	this	study	is	voluntary	and	whether	or	not	you	take	part	in	this	study	is	your	choice.	
Participants	can	withdraw	from	the	interview	at	any	point	during	the	research	process.	This	Participant	
Information	Sheet	will	however	help	you	decide	if	you’d	like	to	take	part.		It	sets	out	why	we	are	doing	
the	study	and	what	your	participation	would	involve.	We	will	go	through	this	information	with	you	
and	answer	any	questions	you	may	have.		
	
If	you	agree	to	take	part	in	this	study,	you	will	be	asked	for	either	a	verbal	or	written	consent.		You	will	
be	given	a	copy	of	both	the	Participant	Information	Sheet	and	the	Consent	Form	to	keep.	
	
Please	make	sure	you	have	read	and	understood	all	the	pages.	
	
	
Yours	faithfully	
	
	
Abdifatah	Tahir		
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WHAT	IS	THE	PURPOSE	OF	THE	STUDY?	
The	purpose	of	this	study	is	to:	
¾ understand	the	institutional	dynamics	in	the	post	conflict	Somaliland	and	the	processes	and	
condition	under	which	they	emerge.		
¾ document	the	experience	of	local/urban	communities	with	institutions	governing	resources	
and	services.	
¾ fill	 the	 gaps	 in	 knowledge	 about	 the	 nexus	 between	 institutional	 dynamics	 and	 access	 to	
resources	and	services.	
¾ provide	an	input	into	the	debates	on	institutional	building	and	contribute	to	the	enhancement	
of	current	processes	and	thinking.	
WHAT	WILL	MY	PARTICIPATION	IN	THE	STUDY	INVOLVE?	
You	might	be	asked	to:	
¾ participate	 in	a	semi	structured	 interview	where	you	would	be	 interviewed	 individually	and	
could	also	be	re-interviewed.		
¾ participate	in	a	key	informant	interviews	and	you	would	be	interviewed	individually	and	could	
also	be	re-interviewed		
¾ participate	in	a	focus	group	discussion	where	you	will	participate	in	a	group	discussion	with	
other	participants.	
¾ share	documents	or	information	necessary	for	this	study.			
	
WHAT	HAPPENS	TO	MY	INFORMATION	AFTER	IT	HAS	BEEN	COLLECTED?	
The	information	collected	from	you	might	be:	
¾ used	for	research	purposes	only		
¾ shared	through	academic	forums		
¾ shared	through	academic	publications			
	
WHO	DO	I	CONTACT	FOR	MORE	INFORMATION	OR	IF	I	HAVE	CONCERNS?	
If	you	have	any	questions,	concerns	or	complaints	about	the	study	at	any	stage,	you	can	contact	the	
researcher	or	the	research	and	Enterprise	Co-Ordinator	at	the	School	of	Global	Studies:		
	
Abdifatah	Tahir	
Doctoral	Researcher		
Email:	a.i.tahir@sussex.ac.uk	
Tel:	+252634891188	
	
Or		
	
Mrs	Jayne	Paulin	
Research	and	Enterprise	Co-Ordinator		
Global	Studies,	Arts	C	C162			
Email:	J.E.Paulin@sussex.ac.uk	
Tel:	+44	1273	877107	
	
	
